What do humans have that birds don't have, which allows them to "acknowledge the debt of it."? — frank

We have the practices of obligation, asking a favor, duty, betrayal, insincerity, etc. which come into play between triggering a response and making a request; the differentiation between them is, we could say, part of the difference between an animal and a human.

We have the practices of obligation, asking a favor, duty, betrayal, insincerity, etc. which come into play between triggering a response and making a request; the differentiation between them is, we could say, part of the difference between an animal and a human. — Antony Nickles

So just form of life. That's as good an answer as any.

But it is not a request; not because of the lack of something (magic, intention), but just that birds can’t meet the requirement of asking something of another — Antony Nickles

The parrot might have an intent to elicit a peanut, so yes, that seems right. Those requirements are the "form of life", presumably? Good stuff, although I don't follow the overall argument.

...but isn't it the case that a single word may have a meaning but no use? — RussellA

"Ouch!"; "Hello"; "Fire!".

No.

So just form of life. That's as good an answer as any. — frank

Well, what I am saying is not an “answer”, nor is it one of any, say, foundations, or however “form of life” is thought to play a part. Our relation to the other (their pain) is a fact of the human condition. We (philosophy, historically) want to turn the other into an intellectual problem, a lack of certainty, but the other is just separate from us, and knowledge is not our only relation to the world (and others). We want the other (their pain, for example) to be an object of knowledge to avoid responding to the fact of: them; that we cannot be sure (they are really in pain), that we commit ourselves in relation to the claim of their pain on us, etc. That is how pain works; that is its significance and manner. The picture of “form of life” is only meant to say there is more than one way the world works; more than objects and knowledge, for example. It is not one more justification of a theoretical solution to the truth of our blindness to and possible refusal of the other.

It is not one more justification of a theoretical solution to the truth of our blindness to and possible refusal of the other. — Antony Nickles

Schopenhauer would argue the compassionate impulse of empathy is the foundation of ethics, in fact. If anything, understanding the language games (of humans and maybe other animals) is the application of this goal. A pat on the belly, a helping hand, a sympathetic ear, a feeding of seeds.

Well, what I am saying is not an “answer”, nor is it one of any, say, foundations, or however “form of life” is thought to play a part. — Antony Nickles

I agree. We were talking about meaning as it relates to normativity. We noted that communication requires more than just using words and sentences correctly. We need intention.

communication requires more than just using words and sentences correctly. We need intention. — frank

The presumption of “intention” comes from expectations that go along with situations. It is not a constant state of something like deciding or “meaning” that we do. We ask about intention when something unexpected happens: “Did you intend to snub them or were you oblivious?” And this is not asking if you had chosen to be rude (though you can), but to now differentiate. So we “need" implications and consequences and expectations and criteria for judging when something is the case or not, etc., and these are all here before anything is said. This is how motive can be inferred from circumstances, which is not guessing at something going on in another’s head.

Ok. I'm not sure how that relates, but it all sounds good.

but isn't it the case that a single word may have a meaning but no use? — RussellA

"Ouch!"; "Hello"; "Fire!". No. — Banno

"Ouch!" and "fire!" are not single words. As exclamations, they are complete sentences. "Ouch" and "fire" are single words.

If I walked into a room and said "ouch" or "fire", people would look at me with bemusement. If I walked into a room and said" ouch!" or "fire!, people would act, either commiserate with me or start running.

"Ouch" and "fire" as single words have meaning but no use in the language game. "Ouch!" and "fire!" as complete sentences have both meaning and use in the language game.

If I walked into a room and said "no", people would again look at me with bemusement, as the word has meaning but no use.

When walking into a room, the word "hello" is being used as an exclamation, where the exclamation mark is assumed, and as an exclamation is not a single word.

You are pissing upwind, my friend.

It is the exclamation itself that is a noun, as an event, not as a name for (referent for) “the pain” (some object inside us) — Antony Nickles

I agree that the exclamation "ouch!" is not a name for the pain inside us, but rather, is the name for an observable pain-behaviour that has been caused by something inside us.

Wittgenstein refers to the difference between pain and pain-behaviour:
PI 281 - "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"

And the word is not a replacement for a “picture” (whatever we would imagine when we hear it I suppose you to mean); it is a replacement for the wordless expression, the wince, the cry, the clear attempt at repression, etc. — Antony Nickles

An Indirect Realist would say that the word is a replacement for a picture of the wince or cry. A Direct Realist would say that the word is a replacement for the wince or cry.

This way of looking at pain as word-object is created to avoid the real way pain matters between me and to you (how it works)—that it is I that is in pain (I am the one; I don’t know pain, I have it) and you either acknowledge me (say, come to my aid) or ignore me, reject me (say I’m faking). — Antony Nickles

Yes, how does an observer know whether when someone is exhibiting pain-behaviour, that they are actually in pain. An actor on the stage may exhibit pain-behaviour without actually experiencing pain.

PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it.

You are pissing upwind, my friend. — Banno

A sentence full of metaphorical meaning. Yet the problem is, how do I actually use such knowledge. I know what you mean, but making practical use of such advice is a lot more difficult. :grin:

Ok. I'm not sure how that relates [that meaning is not internal], but it all sounds good — frank

Well, one point is we do not need intention; that it is only an issue when something is unexpected (not incorrect nor not the norm), and intention is judged differently, comes into play in other ways (there are other reasons for explaining what was intended).

Ok. I'm not sure how that relates [that meaning is not internal], but it all sounds good
— frank

Well, one point is we do not need intention; that it is only an issue when something is unexpected — Antony Nickles

Like when AI gives you a kick ass essay on the relationship between Kierkegaard and Regine? It was so good I saved it. That was slightly unexpected, I must say.

I'm not sure how that relates [that meaning is not internal] — Antony Nickles

Sorry, I just noticed this. I wouldn't make a case for meaning being internal because I don't really know what it means for meaning to have a location or be rooted in a specific place or realm. It's just an aspect of communication. The concept is two-sided: meaning, and meaningless. Maybe a third side would be Wittgenstein's "nonsense"?

I agree that the exclamation "ouch!" is not a name for the pain inside us, but rather, is the name for an observable pain-behaviour that has been caused by something inside us. — RussellA

Again, Ouch! is not a name for a thing (an object—“something inside us”), it is an expression of my being in pain (an externalization). (This is not to say that we cannot “name our pain”—a headache—but this doesn’t work as a referent to an object but also as an expression to others (though including myself, as other to my repressed self). As Witt says, “In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.” But here it is the saying and the establishment of recognition that matter). And to say pain is “caused by something inside us” is just a physiological fact (firing neurotransmitters, yada yada) that is philosophically unimportant and confusing because it appears to bring up issues of causation and determinism, etc. when what we care about (what matters as evidenced by its workings, its criteria) when we talk about our pain (or don’t care about it) is the person.

Wittgenstein refers to the difference between pain and pain-behaviour:
PI 281 - "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?" — RussellA

It is the interlocutor (not Wittgenstein) that is asking a question based on their desire to separate pain and the expression of pain (see #245). They are trying to force Wittgenstein into admitting a behavioral conclusion that without expression there is no pain. Keep in mind, the example here of pain is used for its unmistakability, but it is analogous for the other in their entirety. To keep the pain theirs (as in unique) is to want to keep the picture that they are innately individual, to have certainty of themselves, and the desire to be unknowable to others (or to be fully known in “knowing” and communicating what they take as a definite personal object, “my pain”). But the way pain works is not in my knowing my pain, it is in my having my pain (#246) which the next line says is part of being human—that what is important to us about pain is ordinarily not mine different than yours**, but me separate from you (that it is me that is in pain), and that bridging that gap is not a matter of knowledge of your individual pain, but my reacting to you having pain, your being in pain.

(You seem to be misreading this I believe because you are trying to force as essential the physical nature of pain and are taking this out of context and possibly without understanding the role of the interlocutor (the second voice Wittgenstein uses to speak the assumptions of traditional philosophy). It might help to realize that Wittgenstein is asking questions to get you to reflect on your assumptions and desires; and so you should spend the time to really try to find an answer that reveals something revelatory (say, in #278 & 280)).

And the word is not a replacement for a “picture” (whatever we would imagine when we hear it I suppose you to mean); it is a replacement for the wordless expression, the wince, the cry, the clear attempt at repression, etc.
— Antony Nickles

An Indirect Realist would say that the word is a replacement for a picture of the wince or cry. A Direct Realist would say that the word is a replacement for the wince or cry. — RussellA

Wittgenstein is trying to get us to see that both of those misunderstand how we handle pain, what is important to us about it. His point is that the word (a description, etc.) are expressions, just like a cry is an expression, different entirely from a referent to an object (“reality”).

This way of looking at pain as word-object is created to avoid the real way pain matters between me and to you (how it works)—that it is I that is in pain (I am the one; I don’t know pain, I have it) and you either acknowledge me (say, come to my aid) or ignore me, reject me (say I’m faking).
— Antony Nickles

Yes, how does an observer know whether someone is exhibiting pain-behaviour, that they are actually in pain. An actor on the stage may exhibit pain-behaviour without actually experiencing pain.PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it. — RussellA

Of course we can exhibit pain behavior and not be in pain. That is the uncertainty of the other that makes us want to circumvent them through just having knowledge (certainty) of them; it’s also why we want to know ourselves—have it be impossible not to be known to ourselves—because we can be in pain and not be aware of it at all (suppression being the opposite of expression). But as Wittgenstein points out, the way our lives work, we don’t know another’s pain. “If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me.” P. 225. We react to them (or ignore them), accept or reject them (even because of faking it).

**And of course I have personal experiences (alone seeing a unique sunset) and sensations, but the points Wittgenstein makes are that our language and ability to express ourselves have a shared depth and so possibility of reaching all the way into each other, across the panic from our separation; that we have a fantasy that we can’t fail to know ourselves, a desire to be unknowable to others, and a (rightful) fear that there is nothing more to us than anyone else.

But it is not a request; not because of the lack of something (magic, intention), but just that birds can’t meet the requirement of asking something of another
— Antony Nickles

The parrot might have an intent to elicit a peanut, so yes, that seems right. Those requirements are the "form of life", presumably? Good stuff, although I don't follow the overall argument. — Banno

To address any metaphysical sense, the bird (or anyone) would not have an “intent”, and because it is a bird, it would not intend (in the sense of deliberately decide), but we could ask (it is part of the grammar of intention) whether the bird was asking for a cracker because it was hungry, in other words, whether it wanted a cracker, and the owner might know its behavior well enough to tell when it was hungry and when it is merely saying it, or saying it, maybe, to get attention.

The practice of requesting is different than a demand (which is more what the bird is doing) because it implies that I understand I am asking a favor, that my desires are contingent on you, that I should couch my request in order not to meet the possibility of denial, that I have no authority over your actions, that I can suggest reasons (an emotional pitch, say from a dog, is begging). All of this is philosophical evidence of the difference between the bird and the human that is more than what is normally reduced to the physical differences of animals and humans, e.g., they don’t use language, they aren’t self-conscious, etc. All of that is to say that there are more ways that the world works than: intending actions or referring to objects.

...metaphysical... — Antony Nickles

Hmm. I think I'm still missing your point.

Following Anscombe, which I take as being as close as we might get to how Wittgenstein might have dealt with intent, the Parrot's action can be spoken of as intentional under a certain description... "Oh, he does that when he wants his bowl filled". There is no metaphysics here, just as with pain. The intent is part of the way we explain actions with reasons – I'm baulking at calling it a 'causal' explanation because of the baggage therein – and is not naming things in the world.

I think we agree on this.

The intent is part of the way we explain actions with reasons…

I think we agree on this. — Banno

Yes. I would only add that we don’t normally (in anticipated contexts) explain actions, and it is not necessary or even possible to always explain—an ordinary context would never necessitate asking “Why are you stopping at the light because it is red?”, and we might not be able to imagine one (even an imaginary one; though, of course, now that I say that, maybe someone learning who has never been in modern civilization). The point being that talk of intention is situational (and, as Banno says, not metaphysical, i.e., part of meaning or all action); in Banno’s example—"Oh, he does that when he wants his bowl filled"—the intention, or reason, must be explained, say: in response to my curiosity at the animal’s, perhaps, inexplicably pawing at the air, or any other action which is, as Austin would put it, “fishy”, or, as I put it to @frank, unexpected, or abnormal (our lives are what is normative Cavell says). Expected, appropriate actions in ordinary situations would not and do not have reasons, and I would be stumped how to answer if you asked for one (though I may have subterfuge at heart in “acting” normal; but the exception proves the rule).

All that to say that traditional philosophy wants to place “intention” before action, or tie “meaning” to speaking, in order to have certainty (rationality, control, predictability) so it can remove (by theoretical explanation) the limitations and vagaries of involving a human, an uncertain future, calling for responsiveness and responsibility, perhaps breaking us apart.

I agree in the main with what you are saying about Wittgenstein, and only on a few points could I quibble.

Again, Ouch! is not a name for a thing (an object—“something inside us”), it is an expression of my being in pain (an externalization). — Antony Nickles

Agree. "Ouch!" is a name for an observable behaviour. As pain is not observable, if there was no observable pain behaviour, then there could be no word "pain" in the language game.
PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

And to say pain is “caused by something inside us” is just a physiological fact..........................that is philosophically unimportant and confusing because it appears to bring up issues of causation and determinism, etc. — Antony Nickles

With this, I disagree. The issues of causation and determinism are important philosophical topics. In the present, there are certain facts in the world. In the past there were different facts in the world. It is a philosophical question to ask why are the facts in the world today are as they are rather than different to what they are. The concepts of causation, determination as well as the Principle of Sufficient Reason may be used to tackle this metaphysical problem.
PI 169: But why do you say that we felt a causal connexion? Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concomitance of events for example. So how could I say that I felt something which is established by experiment?

It is the interlocutor (not Wittgenstein) that is asking a question based on their desire to separate pain and the expression of pain (see #245). They are trying to force Wittgenstein into admitting a behavioral conclusion that without expression there is no pain — Antony Nickles

It is clear in PI 281 that it is the interlocutor that is asking"But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?", but after all, the interlocutor is part of Wittgenstein's imagination, and is putting forward ideas that Wittgenstein considers important. Wittgenstein does conclude that there is a difference between pain and pain behaviour, where he describes that even though the private sensation of pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, pain does not drop out as a private sensation.
PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

But the way pain works is not in my knowing my pain, it is in my having my pain — Antony Nickles

There are two aspects, the private and the public. As regards the private aspect, the thought "know" in "I know I am in pain" is redundant, as this means no more than the thought "I am in pain". As regards the public aspect, the word "know" in "I know I am in pain" isn't redundant, as the expression "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain"
PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

His point is that the word (a description, etc.) are expressions, just like a cry is an expression, different entirely from a referent to an object (“reality”). — Antony Nickles

Yes, as in PI 293, the Beetle in the Box analogy, the object, the pain, drops out of consideration in the language game.
PI 293: That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

But as Wittgenstein points out, the way our lives work, we don’t know another’s pain...but the points Wittgenstein makes are that our language and ability to express ourselves have a shared depth and so possibility of reaching all the way into each other — Antony Nickles

Yes, we can talk about pain in the language game, even though no one else can know my pain and I cannot know theirs. Wittgenstein is trying to find a means of countering Cartesian solipsism, the separation of mind from world, through language. In part successful, in that the beetle does drop out of consideration in the language game, but in part unsuccessful, in that there still remains the problem that I can still not know another's beetle and they can still not know mine
PI 293 Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

All that to say that traditional philosophy wants to place “intention” before action, or tie “meaning” to speaking — Antony Nickles

Yes, you are on the road to answering my previous question. As the tortoise said to Achilles,
where is the rule that we must follow a rule. A child learns the rules of the language game, but how does the child know that there are rules to follow. In Wittgenstein's terms, the answer is in the "primitive", in Chomsky's terms, the answer is in the innate, and in Kant's terms, the answer is in the a priori. Wittgenstein bases his argument against a Private Language in part of the impossibility of developing private language rules, yet the same problem attaches to a language game based on rules. Where is the rule that there are rules.
PI 5: A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.

@Banno @Luke @Sam @schopenhauer1 @Richard B @frank

"Ouch!" is a name for an observable behaviour. As pain is not observable, if there was no observable pain behaviour” — RussellA

The act of “expression” (rather than “observable behavior”) is necessary as it implies that it is of me (reveals me), and pain does not function as “unobservable” but is suppressed (even if I try to hide it, it can be expressed in hiding it; even when nothing is observable, you can know I am in pain by inference from the context). Imagine sadness or guilt (pain is just one example of the problem of the other). And, again, expression is not a “name”. You are confusing all this by hanging onto a certain goal or picture; I suggest you start taking a look at that insistence (the need of that desire). It is the same as the interlocutor’s.

“after all, the interlocutor is part of Wittgenstein's imagination, and is putting forward ideas that Wittgenstein considers important.” — RussellA

They are important because they embody the confusion Wittgenstein was in during the Tractatus; the interlocutor has the impulsive desire for certainty and “crystalline purity” that Wittgenstein is trying to understand and unravel—this is the point of all of his examples (they are not explanations). You appear to be in the mindset of the interlocutor now (which is an ancient desire of philosophy—and why it wishes it was science). Wittgenstein cannot tell you an answer (a fact or theory), you have to become a different person, see differently.

As an alternative reading, or way of reading, I would suggest Stanley Cavell’s 29-page essay on the availability of the PI, a copy of which I am attaching below, particularly the section on the Style on the page marked 70 and the discussion of his method starting on 62.

And to say pain is “caused by something inside us” is just a physiological fact..........................that is philosophically unimportant and confusing because it appears to bring up issues of causation and determinism, etc.
— Antony Nickles

The issues of causation and determinism are important philosophical topics. — RussellA

I said the fact is philosophically unimportant. The picture of our expression being caused or determined by neurons, even if true, is not relevant to the skepticism of the other. We want science to solve philosophy, but they are like two separate worlds, and what Wittgenstein is doing (his method) is not empiricism or statistics or an experiment. The result is not facts or theories, its to change you.

Let’s try to do the work and answer the question “how could I say [ordinarily, he means] I felt something which is established by experiment?” one answer: “I’m sad”, “why?”, “Because of the neurons firing within me” Also, did you figure out how it is “indeed true that observation of regular concomitances is not the only way we establish causation.”? If you can see for yourself the other ways, then perhaps you might start to see the fact that the picture of internal causation is forced by a desire for a particular outcome. (He is more often asking you to imagine something or being cryptic to force you to see something for yourself—he is not arguing for a conclusion.)

“even though the private sensation of pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, pain does not drop out as a private sensation.” — RussellA

First, “language game” sounds trivial (simplistic). Our language and our lives are the same (usually), and it is not playing a “game” as opposed to some alternative that is more serious, valid. Second, if we can say our pain is the same, we have the same pain. #253 “I have a headache. Me too. No, mine is sharp and behind my ear. Mine too!” Taking out the focus on my difference is to show that the owning is the important part about pain. Part of this process would be to ask yourself why you are fixated on our singularity?

The discussion of a “private” language is not an argument—it’s the examination of a fantasy. One realization of its failure is that our lives are essentially shared; that, yes, it is possible to have a personal even ineffable experience (alone with a sunset), but not always or just because I am me (we could say, our nature is the same; I can feel everything that you feel.) Now you can try to hide your pain (even from yourself), but this is not its being private (unique), but secret. These are the ordinary ways in which pain works; humans have (traditional philosophy has) a reason for wanting to hang onto the uniqueness of our sensations, our selves. Wittgenstein is getting at the motivation for those reasons. Maybe to avoid the responsibility to make ourselves intelligible, to block off the other from our imagined “knowledge of ourself”—so we imagine that it is the nature of humans that comes between us, rather than our choice, our “conviction” p 223. And it is possible (and terrifying) for you to be empty, just a puppet, fake, and, in the face of that fear, we want to stay unique, unknowable, so we look around for a reason, and pick the thing most certain—“our” experience. But all the focus on us is easier to face than the real problem to be accounted for: our lack of knowledge of the other. The desire to enforce a connection between outward and inward in me is actually about our limitation to have knowledge of the other, which shows how we do respond to them (acknowledging them, or not).

“PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!” — RussellA

So yes, pain is not a “thing” (like color is not), but what he is saying is that it nevertheless is important (thus, not “nothing”); it just matters in different ways; we care (or not) about the pain being “had” by this person; it is that pain is expressed by a person, that it expresses them, that they matter. It is not a matter of knowledge, but interest.

…the expression "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain" PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — RussellA

It is not that they are “joking”; it only makes sense as a “joke” (you are to imagine the context in which it is a joke)—we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known (other than in the sense of knowing as being sure, as in “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”) Again, I do not know it, I have it; I do not know their pain, I acknowledge it (them). The idea is to take a strange philosophical picture or framework apart by looking at the ordinary ways they are said (this is his method, not that his philosophy is about language), not that there is a better framework, but to find out why we insist on an intellectual picture at all. For instance, if we had “knowledge” of ourself, there would be something specific that would by mine, me, but also something that I could hold in reserve so I could be different, unique, from you. In addition, we would have “certainty” of ourself, control, and an impersonal explanation for your indeterminacy.

Yes, we can talk about pain in the language game, even though no one else can know my pain and I cannot know theirs. Wittgenstein is trying to find a means of countering Cartesian solipsism, the separation of mind from world, through language. — RussellA

Again, pain is not a matter of knowledge (except in its sense of “I know” as “I accept/acknowledge”). Wittgenstein is not “countering” solipsism, but getting at the desire for it, and the desire to “solve” it. One realization is that there are more relations to the world and others than knowledge.

And there is a misunderstanding that Wittgenstein is trying to create a theory of language that is different, or that the solution to skepticism is that the world is language or “language games” or not skeptical because of “forms of life”. He is bringing up examples of what we say, the language we ordinarily use, as a method, to examine philosophy and ourselves. Most notably misread “ Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” #109 It is not that language is the “means” of our bewitchment, so we just need to clear up language in order not to be bewitched. Language is the means of “battling”, the method by which we battle. He is using the evidence of the historical things we say in situations as a “means” to gain insight into why philosophy abandons our ordinary criteria to impose the singular standard of certainty.

…the same problem attaches to a language game based on rules. Where is the rule that there are rules. PI 5: A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training. — RussellA

Language does not follow rules; there is no fact that ensures communication. We are not “trained” in rules; it is an osmosis of, an indoctrination into, our culture, including implications, consequences, criteria for judgment, learning from mistakes, being guided, following examples, etc. This is like an apprenticeship, not knowledge to be explained, or workings we are always conscious of, or reasons we always use. Wittgenstein is not looking at rule-following to explain language, it is just one among all the examples of how different things work differently than we’d like. Wanting our world to work like rules has in common with other of his examples the desire for certainty that Wittgenstein is trying to understand why it’s so compelling for humans, for philosophy.

The act of “expression” (rather than “observable behavior”) is necessary as it implies that it is of me (reveals me)you can know I am in pain by inference from the context) — Antony Nickles

I could say "ouch!" or I could wince, both serve the same function in indicating to others that I am in pain. They cannot know that I am in pain, they can only believe that I am in pain.
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And, again, expression is not a “name”. — Antony Nickles

From the Wikipedia article Name, a name identifies something, a referent. A proper name identifies a specific individual human. A common name identifies a person, place or thing.

Wincing is an instinctive behaviour. Saying the word "ouch!" is a cognitive act, and as a cognitive act refers to something. As a part of language that is identifying something, it is a name.
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the interlocutor has the impulsive desire for certainty........... Wittgenstein cannot tell you an answer — Antony Nickles

In PI 281 the interlocutor asks "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"

Yes, this is a simplistic thing to say, in that: i) There can be pain and no pain behaviour, ii) there can be pain with pain behaviour, iii) there can be no pain and no pain behaviour and iv) there can be no pain and pain behaviour

However, Wittgenstein does make the specific statement in PI 304 "Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!". Even though pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, the pain can still exist within the individual.
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We want science to solve philosophy, but they are like two separate worlds, and what Wittgenstein is doing (his method) is not empiricism or statistics or an experiment. The result is not facts or theories, its to change you...(He is more often asking you to imagine something or being cryptic to force you to see something for yourself—he is not arguing for a conclusion.) — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein is doing what any scientist would start by doing, he starts by asking questions:
PI 281 "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"
PI 282 - "But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear!" (Certainly; but it can also talk.)
PI 283 - What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?
PI 284 - Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.—One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing?

The scientist would also start by asking:
What is the universe made of?
How did life begin? ...
Are we alone in the universe? ...
What makes us human? ...

But what Wittgenstein doesn't do is the harder part, trying to discover a theory that gives a coherent answer to all these questions. He is not trying to discover that e = mc2.

Anyone can ask questions, what is more difficult is coming up with answers.
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Taking out the focus on my difference is to show that the owning is the important part about pain. Part of this process would be to ask yourself why you are fixated on our singularity? — Antony Nickles

As Wittgenstein writes in PI 253 "Another person can't have my pains."The word "pain" is a singular thing, having the four letters p, a, i and n. But the concept that it refers to is not a singular thing. My concept of pain is different to yours, my pain is different to yours, my pain yesterday is different to my pain today, and my concept of pain yesterday is different to my concept of pain today. Only as the word "pain" is it a singular thing.
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One realization of its failure is that our lives are essentially shared; that, yes, it is possible to have a personal even ineffable experience (alone with a sunset) — Antony Nickles

Yes, humans are individuals and generally live in a community of others. However, humans can equally live as individuals independent of any surrounding community, and can also live as part of the surrounding community. The one doesn't preclude the other.
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So yes, pain is not a “thing” (like color is not), but what he is saying is that it nevertheless is important (thus, not “nothing”); it just matters in different ways; we care (or not) about the pain being “had” by this person; it is that pain is expressed by a person, that it expresses them, that they matter. It is not a matter of knowledge, but interest. — Antony Nickles

My sensation, my beetle, can be different to your sensation, your beetle. My sensation is something, it is not a nothing. Your sensation is something, it is not a nothing.

PI 293 —Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

As my something is different to your something, it is true to say that there is not one something but many. It is also true to say that our somethings are not a nothing either, which is why he writes

“PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!”
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It is not that they are “joking”; it only makes sense as a “joke” (you are to imagine the context in which it is a joke)—we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known (other than in the sense of knowing as being sure, as in “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”) — Antony Nickles

PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
I translate this as "only as a joke would I say that I know I am in pain".

If this sentence is referring to my thoughts, then this is true, as the thought I know I am in pain means no more than I am in pain'. As you say"we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known"

If the sentence is referring to my words, then this is false, as the words "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain". As you say “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”.

Therefore, as the only way that this would be a joke is if I am referring to my thoughts, then PI 246 is referring to my thoughts, not my words.
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Wittgenstein is not “countering” solipsism, but getting at the desire for it, and the desire to “solve” it. — Antony Nickles

In forcing us to better understand the language we use, and misuse, although he may not have been deliberately intending it, Wittgenstein did come up with a new Theory of Language, the Language Game. In the sense that a theory is, according the Oxford Languages, "a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained", in his desire to solve the problem of solipsism, he did come up with a theory countering solipsism.
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Language does not follow rules................Wittgenstein is not looking at rule-following to explain language — Antony Nickles

From the John Searle & Bryan Magee conversation 1987, language is rule governed. As for Wittgenstein, rules cannot be private, language must be public. Language is not bounded by rules, as rules can be interpreted in different ways. There are no rules for the rules. Forms of life determine meaning. Use determines meaning. We act in a primitive way, not from some great theory.

From Wikipedia Language Game (Philosophy), Wittgenstein argued that the meaning in language depends on rules.
A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven. Wittgenstein argued that a word or even a sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played. Depending on the context, for example, the utterance "Water!" could be an order, the answer to a question, or some other form of communication.

Oxford Languages defines a rule as "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity." To say that the language game is rule-governed is not to say that such rules are rigid, known and unchanging
PI 102 The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium)

Wittgenstein says that the rules of language are like the rules of chess, in that the rules of chess don't describe the physical properties of the chess pieces, but rather describe what the pieces do. Similarly, in language, the rules don't describe the words but do describe how the words are used.
PI 108 - But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties. The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"

I agree completely with your interpretation of Wittgenstein as you are using it in this thread to counter RussellA’s realist reading of him. I do have some reservations concerning Wittgenstein’s take on desire and motivation, specifically as it relates to such matters as our ‘desire for certainty’.

the interlocutor has the impulsive desire for certainty and “crystalline purity” that Wittgenstein is trying to understand and unravel… humans have (traditional philosophy has) a reason for wanting to hang onto the uniqueness of our sensations, our selves. Wittgenstein is getting at the motivation for those reasons. Maybe to avoid the responsibility to make ourselves intelligible, to block off the other from our imagined “knowledge of ourself”—so we imagine that it is the nature of humans that comes between us, rather than our choice, our “conviction” p 223. And it is possible (and terrifying) for you to be empty, just a puppet, fake, and, in the face of that fear, we want to stay unique, unknowable, so we look around for a reason, and pick the thing most certain—“our” experience. But all the focus on us is easier to face than the real problem to be accounted for: our lack of knowledge of the other. The desire to enforce a connection between outward and inward in me is actually about our limitation to have knowledge of the other, which shows how we do respond to them (acknowledging them, or not). — Antony Nickles

My uneasiness about these comments, which I think represents Wittgenstein’s view fairly faithfully, has to do with a distinction which he seems to want to maintain between the relationally discursive and that which would transcend the particularities of historical practices. Put differently, who is it that is motivated by the desire for uniqueness and certainty? If the self is a relational achievement, then aren’t desire and motive also relational, discursive constructions that emerge from traditions of intelligibility within particular communities? Rorty makes a similar point, arguing that what Wittgenstein reifies as a primal desire of humankind is in fact the product of historically changing social-discursive forms of life.

“It is certainly true that the desire to get in touch with something that stays the same despite being described in many different ways keeps turning up in philosophy. But it is not obvious that this desire, the one that sometimes manifests itself as the need to “emit an inarticulate sound” has deep roots. A desire may be shared by Parmenides, Meister Eckhart, Russell, Heidegger, and Kripke without being intrinsic to the human condition. Are we really in a position to say that this desire is a manifestation of what Conant calls “our most profound confusions of soul”?Wittgenstein was certainly convinced that it was. But this conviction may tell us more about Wittgenstein than about philosophy. The more one reflects on the relation between Wittgenstein's technical use of “philosophy” and its everyday use, the more he appears to have redefined “philosophy” to mean “all those bad things I feel tempted to do” Such persuasive redefinitions of “philosophy” are characteristic of the attempt to step back from philosophy as a continuing conversation and to see that conversation against a stable, ahistorical background. Knowledge of that background, it is thought, will permit one to criticize the conversation itself, rather than joining in it.

The transcendental turn and the linguistic turn were both taken by people who thought that disputes among philosophers might fruitfully be viewed from an Archimedean point outside the controversies these phi-losophers conduct. The idea, in both cases, was that we should step back from the controversy and show that the clash of theories is possible only because both sets of theorists missed something that was already there, waiting to be noticed.

Once we give up on the project of “stepping back”, we will think of the strange ways in which philosophers talk not as needing to be elucidated out of existence, but as suggestions for talking differently, on all fours with suggestions made by scientists and poets. A few philosophers, we may admit, are “like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it”. (PI 194) But most of them are not. They are, rather, contributors to the progress of civilization. Knowledgeable about the dead ends down which we have gone in the past, they are anxious that future generations should fare better. If we see philosophy in this historicist way, we shall have to give up on the idea that there is a special relation between something called “language” and something else called “philosophy.”

Wittgenstein says that the rules of language are like the rules of chess, in that the rules of chess don't describe the physical properties of the chess pieces, but rather describe what the pieces do. Similarly, in language, the rules don't describe the words but do describe how the words are used — RussellA

As you may be aware, there are numerous competing interpretations of the later Wittgenstein. You embrace a more conservative, realist-oriented reading, whereas Antony hews to the interpretations of writers like Cavell. I also favor these more ‘postmodern’ approaches. For instance, Hutchinson and Read critique a key representative of this more conservative approach:

The mistake here then is Baker & Hacker thought that what is problematic for Wittgenstein is that words name things or correspond to objects, with the emphasis laid on the nature of what is on the other side of the word-object relationship. Rather, we contend that what is problematic in this picture is that words must be relational at all—whether as names to the named, words to objects, or ‘words' belonging to a ‘type of use.'It is the necessarily relational character of ‘the Augustinian picture' which is apt to lead one astray; Baker & Hacker, in missing this, ultimately replace it with a picture that retains the relational character, only recast. There is no such thing as a word outside of some particular use; but that is a different claim from saying, with Baker & Hacker, that words belong to a type of use. For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world.”

Interestingly, Gordon Baker, Hacker's co-author in these papers, had, from 1991 onwards, not only explicitly distanced himself from the Baker & Hacker reading of Philosophical Investigations but also frequently used ‘Baker & Hacker' readings as a stalking horse for his own new reading.

Joseph Rouse reiterates Hutchinson and Read’s contention that for Wittgenstein words do not refer to a pre-existing type or rule of use.

“… we cannot appeal to social regularities or collectively presupposed norms within a practice: there are no such things, I have argued, but more important, if there were they would not thereby legitimately bind us. Any regularities in what practitioners have previously done does not thereby have any authority to bind subsequent performances to the same regularities. The familiar Wittgensteinian paradoxes about rule following similarly block any institution of norms merely by invocation of a rule, since no rule can specify its correct application to future instances. Practices should instead be understood as comprising performances that are mutually interactive in partially shared circumstances.”

The act of “expression” (rather than “observable behavior”) is necessary as it implies that it is of me (reveals me)you can know I am in pain by inference from the context)
— Antony Nickles

I could say "ouch!" or I could wince, both serve the same function in indicating to others that I am in pain. They cannot know that I am in pain, they can only believe that I am in pain.
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And, again, expression is not a “name”.
— Antony Nickles

From the Wikipedia article Name, a name identifies something, a referent. A proper name identifies a specific individual human. A common name identifies a person, place or thing.

Wincing is an instinctive behaviour. Saying the word "ouch!" is a cognitive act, and as a cognitive act refers to something. As a part of language that is identifying something, it is a name. — RussellA

Sorry, but it appears you are not attempting to understand Wittgenstein but are simply operating from your opinions which you refuse to question, in which case, I can’t help. I would suggest reading the entire work of PI and actually answering the questions and trying to see how you could see things entirely differently. Sorry I couldn’t be of more use, good luck.

If we are to understand Wittgenstein we would do well to look at what he points to, what people do and say, and not posit theories. If I cut myself or hit my hand with a hammer I might say ouch even if no one hears it. If you ask why, "because it hurt" is as good an explanation as any other and better than many. Given than no one else is around it is obviously not to convey anything or communicate anything to anyone. It is only an observable behavior if someone observes it, but it is what we do whether it is observed or not.

A good read. I liked

For Wittgenstein, philosophy comes to grief not in denying what we all know to be true, but in its effort to escape those human forms of life which alone provide the coherence of our expression.

Cavell would not be my got-to for this stuff. There are others who had more direct contact with Wittgenstein. That's not to say that what he says is wrong, so much as that the emphasis may be skewed. In particular, it seems to me that the essay follows Kripke into rule-scepticism, which I think absent from Wittgenstein.

Thanks.

As Wittgenstein writes in PI 253 "Another person can't have my pains." — RussellA

You might re-visit this. The remainder of the section is a rejection of that suggestion.

And see

Be clear as to the philosophical point here; The way in which Salinas talks about feeling another's pain is self-consistent. There is no logical problem with speaking in this way. The language game has a purpose. — Banno

Here's the danger, of back-reading Kripke into Wittgenstein. The paradoxes of rule-following are from Kripke, not Wittgenstein. Characterising @RussellA's responses as "realist" skips the many contradictions they contain. They are not coherent enough to be given such a title.