but not internal sensations such as fear, anger, etc. — RussellA
The observation that a particular use governs the meaning of a word does not cancel the fact that language is referring to entities and events we encounter in the world. — Paine
In that case, would you not feel that referentialism and logical positivism are blind system? I mean, the world is not just material, but there are also mental sides too. — Corvus
You talked about five apples and gave me a slab scenario in the posts. Before you and I sit down facing in between the apples and slabs, they are just mental objects whilst we talking about them. I have no clue what apples and which slab you are referring to. — Corvus
For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it. — RussellA
Unfortunately, 20th century philosophy bifurcated philosophy into linguistic/logic/mathematical approaches which took discrete propositions and tried to answer them on one side and phenomenological approaches on the other (existentialism for example). — schopenhauer1
The great analytic philosophy vs continental philosophy divide.
My favourite city is Paris, and we always stay near the Left Bank, so perhaps I should be moving away from Wittgenstein and towards Sartre. — RussellA
As I see it, the whole point of the PI is in denying that any word gets its meaning from referring to objects in the world. — RussellA
The child has a concept of "table", as only having four legs, and points to an example in the world of what it believes to be a table. Its parent may believe that the child's concept is wrong, as for the parent a "table" may have either three or four legs .
However, as far as the child is concerned, they are not wrong, in that they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a "table". — RussellA
201. ...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”...
202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.
258. ...One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’.
But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer — schopenhauer1
The point of PI 40 is that the users of the name give the name meaning, not the object or person to which the name refers. The meaning of the name does not cease to exist when the object or person ceases to exist — Luke
You also seem to have the impression that Wittgenstein's rejection of this view implies that words cannot refer to objects, but we obviously can and do sometimes use words to refer to objects — Luke
Are you saying that there is no way to determine whether the parents or the child is correct?......................Wittgenstein does not endorse this sort of relativism................There are rules for the correct use of the word "table". — Luke
In the words of Sun Tzu from The Art of War: “Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.” — RussellA
Witty is an interesting and significant philosopher, because the issues he had raised were compelling and important. — Corvus
Yes, that is Wittgenstein's position, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on there being a slab in the world. — RussellA
What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon? — RussellA
3) If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world. — RussellA
69. How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we’d describe games to him, and we might add to the description: “This and similar things are called ‘games’.” And do we know any more ourselves? Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a game is? — But this is not ignorance. We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary — for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. No more than it took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable. And if you want to say “But still, before that it wasn’t an exact measure of length”, then I reply: all right, so it was an inexact one. — Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. — Wittgenstein, PI
Can you show me the rule for the correct use of the word "table"? — RussellA
The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world. — Luke
Language users. — Luke
Replace the word "game" with the word "table" in the above section. We don't need to draw any strict boundary for the concept to be usable (in language). But we can and might do so for a special purpose. — Luke
But a child can be taught how to use the word correctly. — Luke
For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it.
— @RussellA
But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer. — schopenhauer1
So doubt creates the framework of ontology, appearances, or something else (in Wittgenstein: the misinterpretation of “use” or forms of life or language games) to try to ensure our words are meaningful, to close the gap we created. Philosophy takes the limitations of knowledge and turns it into an underlying ever-present intellectual problem it feels it needs to “solve”, rather than a truth about our human condition that only raises it head when we “don’t know our way about”, and we become dissatisfied with our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles
It just seems like not making any commitments and saying "language games" is akin to putting on a pair of sunglasses and posting an "office closed" sign with feet up on the desk and calling it a day… if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling. — schopenhauer1
The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. — schopenhauer1
The prophet for Wittgenstein... Then why doesn't he just say it thus? There is a point where "showing it and not saying it" becomes pedantically pedantic. Some explication is okay. Instead we have to have prophets who speak for Witty on this. As I said:He is trying — Antony Nickles
If I want to be real charitable to Witty, I would say that as long as you clarify what the language game is you are playing, then you can proceed to answer in your philosophical language game way. However, if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling. — schopenhauer1
The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. Just philosophize or don't philosophize. If you have a problem with something X philosopher is saying, then critique that philosopher and explain how that philosopher is using the language game incorrectly, or whatnot. Otherwise, it is is a long elaboration on something without application. Rather, it is adherents (people perhaps as yourself and others on here) who apply it for him and thus it is always Wittgenstein-lite or Wittgenstein-inspired, but not really much commitments from Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1
Also, as I said, this is not about language. He is looking at the things we say in a situation as a method and means for learning why philosophy ignores our ordinary criteria of judgment about the world to focus on a general explanation to ensure certainty. “Language use” is neither the issue nor a “solution”; it is a means of seeing the variety of what is meaningful rather than a single standard and explanation. — Antony Nickles
Then why doesn't he just say it thus?… Some explication is okay… An author presumably is trying to convey "something". — schopenhauer1
Even "knowing" that there are various rules in various contexts, doesn't thus confer anything more than the usual of me just trying to interpret the person's philosophical statements. — schopenhauer1
The investigation is to find out why we want what he wanted in the Tractatus, what Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, etc. wanted. — Antony Nickles
Well I would say criteria rather than rules (another day), but what you are meant to see is not (only) his descriptions, but to ask why the philosopher wants to overlook our ordinary criteria to substitute the sole standard of certainty or something certain (as metaphysics was). This I would say first takes letting go of the fixation that he is trying to (somehow alternatively) answer the problem the skeptic (or uncertainty) poses. — Antony Nickles
How do you know? There are smidgens of philosophers he sort of mentions but this seems very interpretive. — schopenhauer1
Plato was trying to figure out change and permanence, universals and particulars, things like this. Kant was trying to figure out empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge and how they fit together to understand the world, etc. I don't see that as major breakdowns in ordinary use of language. — schopenhauer1
The claim is not “interpretative”. It comes from a familiarity with the history of western analytical philosophy. The desire to solve skepticism is an ever-present theme. — Antony Nickles
Again, it’s not about language or language use. Skepticism starts with a case of not knowing what to do (#123). Kant and Plato find no satisfactory certainty to resolve it and so abstract from our ordinary cases to the forms or requiring imperatives having denied the thing-in-itself (“constructing systems” you say). It is this flight from ordinary criteria for how things work in a desire for certainty that concerns Wittgenstein. — Antony Nickles
why we have this delusional need for a standard of purity (certainty) that we create systems in advance of looking at the world. — Antony Nickles
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share the goal of creating a new philosophy out of the old, and so are speaking to a new philosopher, one that you must become in order to see in a new way. These are not textbooks that say everything explicitly, only there to tell you information. — Antony Nickles
Eh, that's so vague though. — schopenhauer1
if the "language game" is thus defined appropriately, why would the abstractions not be helpful in conveying these new "concepts" about "reality"? — schopenhauer1
I think certainty has more to do with confidence in one's knowledge. — schopenhauer1
I'd say something like Forms or the "Thing-in-Itself" or theories of understanding, are more about being, ontology, and the mechanisms of knowing. — schopenhauer1
Yeah, same reason I think I don't like either of them. It's vagueness is just enough to have a fanbase use it endless debates and they can then always say, "No, it REALLY means this...". — schopenhauer1
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