but not internal sensations such as fear, anger, etc. — RussellA

In that case, would you not feel that referentialism and logical positivism are blind system? I mean, the world is not just material, but there are also mental sides too.

You talked about Five apples and Give me a slab scenario in the posts.  Before you and I sit down face to face in between the actual apples and slabs, they are just mental objects whilst we talking about them.  I have no clue what apples and which slab you are referring to.

The observation that a particular use governs the meaning of a word does not cancel the fact that language is referring to entities and events we encounter in the world. — Paine

Objects, entities and events exist in space and time in the world.

In the mind, the parts of objects, entities and events are connected within concepts.

In the world, what connects the parts of an object, entity or event into a whole? What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon?

If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world.

I think it's important to understand that "analytic philosophy" is dominated by examining propositions (or in Wittgenstein's later idea "language games"). But that this is not the only way to "do" philosophy. One can approach it more holistically, from the stance of epistemological / metaphysical theory. Unfortunately, 20th century philosophy bifurcated philosophy into linguistic/logic/mathematical approaches which took discrete propositions and tried to answer them on one side and phenomenological approaches on the other (existentialism for example). Both sides have a problem with "everything is text" (in much different ways), with post-modernism and the "linguistic turn" (both very different methods but are similar in that they are caught up in language usage).

In that case, would you not feel that referentialism and logical positivism are blind system? I mean, the world is not just material, but there are also mental sides too. — Corvus

Yes. They ignored causation. If I see someone wince, I know that something has caused such pain behaviour, whether pain or acting. I may never know what, but I know that whatever caused the pain behaviour was real. I know rather than believe because of the principle of Innatism.

You talked about five apples and gave me a slab scenario in the posts.  Before you and I sit down facing in between the apples and slabs, they are just mental objects whilst we talking about them.  I have no clue what apples and which slab you are referring to. — Corvus

I have learnt the concept of "apple" after seeing numerous examples of things in the world that have been named "apple" by my community. No two apples were the same, but they all shared a family resemblance.

On the table in front of me is a particular thing in space and time that shares a family resemblance with all the previous things I have seen in the world that have been named "apple" by my community.

For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it.

For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it. — RussellA

But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer. "Family resemblances" just seems like formalized idea written down about something we intuitively know- that concepts are are not exacting but have resemblances. I don't think it added much except a neologism to a concept we already understand about how we use language. But what does it say about the problems of ontology, epistemology, and such? Very little.. which is my problem with it. It's like he's only talking to the formalists of language that were his contemporaries and his former ideas, but then doesn't really posit much with it. Yeah, that sort of logical positivistic "referentialism" is wrong, but that was a problem they created themselves. It's like.. okay, let's just go to the whole, philosophizing now that we cleared that up...

Unfortunately, 20th century philosophy bifurcated philosophy into linguistic/logic/mathematical approaches which took discrete propositions and tried to answer them on one side and phenomenological approaches on the other (existentialism for example). — schopenhauer1

The great analytic philosophy vs continental philosophy divide.

My favourite city is Paris, and we always stay near the Left Bank, so perhaps I should be moving away from Wittgenstein and towards Sartre.

:up:

The great analytic philosophy vs continental philosophy divide.

My favourite city is Paris, and we always stay near the Left Bank, so perhaps I should be moving away from Wittgenstein and towards Sartre. — RussellA

Analytic philosophy is still great for critical exercises. But if you are moving towards the continental philosophy, then Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Sartre or even Deleuze are all great philosophers.

But if you are moving towards the continental philosophy, then Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Sartre or even Deleuze are all great philosophers. — Corvus

:up: :up:

As I see it, the whole point of the PI is in denying that any word gets its meaning from referring to objects in the world. — RussellA

It depends what you mean by "gets its meaning from". This seems to suggest that names have their meanings bestowed upon them by the objects they refer to; as if the object somehow gives the word its meaning, instead of those who use the word. I don't see how this would work. The point of PI 40 is that the users of the name give the name meaning, not the object or person to which the name refers. The meaning of the name does not cease to exist when the object or person ceases to exist. You also seem to have the impression that Wittgenstein's rejection of this view implies that words cannot refer to objects, but we obviously can and do sometimes use words to refer to objects. According to Wittgenstein, in many or most cases the meaning of a word is its use.

The child has a concept of "table", as only having four legs, and points to an example in the world of what it believes to be a table. Its parent may believe that the child's concept is wrong, as for the parent a "table" may have either three or four legs .

However, as far as the child is concerned, they are not wrong, in that they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a "table". — RussellA

Are you saying that there is no way to determine whether the parents or the child is correct? What if the child points to an apple or to the ceiling and says "table" because they believe they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a table. Can we not correct the child?

Wittgenstein does not endorse this sort of relativism.

201. ...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”...

202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.

258. ...One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’.

There are rules for the correct use of the word "table". If a child uses the word incorrectly, then we correct them.

But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer — schopenhauer1

Yes, Wittgenstein makes no attempt at coming up with an answer to the questions he raises. As he wrote in the Preface "After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed."

My understanding of a concept is as follows:

Suppose someone says "bring me an apple", and I have the concept of "apple". They are not asking to be brought the concept of an "apple", they are asking to be brought one particular physical instantiation of the concept "apple". They want to be brought one particular set of atoms existing in space and time.

After being shown many examples of things in the world that have been given the name "apple" by my community, I develop the concept of "apple". In part because between the many examples there has been some kind of family resemblance. All different, but also similar in some undefinable, intuitive way.

It is true that the term family resemblance doesn't explain anything substantive apart from the fact that the examples were all different but have some similarities, similarities that I cannot define but can only intuitively perceive

It seems to me that there are two types of concepts: compound and elementary.

Compound concepts are equivalent to knowledge by description, such as the concept "unicorn", which can only be known by description as "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead". Compound concepts are sets of elementary concepts.

Elementary concepts are equivalent to knowledge by acquaintance, such as the colour red, a sweet taste, an acrid smell, a painful touch or a grating noise. Primitive sensations that have been directly caused by things in the world.

Compound concepts exist as sets of elementary concepts within language, whereas elementary concepts depend on information passing through the senses from the world into the mind.

The particular elementary concepts we happen to have is a function of 3.5 billion years of evolution of life in synergy with the word, as described by Enactivism. The particular compound concepts we have is a function of their use within our community and the world in general.

perhaps I should be moving away from Wittgenstein and towards Sartre. — RussellA

I think that is a very good idea. Wittgenstein is not for you.

Wittgenstein is not for you. — Banno

In the words of Sun Tzu from The Art of War: “Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

The point of PI 40 is that the users of the name give the name meaning, not the object or person to which the name refers. The meaning of the name does not cease to exist when the object or person ceases to exist — Luke

Yes, that is Wittgenstein's position, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on there being a slab in the world.

You also seem to have the impression that Wittgenstein's rejection of this view implies that words cannot refer to objects, but we obviously can and do sometimes use words to refer to objects — Luke

It depends what you mean by "object". For the Nominalist, universal and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. For the Platonic Realist, objects, entities and events exist in space and time in the world (Wikipedia - Nominalism).

If you are a Platonic Realist, then how to answer the following:

1) In the mind, the parts of objects, entities and events are connected within concepts.
2) In the world, what connects the parts of an object, entity or event into a whole? What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon?
3) If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world.

Are you saying that there is no way to determine whether the parents or the child is correct?......................Wittgenstein does not endorse this sort of relativism................There are rules for the correct use of the word "table". — Luke

Can you show me the rule for the correct use of the word "table"?

In the words of Sun Tzu from The Art of War: “Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.” — RussellA

Witty is an interesting and significant philosopher, because the issues he had raised were compelling and important.

I used to read Witty with minor interest, peripheral significance, and not a great deal. But I will be reading him with more attention and focus.

He definitely has intriguing points, views and arguments in his philosophy . His weakness seems come from the inconsistency between TLP and PI, and his concept of words, objects and the world.

What does he say about God and religion? I am going to read about that topic in the near future.

Witty is an interesting and significant philosopher, because the issues he had raised were compelling and important. — Corvus

I agree. I feel I have clarified my own ideas about language and the relationship between the mind and world by studying Wittgenstein. He did raise important issues. I'm not saying my interpretation is necessarily correct, but I feel I can justify it. One has to start somewhere.

As Nietzsche wrote in 1888: “Aus der Kriegsschule des Lebens, was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich stärker,” - “Out of life’s school of war, what doesn’t kill me, makes me stronger.”

Yes, that is Wittgenstein's position, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on there being a slab in the world. — RussellA

That's true. The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world.

What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon? — RussellA

Language users.

3) If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world. — RussellA

69. How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we’d describe games to him, and we might add to the description: “This and similar things are called ‘games’.” And do we know any more ourselves? Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a game is? — But this is not ignorance. We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary — for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. No more than it took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable. And if you want to say “But still, before that it wasn’t an exact measure of length”, then I reply: all right, so it was an inexact one. — Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. — Wittgenstein, PI

Replace the word "game" with the word "table" in the above section. We don't need to draw any strict boundary for the concept to be usable (in language). But we can and might do so for a special purpose.

Can you show me the rule for the correct use of the word "table"? — RussellA

No. But a child can be taught how to use the word correctly.

The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world. — Luke

You write that "slabs exist in the world", and also write that there can be the word "slab" in language even if there is no slab in the world.

So what you are really saying is that "slabs exist in the world even if there is no slab in the world"

Language users. — Luke

I agree, it is the human who judges that the something in the world is an object, not that the something in the world has a Platonic Form.

Replace the word "game" with the word "table" in the above section. We don't need to draw any strict boundary for the concept to be usable (in language). But we can and might do so for a special purpose. — Luke

Yes, the meaning of a word such as "table" has no definite boundary, whereas some words such as 1 metre can be defined as being 100 centimetres.

But a child can be taught how to use the word correctly. — Luke

There cannot be a correct use of a word such as "table". Within different contexts there are different sets of family resemblances. Is it correct to say that this is a "table"?



PI 217 - "How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

@Banno @Sam26 @Luke @Corvus

For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it.
— @RussellA

But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein is responding to the historical status of philosophy in his time. However, the problem of appearances or “resemblances” has been an issue since Plato in the Theatetus. What he did was take the ordinary alignment between language and the world and our lives (that they are the same; that they operate without any concerns) and inserted a space between them, creating the necessity of a connection in order to make it fixed. Mostly this starts with an inability to reconcile moral or interpersonal issues, and then working backwards to try to be certain with the best case scenario, physical objects.

So doubt creates the framework of ontology, appearances, or something else (in Wittgenstein: the misinterpretation of “use” or forms of life or language games) to try to ensure our words are meaningful, to close the gap we created. Philosophy takes the limitations of knowledge and turns it into an underlying ever-present intellectual problem it feels it needs to “solve”, rather than a truth about our human condition that only raises it head when we “don’t know our way about”, and we become dissatisfied with our ordinary criteria.

So Wittgenstein is making explicit the criteria and activities we use about a bunch of different examples in order to show that our ordinary criteria are more complicated and it is not just a matter of solving a problem like “essence” or “meaning” with a different, better explanation. In the case of physical objects, there are many underlying activities and contexts that we skip over, such as: identification, pointing out an aspect, extrapolating from seen to unseen, our interests in that object, when it is out of place, scientific problems, differentiating from other objects, the stretching and extension of the criteria of identity and purpose thus our judgement of whether they are misapplied or broken, e.g., an ottoman is not a table but can be used for that purpose, or, part of or judgment of a “table” is where we gather with others to eat, so, even if it is around a rock, we would still say we are sitting around the “table”. This is not empirical or about the about, but is still normative, “real”, not “subjective”.

So doubt creates the framework of ontology, appearances, or something else (in Wittgenstein: the misinterpretation of “use” or forms of life or language games) to try to ensure our words are meaningful, to close the gap we created. Philosophy takes the limitations of knowledge and turns it into an underlying ever-present intellectual problem it feels it needs to “solve”, rather than a truth about our human condition that only raises it head when we “don’t know our way about”, and we become dissatisfied with our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles

It just seems like not making any commitments and saying "language games" is akin to putting on a pair of sunglasses and posting an "office closed" sign with feet up on the desk and calling it a day. It's as if I asked you to show me the house you built, but instead, you not only not show me the house, you not only not show me the blueprints even, you talk to me about how the language is used to program the software that makes the blueprints. It's majorly trolling.

If I want to be real charitable to Witty, I would say that as long as you clarify what the language game is you are playing, then you can proceed to answer in your philosophical language game way. However, if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling.

The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. Just philosophize or don't philosophize. If you have a problem with something X philosopher is saying, then critique that philosopher and explain how that philosopher is using the language game incorrectly, or whatnot. Otherwise, it is is a long elaboration on something without application. Rather, it is adherents (people perhaps as yourself and others on here) who apply it for him and thus it is always Wittgenstein-lite or Wittgenstein-inspired, but not really much commitments from Wittgenstein.

It just seems like not making any commitments and saying "language games" is akin to putting on a pair of sunglasses and posting an "office closed" sign with feet up on the desk and calling it a day… if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling. — schopenhauer1

He is trying to find out why we want to create explanations, such as correspondence, forms, positivism, and, as I tried to say, your (and others) misreading that “language games” or “use” is a substitute for those (even if a failed one). I would take your requirement to having an explanation (a “commitment”) as the same desire for certainty for which Wittgenstein is trying to find a reason.

Also, as I said, this is not about language. He is looking at the things we say in a situation as a method and means for learning why philosophy ignores our ordinary criteria of judgment about the world to focus on a general explanation to ensure certainty. “Language use” is neither the issue nor a “solution”; it is a means of seeing the variety of what is meaningful rather than a single standard and explanation.

The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. — schopenhauer1

I remain willing to elaborate or answer questions but it’s fine if that is just an expression of a lack of interest.

He is trying — Antony Nickles

The prophet for Wittgenstein... Then why doesn't he just say it thus? There is a point where "showing it and not saying it" becomes pedantically pedantic. Some explication is okay. Instead we have to have prophets who speak for Witty on this. As I said:

If I want to be real charitable to Witty, I would say that as long as you clarify what the language game is you are playing, then you can proceed to answer in your philosophical language game way. However, if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling. — schopenhauer1

The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. Just philosophize or don't philosophize. If you have a problem with something X philosopher is saying, then critique that philosopher and explain how that philosopher is using the language game incorrectly, or whatnot. Otherwise, it is is a long elaboration on something without application. Rather, it is adherents (people perhaps as yourself and others on here) who apply it for him and thus it is always Wittgenstein-lite or Wittgenstein-inspired, but not really much commitments from Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1

Also, as I said, this is not about language. He is looking at the things we say in a situation as a method and means for learning why philosophy ignores our ordinary criteria of judgment about the world to focus on a general explanation to ensure certainty. “Language use” is neither the issue nor a “solution”; it is a means of seeing the variety of what is meaningful rather than a single standard and explanation. — Antony Nickles

Huh? An author presumably is trying to convey "something". Perhaps they aren't explaining it clearly, but we try to interpret it correctly so that we can make judgements about agreement. Even "knowing" that there are various rules in various contexts, doesn't thus confer anything more than the usual of me just trying to interpret the person's philosophical statements. Perhaps they are using neologisms or not explaining their terms correctly, but that is a different issue. Or should I say, that is a meta-problem with the way the philosopher is communicating the ideas.. Perhaps they aren't playing the "language game" correctly in the philosophical context. But that simply takes clarification and some back-and-forth and attempts at understanding what is being conveyed.

Then why doesn't he just say it thus?… Some explication is okay… An author presumably is trying to convey "something". — schopenhauer1

Well there are times he addresses us directly but the point is for you to judge if you would agree with what is said in a situation, or agree that his explication of a context allows what is said to become understandable in a way other than the “philosophy” he is critiquing insists on. He is not trying to convey anything; he is trying to change how you think, get you to see yourself (as having the same desire he did). The investigation is to find out why we want what he wanted in the Tractatus, what Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, etc. wanted.

Even "knowing" that there are various rules in various contexts, doesn't thus confer anything more than the usual of me just trying to interpret the person's philosophical statements. — schopenhauer1

Well I would say criteria rather than rules (another day), but what you are meant to see is not (only) his descriptions, but to ask why the philosopher wants to overlook our ordinary criteria to substitute the sole standard of certainty or something certain (as metaphysics was). This I would say first takes letting go of the fixation that he is trying to (somehow alternatively) answer the problem the skeptic (or uncertainty) poses.

The investigation is to find out why we want what he wanted in the Tractatus, what Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, etc. wanted. — Antony Nickles

Is it? How do you know? There are smidgens of philosophers he sort of mentions but this seems very interpretive. More auguring.

Well I would say criteria rather than rules (another day), but what you are meant to see is not (only) his descriptions, but to ask why the philosopher wants to overlook our ordinary criteria to substitute the sole standard of certainty or something certain (as metaphysics was). This I would say first takes letting go of the fixation that he is trying to (somehow alternatively) answer the problem the skeptic (or uncertainty) poses. — Antony Nickles

But I don't see that as the case. And it's hard to "prove" he was really "saying that" being he didn't provide many historical examples.. I mean you can really cherry pick some Augustine and Frege every once in a while.. but not with what you said really as the topic (more just refuting referentialism in general).

But let's say that is what he was trying to say (because after all it's a method without much explication...), how does this really apply to the philosophers throughout history? He doesn't really explain again.. but I can say Plato was trying to figure out change and permanence, universals and particulars, things like this. Kant was trying to figure out empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge and how they fit together to understand the world, etc. I don't see that as major breakdowns in ordinary use of language. Rather it is constructing systems out of our ordinary language. As long as they try to define it so that the reader tries to understand their project, it doesn't seem a misuse of things.

Wittgenstein didn’t provide a recipient for fruitcake, either. Presumable some think this a problem with his philosophy.

Indeed it is to a degree. Or rather application of misguided use of language towards example philosophers that isn’t just adherents auguring.

How do you know? There are smidgens of philosophers he sort of mentions but this seems very interpretive. — schopenhauer1

The claim is not “interpretative”. It comes from a familiarity with the history of western analytical philosophy. The desire to solve skepticism is an ever-present theme.

Plato was trying to figure out change and permanence, universals and particulars, things like this. Kant was trying to figure out empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge and how they fit together to understand the world, etc. I don't see that as major breakdowns in ordinary use of language. — schopenhauer1

Again, it’s not about language or language use. Skepticism starts with a case of not knowing what to do (#123). Kant and Plato find no satisfactory certainty to resolve it and so abstract from our ordinary cases to the forms or requiring imperatives having denied the thing-in-itself (“constructing systems” you say). It is this flight from ordinary criteria for how things work in a desire for certainty that concerns Wittgenstein.

“The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)” #108 He is turning the investigation around onto ourselves—why we have this delusional need for a standard of purity (certainty) that we create systems in advance of looking at the world.

Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share the goal of creating a new philosophy out of the old, and so are speaking to a new philosopher, one that you must become in order to see in a new way. These are not textbooks that say everything explicitly, only there to tell you information.

What exactly is “the fruitcake” in this analogy? The method? The realization about our desire for certainty? A paragraph summary?

The claim is not “interpretative”. It comes from a familiarity with the history of western analytical philosophy. The desire to solve skepticism is an ever-present theme. — Antony Nickles

Eh, that's so vague though. Talk about language games! Plato's search for "Truth" and Kant's search for "reason" or "knowledge", or whatnot are in the same tradition, but are positing slightly different questions about ontology and epistemology. They come at it from different approaches. That is to say, "skepticism" is too broad a stroke there. Either way, my claim was if that was interpretive for what Witty was saying being that he doesn't outright say much of what he is doing but just ya know, "shows it".

Again, it’s not about language or language use. Skepticism starts with a case of not knowing what to do (#123). Kant and Plato find no satisfactory certainty to resolve it and so abstract from our ordinary cases to the forms or requiring imperatives having denied the thing-in-itself (“constructing systems” you say). It is this flight from ordinary criteria for how things work in a desire for certainty that concerns Wittgenstein. — Antony Nickles

Supposing he was directing his line of thought to philosophers like Plato (and not more contemporaries perhaps or his former beliefs), if the "language game" is thus defined appropriately, why would the abstractions not be helpful in conveying these new "concepts" about "reality"? An architect sees blueprints and he understands them because he has learned the art and science of reading blueprints. He has learned that synthetic language game. A musician learned notes in the diatonic scale and reading sheet music. Again, synthetic language. This is yet another set of synthetic terms and uses of those terms. But in this case, it is applied to ontological questions of being, knowing, and the like. They are ways of viewing the world (a worldview).

why we have this delusional need for a standard of purity (certainty) that we create systems in advance of looking at the world. — Antony Nickles

I don't even think that is the whole philosophical project, as I've stated. I think certainty has more to do with confidence in one's knowledge. I'd say something like Forms or the "Thing-in-Itself" or theories of understanding, are more about being, ontology, and the mechanisms of knowing.

Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share the goal of creating a new philosophy out of the old, and so are speaking to a new philosopher, one that you must become in order to see in a new way. These are not textbooks that say everything explicitly, only there to tell you information. — Antony Nickles

Yeah, same reason I think I don't like either of them. It's vagueness is just enough to have a fanbase use it endless debates and they can then always say, "No, it REALLY means this...".

It just reminds of this:

https://youtube.com/shorts/xlKOLXArvrc?si=xiR2g2GIxLrgpxCs

Eh, that's so vague though. — schopenhauer1

Plato, Kant, Hume, Descartes, etc. are all reacting to skepticism, doubt in our knowledge. That’s not vague, it’s pervasive.

if the "language game" is thus defined appropriately, why would the abstractions not be helpful in conveying these new "concepts" about "reality"? — schopenhauer1

“Language game” is not a helpful term to latch onto; it confuses people. In an attempt at shorthand (which is never gonna work), abstraction removes any criteria and circumstances of an individual case of confusion and takes me out of the equation, along with my responsibility (in the fear of “subjectivity”). Our ordinary criteria are sufficient; it’s just hard for people to swallow that some of the time things just don’t work out the easy way, or at all.

I think certainty has more to do with confidence in one's knowledge. — schopenhauer1

Yes, that would be an ordinary sense of certainty. I am using it in the sense of a math-like necessity; Witt calls it “logic” or “crystalline purity”; Descartes will call it perfection; Plato just calls it knowledge. Basically it is the desire to know beforehand, generally, reliably, based on fact, without involving the human, etc. It is a standard invented by philosophy in an attempt to counteract skepticism.

I'd say something like Forms or the "Thing-in-Itself" or theories of understanding, are more about being, ontology, and the mechanisms of knowing. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein is getting at why they were created; it’s not a discussion of what they were about (the theories). I wouldn’t say Wittgenstein avoids existentialism (the creation of the self), ontology (essence), or knowing, but I don’t think you’d like his answers.

Yeah, same reason I think I don't like either of them. It's vagueness is just enough to have a fanbase use it endless debates and they can then always say, "No, it REALLY means this...". — schopenhauer1

Just because you don’t get it yet doesn’t mean that it is “vague”. The writing is very specific, rigorous, and necessary for its purpose. Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong (including me), thus the problem with summaries. I’m just trying to help you guys in reading it; to avoid its pitfalls. You have to figure it out for yourself (I mean I could walk you through it but again you seem like another thread would satisfy you more).