Plato, Kant, Hume, Descartes, etc. are all reacting to skepticism, doubt in our knowledge. That’s not vague, it’s pervasive. — Antony Nickles

But this itself is a language game of how "certainty" is used. I'm going to push back that this as even appropriate to use for all of them, as they all had such differing approaches and asked slightly different questions. Descartes psychological approach (the cogito), Hume's outright "skeptical" empiricism, Kant's trying to solve some of Hume's skepticism, and Plato's Forms, are kind of their own thing and use their own approaches, and draw on different influences. Again, I think "certainty" is a misplaced word for what they were getting at. They use various methods for constructing metaphysics (Plato's Forms, Descartes' God, and Kant's Thing-in-Itself mainly), and epistemology (Descartes' cogito, Hume's impressions and habits of thought, and Kant's transcendental idealism, respectively). Certainty is something regarding confidence in one's judgements of knowledge. Certainty in Descartes would be a much different kind of thing then certainty in Plato, or even Kant. That is to say, certainty should just be replaced with for "constructions of epistemology and metaphysics". Indeed certain philosophers had more emphasis on "confidence of one's knowledge", but it's not always cut and dry that all of them emphasized these types of judgements of cases. And even then, only some of the time, were these philosophers concerned with specifically, "certainty".

“Language game” is not a helpful term to latch onto; it confuses people. In an attempt at shorthand (which is never gonna work), abstraction removes any criteria and circumstances of an individual case of confusion and takes me out of the equation, along with my responsibility (in the fear of “subjectivity”). Our ordinary criteria are sufficient; it’s just hard for people to swallow that some of the time things just don’t work out the easy way, or at all. — Antony Nickles

Not sure what you're quite saying here.

Yes, that would be an ordinary sense of certainty. I am using it in the sense of a math-like necessity; Witt calls it “logic” or “crystalline purity”; Descartes will call it perfection; Plato just calls it knowledge. Basically it is the desire to know beforehand, generally, reliably, based on fact, without involving the human, etc. It is a standard invented by philosophy in an attempt to counteract skepticism. — Antony Nickles

Fine with me. Is all of philosophy logic? It is one approach to formalizing language. Aristotle used it for looking at classes and if things fit into classes and such. They were rhetorical devices that became more formalized over time. Frege, Russell, and many analytics began making it as if it can solve all problems related to propositions. So to me, it is still speaking to this main subset, more or less.

Just because you don’t get it yet doesn’t mean that it is “vague”. The writing is very specific, rigorous, and necessary for its purpose. Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong (including me), thus the problem with summaries. I’m just trying to help you guys in reading it; to avoid its pitfalls. — Antony Nickles

Ugh, this is the kind of presumption that I can't stand... As if "getting" Wittgenstein confers some apotheosis. But I still think it stands that if you want to be known, then say it. Show it after you say it. Or show it and then say it. There is a balance. All show and no tell, and now you are a prophet and others are doing your telling.

But this itself is a language game of how "certainty" is used. — schopenhauer1

You really should stop using those words; that use insinuates triviality and that it’s just about language. This isn’t a debate on how certainty should be used. I’m using it as a term—I could spell it all out every time, but it seems pretty clear where it comes up in the PI. Different approaches, influences, methods don’t matter. They all had the same goal, to solve skepticism by having something foundational—call it “constructions of epistemology and metaphysics”.

“Language game” is not a helpful term to latch onto; it confuses people. In an attempt at shorthand (which is never gonna work), abstraction removes any criteria and circumstances of an individual case of confusion and takes me out of the equation, along with my responsibility (in the fear of “subjectivity”). Our ordinary criteria are sufficient; it’s just hard for people to swallow that some of the time things just don’t work out the easy way, or at all.
— Antony Nickles

Not sure what you're quite saying here. — schopenhauer1

Well that certainly makes it easy to clarify.

I still think it stands that if you want to be known, then say it. Show it after you say it. Or show it and then say it. There is a balance. All show and no tell, and now you are a prophet and others are doing your telling. — schopenhauer1

He’s not “showing” you rather than telling you—he’s asking for your approval: do you see what I see? He’s working out something nobody saw and you’re along for the ride; this is not something you can understand from your first impression or with it being spoon-fed to you, so quit letting people do that for you and figure it out if you want or get off the pot. It’s quite clear you don’t want my help.

The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world.
— Luke

You write that "slabs exist in the world", and also write that there can be the word "slab" in language even if there is no slab in the world.

So what you are really saying is that "slabs exist in the world even if there is no slab in the world" — RussellA

That does not follow.

I said that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, just as the meaning of the word "unicorn" does not depend on the existence of unicorns. However, regardless of this fact about meaning, slabs do exist in the world.

There cannot be a correct use of a word such as "table". — RussellA

Then neither can there be an incorrect use of the word. It follows that there cannot be a correct or incorrect use of any word. But then language would be like a game of chess where each player makes up their own individual rules about what to do with the pieces. And that just means there wouldn't be any game of chess (or any language).

Within different contexts there are different sets of family resemblances. Is it correct to say that this is a "table"? — RussellA

That was the point of my quote of PI 69. You might say it's a table. There will always be borderline cases (in addition to more obvious and clear cut cases). This is a result of there being no strict definition (for most) of our words. Again:

Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a [table] is? — But this is not ignorance. We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary — for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. — Wittgenstein, PI 69

We might agree (for some special purpose) that a table must have four legs and a table top, in which case the photo you posted would not count as a table. But unless we agree to something like this, then the concept of table has no clear boundary. Does this make the concept unusable? Not at all.

Both TLP and PI seems written in richly aphoristic style, which attract broad range of different interpretations by the academics and readers.

What is his view on mental objects such as fear, anger, joy, hope, doubt ...etc? What is his idea on existence of God?

In the case of physical objects, there are many underlying activities and contexts that we skip over...........................e.g., an ottoman is not a table but can be used for that purpose, or, part of or judgment of a “table” is where we gather with others to eat, so, even if it is around a rock, we would still say we are sitting around the “table”........................This is not empirical or about the about, but is still normative, “real”, not “subjective”. — Antony Nickles

As Wittgenstein writes in the Preface, a vagueness in the PI is inevitable, as he admits himself that he was unable to weld his results together.
Preface: After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination

Wittgenstein in PI asks lots of questions, often without trying to answer them. For some of these questions it is also unclear whether he considers them valid or not, and I agree when you say "Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong".

What status does a "table" have for me. It is an inseparable fusion of the concept "table" in the mind and a momentary set of atoms existing in the world in time and space. Both aspects are necessary. My position is that of Nominalism rather than Platonic Realism.

I wrote: "For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it".

As regards the empirical, our concept of "table" has originated from states of affairs in the world, an empirical discovery.

As regards the normative, the only standards placed on the meaning of the word have originated from the users of the language living within a community. IE, we do the ethical thing, not because it is required by the table, but because of the use we put the table to within the community within which we live.

As regards the real, our concepts are real in our mind and the atoms are real in the world.

As regards the subjective, only concepts in the mind can be subjective, in that tables cannot have concepts. Atoms (thought of as logical entities rather than existant things) in the world can only be objective, in that they would exist independent of any sentient observer.

There is nothing wrong with asking questions, whether "is my pain the same as yours" or "how far is it from the Earth to the Moon", but humans can only learn when they try to answer these questions. Only by theorising can we make progress, as science has clearly shown.

@RussellA

This weeks comic ha. Very appropriate.

https://existentialcomics.com/comic/516

I said that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, just as the meaning of the word "unicorn" does not depend on the existence of unicorns. However, regardless of this fact about meaning, slabs do exist in the world. — Luke

1) "the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs"
2) "slabs do exist in the world"

Sentence 1)
As the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs in the world, there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world. Therefore, the word "slab" in language cannot be referring to something in the world. If the word "slab" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no slab in the world then there would be no word "slab" in language, but that is not the case.

Sentence 2)
There are two logical parts to the sentence "slabs do exist in the world". Part i) there are things that are named "slabs" and part ii) these things exist in the world. Within the sentence, the things named "slabs" refer to the things that exist in the world.

Sentences 1) and 2) are contradictory, in that in sentence 1) the word "slab" doesn't refer to a thing in the world but in sentence 2) the word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world.

Sentence 1) encapsulates the core of the PI in that the meaning of a word is its use in language.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Sentence 2) is the position of Referentialism that Wittgenstein is opposing.
PI 2 . That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with buildingstones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.——Conceive this as a complete primitive language

comic — schopenhauer1

If only PI 43 subsection A had been "For that reason, I call this thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it".

There would then have been no hesitancy within society in calling the emperor "naked", in seeing one particular example of nakedness in front of them.

1) "the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs"
2) "slabs do exist in the world" — RussellA

The meaning of the word 'slab' in the builder's language depends on two things:

1. The existence of these objects.

2. What the assistant is to do with them.

The meaning is not the name of the object.

As the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs in the world, there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world. Therefore, the word "slab" in language cannot be referring to something in the world. — RussellA

How does that follow? You say that there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world (i.e. whether there are slabs in the world or not). Do you think this implies that there are not slabs in the world? Or, why do you say the word "slab" can't be used to refer to something in the world?

If the word "slab" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no slab in the world then there would be no word "slab" in language, but that is not the case. — RussellA

Try the same with the word "unicorn". If the word "unicorn" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no unicorn in the world then there would be no word "unicorn" in language. Since there is the word "unicorn" in language, then there must be a unicorn in the world. This is the absurd consequence of your argument.

Sentences 1) and 2) are contradictory, in that in sentence 1) the word "slab" doesn't refer to a thing in the world but in sentence 2) the word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world. — RussellA

The word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world. However, the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of any slabs. This is no different to the word "unicorn" or the name of Wittgenstein's deceased "Mr. N.N."

Sentence 1) encapsulates the core of the PI in that the meaning of a word is its use in language. — RussellA

Yes, except you mistakenly believe this implies that words cannot be used to refer to objects in the world.

The word "slab" can be used to refer to either an existing or to a non-existing slab. The only difference is whether the slab exists.

The word "slab" can be used to refer to either an existing or to a non-existing slab. The only difference is whether the slab exists. — Luke

So how does one use Wittgenstein's "revelation" (the common sense notion that we already knew that a words meaning changes with context) pertain to such things as to "what exists" (ontology)? I just think this is treading the same ground over and over. Unless this thesis is used to actually "mine" some philosophical concepts, what is the use of pouring over this?

If your answer is, "We can't because language games", I'm going to (metaphorically) scream. See my post here for more elaboration:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/839003

The meaning of the word 'slab' in the builder's language depends on two things: 1. The existence of these objects. 2. What the assistant is to do with them. — Fooloso4

As the meaning of "unicorn" in language doesn't depend on the existence of a unicorn in the world, then why should the meaning of "slab" in language depend on the existence of a slab in the world?

Even assuming "bring me slab" is referring to an object in the world, what kind of object is being referred to in the Philosophical Investigations. An object as determined by Nominalism or an object as determined by Platonic Realism?

The meaning is not the name of the object. — Fooloso4

That's how I understand Wittgenstein in the PI, whereby meaning is use in language, in opposition to Augustine's Referentialism.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

That's how I understand Wittgenstein in the PI, whereby meaning is use in language, in opposition to Augustine's Referentialism.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. — RussellA

Presumably, someone might say the "pointing to its bearer" is a function to help the person get a sense of its "use" (i.e. the word refers to that object). In a different language game, perhaps that same word would not need an ostensive pointing. For example, a whatchamacallit might be some yellow button. Someone points and says "whatchamacallit". You start referring to it as a watchamacallit. Then, someone yells "whatchmacallit!". You are in some job that requires you push that yellow button when they shout the name like that. So now "whatchamacallit" means "press the yellow button referred to as watchmacallit". So ostensive pointing to an object is simply one mechanism of teaching use, it doesn't replace use.

Now, let's say the "whatchamacallit" yellow button was a mystery as to what it did. The crew had no idea what it's function was other than they needed to push it as part of their job. The work crew starts replacing the word "mystery" with watchmacallit". So now crewmembers say things like, "Life is a big watchamacallit" (mystery). Now its use has changed. In the language game of the crew, this makes sense. The small crew of 10 people think it means "yellow button" and "mystery". The wider company only knows it as the "yellow button". People outside of the company don't attach any meaning to that word.

Interestingly, this follows a path of causality leading to a modal theory of reference (pace Kripke).

As the meaning of "unicorn" in language doesn't depend on the existence of a unicorn in the world, — RussellA

Whatever one might mean when uttering the word 'slab', it has a specific meaning in the builder's language game. In that game 'slab' gets its meaning from its role in the activity of building. They are not building with unicorns or other imaginary objects. "Unicorn" has no place or role or function in this game. It is a complete but limited language.

what kind of object is being referred to in the Philosophical Investigations. — RussellA

Several objects are referred to in the PI.

See my response here. I think this helps illustrate it:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/839179

If you are trying to get ontological commitments from PI, you won't find any as far as I see. Besides that meaning of words comes from language games, you won't find much ontologically-speaking. If you think that is a lame cop out, then I agree. It's basically up to his disciples to figure out a "use" for the language game idea for actual philosophical commitments and jumping off points I guess.

So ostensive pointing to an object is simply one mechanism of teaching use, it doesn't replace use. — schopenhauer1

PI 40 reads that a word such as "slab" doesn't get its meaning from corresponding with a slab in the world, as the word "Mr N N" doesn't get its meaning from corresponding with a Mr N N in the world.

PI 40 Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

For the word "slab" to correspond with the object slab, then the word is "pointing" at the object.

As this is at odds with the last sentence in PI 43, I assume the last sentence of PI 43 about pointing is that of the interlocutor. The last sentence of PI 43 about "pointing" seems something a supporter of Augustine's Referentialism would say.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

If you are trying to get ontological commitments from PI, you won't find any as far as I see. Besides that meaning of words comes from language games, you won't find much ontologically-speaking — schopenhauer1

Yes, it is very difficult to make sense of the PI when we don't even know whether the objects he refers to, such as slabs, are those of the Nominalist or the Platonic Realist.

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object?

Yes, it is very difficult to make sense of the PI when we don't even know whether the objects he refers to, such as slabs, are those of the Nominalist or the Platonic Realist. — RussellA

And I don’t even think he cares about the question. The flock of disciples will then in unison say “because you can’t” or some such.

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object? — schopenhauer1

I guess what I’m saying is the object itself falls out perhaps. Whatever the object is, it’s a way to help define meaning. And that’s its importance in language meaning. The object’s only relevance here is its use in defining meaning.

But I agree, Witt seems to have a problem making ontological claims, especially as to the status of objects. This is why it seems pedantic to provide examples of how language meaning comes from language games but then not do much else with it.

For the word "slab" to correspond with the object slab, then the word is "pointing" at the object. — RussellA

The word has a specific meaning in the builder's language game. That does not translate to how it might be used elsewhere.

Imagine the builder pointing to a slab and saying slab. His helper now points to the slab and says slab. We might call this the "pointing language game or maybe the "name game". It cannot be called the 'builder's language game". What is the point of all this pointing?

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object? — schopenhauer1

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Philip Cartright in a blog on PI makes the case that although Wittgenstein appears to write that the word "slab" gets its meaning from pointing at a slab, this is not promoting an Augustinian Referentialism.

The word "slab" has a use in the language game because the object slab has a use in the world. If there was no use for an object such as a slab in the world, then it wouldn't be given a name in language. Even if an object doesn't have a actual present use, it will be named as long as it has a potential future use.

I can learn the names of objects that have no actual present use, on the proviso that there is an understanding that they have a potential future use.

In a sense, the word "slab" is not pointing to a slab, as in Referentionalism, rather it is pointing to either an actual or potential use that is borne by the slab, as in "meaning is use".

Yes, this accords more or less with what I said here

I guess what I’m saying is the object itself falls out perhaps. Whatever the object is, it’s a way to help define meaning. And that’s its importance in language meaning. The object’s only relevance here is its use in defining meaning. — schopenhauer1

Yes, this accords more or less with what I said here — schopenhauer1

Yes, as private sensations such as pain drop out of consideration in the language game, as with the beetle in PI 293, objects in the world also drop out of consideration in the language game, as it is the use of objects we are interested in, not the object in itself.

Yep. But then it goes back to this:

It's as if I asked you to show me the house you built, but instead, you not only not show me the house, you not only not show me the blueprints even, you talk to me about how the language is used to program the software that makes the blueprints. — schopenhauer1

If I asked you to show me the video game and you constantly referred me back to how you used the code to create the game OR you showed me how you interact with the game using a controller and where people sit in relation to the game, BUT YOU FAIL TO SHOW ME THE GAME ITSELF, something is missing. You have given me the meta-rules of the game perhaps, but you have not given me any commitments on the game itself.

As Wittgenstein writes in the Preface, a vagueness in the PI is inevitable, as he admits himself that he was unable to weld his results together. — RussellA

This is not “vagueness”. It is a realization that there is no general explanation of “meaning” or “solution” to skepticism. He comes at it from multiple angles to understand how the desire for purity affects different areas of our lives.

For some of these questions it is also unclear whether he considers them valid or not, — RussellA

He does test hypotheses, but you may be confusing the role of the “interlocutor” who represents and expresses the embodiment of the desire for purity (what motivated the Tractatus and the picture of the world that created).

I agree when you say "Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong". — RussellA

I don’t say this to imply there isn’t something clear, specific, rigorous, etc. But just that narrowing it down to positions and statements that we can tell someone misses the point that he is doing something by a certain method which you must participate in to have it become meaningful to you.

What status does a "table" have for me. It is an inseparable fusion of the concept "table" in the mind and a momentary set of atoms existing in the world in time and space. Both aspects are necessary. My position is that of Nominalism rather than Platonic Realism. — RussellA

Wittgenstein focuses on our criteria for judging identity in the case of tables (and objects) but also not a generalized “concept” (I assume some kind of universal or idea) separate from the world. I would move to more complicated activities that he discusses because the case of physical objects makes it too easy to stay stuck in the picture Wittgenstein is trying to broaden. Below are other activities that Wittgenstein groups together under his unique term “concepts” (not the historical philosophical use of concept as idea). See p. 200 about material objects especially.

-of game, 71, 75, 135
- of a material object, p. 200
- of mathematical certainty, p. 225
- of (noticing) an aspect, pp. 193, 213
of number, 67, 135
- of order, 345
- of pain, 282, 384
- of proposition, 136
- of saying inwardly, p. 220
- of seeing, pp. 200, 209
-s of sensation, p. 209
understanding, 532

It is these kinds of things we do where he gets into how things go sideways or when we bump up against limits of an activity or when we don’t know our way about in an activity in a new context:

teaching, learning -s, 208, 384
use of a -, 82; p. 209
- with blurred edges, 71, 76
direct interest, 570
extending a -, 67

Also this ties to the criteria for judging our lives (concepts). Below is another list of concepts he looks at (under “criteria” in the index).

- for a dream, pp. 222-3
- for an experience, 509, 542; p. 198
- of guessing thoughts right, p. 222
- of having an opinion, 573
- identifying my sensation, 290
- of identity, sameness, 253, 288, 322, 376-7,
404
- ofimage, 239
- of intended projection's coming before
one's mind, 141
-of learning a shape, p. 185
- for looking without seeing, p. 211
- for mastering the series ofnatural numbers,
185
- for matter of course, 238
- of meaning, 190, 692
- of mistake, 51
-of reading, 159-60, 164
- of remembering right, 56
-of state of mind, 149, 572-3 -and symptoms, 354
- of talking to onself, 344
- for temporality of thought, 633
- of understanding, 146, 182, 269

Only by theorising can we make progress, as science has clearly shown. — RussellA

The desire for purity Wittgenstein is investigating is the same as the desire for everything (all our activities) to meet the criteria for science; that expectation of predictability, repeatability, generality, abstraction from a situation, resolution, agreement, etc., and such that it should have nothing to do with my ongoing responsibility (anyone can do science and come to the same conclusion). But philosophy is not science; it has other satisfactions, e.g., its progress is understanding ourselves and the conditions (and limitations) of being human.

Both TLP and PI seems written in richly aphoristic style, which attract broad range of different interpretations by the academics and readers. — Corvus

I think aphorism is a misscharacterization. They are not meant as individual (independent) statements of something he is arguing is true. He does make statements, but they are speculative (like a hypothesis) with the purpose of your coming to the same conclusion on your own, seeing the viewpoint of why he is pointing this out in the context of the rest of the book. I would say they are hard to understand because they require you to change yourself in order to see the way he is looking at things. Removed from his process, they are easy to take in multiple ways.

What is his view on mental objects such as fear, anger, joy, hope, doubt ...etc? What is his idea on existence of God? — Corvus

He is trying to find out why we want feelings to be objects. He does not address the argument for the existence of God other than looking at the same desire of why Descartes looked to God for the purpose of having something fixed, universal, perfect, as Wittgenstein equates with purity as a goal and standard for knowledge.

@Banno @RussellA @Luke

This weeks comic ha. Very appropriate. — schopenhauer1

I get how this would be funny, but it is not accurate or helpful for either Nietzsche or Wittgenstein. I would point out a few things because the comic makes assumptions that are common misunderstandings.

Wittgenstein is not denying “truth” but only saying we have different criteria for judging what truth does in different areas of our lives, and they are not all pure like we want a certain picture of truth to be (like math).

He is not isolating us to language removed from the world. It is through the method of looking at language that he is investigating why we misconceive the world, as they are the normally the same (until we have a situation in time when that falls apart—we don’t know our way about).

Our ordinary criteria are not based on agreement, nor statistical majority (this is not a defense of common sense or “ordinary people”), but the way our lives have aligned over our history, that we would judge things using the same criteria, usually come to same conclusions, respond the same way, have the same expectations, understand the same implications. These are not rules, nor usually explicit. It is the same basis that allows each of us the ability to evaluate his claims of what we say when, to see for yourself.

He is not isolating us to language removed from the world. It is through the method of looking at language that he is investigating why we misconceive the world, as they are the normally the same (until we have a situation in time when that falls apart—we don’t know our way about).

Our ordinary criteria are not based on agreement, nor statistical majority (this is not a defense of common sense or “ordinary people”), but the way our lives have aligned over our history, that we would judge things using the same criteria, usually come to same conclusions, respond the same way, have the same expectations, understand the same implications. These are not rules, nor usually explicit. It is the same basis that allows each of us the ability to evaluate his claims of what we say when, to see for yourself. — Antony Nickles

See this is all meaningless to me. In 1-3 sentences, explain to me what Wittgenstein's views of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics are. If you cannot tell me, then we are treading water. I can make balloon animals for you as a response to a question, but it's not getting anywhere. I can then tell you, "You don't get it" and we would not be getting anywhere.