what I do get is Witt thought we shouldn’t try to philosophize about these things as there is no certainty… No system is going to give me slam dunk certainty. — schopenhauer1
I think aphorism is a misscharacterization. They are not meant as individual (independent) statements of something he is arguing is true. He does make statements, but they are speculative (like a hypothesis) with the purpose of your coming to the same conclusion on your own, — Antony Nickles
He is trying to find out why we want feelings to be objects. He does not address the argument for the existence of God other than looking at the same desire of why Descartes looked to God for the purpose of having something fixed, universal, perfect, as Wittgenstein equates with purity as a goal and standard for knowledge. — Antony Nickles
apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. He claims Wittgenstein doesn't address ontological concerns, while the first hundred remarks of PI do exactly that. — Banno
apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. — Banno
The first sentence of TLP starts with a declarative type of sentence "The world is all that is the case."
and then it goes on, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." They are quite unusual writing styles for philosophical texts, which can only be described as aphoristic.
Of course Witt makes his points in his writings, and it is not all 100% aphoristic writing style which fills his books, but we cannot help, but notice the writing style. — Corvus
As for seeing Wittgenstein in different ways, there's a long overdue thread on Moyal-Sharrock's Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty that should be started. Have you read it? — Banno
Yep.
But you will. — Banno
Try the same with the word "unicorn". If the word "unicorn" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no unicorn in the world then there would be no word "unicorn" in language. Since there is the word "unicorn" in language, then there must be a unicorn in the world. This is the absurd consequence of your argument. — Luke
This is not “vagueness”. It is a realization that there is no general explanation of “meaning” or “solution” to skepticism. He comes at it from multiple angles to understand how the desire for purity affects different areas of our lives. — Antony Nickles
He does test hypotheses, but you may be confusing the role of the “interlocutor” who represents and expresses the embodiment of the desire for purity (what motivated the Tractatus and the picture of the world that created). — Antony Nickles
I don’t say this to imply there isn’t something clear, specific, rigorous, etc. But just that narrowing it down to positions and statements that we can tell someone misses the point that he is doing something by a certain method which you must participate in to have it become meaningful to you. — Antony Nickles
— Culture and ValueIf you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!
The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.
— Culture and ValueI ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way he can put it right.
— Culture and ValueWhen you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.
the word "unicorn" refers to other words in the language, as in "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" — RussellA
It remains a fact that if the word "unicorn " in language depends on its existence on the fact of there being a unicorn in the world, then the word "unicorn" would not exist. — RussellA
Within his theory that meaning is use in language, in the sentence "bring me the slab", the word "slab" is not being used, as it would be in Referentialism, in naming a slab in the world, but is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language — RussellA
It would not make sense for Wittgenstein to be in opposition to Referentialism, but then use the word "slab" to name a slab in the world. — RussellA
If I asked you to show me the video game and you constantly referred me back to how you used the code to create the game OR you showed me how you interact with the game using a controller and where people sit in relation to the game, BUT YOU FAIL TO SHOW ME THE GAME ITSELF, something is missing. — schopenhauer1
Yes, it's as if I asked Wittgenstein how to get to Paris and rather than say that he didn't know, responded with innumerable questions, such as: Is my Paris better than your Lyon? Why does Paris exist? Why is it that Paris is north of Lyon? When did you first want to go to Paris? Who is the Parisian most influential in ballet? Which Parisian can make the best fruitcake?
All well and good, but what one really wants is "take the Eurostar leaving St Pancras at 10.31 tomorrow". — RussellA
Yes, the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, but not asking questions for the sake of asking questions without any underlying direction. But rather it is broader than that, as in questioning theories developed by such questions. For example: What value does the theory of Referentialism have? Does Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of words is their use in language help our understanding of the nature of language?
There is a quantitative difference between asking questions for their own sake and questioning theories. — RussellA
The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this? — Luke
If that were true then we could no longer speak about any extinct animal for the names of those animals would no longer exist. — Luke
What you have said is similar to: "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use", which is circular. — Luke
To repeat, Wittgenstein opposes Referentialism because it views reference as the only use that words can have. His opposition does not imply that words cannot be used to refer; only that they have more uses than this. — Luke
As in language, the word "pain" directly refers to pain behaviour and only indirectly to the cause of the pain behaviour, the word "slab" directly refers to the representation of a slab and only indirectly to the cause of the representation of a slab — RussellA
it does not seem to be the case that it is the reader's problem that they have difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's writings, but rather the responsibility lies with Wittgenstein himself. — RussellA
But this undertaking is arduous, and a certain indolence insensibly leads me back to my ordinary course of life; and just as the captive, who, perchance, was enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the darkness that will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised. — Descartes, end of 1st meditation
We only know the "unicorn" by description, not acquaintance. Apart from a few people who have directly seen the fossil of a Tyrannosaurus Rex, most people only know about dinosaurs by description, not acquaintance — RussellA
Totally agree. I have been trying to get across the idea for weeks that Wittgenstein's theory that meaning is use in language is circular, as I wrote before: — RussellA
That is to say, does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves. — schopenhauer1
Not sure if you are familiar with the book "Words and Things" by Ernest Gellner, but he provides similar arguments you are suggesting in your post. For Gellner, there is a great desire/importance to theorizing, and so he takes great offense that he needs Wittgenstein's therapy. Take for example,
"If these principles(linguistic philosophy) come to be generally respected, the result would be inhibition of all interesting thought.” — Richard B
“It(linguistic philiosophy) is an attempt to undermine and paralyze one of the most important kinds of thinking, and one of the main agents of progress, namely intellectual advance through consistency and unification, through attainment of coherence, the elimination of exceptions, arbitrariness, and unnecessary idiosyncrasies.” — Richard B
Additionally, Jerrold Katz, in "Metaphysics of Meaning", presents a theory of meaning that tries to resist the many criticism of Wittgenstein. He believe that Wittgenstein criticism mainly addresses those theories proposed by Frege, Russel, and those presented in Tractatus,
"For Wittgenstein to be successful in his radical critical purpose, he has to show how to eliminate all theories of meaning on which metaphysical questions are meaningful.” — Richard B
I see Witt's style in PI as a sort of "confounding" affect/effect. I can't say if it is intentional, but it is the way the text is laid out. He generally starts out as the "interlocutor" in quotations, sort of like his "demon" presenting various absolute cases of language use (very Socrates-like) and then Witt goes on to prove that absolute case is not as absolute upon further reflection. — schopenhauer1
does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves. — schopenhauer1
Well, if Witt represents being "caught in the web of ecology" of word use and not about understanding things like the "human condition, ethical implications, suffering, what is, what should, what ought, what can, by what criteria, etc." then one isn't really practicing philosophy so much anymore. — schopenhauer1
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