• Bob Ross
    1.7k
    Upon further investigation, I am finding that metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imagination; and, thusly, is an illegitimate source of knowledge. Consequently, there is no means of performing standard, traditional ontology nor investigations into the world as it is in-itself.

    Metaphysics is indistinguishable from the human imagination because it claims knowledge of that which is beyond the possible forms of experience (namely, space and time) which can never be empirically grounded. However, it is perfectly possible to limit traditional metaphysical claims to the possibility of experience, such that we only attempt to provide a map of what to experience--but this is no longer metaphysics: instead, it is pragmatic modelling of possible experience.

    If anyone thinks of metaphysics (in the sense of gaining knowledge of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience) as a legitimate practice, then, I would ask, how can one distinguish it from the human imagination (irregardless of how plausible it may sound)? It seems, to me now, like the practice of overstepping our bounds, not for the purpose of just providing a map but, rather, to actually gain knowledge of the real world (beyond that experience).

    If one takes away the possible forms of their experience and we do not accept claims indistinguishable from the imagination (no matter how plausible), then there is nothing intelligible left: there is nothing to be said about the world in-itself.

    What say you?

    UPDATE

    I believe I have refuted myself, and wanted to share it with everyone who was so kind as to engage with me in this discussion board. I think, now, that the flaw in my reasoning was in the unexamined presumptions in the (implied) question itself. The question was: "How can I know about anything which transcends my experience?". This question presupposes, among other things, three note-worthy points:

    1. There is a world (independent of 'me');
    2. There is an 'I' (or 'me') which is in that world; and
    3.There is a distinction between my experience of and the world itself.

    Firstly, all three of these are transcendent claims assumed as true, thusly self-refuting the conclusion that all transcendent claims are barred from our reach. Secondly, either one is experiencing, which can be summed up as a transcendent claim of its own (and, not to mention, promotes the possibility of a gap between subject and object, which inevitably leads to Kantian dilemmas) or one is not experiencing and, thusly, is just in a state of direct comprehension of reality. In the case of the former, it refutes my conclusion (which presupposed to conclude it in the first place); in the case of the latter, the transcendent world doesn't exist at all but, rather, the 'world' is just what is directly apprehended and, thusly, the dilemma which I posited is equally annihilated as a false split between what is directly apprehended and what is beyond.

    In other words, I don't think that 'one is experiencing' and that one cannot know anything which transcends themselves cannot be both granted.

    I think the challenge between knowing the things-in-themselves with what we experience of them is already presupposed in granting that one is experiencing at all, which I originally overlooked, and, thusly, metaphysics is indispensable; and if it is not granted, then there is not transcendent world at all and, thusly, metaphysics is dispensable but there's no such dilemma not because we have no possible empirical evidence of that which transcends our experience but, rather, because there is nothing which transcends it in the first place (since there is no experience at all: just some odd, pure apprehension).

    So the original question (and conclusion) is annihilated (by itself); but the new question becomes: "is the world just directly apprehended with no subject apprehending it?". I find incredibly implausible, for I find it abundantly clear that there is a 'me' which is experiencing the world.

    Thoughts?
  • simplyG
    111
    There’s more to metaphysics than just imagination it also includes reasoning not based upon experience but using deduction thereof such as found in math. It also includes tautologies which again are aspects of reason.

    Also metaphysics does not claim to be a source of knowledge that’s what epistemology is for…

    You might like this quote by Kant as to what metaphysics is from his Critique of Pure reason preface.

    Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.
    It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.
    — Kant
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    If anyone thinks of metaphysics (in the sense of gaining knowledge of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience) as a legitimate practice, then, I would ask, how can one distinguish it from the human imagination (irregardless of how plausible it may sound)?Bob Ross

    People have lots of ideas about what "metaphysics" is. Our discussions of the subject are always tangled up in disagreements about the meaning of the word. Your definition is certainly not what I mean when I talk about metaphysics. More importantly, I don't think it's consistent with what most other people think it is either.
  • 180 Proof
    15.4k
    :up:

    "The overwhelming majority of theories are rejected because they contain bad explanations, not because they fail experimental tests ... So we seek explanations that remain robust when we test them against those flickers and shadows, and against each other, and against criteria of logic and reasonableness and everything else we can think of. And when we can change them no more, we have understood some objective truth." ~David Deutsch

    An excerpt from an old thread "Metaphysics in Science" ...
    Metaphysics, again as I understand it, proposes criteria for discerning 'impossible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality necessarily cannot be) from 'possible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality can be) - btw, I'm an actualist, not a possibilist - thereby concerning the most general states of affairs; unlike the sciences, which consist of testing models of how possible transformations of specific, physical (class, or domain, of) states of affairs from one to another (can be made to) happen, and thus is explanatory (even if only approximative, probabilistic), metaphysics explains only concepts abstracted from, and therefore useful for categorizing, (experience of(?)) 'how things are', and does not explain any facts of the matter. Metaphysics is not theoretical.180 Proof
  • L'éléphant
    1.6k
    There’s more to metaphysics than just imagination it also includes reasoning not based upon experience but using deduction thereof such as found in math. It also includes tautologies which again are aspects of reason.simplyG
    I was going to say this until I scrolled down to your comment.


    Metaphysics also exposes the error in our thinking. So, while that does not count as "knowledge", it makes us examine, or even discover, how we think ordinarily about reality, or the carelessness of how we think, or what we take for granted as true.
  • RogueAI
    2.8k
    Consequently, there is no means of performing standard, traditional ontology nor investigations into the world as it is in-itself.Bob Ross

    Presently, science is trying to explain consciousness with the ontological assumption that materialism/physicalism is the case. If, in ten thousand years, that scientific project still has not given a definitive answer to the hard problem/mind-body problem, wouldn't that be strong evidence that materialism/physicalism is not true?
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Hello SimpleG,

    There’s more to metaphysics than just imagination it also includes reasoning not based upon experience but using deduction thereof such as found in math

    1. Reasoning based upon experience to make claims about something beyond experience, as opposed to merely creating a predictive model for experience, is indistinguishable from human imagination; because that claim is not grounded in experience. It is all fine and well to claim that I should expect things within experience to behave like X, but to posit that about things beyond experience is completely devoid of empirical content.

    2. Math and logic are grounded in empirical arguments. We can introspectively analyze how we reason to construct them both, and, in the case of math, test to see how well they relate to the world outside of us.

    You might like this quote by Kant as to what metaphysics is from his Critique of Pure reason preface.

    Kant is a major motivator of my thinking on metaphysics: especially his prolegomena.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    People have lots of ideas about what "metaphysics" is. Our discussions of the subject are always tangled up in disagreements about the meaning of the word. Your definition is certainly not what I mean when I talk about metaphysics. More importantly, I don't think it's consistent with what most other people think it is either.

    What do you mean by it then?

    I am using the traditional term going back to leibniz, Kant, etc.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    metaphysics explains only concepts abstracted from, and therefore useful for categorizing, (experience of(?)) 'how things are', and does not explain any facts of the matter. Metaphysics is not theoretical.

    I have no problem with this, since it isn't metaphysics in the more traditional sense (I would say at least). You are basically saying, and correct me if I am wrong, that metaphysics doesn't actually get at ontology (like Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, etc. thought): instead, it just is a useful model for experience. To me, that just isn't metaphysics anymore, it's just pragmatic models; which I have no problem with: the actual claim about transcendent reality is missing therefrom.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Metaphysics also exposes the error in our thinking. So, while that does not count as "knowledge", it makes us examine, or even discover, how we think ordinarily about reality, or the carelessness of how we think, or what we take for granted as true.

    In the sense that I defined it in the OP, I don't think we need metaphysics to expose errors in our reasoning: we can do so without making ontological claims.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Presently, science is trying to explain consciousness with the ontological assumption that materialism/physicalism is the case. If, in ten thousand years, that scientific project still has not given a definitive answer to the hard problem/mind-body problem, wouldn't that be strong evidence that materialism/physicalism is not true?

    If you consider pure speculation that is indistinguishable from human imagination valid forms of inquiring about that which is beyond the possible forms of one's experience, then, yes, I would say that counts in disfavor of physicalism and possibly in favor of idealism.
  • 180 Proof
    15.4k
    You are basically saying, and correct me if I am wrong, that metaphysics doesn't actually get at ontology (like Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, etc. thought): instead, it just is a useful model for experience.Bob Ross
    This is neither a charitable nor close reading of what I actually wrote, Bob. I'm an Epicurean-Spinozist, after all, very much concerned with ontology, or the concept of what Clément Rosset calls "the Real". To paraphrase the beginning of my statement on 'metaphysics': it is an inquiry into criteria for differentiating 'what is necessarily not the case' from 'what is possibly the case' in the most general sense; thus, ontology, as I understand Epicurus/Spinoza, is an explanation of concepts for "the Real".

    Metaphysics is not theoretical.180 Proof
    Translation: Physics (Aristotle et al), not metaphysics, "is a useful model of experience" (i.e. physical reality, or publicly intelligible aspect of the real, aka "nature"). Metaphysics consists in categorical criteria for making hypothetical explanations, or "useful models..."

    Maybe that's clearer?
  • Mww
    4.9k
    …..how can one distinguish (metaphysics) from the human imagination….Bob Ross

    Metaphysics is a discipline; imagination is a faculty.

    Even if one chooses to deny to imagination the denomination of faculty, metaphysics is still a discipline, and in which case, the distinction remains that imagination is not.
  • 180 Proof
    15.4k
    Metaphysics is a discipline; imagination is a faculty.Mww
    :up:
  • Ciceronianus
    3k
    "Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability."

    Rudolf Carnap
  • simplyG
    111
    1. Reasoning based upon experience to make claims about something beyond experience, as opposed to merely creating a predictive model for experience, is indistinguishable from human imagination; because that claim is not grounded in experience. It is all fine and well to claim that I should expect things within experience to behave like X, but to posit that about things beyond experience is completely devoid of empirical contentBob Ross

    Yes I agree with you, metaphysics in its nature is not always concerned with producing knowledge but it’s more of a method of thinking and reasoning . You can leave that to science which employs metaphysical methods and theories to yield knowledge such as testable theories that behave as expected in the real world so it’s a fore runner to the scientific method.

    Take this tautology: All bachelors are unmarried men. Now you don’t need to go around and check if this is true as this is self evident and knowledge of its truth is produced in the sentence itself.

    Metaphysics is a purely speculative and knowledge is a by product of its enquiry rather than its ultimate aim as it makes no claims of knowledge therefore it remains purely theoretical and abstract.

    I think it was Einstein who said “imagination is more important than knowledge” and it seems to me quantum theory is ripe for metaphysical speculations of how things at the subatomic scale don’t behave as expected according to ordinary experience.

    2. Math and logic are grounded in empirical arguments. We can introspectively analyze how we reason to construct them both, and, in the case of math, test to see how well they relate to the world outside of us.Bob Ross

    I made a thread specifically related to this question with posters positing that math precedes the physical empirical universe but that there are correlation between the two either by accident or design:

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14673/is-maths-embedded-in-the-universe-
  • Joshs
    5.7k


    There’s more to metaphysics than just imagination it also includes reasoning not based upon experience but using deduction thereof such as found in math. It also includes tautologies which again are aspects of reasonsimplyG

    Metaphysics also exposes the error in our thinking. So, while that does not count as "knowledge", it makes us examine, or even discover, how we think ordinarily about reality, or the carelessness of how we think, or what we take for granted as true.L'éléphant

    This is an Enlightenment view of what metaphysics is and does. In other words, the metaphysical presuppositions of Enlightenment philosophy involve the belief that one can secure truth through deductive reasoning. Post-Enlightenment metaphysics is quite different.
  • Joshs
    5.7k


    In the sense that I defined it in the OP, I don't think we need metaphysics to expose errors in our reasoning: we can do so without making ontological claimsBob Ross

    We wouldn’t be able to distinguish truth from error in the first place if we didn’t have a pre-existing system of criteria ( theory) on the basis of which to make such determinations. Theory is a manifestation of a metaphysical viewpoint. If all we are interested in is exposing errors in reasoning, then we need not question our underlying metaphysical assumptions. In fact , we would be incapable of doing so if we merely remain stuck within a particular theoretical framework by looking for errors. The profoundly creative work of science consists not in exposing errors in reasoning but in changing the subject, turning the frame on its head, redefining the criteria of truth and error, not just checking our answers to old questions but asking different questions. In other words, transforming the underlying metaphysical presuppositions.

    Heidegger wrote:

    Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order that there may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena themselves, the metaphysical basis for them must let itself be apprehended.
  • simplyG
    111


    I was under impression that metaphysics has remained unchanged since the days of Aristotle whose work did not really gain traction until the age of Reason or Enlightenment beginning in the 17th century where Kant, Liebniz and others built upon it ?
  • Joshs
    5.7k
    I was under impression that metaphysics has remained unchanged since the days of Aristotle whose work did not really gain traction until the age of Reason or Enlightenment beginning in the 17th century where Kant, Liebniz and others built upon it ?simplyG

    Metaphysical assumptions change with every cultural
    era and with every innovation in philosophy. We can see this historical development in the transition from the neo-Platonism of Philo and Augustine to the neo-Aristotelianism of Maimonides and Aquinas, from the rationalism of Descartes to the empiricism of Hume to the Idealism of Kant and Hegel, to the various postmodernist philosophies.
  • Mww
    4.9k
    metaphysics explains only concepts (….) and does not explain any facts of the matter.180 Proof

    I have no problem with this, since it isn't metaphysics in the more traditional senseBob Ross

    I am using the traditional term going back to leibniz, Kant, etc.Bob Ross

    “…..We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions….and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone…..” (Bxiv)

    If the watershed for the traditional sense of metaphysics is Kant and Enlightenment philosophy in general, and metaphysics in such traditional sense has only to do with conceptions, it follows that to combine metaphysics with, juxtaposition it to, or ground it in, imagination, is very far from the traditional sense.

    While it is true metaphysics is not a legitimate source of knowledge, it isn’t so because of the synthesis of it in whatever shape or form, to imagination.
  • LuckyR
    501
    What say you?


    I completely agree with you.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    What do you mean by it then?Bob Ross

    I have my own ideas about how to think about metaphysics, but for now, I'll just provide a conventional definition:

    Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental nature of reality. This includes the first principles of: being or existence, identity, change, space and time, cause and effect, necessity, actuality, and possibility.Wikipedia - Metphysics

    That is not at all the same as:

    metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imaginationBob Ross
  • Manuel
    4.1k


    Either we hold onto some kind of metaphysics or we do not. If we deny that metaphysics is legitimate, then we are left with the view that all there is, is sense data, for us.

    The argument then becomes, everything there ever was, is or will be is sense-data and nothing else. Such a view is so radical, I don't recall any traditional figure ever arguing for such a view, it's too outlandish.

    But you ask, how do we separate the imagination from metaphysics? It is not trivial nor should we be expected to find a nice cutting point in which we are able to say "the imagination stops here and metaphysics begins."

    All the traditional topics of metaphysics, materialism, the self, dualism, free will, things-in-themselves, the nature of objects and so on, would be impossible to formulate absent imagination.

    It's part of our way of interpreting the world. I mean, look at how Einstein discovered General Relativity, literally, by imagining a guy falling off a building, contemplating how would that person feel.

    And I think we can say that part of General Relativity is important for metaphysics. We shouldn't have a metaphysics that says modern physics is wrong. It would be a bad system, imo.
  • Joshs
    5.7k
    And I think we can say that part of General Relativity is important for metaphysics. We shouldn't have a metaphysics that says modern physics is wrong. It would be a bad system, imo.Manuel

    A metaphysics is not a piece of evidence or a collection of facts to be compared against scientific claims. It’s the meta-framework within which scientific claims, facts and evidence are intelligible. Change the metaphysics and we don’t ‘disprove’ a science’s facts, we change their sense and relevance.

    Heidegger wrote:

    Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order that there may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena themselves, the metaphysical basis for them must let itself be apprehended.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    Either we hold onto some kind of metaphysics or we do not. If we deny that metaphysics is legitimate, then we are left with the view that all there is, is sense data, for us.Manuel

    I agree, although maybe a clearer way of saying this is that we do have a metaphysics, whether or not we recognize it.
  • Manuel
    4.1k


    Sure, relativity or classical physics are not changed if we consider ourselves idealists or eliminitavists. But given how a non-trivial amount of metaphysics come from "New Age" sectors, if someone argues that say, God created physics or that you can change reality just by thinking about it, then that would be wrong. And you may reply that such views are not metaphysics, and I would agree.

    But I'm trying to cover as much as I can.



    Correct. I replied in that manner to avoid someone asking "what do you mean by metaphysics?", if I say that sense-data is what remains if you deny metaphysics, then they know I'm talking about the world.

    But the main point is better stated as you did.
  • 180 Proof
    15.4k
    A metaphysics is not a piece of evidence or a collection of facts to be compared against scientific claims. It’s the meta-framework within which scientific claims, facts and evidence are intelligible. Change the metaphysics and we don’t ‘disprove’ a science’s facts, we change their sense and relevance.Joshs
    I'd only add 'to the degree "the meta-framework" is rational' (i.e. soundly inferential, coherent & self-consistent).

    :up:
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    I replied in that manner to avoid someone asking "what do you mean by metaphysics?", if I say that sense-data is what remains if you deny metaphysics, then they know I'm talking about the world.Manuel

    YGID%20small.png
  • L'éléphant
    1.6k
    In the sense that I defined it in the OP, I don't think we need metaphysics to expose errors in our reasoning: we can do so without making ontological claims.Bob Ross
    There is no other task that makes us think in a way that does not involve memorization of equation, procedure, or statistics than metaphysics. Philosophical discussions is natural to humans.
  • Wayfarer
    22.6k
    If anyone thinks of metaphysics (in the sense of gaining knowledge of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience) as a legitimate practice, then, I would ask, how can one distinguish it from the human imagination (irregardless of how plausible it may sound)?Bob Ross

    This sounds very Kantian. My interpretation of metaphysics is that we should always begin with the derivation of the term 'metaphysics' by one of the redactors of Aristotle's writing. To recall that the term originally meant 'after the physics', meaning, the texts that came in sequence after the physics, but that it originates with Aristotle's texts and has meaning in relation to them. What is after, and possibly implied by, the physics, but not necessarily shown by the physics. What must be the case in order for the physics to be as it is. And as such, it is very much alive in many of the current debates about the implications of physics. 'Philosophy', Etienne Gilson remarked 'generally buries its undertakers'. Also applies to metaphysics.

    The second point is to recall the origin of metaphysics - with Parmenides. He is known for a fragmentary 'proem' (prose/poem) which is arguably the source of all metaphysics proper. Then there's Plato's dialogue, The Parmenides, which recounts the apocryphal meeting of a young Socrates with an old Parmenides - one of the most difficult of the dialogues. In it the nature of 'the knowledge of what is' that is the major subject. The nature of what truly is, which is not subject to change and decay, the imperishable. Set against the conviction that the experience of the senses was not necessarily a reliable source of knowledge. The basic drift of Parmenides was that that which truly is must necessarily be:

    Two paths are open to investigation.
    The first says: being is and nonbeing is not.
    It is the path of certainty, because it follows the truth.
    The other says: being is not, therefore nonbeing is.
    This misdirected path, I tell you, cannot lead to a sound conviction.

    That was the background to Aristotle's metaphysics. It is often dismissed nowadays without the vaguest idea of what it was actually about.

    As for what is beyond the possible forms of experience - who knows what types of experience are possible? The human psyche is still a vast uncharted ocean, with realms of possibility that we might never dream of. I think it's a mistake to deprecate the imagination, after all, Einstein himself said imagination was more important than knowledge. He discovered the theory of relativity mainly through thought-experiments.

    Overall I think it's a mistake to dismiss metaphysics.
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