424. The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But what is its application? Think of the picture of blindness as a darkness in the mind or in the head of a blind person.

This and the text thereabouts lead me to suppose that the picture theory of meaning is itself being rejected here. More generally, we might ask "what is the relation between a proposition and a state of affairs?" In the Tractatus, the picture stood between the state of affairs and the proposition. Kenny has it that "In the Investigations the relation between the proposition and the state of affairs is made by the language game". I'm suggesting that the state of affairs is itself made, or perhaps, presupposed, by the language game; that it is fundamental that things are considered to be so-and-so in order that the game occur. Hence

432. Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? In use it lives. Is it there that it has living breath within it? Or is the use its breath?

You haven't sufficiently provided what this public is. Those things you described can simply be representations in individual minds. — schopenhauer1

As I said: other people. Other people such as the parents and teachers and others who taught you many of the rules and the games and the language. If you think that other people are no more than representations, and that you were born with an innate knowledge of all the rules and games and language, and that children don't learn rules and games and language, and that you are actually speaking only to a representation of me (and others) in your private language, and all of this because there are no things or people outside yourself but only your representations of them, then I can't help you with your solipsism.

Solipsism is not possible without a private language, and Wittgenstein showed that the concept of a
private language is incoherent.

There has to be a theory of what this public is — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein uses the term "public" only once in the PI and that is in the preface. Besides, why does there need to be a theory instead of the common meaning of the word?

As I said: other people. Other people such as the parents and teachers and others who taught you many of the rules and the games and the language. If you think that other people are no more than representations, and that you were born with an innate knowledge of all the rules and games and language, and that children don't learn rules and games and language, and that you are actually speaking only to a representation of me (and others) in your private language, and all of this because there are no things or people outside yourself but only your representations of them, then I can't help you with your solipsism.

Solipsism is not possible without a private language, and Wittgenstein showed that the concept of a
private language is incoherent. — Luke

It’s not my view it’s what Witts anti foundationalism points to. That is to say he wants the inner representation to be always hidden and private yet have “room” for public. Public is always individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas. So how is it he is getting out of any private version of representation? What is this public he refers to? Individuals may still just think they are confirming some thing, but one can still be a skeptic about all of it. You can’t just say common sense or refer to the other person because that can just be an individuals representation. The beetle is still in the box.

Just a meta question completely separate than my critique. Do you feel Wittgenstein can be wrong or everything he said is airtight? I mean this in both his content and in the weird “oh well the way he wrote there is no wrong even” or some such claim.

I’m asking without you making it personal or making a snide remark about me as a retort.

It’s not my view it’s what Witts anti foundationalism points to. That is to say he wants the inner representation to be always hidden and private yet have “room” for public. Public is always individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas. So how is it he is getting out of any private version of representation? — schopenhauer1

Individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas are not hidden and private; they are expressed publicly. One's public expression can be demonstrated to be inconsistent with the accepted practice that is called "following the rule".

You can’t just say common sense or refer to the other person because that can just be an individuals representation. The beetle in the box. — schopenhauer1

201. ...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”.
That’s why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another.

202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. — PI 201

Although there may occasionally be borderline cases where it is unclear whether a rule has been broken or not, there are the more common, obvious cases where it either has or it hasn't. If there weren't such obvious cases, then we wouldn't be able to learn or to teach any rules or games or language and we wouldn't have them.

Do you feel Wittgenstein can be wrong or everything he said is airtight? I mean this in both his content and in the weird “oh well the way he wrote there is no wrong even” or some such claim. — schopenhauer1

Yes, Wittgenstein can be wrong. Like anyone, he was not infallible.

Individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas are not hidden and private; they are expressed publicly. One's public expression can be demonstrated to be inconsistent with the accepted practice that is called "following the rule". — Luke

But how is this internalized? Publicly ? :chin: How odd. How do you know what’s internalized is what’s being conveyed? Who has these rules? Who doesn’t? Who decides? Is it hom or her or him or you or that guy or that person or that …

Social facts!!!!!!!!!

Searle!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

But how is this internalized? — schopenhauer1

It doesn't matter how it is "internalized". That is irrelevant to following the rule.

Publically? — schopenhauer1

What?

How do you know what’s internalized is what’s being conveyed? — schopenhauer1

I don't. What's internalized (or internal) is the beetle, which drops out of consideration as irrelevant. All that matters to following a rule is "what's being conveyed" or one's words and actions.

It doesn't matter how it is "internalized". That is irrelevant to following the rule. — Luke

Who decides? :chin:

I don't. What's internalized (or internal) is the beetle, which drops out of consideration as irrelevant. All that matters to following a rule is "what's being conveyed" or one's words and actions. — Luke

Huh who decides?

What — Luke

Typooooo

It doesn't matter how it is "internalized". That is irrelevant to following the rule.
— Luke

Who decides? :chin: — schopenhauer1

To begin with, those who teach you the rules, the game or the language "decide" - that is, show you what the practice is or how to play. Later, other players/speakers may also correct you or remind you of the rules. Or you might correct or remind them. Maybe a referee or a rule book or an authority will decide. Some may be incapable of learning the game/language. Some might not want to play along.

I don't. What's internalized (or internal) is the beetle, which drops out of consideration as irrelevant. All that matters to following a rule is "what's being conveyed" or one's words and actions.
— Luke

Huh who decides? — schopenhauer1

Nobody decides this. We are unable to verify anyone else's private, internal beetle, so we can only judge whether another has followed the rule based on their ("external") behaviour.

Nobody decides this. We are unable to verify anyone else's private, internal beetle, so we can only judge whether another has followed the rule based on their ("external") behaviour. — Luke

How is anything “external”?
As I said:

Individuals may still just think they are confirming some thing, but one can still be a skeptic about all of it. You can’t just say common sense or refer to the other person because that can just be an individuals representation. The beetle is still in the box. — schopenhauer1

How is anything “external”? — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by "external"? I mean public, open to view, available for others to verify, not limited to one person's private experiences.

What do you mean by "external"? I mean public, open to view, available for others to verify, not limited to one person's private experiences. — Luke

Others are verifying…right so no it goes to others verifying. Now, when they verify, is it their own representation of what’s right or wrong, or do they have access to something outside their own representation?

P1: I say yes

P2: I see this and say yes

P3: me too!


Persons 1-3 are an entity unto itself or is each one verifying by judging with their own representation?

Others are verifying…right so no it goes to others verifying. Now, when they verify, is it their own representation of what’s right or wrong, or do they have access to something outside their own representation? — schopenhauer1

I've already answered this. They have access to something outside their own representation:

Individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas are not hidden and private; they are expressed publicly. One's public expression can be demonstrated to be inconsistent with the accepted practice that is called "following the rule". — Luke

How is this outside their own representation? What can that mean?

Whence rules etc… outside of one’s representation


You can only go to incredulity (common sense etc)

How is this outside their own representation? What can that mean? — schopenhauer1

202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. — PI 202

If the practice called "following the rule" wasn't outside of one's own representation, then there would be no difference between thinking one was following a rule and following it.

I'm not going to keep going around in circles on this.

If the practice called "following the rule" wasn't outside of one's own representation, then there would be no difference between thinking one was following a rule and following it.

I'm not going to keep going around in circles on this. — Luke

How can one claim one was following it? Verifying by another representation. There’s no getting outside representation.

Practice isn’t a magic word

How can one claim one was following it? Verifying by another representation suv. There’s no getting outside representation — schopenhauer1

A second ago you were asking about getting outside of one's own representation. Now you are asking about getting outside of everyone's representations. Which is it?

It's our practices, our rules, our games, our language. Calling all of these "our representations" makes them seem like some communal, shared idea, rather than our practices and actions in the world. I don't see the benefit or truth in calling them all "representations".

A second ago you were asking about getting outside of one's own representation. Now you are asking about getting outside of everyone's representations. Which is it?

It's our practices, our rules, our games, our language. Calling all of these "our representations" makes them seem like some communal, shared idea, rather than our practices and actions in the world. I don't see the benefit or truth in caliing them all "representations". — Luke

Oh I wasnt meaning to say “our representation” but rather “my representation”, however that applies

Oh I wasnt meaning to say “our representation” bit rather “my representation”, however that applies — schopenhauer1

Well, I've answered that. I'll leave you to your private language.

Well, I've answered that. I'll leave you to your private language. — Luke

You cannot prove beyond “my representation” without foundation.

That means language games / forms of life need an overriding theory but perhaps that violates his need for not relying on “certainty” :snicker:

I'm suggesting that the state of affairs is itself made, or perhaps, presupposed, by the language game; that it is fundamental that things are considered to be so-and-so in order that the game occur. — Banno

Is this the position of Antirealism?

IE, if someone says "bring me the slab", are you saying:

1) the state of affairs that there is a slab in the world is made by using the word "slab" in language. IE, the sentence "bring me a slab" creates a slab in the world.

2) the state of affairs that there is a slab in the world is presupposed when using the word "slab" in language. IE, there must be a slab in the world before being able to say "bring me a slab".

Don’t you know Witt, can’t be categorized silly. His philosophy just is…,

Many philosophers have taken ‘I remember the connection right’ to mean ‘I use “S” when and only when I really have S’. They then take Wittgenstein’s argument to be based on scepticism about memory: how can you be sure that you have remembered aright when next you call a sensation ‘S’? …

Critics of Wittgenstein have found the argument, so interpreted, quite unconvincing. Surely, they say, the untrustworthiness of memory presents no more and no less a problem for the user of a private language than for the user of a public one. No, Wittgenstein’s defenders have said, for memory-mistakes about public objects may be corrected, memory-mistakes about private sensations cannot; and where correction is impossible, talk of correctness is out of place. At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too. (Kenny[ 1973] pp. 191–2) — SEP - Private Language

I’d only add that I don’t even get the arbitrary stopping at private. If there’s no foundational criteria, public cases cannot truly be “corrected” either. Or perhaps put differently, correction itself is not an indicator of right/valid/true. The correction can always be wrong etc.

Just using Wittgenstein against himself perhaps, what if every person in the community had an idea wrong such that every correction was actually never correct. How would you know any differently than the private sensation case? Diving in further in skepticism, how do you know that every supposedly public correction is not distorted by one’s own view? At some point you can keep drilling downward and you start getting to Decartes Demon again. Using public or practice or community as a way out doesn’t suffice.

Don’t you know Witt, can’t be categorized — schopenhauer1

As the IEP article Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) writes:
Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of theories in philosophy. This does not prove that he practised what he preached, but it should give us pause.

Though the famous PI 43 does very much sound like a theory:
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

pause.

Though the famous PI 43 does very much sound like a theory:
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. — RussellA

Schrodinger’s theory perhaps? It is both a theory and not a theory. It is immune to all categorization. It is above all such attempts. It is special and unique, you can’t contain it in such crass terms. Read that with eye rolling.

Plotinus article on the One:

For Plotinus, the first principle of reality is "the One", an utterly simple, ineffable, unknowable subsistence which is both the creative source of the Universe and the teleological end of all existing things. — Wiki Neoplatonism

It is both a theory and not a theory. — schopenhauer1

Yes, the phrase "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" is more a theory encompassed in a metaphor, as is "“theory of evolution by natural selection.”

As the National Library of Medicine in the USA wrote:
Metaphors in biology and ecology are so ubiquitous that we have to some extent become blind to their existence. We are inundated with metaphorical language, such as genetic “blueprints,” ecological “footprints,” “invasive” species, “agents” of infectious disease, “superbugs,” “food chains,” “missing links,” and so on.

Wittgenstein may be read the same way, metaphorically rather than literally.

Just curious, what’s your take on this?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/841611

In the Tractatus, the picture stood between the state of affairs and the proposition. — Banno

In the Tractatus the proposition is a picture of a state of affairs, not something between a state of affairs and the proposition.

What the later Wittgenstein rejects is the logical connection between the picture and reality, not that we form pictures of how things are:

115. A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.

Here he is not rejecting pictures but this picture.

Pictures continue to have an important place in the later Wittgenstein, in both a positive and negative way.

424. The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But what is its application? Think of the picture of blindness as a darkness in the mind or in the head of a blind person.

What is at issue here is not the picture but the application:

423. Certainly all these things happen in you. - And now just let me understand the expression we use. - The picture is there. And I am not disputing its validity in particular cases. - Only let me now understand its application.

Consider the following:

143 ... I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this sequence of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things. (Indian mathematicians: “Look at this!”)

In Zettel Wittgenstein we find the following:

461. ... (I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.)

Despite significant changes the Tractarian theme of seeing and saying are still at work. It is sometimes the case that a proposition stands in the way of seeing things.

PI 66 To repeat: don’t think, but look!