I think you’re right. But the question for me is: upon what grounds should I stand? Making sense of “what is there” seems to me paramount, and not entirely fruitless.

Making sense of “what is there” seems to me paramount, and not entirely fruitless. — NOS4A2

Agreed. As I noted, for me, metaphysics, along with epistemology, is what really matters about philosophy.

We can only know of the world in-itself through logical limitations and consequences. Namely, some "thing" must be there. But beyond that, everything is a model we create that attempts to represent what is there. Knowledge is the the logical application of our representations for our best chance at matching to the consequences of its existence. But such an existence can only be known as the representations we hold, as we only know how the thing in-itself impacts the world, not what it truly is to exist as itself unobserved — Philosophim

“Logical”, “model”, “representation”. I just want to point out that these concepts get their sense from to a particular sort of metaphysical foundation. If we shifted to a different metaphysics, we could find ourselves putting into question the assumed priority of logical, representational modeling as our fundamental mode of access to the world.

According to The Philosopher,

"...yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience...and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the "why" and the cause."

Metaphysics, Book I, 981a (25-30).

Hello 180 Proof,

No, definitely not. By analogy, for instance, the rules – generalizations abstracted from design (logical) space – for valid moves in chess (e.g. metaphysics) are not "over-arching means of determining" winning strategies for playing chess (e.g. physical theories).

Would you say, then, that metaphysics is informed by physics, and never vice-versa?

Irregardless, if metaphysics is the “abstracted design” of experience, then it should never make any ontological claims but, rather, merely provide models of that experience; for how could an abstraction from experience necessarily pertain to that which is beyond it?

Hello Manuel,

Constrained in relation to what?

Constrained by our possible forms of experience: space and time. Just because I experience the outer world in space and time, it does not follow that they exist in the outer world itself; nor that anything I derive from my experience, which is conditioned by them, pertains to anything beyond it. Instead, it only holds valid insofar as it references a possible experience from a being which has a similar ‘type’ of experience as myself.

Also, experience of what?

The world in the sense of whatever transcends experience, if anything, of which I call ‘the absolute’. It is the ‘whole’, the totality of existence, etc.

Absolutely sense-data or sensations or however you want to call it, is fundamental to any metaphysics.

That you sense, is something one empirically discovers; which is thusly conditioned by the forms of space and time of which one (or another person that one trusts) used to experience that empirical evidence.

In other words, I only know I have sensations which get interpreted into perception, according to the standard model of human biology, by collective empirical studies of organisms; all of which are conditioned by the possible forms of human experience. Take away those forms, and there is nothing intelligible left to speak of.

I think the minimum requirement of agreement should be, that metaphysics is about the world.

I agree, if by ‘about the world’ you take it to mean that one is deriving what the world fundamentally is in-itself: knowledge of the absolute, the whole, the totality of existence, that which transcends you, ontology, etc.

Someone who calls themselves a materialist or an idealist use evidence all the time, they'll say that, for example, the collapse of wave function counts as evidence for idealism, or they'll say that the progress of neuroscientific evidence proves materialism is correct.

That is fair, and I agree that they do try to ground their metaphysical commitments in empirical data; however, upon closer inspection, are they successful? No: these empirical claims are still conditioned by our pure forms of experience (namely space and time): without them, the claim becomes unintelligible. Thusly, the claim that “idealism/physicalism is true” is not universally valid, if granted as true on the empirical grounds, but rather constrained to the possibility of experience. So, in other words, the ontological claims get stripped out, and what is left is the claim that we have reasons to consider the world that we experience as idealistic or physicalist (or what not) and not that the world in-itself actually is any of those.

So, you'd have to specify a bit, what you mean by not having an ounce of empirical data. As I see it, experience must count as empirical content, otherwise we are using the word "empirical" to mean, "publicly observable", these are not the same thing.

Hopefully my above comments help clarify a bit. If not, then please let me know. Likewise, I agree that experience is empirical content.

Sounds as if some kind of model-centric version would count as part of metaphysics for you. Because saying "model of possible experience" without specifying what this relates to, doesn't amount to much, so far as I can see.

I guess I am not entirely following: the model relates to possible experience. Metaphysics, as the study of what which is beyond the possibility of experience, is ontological in nature. For me, a model is not an ontology: the former is a map for navigation, which may or may not be accurate to the territory, and the latter is a theory of what the territory is.

Hello Corvus,

I have nothing to define, but would you not agree that the OP's claim sounds like Metaphysical itself?

I don’t agree, because I am not making claims about that which is beyond the possibility of experience. However, since the term is somewhat muddied these days, I will grant that many people consider the negation of metaphysics to be metaphysics, which doesn’t make sense to me. For example:

"X is unknowable." is also a Metaphysical comment.

The claim of agnosticism about that which is beyond the possibility of experience is not itself a claim about that which is beyond the possibility of experience, just as the claim of agnosticism about God’s existence is not the denial of God’s existence.

Because if it were Science, they will make up some hypothesis on the object they want to find out.

I wouldn’t say that something is either scientific or metaphysical: I think that’s a false dilemma.

Hello T Clark,

For me, metaphysics it's the most important part of philosophy. My objection to your OP is that you attempt to discredit metaphysics using a definition that I, and most philosophers, don't believe is correct.

If you have a different definition, then let’s hear it: I am more than happy to entertain other definitions. On my end, I am using the definition used in the Kantian tradition, as well as Leibniz and many before him.

Hello Philosophim,

I've noted before I generally do not use philosophical terms such as 'metaphysics' in discussions, because as you can see from the many replies, no one can agree what they actually mean.

Apparently so! I didn’t expect the semantics behind ‘metaphysics’ to be such a pinnacle aspect of the conversation.

I mainly agree with your response, but let me highlight some of the subtle disagreements:

We can only know of the world in-itself through logical limitations and consequences. Namely, some "thing" must be there

This is my fault, as I have been using the “world in-itself” terminology to refer to whatever exists beyond one’s experience, but I actually distinguish the “world in-itself” from “the absolute”: the former is actually a product of the model wherein organisms are thought to represent the world, and the latter is whatever exists completely sans anything we gain from our experience. The subtle difference, and contention I would have with your above quote, is that we cannot know, independently of evidence gathered from our experience (which is constrained by our possible forms of experience), that we represent objects in a space and time that transcends us: takeaway the forms of our experience (namely space and time that doesn’t transcend us) and it equally unintelligible that there is some “thing” out there. In other words, some “thing” being out there is a part of a model itself as well.

If you recall the idea of "discrete experience", we part and parcel reality as we wish within our own minds. I can view a field of grass, a blade of grass, or a piece of grass. I do not even need to call it "grass". It is the applications of these identities in practice which determine their usefulness in representing how a thing in-itself impacts the world in a way that is not-contradicted by its existence.

To build off of this, I would say that our “discrete experience” of the objects, such as blades of grass, says nothing about what may exist in the world which transcends our possible forms: not even that there is a blade of grass—irregardless of what we label it.

Just wanted to chime in at how I thought this was a really great post!

As always, I appreciate your responses!

On my end, I am using the definition used in the Kantian tradition, as well as Leibniz and many before him. — Bob Ross

I'm not a Kant scholar, but I've read "Critique of Pure Reason." I don't remember it saying anything like "metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imagination." I doubt that it did and I doubt that Kant thought it. I can't speak to Leibnitz, but I would be surprised if he felt that way.

If you have a different definition, then let’s hear it: I am more than happy to entertain other definitions. — Bob Ross

I'm not interested in discussing my or anyone else's definition of "metaphysics" except to point out that you are basing your argument on a non-standard definition of the word.

Nuff said.

I'm not a Kant scholar, but I've read "Critique of Pure Reason." I don't remember it saying anything like "metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imagination." I doubt that it did and I doubt that Kant thought it. I can't speak to Leibnitz, but I would be surprised if he felt that way. — T Clark

How do people arrive at metaphysical conjectures if not via imagining them?

Constrained by our possible forms of experience: space and time. Just because I experience the outer world in space and time, it does not follow that they exist in the outer world itself; nor that anything I derive from my experience, which is conditioned by them, pertains to anything beyond it. Instead, it only holds valid insofar as it references a possible experience from a being which has a similar ‘type’ of experience as myself. — Bob Ross

Astronomical and physics based evidence suggests otherwise, if you take these sciences seriously, you have to seriously consider that the external world exists. Not to mention archeological evidence. Yes, all these sciences are constrained by our modes of cognition, but when our cognition coincides with aspects of the external world, we get a science.

If that's not enough, or if you think this is not firm enough foundation, then, the only sense which I think cannot be "thought away", is solidity or impenetrability. Everything else is could be modified.

I agree, if by ‘about the world’ you take it to mean that one is deriving what the world fundamentally is in-itself: knowledge of the absolute, the whole, the totality of existence, that which transcends you, ontology, etc. — Bob Ross

That's part of it. It was part of what motivated Aristotle and Descartes, but notice that for neither of these two, was it ever possible to do metaphysics without epistemology. So either we assert, full stop, that we cannot know anything about the external world, or we say that some aspects we can tease out, most of them we cannot.

Or at least, that's how it looks to me. As for fundamental, sure, but this is a "game" we can play infinitely: no that is not fundamental, it is this, etc.

So, in other words, the ontological claims get stripped out, and what is left is the claim that we have reasons to consider the world that we experience as idealistic or physicalist (or what not) and not that the world in-itself actually is any of those. — Bob Ross

I mean, I think they are, if defended properly. But we have to be somewhat realistic, we cannot attain the kind of certainty you are looking for, that is, one that defeats skepticism about these topics. That's kind of what makes it fun, see which argument makes most sense to us.

But it's not definitive, nothing in knowledge is, so far as we can see.

I guess I am not entirely following: the model relates to possible experience. Metaphysics, as the study of what which is beyond the possibility of experience, is ontological in nature. For me, a model is not an ontology: the former is a map for navigation, which may or may not be accurate to the territory, and the latter is a theory of what the territory is. — Bob Ross

But then by definition, we cannot say what metaphysics is, because it is beyond all possible experience.

My point was simple, we have a model, which we use to navigate the world as is given to us. If there was no world, we wouldn't need a model. One needs the other. But again, "ultimate ends", are not things we can attain.

Would you say, then, that metaphysics is informed by physics, and never vice-versa? — Bob Ross

No. Yes.

... for how could an abstraction from experience necessarily pertain to that which is beyond it?

Inferences from factual, or natural, axioms (i.e. physics) are sound. Inferences with "beyond" premises (e.g. magic, myths, ideals), whether or not they are valid, cannot be sound. Metaphysics is rational, at best, and itself is never theoretical (i.e. explanatory of nature). E.g. 'interpretations' of QM are metaphysical (re: ontology), not epistemological (i.e. predictive, or conclusive)³ – in Aristotlean terms they 'come after (i.e. categorical generalizations from, or (as per Collingwood) absolute presuppositions of)¹ the physics'. This is why Spinoza's scientia intuitiva¹ (holistic, nondual) follows from common ideas³ (objective) which in turn follow from inadequate, or imaginary, ideas² (subjective) – the latter two e.g. as per Peirce/Dewey. Of course, there are other 'interpretations of metaphysics' but I find them either less rational (i.e. unsound, anachronistic)² or irrational (i.e. invalid, faith-based / idealist / subjectivist aka "X-of-the-gaps").

:up:

How do people arrive at metaphysical conjectures if not via imagining them? — Janus

The same way they do any other ideas - thinking, using intuition, or reasoning.

Metaphysics is rational, at best, and itself is never theoretical (i.e. explanatory of nature). E.g. 'interpretations' of QM are metaphysical (re: ontology), not epistemological (i.e. predictive, or conclusive)³ – in Aristotlean terms they 'come after (i.e. categorical generalizations from, or (as per Collingwood) absolute presuppositions of)¹ the physics'. This is why Spinoza's scientia intuitiva¹ follows from common ideas³ which in turn follow from imaginary (inadequate) ideas² (the latter two e.g. as per Peirce/Dewey). Of course, there are other 'interpretations of metaphysics' but I find them less rational (i.e. unsound, anachronistic)² or irrational (i.e. invalid, faith-based / idealist / subjectivist). — 180 Proof

I'm not a Kant scholar, but I've read "Critique of Pure Reason." I don't remember it saying anything like "metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imagination." I doubt that it did and I doubt that Kant thought it. I can't speak to Leibnitz, but I would be surprised if he felt that way.

You are confusing my definition with what I claimed about the practice itself: I never said that 'metaphysics' is defined as "the study of that which is indistinguishable from human imagination". I said it is "the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience". In terms of Kant, this can be found in his work (as a presupposition) and explicitly (as well). For example:

First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already lies in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principlesb of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositionsc or basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology

– (Prolegomena, p. 60, Section 1).

The same way they do any other ideas - thinking, using intuition, or reasoning. — T Clark

That leaves me wondering what you think thinking or intuition is, other than exercising the imagination.

:cool:

From CPR

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must already underlie them [dazu muß die Vorstellung des Raumes schon zum Grunde liegen]. Therefore, the representation of space cannot be obtained through experience from the relations of outer appearance; this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation...

...Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is an a priori representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances. — Kant

He says similar things about time. Is it your position that space and time are illegitimate concepts?

I am not sure if the OP's definition on Metaphysics is formally accepted by the public and academics. Metaphysics doesn't use imagination and conjectures all the time as its investigative methods.

For instance, Kant's Metaphysics arrives at its conclusions via rigorous logical arguments. Aristotle's Metaphysics analyses the abstract concepts and universals again via logic. I don't see any imagination there at all. Plato creates the new world of ideas and forms again with the supporting arguments.

Modern Metaphysics has evolved into working with Epistemology, Theology, Ethics and Science, and it asks and investigates the topics these subjects cannot deal with or ask, such as the "why" questions.

The OP's unorthodox definition of Metaphysics seems to lead to the bizarre conclusion with the extreme view discarding the valuable aspects of the studies which are actually essential and important in Philosophy.

If you start trying to wrap your head around the emergence of physical properties as the manifestation of pointer states in the process of the decoherence of quantum superposition from the web of entanglement it is hard not to think that you're thinking in metaphysical terms. From a purely operational perspective. Imagination certainly enters into it as there's not much resemblance to any 'ordinary' descriptions of reality, but it also apparently involves what we experience as consciousness and the nature of the universe. I'd say metaphysics pretty much sums it up, for now.

This is my fault, as I have been using the “world in-itself” terminology to refer to whatever exists beyond one’s experience, but I actually distinguish the “world in-itself” from “the absolute”: the former is actually a product of the model wherein organisms are thought to represent the world, and the latter is whatever exists completely sans anything we gain from our experience. — Bob Ross

Not a worry. We can only communicate within the model, so you must use a model. This is a fine way to use the model to describe the unknowable existence that we model on.

The subtle difference, and contention I would have with your above quote, is that we cannot know, independently of evidence gathered from our experience (which is constrained by our possible forms of experience), that we represent objects in a space and time that transcends us: takeaway the forms of our experience (namely space and time that doesn’t transcend us) and it equally unintelligible that there is some “thing” out there. In other words, some “thing” being out there is a part of a model itself as well. — Bob Ross

Yes, it is a subtle difference, but I believe I understand and agree that we cannot know and communicate anything apart from the model. The model is the creation of an identity, and the application of that identity without contradiction. The way we can "know" the absolute, is truly as that which contradicts, or does not contradict the model we create. Its lack of contradiction does not mean the model captures the absolute, only that it can exist within, as a part of the absolute. The removal of most of the model leaves us with "things-in themselves" of which we are "things-in-ourselves" as well. The entire removal of the model leaves the absolute, of which we are a part of as well. It is of course very tricky to communicate the notion of something which exists outside of the model, as we are limited to thinking and communicating within the model, so I hope my words are read as in accord with your statement, and not against.

To build off of this, I would say that our “discrete experience” of the objects, such as blades of grass, says nothing about what may exist in the world which transcends our possible forms: not even that there is a blade of grass—irregardless of what we label it. — Bob Ross

Absolutely. It is only through the proper application of these discrete experiences that we can determine whether these are allowed to exist without contradiction within the absolute. The discrete experiences are of course always allowed to exist. It is their application which may or may not be contradicted, but this contradiction is for the model, not an expression of what the absolute is apart from the model.

“Logical”, “model”, “representation”. I just want to point out that these concepts get their sense from to a particular sort of metaphysical foundation. If we shifted to a different metaphysics, — Joshs

The problem is for me that the word "metaphysics" is a non-descriptive and generic filler in most conversations. "A different metaphysics" just shows that it seems to be a word that is conveniently used to lump a lot of ideas that are not the same together. Similar words like this are "tree" and "good". They can be useful words, but in philosophical conversation in which we are trying to come to an objective solution to a problem, these words have so much cultural subjectivity loaded into them that their meaning become debates within a debate.

When having a discussion that needs clarity, we should remove such words where possible to focus on the true issue we wish to discuss. As such, it is best to just point out the specific idea that is in one of the many "different metaphysics", and point that out instead of using the word as a whole in any meaningful argument.

Why only, "through logical limitations and consequences"? Could you elaborate?

I'd be more inclined to say, that we can only know the world through our nature, and the nature of other people, including the imaginitive thinking of our intellectual ancestors who managed to point the way towards having a more accurate view of nature, and... and... and...

Is that contradictory? — wonderer1

I appreciate the question, but I do not want to distract from Bob's thread. Bob understands the reference I am pointing to, as we have discussed many times. If you are interested in exploring what I mean, feel free to read and ask me questions in this thread here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

:up:

They can be useful words, but in philosophical conversation in which we are trying to come to an objective solution to a problem, these words have so much cultural subjectivity loaded into them that their meaning become debates within a debate… When having a discussion that needs clarity, we should remove such words where possible to focus on the true issue we wish to discuss.
— Philosophim

What about words like worldview, cultural subjectivity, formulation of problems, perspective, frame of reference, bias, set of presuppositions, paradigm? If we dont remind ourselves that objective solutions to problems are true, factual and objective only in relation to the way problems are formulated, and that the formulation of the nature of problems is not itself amenable to scrutiny in terms of objective truth, then we fool ourselves into believing that objective truth can somehow transcend the cultural relativity and contingency of problem formulation.
Furthermore, focusing on objective solutions to problems often ends up marginalize those who don’t come into the conversation with the same set of presuppositions.

:cool::ok:

What about words like worldview, cultural subjectivity, formulation of problems, perspective, frame of reference, bias, set of presuppositions, paradigm? — Joshs

That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about using specific, clear, and unambiguous words in your discussions so that the debate can remain about the topic of the debate, and not about a word in the debate where possible.