It's trying to talk about stuff about which we cannot talk... — Banno

I will take issue with this. The basic thrust of the OP is to point out that in the 'experience of the world', the objective domain is not simply and unambiguously given. It points out the way our mind/brain construes the nature of the external world. As I've said, there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.

As I say in the OP, there is a sense in which nothing can be said about the world outside any knowledge or experience of it - but that does not prohibit analytical reflection on the question of the role of the mind or brain in the construction of our experience of the world. It needs to be understood what the argument is against. It is against the common presumption that 'the world makes mind' - that the mind is a product of or output of what are presumed to be the (purely) physical processes that purportedly drive evolution (a.k.a. 'evolutionary materialism). The default view of naturalism is that 'the subject' is, at once, simply the consequence of these purported causes, and also outside the domain of what can be known (whence 'eliminativism'). Phenomenology and other forms of (mainly European) philosophy are highlighting that, whereas your Anglo-American analytical philosophers on the whole would rather not. That's the only reason why you say 'we cannot talk'.....

(By the way, googling for the source of the quote that Josh provided above, I happened upon this pdf from the erudite and charming Michel Bitbol, a French - therefore continental! - philosopher of science - Is Consciousness Primary?)

Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. — Wayfarer

This can easily be misconstrued to be claiming that mind is in some absolute sense ontologically fundamental, rather than it being taken to be simply pointing out that what we mean by "the world" is 'the world as it appears to, and is understood by, us".

Or to put it another way the only reality we can imagine and talk about is a relational reality. but it doesn't follow that without humans nothing would exist. That is merely an imaginable possibility, as is the possibility that things have an utterly mind-independent existence, even if we obviously cannot imagine how that existence is.

Indeed. Or perhaps de manu?

I will take issue with this. — Wayfarer

Nothing could please me more. This seems to be pivotal:

(Wayfarer's argument) is against the common presumption that 'the world makes mind' - that the mind is a product of or output of what are presumed to be the (purely) physical processes that purportedly drive evolution — Wayfarer

There's your primacy of consciousness.

The demand is that either everything is physical, and mind somehow emerges therefrom; or that everything is mind, and the physical little more than a pattern. What puzzles me is why we feel obligated to phrase the discussion in these terms; why the juxtaposition?


(That juxtaposition, it seems, underpins the Bitbol paper you cite.)

why the juxtaposition? — Banno

Just my two cents but scientific naturalism doesn't allow for something akin to panpsychism.

Its purely relational equivalent of pansemiosis is all pattern and no qualities.

The next problem is that of emergence. Things like downward causation seem like an illegal move, a sui generis.

All emergent properties are known by an observational setting. How the observation itself comes out of emergence seems an odd difference from other kinds of emergence.

The homunculus fallacy allows people to posit hidden dualisms.

Theories of illusion don't even get at the problem itself, just renames it.

Or to put it another way the only reality we can imagine and talk about is a relational reality. but it doesn't follow that without humans nothing would exist. — Janus

I’m careful to explain that I’m not claiming that things go into and out of existence depending on whether they’re being perceived, but that, absent an observer, whatever exists is unintelligible and meaningless as a matter of fact and principle. Again, that even if you imagine an empty universe, you still introduce an implicit perspective. I said, of course there are unseen objects and empty rooms with nobody in them, but that is something one observer (myself) is saying to another (you).

The demand is that either everything is physical, and mind somehow emerges therefrom; or that everything is mind, and the physical little more than a pattern. What puzzles me is why we feel obligated to phrase the discussion in these terms; why the juxtaposition? — Banno

Physicalism is monistic - it says that there is nothing other than matter-energy. (And I have wondered whether that in its modern form is because it descended from monotheism - 'the jealous god dies hard'.)

Note I said at the outset that I’m not proposing mind as a literal constituent, that things are ‘made from mind’ as yachts from wood or statues from marble. So saying 'everything is mind' is not necessarily isomorphic to saying that 'everything is matter (or matter-energy)'. I think that's the distinction between 'epistemic' and 'ontological' idealism - that mind is the condition by which we know anything at all, which is not quite the same as saying that everything is mind, if you can see the distinction.

As for the juxtaposition - I do believe that there is a real conflict going on, a contest between the materialist attitude and its challengers. That that is what is behind the 'culture wars'.

You remember the brouhaha when Thomas Nagel published Mind and Cosmos?

Ok. I don't see how to respond; I don't see how this relates to what I wrote.

Ok. I don't see how to respond; I don't see how this relates to what I wrote. — Banno

The demand is that either everything is physical, and mind somehow emerges therefrom; or that everything is mind, and the physical little more than a pattern. What puzzles me is why we feel obligated to phrase the discussion in these terms; why the juxtaposition? — Banno

You asked, I answered why the juxtoposition. I am explaining the juxtoposition.. meaning, presumably why we can't (seemingly) have both.

I’m careful to explain that I’m not claiming that things go into and out of existence depending on whether they’re being perceived, but that, absent an observer, whatever exists is unintelligible and meaningless as a matter of fact and principle. — Wayfarer

Very clear. When there is no observer at a site then none of the derived features of the site brought into play by a human mind exist.

Very clear. When there is no observer at a site then none of the derived features of the site brought into play by a human mind exist. — jgill

Drop the mic. Everything is solved.

Physicalism is monistic - it says that there is nothing other than matter-energy. — Wayfarer

If we instead said that physics talks about matter and energy and stuff like that, we wouldn't be surprised to find that physics tells us little about jealousy and democracy and stuff like that. A different area of study, with different concerns. Folk who claim love is nothing but oxytocin don't have much of a grasp of love.

You asked, I answered why the juxtoposition. — schopenhauer1

I'm not seeing that you did provide any such answer. Sorry. Thanks for trying.

I'm not seeing that you did provide any such answer. Sorry. Thanks for trying. — Banno

I believe I did.

When there is no observer at a site then none of the derived features of the site brought into play by a human mind exist. — jgill

I will add, though, that for many purposes, it can be presumed that events will run their course as if it makes no difference whether or not there is an observer. That was what was meant by the 'mind-indepedence' of the objects of physics and chemistry, and it was very much presumed by the mechanistic model of the Universe - set in motion by the deist God of Newton, forever to run on its pre-determined course according to mechanical laws.

But that was all called into question by the 1920's discoveries of quantum physics, where the act of observation suddently became relevant to the observed experimental outcome. That is why Einstein felt compelled to ask the question (rather plaintively, I feel) 'Do you really believe the moon isn't there when nobody looks?'

So I wouldn't downplay the implications of 'mind-dependence' or its contrary.

If we instead said that physics talks about matter and energy and stuff like that, we wouldn't be surprised to find that physics tells us little about jealousy and democracy and stuff like that. — Banno

I'm attempting a philosophical critique of why it doesn't.

I do believe that there is a real conflict going on, a contest between the materialist attitude and its challengers. That that is what is behind the 'culture wars'. — Wayfarer

Sure. That doesn't mean that the conflict is about anything substantive - so to speak.

I’m careful to explain that I’m not claiming that things go into and out of existence depending on whether they’re being perceived, but that, absent an observer, whatever exists is unintelligible and meaningless as a matter of fact and principle. — Wayfarer

So do we agree that the cup, unobserved in the cupboard, still has a handle? I'm going to take it that we do, that the cup in the cupboard is not the sort of thing that you are talking about as "absent an observer".

Then what is it that is "unintelligible"? Aren't you just saying that saying something requires a sayer? That thinking requires a thinker? Sure, why not.

But you seem to think you are saying something else, in between that the unobserved cup has a handle and that thinking implies a thinker. And here I'm at a loss.

So do we agree that the cup, unobserved in the cupboard, still has a handle? — Banno

Which cup? Presumably you have one in mind.

I'm attempting a philosophical critique of why it doesn't. — Wayfarer

Good. I like Mary Midgley's suggestion that they are simply different topics. But I also like Davidson's idea that what's true in one topic, if it can be translated into another, must be true there as well.

Now there's a genuine philosophical puzzle.

It used to be the red one. But pick any cup you like.

It used to be the red one. But pick any cup you like. — Banno

I would have to have one in mind.

I like Mary Midgley's suggestion that they are simply different topics. — Banno

Her 'Evolution as a Religion' is a favourite.

Evolutionary Overreach: Midgley suggests that some scientists and science popularizers overreach by making broad philosophical or moral claims based on evolutionary theory. They treat evolution not just as a biological theory but as a complete worldview or ideology.

"Just-so" Stories: Midgley critiques certain evolutionary explanations, especially in the realm of sociobiology, as being akin to Rudyard Kipling's "just-so" stories – speculative narratives that seem more about confirming existing biases than rigorous scientific explanations.

Science vs. Religion: One of the book's main themes is that the discourse around evolution is heavily influenced by an unnecessary and damaging conflict between science and religion. This conflict is perpetuated by figures on both sides who treat science and religion as mutually exclusive domains.

Moral and Philosophical Implications: Midgley asserts that the implications of evolutionary theory have been overstretched by some proponents to make broad moral or philosophical claims, often with nihilistic or deterministic overtones.

Critique of Reductionism: A recurrent theme in Midgley's work, including this book, is her criticism of reductionism – the idea that complex phenomena can be completely understood in terms of their simplest components. She argues that while reductionist methods are useful in many scientific contexts, they are not suited for understanding human nature and morality.

Scientism as Religion: Midgley suggests that the dogmatic belief in a purely scientific worldview, often at the expense of other forms of knowledge or understanding, can become a kind of secular religion in itself.

Complexity of Life: Midgley emphasizes that life, particularly human life, is complex and cannot be boiled down to simple deterministic laws or principles.

Just my cup of tea.

Yep, wonderful stuff. I support your crusade against the reductionist attitude of the engineers hereabouts. But I don't see the world as a haunted machine, as you seem to.

That's not my motivating metaphor. But never mind, I think I've about done my quota for today.

Fair enough, Been a long session, Very soggy outside, so no gardening. Think the rain is heading your way.

I don't see how it applies. The form of idealist philosophy that I'm advocating does not say that 'the world only exists in your mind'. — Wayfarer

Sure.

I'm referring to the mind - yours, mine, the mind that we as a species and culture share.

Yet there is *my* mind, *your* mind, and some minds are superior to other minds. This is my focus.

The mind is not an objective reality, it's not a material thing - yet we can't plausibly deny it! That's the elephant in the room, the fly in the ointment, for naturalism.

I would describe myself as an idealist, but with a concern for the practical everyday implications of idealism.

Besides, I don't think that Buddhist philosophy has a problem with solipsism, because the basis of solipsism is that 'consciousness is mine alone'. What Buddhist would say that?

I was asking how Buddhism overcomes the problem of solipsism. Every epistemic theory worth its salt has to overcome the problem of solipsism somehow, otherwise it falls into it.

I contend that it is not possible to make a case this way
— baker

Like I said, you want to uphold the taboo! Push it behind the curtain, declare it out of bounds.

No. I'm saying that you're trying to do too much with words, that you're trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds. (I'll keep bringing this up for a concise formulation.)

Look at the quote in the next post - that more or less re-states everything the essay says. (By the way, thankyou Josh, that passage really hits the nail on the head.)

Sure. But there is still "my lived experience" vs. "your lived experience" and the question of which is the right one, or at least superior.
We somehow need to account for epistemic individuality as well as epistemic commonality and epistemic normativity.

As I said, we inhabit a pluralistic secular culture which ought not to make such arbitrary exclusions,

And I contend that you're trying to do with words what can only be accomplished with physical actions.

and I believe the Buddhist perspective (which is really not a perspective!)

How is it not a perspective? (Because of your commitment to to it?)

you're trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds — baker

I don’t really accept that. This is a philosophy forum, and the medium of discourse is writing.

you're trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds
— baker

I don’t really accept that. This is a philosophy forum, and the medium of discourse is writing. — Wayfarer

But you hold that the things said, and said here, have an application beyond this forum, do you not?


More about trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds: The very act of joining a lineage, of accepting someone as one's teacher (with all the vows taken, all the bows, prostrations, money given, time spent, the other people witnessing it) has a real cognitive/epistemic effect on and for the person.
This effect can not be replicated merely by thinking about such sumbmission to a teacher, or reading about it.

It's like the difference between actually going to the bank and taking out a loan, signing documents and becoming subject to all the legal and criminal ramifications of having done so, vs. merely thinking about taking out a loan. Or the difference between actually eating an apple and merely thinking about doing so.

It seems that you're trying to get the benefits from Buddhism without really signing up for it. (If you really signed up for it, you wouldn't post here anymore, among other things.)

I often get accused at these forums for arguing ad personam. But this is my point: the things being said are said by someone, by a person, they don't just impersonally appear somehow. One cannot just gloss over this, thinking that a philosophical problem could, should be solved with an impersonal syllogism. Thinking that such a solution exists or should exist already axiomatically presupposes some things that are not self-evidently true or non-controversial (such as that people don't really matter).

[deleted]

I got a notification of mention, by Banno, but I wasn’t even aware of this thread. Dunno how that happens, but anyway…..

Interesting thesis, and well-spoken.

It's trying to talk about stuff about which we cannot talk... — Banno

This assumption that there are things which we cannot talk about is unequivocally defeatist. That shows a very similar attitude to the judgement that there are aspects of reality which are fundamentally unintelligible. Succinctly, it is unphilosophical, and when it's allowed to fester it becomes anti-philosophical.

If we instead said that physics talks about matter and energy and stuff like that, we wouldn't be surprised to find that physics tells us little about jealousy and democracy and stuff like that. A different area of study, with different concerns. Folk who claim love is nothing but oxytocin don't have much of a grasp of love. — Banno

Those with the philosophical mindset, the wonder and desire to know, will inquire as to why it is the case that physics tells us little if anything at all, about things like jealousy and love.

It's one thing to recognize the reality of fundamental differences in the various aspects of reality, and the need to employ completely distinct disciplinary methods to acquire an understanding of these very different aspects, but some of us want to know why such differences are very real.

I'm attempting a philosophical critique of why it doesn't. — Wayfarer

Banno appears to have the attitude that this is something which cannot be talked about, so shut up because you're proving me wrong by talking about it.

Those with the philosophical mindset, the wonder and desire to know, will inquire as to why it is the case that physics tells us little if anything at all, about things like jealousy and love. — Metaphysician Undercover

Those who include scientific inquiry within the philosophical mindset are apt to recognize that the immense complexity of the brain very well explains the fact that physics tells us little about things like jealousy and love.

Well, not really. Physics, with one of its principal subjects being the relations of one thing to another, motions, is actually designed for understanding complexity. So all you are saying is that physics is not sufficient for the task which it is designed for, understanding complexity, because there is a complexity which is too immense for its capacity.

Saying that there is a physical complexity which physics cannot understand, when physics was designed to understand physical complexities, is like saying that despite the fact that the natural numbers are designed to be able to count anything, by being designated as infinite, there is a number which is greater than the capacity of the natural numbers to count. It's simply defeatist.

Instead of addressing the issue, which is the reason why, and proceed toward a real solution, it is to accept defeat.