which chimes with this:The picture theory is abandoned. — Fooloso4
...which you appeared to be rejecting, here: ; especially:This and the text thereabouts lead me to suppose that the picture theory of meaning is itself being rejected here. — Banno
which it seems I had misunderstood...Despite significant changes the Tractarian theme of seeing and saying are still at work — Fooloso4
But Wittgenstein was quite taken by the fact that it can flip from one to other. He discusses this in the Tractatus as well, with regard to a picture of a cube. — Fooloso4
The "common factor" is what is done with the utterance. — Banno
Obviously not. — Banno
The slab does not exist only in the mind, nor only in the world. You seem stuck on this false dichotomy. — Banno
This indicates that a mental image is what one imagines at a particular time, and the description will describe what one imagines at the time. — Luke
it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else — Luke
What Wittgenstein criticises is that the interlocutor "might come to regard a mental image as a superlikeness" with an object. — Luke
Hacker tells us that a mental image is "not a likeness [to its object] at all" since its being a mental image of X "is not determined by its likeness to X". — Luke
it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else
— Luke
I don't agree. Many things can influence our mental images. Two different events can get blurred in the mind. — Fooloso4
What Wittgenstein criticises is that the interlocutor "might come to regard a mental image as a superlikeness" with an object.
— Luke
How is it that he might come to regard it in this way? As I read it, because he assumes that a mental image must be more like its object than any picture. I think just the opposite is true. My mental picture of the house I used to live differs from photographs of it. I trust the photo to be more like the house. — Fooloso4
I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and say: “But surely another person can’t have THIS pain!” — PI 253
Now I remember why I balk when Hacker is mentioned. — Fooloso4
Then the mental image would be an image of the two blurred events and of nothing else. — Luke
I take it he comes to regard it this way for the reasons given at PI 389 — Luke
Your reading - where you trust the picture to be like its object more than you trust the mental image to be like its object - could explain how the interlocutor comes to regard a mental image as a sub-likeness instead of a super-likeness. This might make more sense to you but it is not consistent with the text. — Luke
I'm presenting this hypothetical scenario to critique Wittgenstein's idea that language use is sufficient as a foundation. The main point is to stress the necessity of a robust foundation for language, especially if we claim it's rooted in community or "Form of Life." — schopenhauer1
You being "correct" isn't enough to stop the wheels of the universe turning and neuronal messaging being transmitted and societies going on their daily business. — Apustimelogist
Hacker tells us that a mental image is "not a likeness [to its object] at all" since its being a mental image of X "is not determined by its likeness to X". — Luke
What I am getting from this post mainly is that things like "forms of life" lack some kind of inflated metaphysical underpinning or something, but concepts like this and games more or less just refer to our behavior in which we use words. There doesn't need to be anything else unless you want to really get into the neurobiological causes of that. I mean, I think Wittgenstein is much closer to jettisoning the idea of reified meaning rather than trying to establish some rigorous explanatory theory. — Apustimelogist
Let me know if you want me to help you put the toys back in the pram. — Apustimelogist
The mental image of this refers to the one object it is an image of. Two blurred objects or events is a counterexample. — Fooloso4
367. A mental image is the image which is described when someone describes what he imagines. — PI 367
Your reading - where you trust the picture to be like its object more than you trust the mental image to be like its object - could explain how the interlocutor comes to regard a mental image as a sub-likeness instead of a super-likeness. This might make more sense to you but it is not consistent with the text.
— Luke
The interlocutor comes to regard it as a super-likeness because he assumes that it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this object and of nothing else. I think the interlocutor is wrong and I gave some reasons why. You think Wittgenstein agrees with the interlocutor's assumption, I don't. — Fooloso4
Hacker tells us that a mental image is "not a likeness [to its object] at all" since its being a mental image of X "is not determined by its likeness to X".
— Luke
This is like saying a photo of X is not a likeness of X at all since it being a photo of X is not determined by its likeness to X. — Fooloso4
So too, our mental images of X may to varying degrees and in various ways capture a likeness of X. — Fooloso4
"it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else." — Luke
I don't see why the mental image must correspond to any object. — Luke
389. “A mental image must be more like its object than any picture.
Your requirement that the mental image must be of one object presupposes that it can correspond or be compared to some object. — Luke
However, this need not imply that Wittgenstein rejects the interlocutor's statement that "it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else". — Luke
Do you therefore think it follows that a picture has a superlikeness to its object, — Luke
A photo of X may to varying degrees and in various ways capture a likeness of X. — Fooloso4
or is the idea of a "superlikeness" irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point here? — Luke
Is his point simply that there is no distinction between a picture and a mental image? — Luke
On my reading, a mental image is unlike a picture because a mental image can only be "the image of this and of nothing else", — Luke
" refer to?this
I view Wittgenstein as being critical of the interlocutor's inference that the mental image is any sort of likeness; that there can be any correspondence between a private (undescribed) mental image and its object. — Luke
A photo is a picture; a mental image is not. — Luke
If you were to describe your mental image, then maybe we could compare it to the object and find out how closely it resembles its object, but a mental image cannot be compared to its object; only a description of the mental image can. — Luke
Therefore, the meaning of the word "slab" in the sentence "bring me the slab" cannot be the private belief of either the foreman or the assistant, but can only exist in the language itself, as language is agnostic about the private beliefs of the users of the language . — RussellA
This doesn't mean that language exists as a Platonic Form independently of its users, as the language was created by its users. But it does mean that language is independent of the private beliefs of its users. Language is grounded in the ability of the mind to discover family resemblances in different physical things in the world. These different things can then be given a public name by one or more individuals within the language community. One should note that it is the family resemblance that is being named, which for the Nominalist is a concept in the mind, not any particular physical thing in the world. — RussellA
I was thinking that Wittgenstein meant the content of the thought (like your Martian example) more than belief about the nature of the content, — schopenhauer1
I would say this is accurate though Witt doesn't seem to discuss "ability of the mind", which makes it as I said mainly about "inside politics of language use" rather than a theory proper. — schopenhauer1
That family resemblances exist, as I see how he is presenting it, is not a positive theory for epistemology, but rather a negative theory of opposing a certain view that words correspond to exactly one kind of meaning. — schopenhauer1
Meaning becomes a sort of emergent phenomenon (he doesn't use that word I don't think), by way of the community's acceptance of the word as being referred to that. — schopenhauer1
But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. — schopenhauer1
Perhaps in order to avoid infinite regression it is best to say that the thought IS the content. — RussellA
Yes, he is describing something that depends on the mind but avoids talking how the mind works. A little bit of science would have helped. — RussellA
I look out of the window and see a "tree", but no two trees on Earth are identical. Every tree is different in some way to every other tree.
In one sense "tree" has a single meaning as a concept, yet in another sense has many different meanings, an Oak Tree, a Yew Tree, an old tree, a short tree, a green tree in the summer, etc.
There seems to be an ability of the brain to discover family resemblances in things in the world that are different yet have something in common. It is because of this ability we have concepts.
I can only see this ability as a positive thing. Why would Wittgenstein see it as a negative thing? — RussellA
I think when interpreting one of Wittgenstein's' paragraphs we should always look for the simplest, most straightforward and most common sense reading, in other words what Wittgenstein calls the "good philosopher" rather than the "bad" philosopher who creates problems out of nothing. — RussellA
He is pointing to a way of meaning but not really giving it an explanation except, "Don't you see!". You are explicitly saying, "Brain discovers X.. " He is just saying what he thinks we do. — schopenhauer1
Maybe the point to take away then is that we don't need an overarching theory of meaning. If you want to know how language and words work and how information is communicated between brains.. we have psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology etc. — Apustimelogist
"it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else."
— Luke
I don't see why the mental image must correspond to any object.
— Luke
In general a mental image need not correspond to any object, but we are discussing PI 389:
389. “A mental image must be more like its object than any picture. — Fooloso4
The mental image of this refers to the one object it is an image of. Two blurred objects or events is a counterexample. — Fooloso4
Your requirement that the mental image must be of one object presupposes that it can correspond or be compared to some object.
— Luke
This is not my requirement. This is the interlocutor's claim: — Fooloso4
Do you therefore think it follows that a picture has a superlikeness to its object, — Luke
No. As I said:
A photo of X may to varying degrees and in various ways capture a likeness of X. — Fooloso4
So too, our mental images of X may to varying degrees and in various ways capture a likeness of X. — Fooloso4
Is his point simply that there is no distinction between a picture and a mental image?
— Luke
Of course not! — Fooloso4
On my reading, a mental image is unlike a picture because a mental image can only be "the image of this and of nothing else", — Luke
What does
"this"
refer to? — Fooloso4
Why can't my mental image be a likeness to the object it is an image of? I do not have to describe that image to myself, I see it. — Fooloso4
I talk to someone on the phone who I have never met. I imagine what this person looks like. I form a mental image of them. Later I meet this person and they are very different from my mental image. — Fooloso4
But of course, that is just grounding an "is" with an "ought". That is to say, because we need to "get shit done to survive", thus all our inquiry stops about what grounds reality. But Wittgenstein might turn that around again and say, "There is no problem with inquiry, as long as it is "useful" for the game you want to play called "philosophy"". And I'm afraid that's all you're going to get as far as Wittgenstein and philosophy's value, perhaps. — schopenhauer1
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