Right, but it isn't just translation. We'd need some sort of very good predictive capability — Count Timothy von Icarus
The world is never the same 'twice,' and yet I am describing the world, as predictably infinitely novel. Concepts have a relative stability that makes our conversation possible. — plaque flag
“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness [in the same person] by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth)
Predictive capacity is already implied in the philosophical approach.
This doesn’t make the scientific version more precise than the philosophical
Husserl’s genetic method begins with an ego-intentionality which we imagine as preceding the constitution of any regularities in experience. At this point there isnt much to determine that there is something like ‘the’ world, if this is to indicate a realm of recognizable regularities, patterns and meaning. So what sort of process is required to turn a chaos of meaningless flux into the meaningful, stable patterns that would justify calling what we experience ‘the’ world? — Joshs
For example, if I was hooked up to a machine and someone said "I'm going to press a button and you're going to experience enacting x exact internal monologue, feel happy, see a green pony walk into the room, then lift your arms up and yell "I love Newt Gingrich," and mean it," and the person pressed the button and all that actually happened, I'd assume that whatever technology they were using implied enough mastery of the causes of sentience that they could tell me if a given AI experiences it or not. The reason P Zombies are a problem, IMO, is that we actually don't have a good idea what causes sentience, and so we don't know what to look for to determine what things have it. — Count Timothy von Icarus
We must have radically different conceptions of phenomenology. I'd say it's largely the opposite of naive realism. Though I will grant that it sometimes comes back around to a highly sophisticated direct realism. — plaque flag
Time is that within which events take place.
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Time is initially encountered in those entities which are changeable; change is in time. How is time exhibited in this way of encountering it, namely, as that within which things change?
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What is this now, the time now , as I look at my watch? Now, as I do this; now, as the light here goes out, for instance. What is the now? Is the now at my disposal? Am I the now? Is every other person the now? Then time would indeed be I myself, and every other person would be time. And in our being with one another we would be time — everyone and no one. Am I the now, or only the one who is saying this?
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What is involved in the fact that human existence has already procured a clock prior to all pocket-watches and sundials? Do I dispose over the Being of time, and do I also mean myself in the now? Am I myself the now and my existence time? Or is it ultimately time itself that procures for itself the clock in us? Augustine, in the Eleventh Book of his Confessions, pursued the question so far as to ask whether spirit itself is time.
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"In you, I say repeatedly, I measure time; the transitory things encountered bring you into a disposition which remains, while those things disappear. The disposition I measure in present existence, not
the things that pass by in order that this disposition first arise. My very finding myself disposed, I repeat, is what I measure when I measure time. " — early lecture The Concept of Time ---the ur Being and Time
The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory. — FrancisRay
The 'pure witness' is, in my view, anonymous being, more like a clearing or the light that shines on the scene of development. Or really just its being there. Just its happening.
FWIW, I don't think babies are able to think of being in this world, but I think we practiced concept-mongers understand their awareness to be awareness of the world. — plaque flag
The point is that phenomenology is exclusively concerned with observable phenomena or appearances and has nothing to say about the origin and essential nature of phenomena. Thus it is defined as being free from any claims concerning existence. It doesn't stray onto metaphysics but is a non-reductive approach. Nothing wrong with this but it cannot produce a fundamental theory — FrancisRay
Our monadological results are metaphysical, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here is anything but metaphysics in the customary sense: a historically degenerate metaphysics, which by no means conforms to the sense with which metaphysics, as "first philosophy", was instituted originally. Phenomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses. (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations)
To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and thus to bring to insight the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility—this is the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy on the
strenuous road to realization. It is the only way to decide
whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy—that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature— whether this telos, then, is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations * and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not
rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its entelechy. ( Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences)
Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart (gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “ This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity. — Joshs
:up:Phenomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses.
Ah, I see. That's a reasonable way to understand bracketing. But phenomenology is a big tent. Husserl alone was amazingly prolific and always revising (his work is too large and complex for me to begin to pretend to have mastered it. But I see that mountain of it. And once Husserl embraced transcendental idealism (and lost some worthy followers), he was a full-fledged metaphysician doing first philosophy. Doing it pretty well often enough it seems to me. — plaque flag
Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of R). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation — plaque flag
:up:But it's a much bigger and braver idea that leads beyond phenomenology and perhaps this is why he lost followers. — FrancisRay
Yes, which is why I think Heidegger’s critique of internal time consciousness as a metaphysics of presence is a bit unfair to Husserl. — Joshs
Husserl shows that (the 'experience' of ) time is stretched. There is no pointlike now, except as a useful mathematical fiction (the glories of R). But the gap between the so-called experience of time and time itself is also a fiction. 'Time in itself' is silly talk, 'decadent' metaphysics without an intuitive foundation. — plaque flag
The study of appearances is physics and the natural sciences and the the study of their origin and true nature is metaphysics and mysticism, so I'm not sure how phenomenology could be defined as a distinct subject. The boundaries are always going to be messy. . . .
I wonder if we all agree on the definition of phenomenology, since all those I've seen are quite vague. . — FrancisRay
You might like the read Herman Weyl's famous book on the continuum. — FrancisRay
He correctly states that we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to creatr the illusion that we are experiencing it. The 'eternal now' is what Weyl calls the 'intuitive continuum, which is unextended, and the fictional time we seem to experience he explains as a theoretical construction. — FrancisRay
https://iep.utm.edu/phe-time/Since temporal objects, like a melody or a sentence, are characterized by and experienced as a unity across a succession, an account of the perception of a temporal object must explain how we synthesize a flowing object in such a way that we (i) preserve the position of each tone without (ii) eliminating the unity of the melody or (iii) relating each tone by collapsing the difference in the order between the tones.
Bergson, James and Husserl realized that if our consciousness were structured in such a way that each moment occurred in strict separation from every other (like planks of a picket fence), then we never could apprehend or perceive the unity of our experiences or enduring objects in time otherwise than as a convoluted patchwork.
we do not experience time. It is a fiction created from memories and anticipations. This is what Husserl means by saying time is stretched. It has to be stretched in order to create the illusion that we are experiencing it. — FrancisRay
I would say physics is the study of appearances as filtered though a particular set of metaphysical suppositions, what Husserl calls objectivist metalhysics. All science is doing metaphysics, but implicitly rather than explicitly. — Joshs
Heidegger would say that the notion of ‘appearance’ of a world before a subject is itself grounded in a particular metaphysical presupposition.
o me it's still feels pretty bold to doubt the 'independent object.' It reads almost like impiety, even if one is an atheist. — plaque flag
I'd rather say physics doesn't need to make metaphysical suppositions. It has banished metaphysics to a different department. Physicists often stray into metaphysics and sometimes hold strong views, but when they do they're no longer doing physics — FrancisRay
Sorry but I don;t quite understand your post. What do you mean by 'independent object'? . . — FrancisRay
:up:I would say it is the pure present we only experience as a fiction , and that, most primordially, the only thing we do experience is the tripartite structure of time. — Joshs
To be 'punctiform' is to be a point with no extension. Thus the 'eternal now' is outside of time.and should not be thought of as a brief amount of time. In this sense time is not punctiform.
These problems arise for space and time and for the numbers and the number line and Weyl dismisses all of them as a fiction. The idea that any of then are made out of points is paradoxical/. He concludes that the idea of extension is paradoxical when we reify it, and endorses the 'Perennial' explanation of extension as a fabrication of mind. . — FrancisRay
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