I would say it is the pure present we only experience as a fiction , and that, most primordially, the only thing we do experience is the tripartite structure of time. — Joshs

Yes. The idea of the eternal now requires the idea that we can transcend the experience-experiencer duality. As you seem to say, if we cannot do this the idea makes no sense.

We never experience the pure present. There isn't time to experience it. But we can be in it. This explains how yogis can sit for weeks without moving. They are not experiencing the passing of time.

The nonduality teacher Sadhguru began to become famous after sitting on a rock for two weeks. When he came back to everyday li0fe found himself surrounded by admirers. He thought he'd been sitting for half an hour and was taken by surprise. . , . .

I mean the idea of something existing which cannot even in principle be perceived, something like 'things in themselves,' when it's also assumed they are only ever mediated by appearances -- by phenomena in the crude prephenomenological sense. — plaque flag

Ah. So you disagree with Kant? He concludes that it is a necessary definition of the ultimate phenomenon that it cannot be perceived or conceived since it lies beyond thee categories of thought. . But clearly it does not exist in the usual sense of ;standing out'. It has nothing from which it can stand out.

This is the classical Christian idea of God, that God exists but not in the way you and I exist. I don't like the word 'God' but the argument holds for the ultimate phenomenon whatever we call it.

.

Here's some more wood for the fire. Not offered as authority, but perhaps as an influence on Husserl. Both he and Heidegger mention James by name within their work.

Let any one try, I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend to, the present moment of time. One of the most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming.
...
The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were -- a rearward -- and a forward-looking end.[5] It is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends embedded in it. The experience is from the outset a synthetic datum, not a simple one; and to sensible perception its elements are inseparable, although attention looking back may easily decompose the experience, and distinguish its beginning from its end.
...
In the experience of watching empty time flow -- 'empty' to be taken hereafter in the relative sense just set forth -- we tell it off in pulses. We say 'now! now! now!' or we count 'more! more! more!' as we feel it bud. This composition out of units of duration is called the law of time's discrete flow. The discreteness is, however, merely due to the fact that our successive acts of recognition or apperception of what it is are discrete. The sensation is as continuous as any sensation can be.
...
Let me sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious of a certain duration -- the specious present -- varying in length from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and that this duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and the other part later) is the original intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by adding, shorter ones by dividing, portions of this vaguely bounded unit, and are habitually thought by us symbolically.
https://genius.com/William-james-chapter-xv-1-the-perception-of-time-annotated

What metaphysical presupposition are requited for physics? I cannot think of any but perhaps I'm missing something. . .

So are you saying that space is an illusion ? Along with time ? — plaque flag

Yes. It has to be both or neither. This is Weyl's view also. As an illusion extension it is just as real as it seems to be, but as a metaphysical phenomenon it would be reducible.

Leibnitz makes the point thus:

"In Leibnitz’s view, the ultimately real, something that depends on nothing else for its existence, cannot have parts. If it had parts, its existence would depend on them. But whatever has spatial extension has parts. It follows that what is ultimately real cannot have spatial extension, …”

Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy
Ed. Thomas Mautner (2000)
,

This is from a different section focused on thought, but time is central:

In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought
revolve. Half the time this topic is a problem, a gap we cannot yet fill with a definite picture, word, or phrase, but which, in the manner described some time back, influences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way. Whatever may be the images and phrases that pass before us, we feel their relation to this aching gap. To fill it up is our thought's destiny. Some bring us nearer to that consummation. Some the gap negates as quite irrelevant. Each swims in a felt fringe of relations of which the aforesaid gap is the term. Or instead of a definite gap we may merely carry a mood of interest about with us. Then, however vague the mood, it will still act in the same way, throwing a mantle of felt affinity over such representations, entering the mind, as suit it, and tingeing with the feeling of tediousness or discord all those with which it has no concern.

Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic. When the sense of furtherance is there, we are 'all right;' with the sense of hindrance we are dissatisfied and perplexed, and cast about us for other thoughts. Now any thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all right,' is an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever kind of thought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it to have a place in the scheme of relations in which the interesting topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas.

For the important thing about a train of thought is its conclusion. That is the meaning, or, as we say, the topic of the thought. That is what abides when all its other members have faded from memory. Usually this conclusion is a word or phrase or particular image, or practical attitude or resolve, whether rising to answer a problem or fill a pre−existing gap that worried us, or whether accidentally stumbled on in revery. In either case it stands out from the other segments of the stream by reason of the peculiar interest attaching to it. This interest arrests it, makes a sort of crisis of it when it comes, induces attention upon it and makes us treat it in a substantive way.

...
The ordinary associationist−psychology supposes, in contrast with this, that whenever an object of thought contains many elements, the thought itself must be made up of just as many ideas, one idea for each element, and all fused together in appearance, but really separate.[35] The enemies of this psychology find (as we have already seen) little trouble in showing that such a bundle of separate ideas would never form one thought at all, and they contend that an Ego must be added to the bundle to give it unity, and bring the various ideas into relation with each other. We will not discuss the ego just yet, but it is obvious that if things are to be thought in relation, they must be thought together, and in one something, be that something ego, psychosis, state of consciousness, or whatever you please. If not thought with each other, things are not thought in relation at all. Now most believers in the ego make the same mistake as the associationists and sensationists whom they oppose. Both agree that the elements of the subjective stream are discrete and separate and constitute what Kant calls a 'manifold.' But while the associationists think that a 'manifold' can form a single knowledge, the egoists deny this, and say that the knowledge comes only when the manifold is subjected to the synthetizing activity of an ego. Both make an identical initial hypothesis; but the egoist, finding it won't express the facts, adds another hypothesis to correct it. Now I do not wish just yet to 'commit myself' about the existence or non−existence of the ego, but I do contend that we need not invoke it for this particular reason − namely, because the manifold of ideas has to be reduced to unity. There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera. Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind.
http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/50/61.pdf

FWIW, I think a certain kind of knowledge strives to transcend both time and space --to be valid or worthy at all times and places. But this is the only kind of negation of space and time I can make sense of. It's a negation of the relevance of where 'o clock for the divine thinking that is everywhen and all ways. — plaque flag

Okay. But this is not a metaphysical idea. In metaphysics the idea that time and space are truly real doesn't survive analysis. It is a difficult idea for sure, but not incomprehensible. Ive been quoting Kant, Leibnitz and Weyl, who all endorse the unreality of space-time. So did Erwin Schrodinger, and as far as I can make out modern physics seems to be arriving at the same conclusion. .

Okay. But this is not a metaphysical idea. In metaphysics the idea that time and space are truly real doesn't survive analysis. It is a difficult idea for sure, but not incomprehensible. Ive been quoting Kant, Leibnitz and Weyl, who all endorse the unreality of space-time. So did Erwin Schrodinger, and as far as I can make out modern physics seems to be arriving at the same conclusion. . — FrancisRay

I see the charm of the idea. Reminds me of (as you say) Kant. And of course Schopenhauer. The Will is the Real 'behind' the Veil. That sort of thing.

To me this is using 'real' honorifically. It's another version of what I'd call filtering. Some of experience or being is declared 'unreal,' while a precious kernel, possibly only available to an elite, is honored with the label 'Real.' In many contexts, this makes sense. Real gold as opposed to fool's gold. Real quality, real insight. Ironically, this real insight is 'ideal.' The ideal marriage, etc. The perfect circle, which can never be instantiated in its perfection but makes the instantiation of circles possible (meaningful) in the first place.

So I'm not again your approach, but I favor an inclusive approach. It's all real. Confused daydreams are real, and they exist in the style of confused daydreams. All entities are semantically-inferentially linked in a single nexus. Language is directed at the one common world.

Philosophy, in my view, is largely about drawing our attention to neglected aspects of the real. This often involves seeing around old metaphors that hide structure. We see only what we were told to expect to see. It's hard to look with our own eyes, that sort of thing.

Then, finally, there's still a filter, but it's more about articulating general aprior forms of 'experience' (world-streaming), such as the tripartite structure of the rubber moment.

but I favor an inclusive approach. It's all real. Confused daydreams are real, and they exist in the style of confused daydreams. All entities are semantically-inferentially linked in a single nexus. Language is directed at the one common world. — plaque flag

You’d like Deleuze’s approach. He distinguishes between the virtual and the actual. Both are real; the virtual is the problematic field within which actual events arise and disappear.

You’d like Deleuze’s approach. He distinguishes between the virtual and the actual. Both are real; the virtual is the problematic field within which actual events arise and disappear — Joshs

I like some of what I've seen from Delueze. He's on my list, etc. If you feel like curating some gems, I'd be glad to see them.

By the way, Ong's Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (1982) is great. I bumped into it at a used book store. Good stuff.

So I'm not against your approach, — plaque flag

To be clear. it's not just my approach, it's the Perennial philosophy.

but I favor an inclusive approach. It's all real. Confused daydreams are real, and they exist in the style of confused daydreams. All entities are semantically-inferentially linked in a single nexus. Language is directed at the one common world.

You might like to look at Buddhism's doctrine of two truths. This states that space-time phenomena - , which in Buddhism are dhamma or 'thing-events' ,- are conventionally real but ultimately unreal. This is why they are said to 'not really exist'. One could say that by reduction they are unreal, and what is truly real would be irreducible, Nobody claims that nothing exists, although some western scholars confuse Buddhism with nihilism. ,

Metaphysics has to reduce the many to the one, and if we assume the many is truly real this cannot be done. I think you'd have to admit that the incomprehension of philosophers suggests that they're missing a trick. .

To be clear. it's not just my approach, it's the Perennial philosophy. — FrancisRay

Understood. But, for me anyway, there's no authority beyond something like our own earnestly critical investigation of the matters themselves.

This states that space-time phenomena - , which in Buddhism are dhamma or 'thing-events' ,- are conventionally real but ultimately unreal. — FrancisRay

I'm not against that. Indeed, I agree with Hegel that the finite is 'unreal,' 'fictional,' [merely] conventional. Reality is one and continuous. I also like Ecclesiastes: all is hebel. Everything is 'empty.' See there how the great void shines.

Metaphysics has to reduce the many to the one, and if we assume the many is truly real this cannot be done. — FrancisRay

I'd say metaphysics is a kind of grand science, and that it projects illuminating metaphors on the whole of reality. For instance: 'all is vanity [empty].' Or: 'all is one [connected, interdependent].' Of course people like to say that 'all is mind' or 'all is matter' too. Or that all is God creating and recognizing itself. Or that all is 'a tale of sound and fury signifying nothing.'

You mention 'truly real,' which is like 'really real.' I'm not against it, but the question for me is almost always one of meaning. What does is mean to call something 'real' ? Of course I know well enough in dozens of ordinary contexts, but what does this or that metaphysician mean? 'Of course all things are really empty.' I can relate to that one, which means: it's our investment in a game that gives it life. Beauty is (largely) 'in' the eye of the beholder. We [spontaneously, unconsciously] 'project' a grand meaning on this or that, but this or that is straw dogs, cast away after the ceremony. The cat chases a red light on the wall. That light is 'nothing.'

Understood. But, for me anyway, there's no authority beyond something like our own earnestly critical investigation of the matters themselves.

Agreed in respect of discursive philosophers. For practitioners their authority is direct experience and not speculation. .

I'm not against that. Indeed, I agree with Hegel that the finite is 'unreal,' 'fictional,' [merely] conventional. Reality is one and continuous. I also like Ecclesiastes: all is hebel. Everything is 'empty.' See there how the great void shines.

This is interesting. Do you know where it says this in Ecclesiastes? It shows how easy it would be to interpret the Bible as endorsing the perennial philosophy.

I'd say metaphysics is a kind of grand science, and that it projects illuminating metaphors on the whole of reality. For instance: 'all is vanity [empty].' Or: 'all is one [connected, interdependent].' Of course people like to say that 'all is mind' or 'all is matter' too. Or that all is God creating and recognizing itself. Or that all is 'a tale of sound and fury signifying nothing.'

It ought to be a science of logic, but the views you mention show that few people approach it as such. The voidness of phenomena is a logical result, as Kant shows, but most of these other views fail under analysis and so are profoundly unscientific. . . .

You mention 'truly real,' which is like 'really real.' I'm not against it, but the question for me is almost always one of meaning. What does is mean to call something 'real' ?

To be truly real a phenomenon would have to be independent, irreducible, non-contingent and unchanging. What we usually call 'existence' is dependent or relative existence. It requires that the phenomenon 'stands out' from a background. But, as Schrodinger points out, as well as the myriad dependent phenomena there is the 'background on which they are painted'. This is what would be truly real. You could think of it as the information space necessary for an information theory, or the blank sheet of paper required for a Venn diagram and set theory,

The idea is not that the conventional world does not exist, but that it exist only in a weak and non-metaphysical sense. Thus Heraclitus states 'We are and are-not', and in this way takes account of both aspects of the world, or both levels of analysis, the conventional and the ultimate. This is an example of the 'two truths'. Hence the seemingly contradictory language of mysticism. . . . . , . . ,

. . . . .

Agreed in respect of discursive philosophers. For practitioners their authority is direct experience and not speculation. — FrancisRay

:up:

This is interesting. Do you know where it says this in Ecclesiastes? It shows how easy it would be to interpret the Bible as endorsing the perennial philosophy. — FrancisRay

It's very near the beginning. The word 'vanity' in the KJV is a translation of hebel, which could have been translated as 'vapor' or 'breath.' Turns out the hebel is already a rich metaphor in the original Hebrew. All is fog, mist, vapor, even the meaning of hebel, the meaning of saying so.

“Vanity of vanities,” says the Preacher;
“Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.”

3 What profit has a man from all his labor
In which he toils under the sun?
4 One generation passes away, and another generation comes;
But the earth abides forever.
5 The sun also rises, and the sun goes down,
And hastens to the place where it arose.
6 The wind goes toward the south,
And turns around to the north;
The wind whirls about continually,
And comes again on its circuit.
7 All the rivers run into the sea,
Yet the sea is not full;
To the place from which the rivers come,
There they return again.
8 All things are full of labor;
Man cannot express it.
The eye is not satisfied with seeing,
Nor the ear filled with hearing.

That which has been is what will be,
That which is done is what will be done,
And there is nothing new under the sun.
10 Is there anything of which it may be said,
“See, this is new”?
It has already been in ancient times before us.
11 There is no remembrance of former things,
Nor will there be any remembrance of things that are to come
By those who will come after.

https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=ecclesiastes+1&version=NKJV

It ought to be a science of logic, but the views you mention show that few people approach it as such. The voidness of phenomena is a logical result, as Kant shows, but most of these other views fail under analysis and so are profoundly unscientific. — FrancisRay

We may have to disagree here. I don't accept Kant's idea (or what is often taken to be his idea) that we are cut off from reality. I think we are always already 'in' reality, seeing reality. Indeed the vanishing subject, in my view, is reality-from-a-point-of-view. 'I' am not only being-in-the-world but the world's very being, along with you and him and her and them.

But I do very much think that some perspectives (some conceptual articulations of reality) are richer and more adequate than others. I think we do agree on the value of some kind of scientific rational approach.

To be truly real a phenomenon would have to be independent, irreducible, non-contingent and unchanging. — FrancisRay

I agree pretty much with the first two requirements, but I don't see why reality can't be in flux --- or why it can't be a brute fact.

I do agree that grandest kind of knowledge is the articulation of eternal necessity, preferably of an independent, irreducible being. This is the knowledge of self-knowing God -- perhaps the knowledge of the seer in a certain state. But, for me, that seer would only be in a beautiful semi-discursive frame of mind. I've had some intense experiences, and I'd explain them in terms of deeply understanding certain myths --as feeling the 'truth' of the symbols / stories. I mean the experience of very high/sublime emotion that allows one to 'get' certain myths. Of course people can't live for long on such heights, but perhaps a residue of the insight sticks. And maybe it's a little easier to get back up there when the conditions are right again.

But, as Schrodinger points out, as well as the myriad dependent phenomena there is the 'background on which they are painted'. This is what would be truly real. You could think of it as the information space necessary for an information theory, or the blank sheet of paper required for a Venn diagram and set theory, — FrancisRay

This (as you may already know) is pretty close to Heidegger. The background is a kind of elusive 'nothing' that enables all the little things to make sense. It's the enabling framework, mostly transparent, mostly hiding. I can agree with you that this background is more substantial in some sense.

But it should maybe be mentioned that identifying true being with the unchanging is not obviously the way to go, however traditional. Why are we drawn toward the eternal , the durable? Is it a triumph over death? Is it a greater personal achievement ? Akin to a great mathematical or scientific theory ? Note that there too the goal is eternal knowledge. And Milton's (and others poets') goal is to write something that no one wants to forget ---writerly immortality. What is this lust for that which lasts ?

We may have to disagree here. I don't accept Kant's idea (or what is often taken to be his idea) that we are cut off from reality. — plaque flag

Nor me. I feel this is his biggest mistake. It leads him to the view we can know nothing about ultimate reality, which is NOt a logical result. But the voidness of phenomena is a matter of analysis.

I think we are always already 'in' reality, seeing reality. Indeed the vanishing subject, in my view, is reality-from-a-point-of-view. '

This makes sense. But what are you when the subject disappears? This is the question that the perennial philosophy answers. This would be our 'end before our beginning' as spoken of by Jesus. . .

But I do very much think that some perspectives (some conceptual articulations of reality) are richer and more adequate than others. I think we do agree on the value of some kind of scientific rational approach.

Absolutely we agree on this. This is why I endorse the perennial philosophy, for which reality is not a perspective but a phenomenon, Reality would be our identity, not a perspective on something else. Kant shows that the ultimate is inconceivable and unsayable, as the OT story of the golden calf suggests. It would be knowable, however, as it is who we are. ,

But it should maybe be mentioned that identifying true being with the unchanging is not obviously the way to go, however traditional. — plaque flag

Hmm. I'd say it is the only way to go. No other idea allows us to create a fundamental theory.

The crucial idea here is the principle of nonduality and the unity of all. .

But, for me, that seer would only be in a beautiful semi-discursive frame of mind. — plaque flag

Okay. But in this case how do you explain the odd fact that the mystics have the only metaphysical theory that works? All others are rejected by analysis. Also, meditation is said to be shallow if it does not go beyond mind.

I think perhaps you underestimate just how deep it is possible to go.

Nor me. I feel this is his biggest mistake. It leads him to the view we can know nothing about ultimate reality, which is NOt a logical result. But the voidness of phenomena is a matter of analysis. — FrancisRay

How so ? This voidness ?

But what are you when the subject disappears? This is the question that the perennial philosophy answers. This would be our 'end before our beginning' as spoken of by Jesus. . . — FrancisRay

In my view, 'pure' subjectivity is so radically transparent that it's really just the being of the world. I claim that the world has no other being. Or, at least, that we can't know of make sense of some other kind of being than our own (the world's ) perspectival kind.

But I'd be glad to hear more about this 'end before our beginning' as spoken of by Jesus.

Absolutely we agree on this. This is why I endorse the perennial philosophy, for which reality is not a perspective but a phenomenon, Reality would be our identity, not a perspective on something else. Kant shows that the ultimate is inconceivable and unsayable, as the OT story of the golden calf suggests. It would be knowable, however, as it is who we are. , — FrancisRay

Well maybe our views are pretty close. It's always interesting to navigate others' idiolects. We all have our own way of saying things. But I think we should differentiate between perspectivism and indirect realism. Because I view perspectivism as the subjectivity finally done right, finally grasped properly, in a way that doesn't hide reality from the subject, put us all in a solipsistic box of mere appearance.

Okay. But in this case how do you explain the odd fact that the mystics have the only metaphysical theory that works? — FrancisRay

I'm not sure what metaphysical theory you have in mind. To me, perennial philosophy is not so exact or definite.

The perennial philosophy (Latin: philosophia perennis),[note 1] also referred to as perennialism and perennial wisdom, is a perspective in philosophy and spirituality that views religious traditions as sharing a single, metaphysical truth or origin from which all esoteric and exoteric knowledge and doctrine has grown.

Now I lean more toward than away from this idea. I've studied thinkers for different eras and cultures and I do think that there's a blurry consensus that's worth something. I find my own favored perspectivism appearing in different flavors in Western philosophy. But, FWIW, I am fascinating by Buddhism, Taoism, etc.

All others are rejected by analysis. Also, meditation is said to be shallow if it does not go beyond mind. — FrancisRay

I do think 'rejection by analysis' is, roughly, the correct method. I also think it's analytically shallow to take the subject as something final and absolute. The subject is a kind of fiction. And in heightened states it's maybe an acceptance of death that allows for an ecstatic breakthrough. (Happened to me once.) And just conceptually, I'm sharing my own ideas in this thread because I feel like there's genuine progress in understanding consciousness as the being of the world. Like a knot has been untied, even if it's hard to communicate to others (I'm not saying you don't get what I'm trying to say, just that it's tricky to talk about with most people.)

I think perhaps you underestimate just how deep it is possible to go. — FrancisRay

It could be. And I could end up revising my beliefs. All I can do is sincerely think and be open and be critical, and so on.

How so ? This voidness ? — plaque flag

Under analysis the phenomena of this world are found to be empty of substance or essence. This is not a metaphysical speculation bur a verifiable fact.

In metaphysics the results of analysis are surprisingly easy to summarise. All extreme or positive metaphysical positions are found to be logically indefensible. This is the reason why metaphysical questions are undecidable, If you reject all these failed positions you are left with a neutral theory, as required for the perennial philosophy. Hence those who reject mysticism are unable to make sense of metaphysics. ,

In my view, 'pure' subjectivity is so radically transparent that it's really just the being of the world. I claim that the world has no other being. Or, at least, that we can't know of make sense of some other kind of being than our own (the world's ) perspectival kind.

For the mystics reality and consciousness are the same phenomenon, and perhaps this is the idea you need to overcome the idea of pure subjectivity. They say the subject-object distinction is functional or conventional, and not ontological.

But I'd be glad to hear more about this 'end before our beginning' as spoken of by Jesus.

This is not an idea endorsed by the church, so be warned. . .

"Blessed is he whose beginning is before he came into being!"

Jesus - Gospel of Thomas - V 20

"The disciples said to Jesus, "Tell us how our end will be." Jesus said, "Have you discovered, then, the beginning, that you look for the end? For where the beginning is, there will the end be. Blessed is he who will take his place in the beginning; he will know the end and will not experience death."

Gospel of Thomas - V18

This refers to what in Taoism is 'our face before we were born'. If we can dive this deep we can overcome life and death, and this would be the Grail experience of total 'holiness'. In its proper meaning yoga is the 'art of union with reality',and this definition reveals what meditation is all about. It's about going back to the beginning, before we began to identify as a subject with a perspective.

. . . .

t could be. And I could end up revising my beliefs. All I can do is sincerely think and be open and be critical, and so on. — plaque flag

It's wonderful to talk to someone so thoughtful and open minded.

BTW, I'm reading this right now:



It has a similar set of ideas at its core, although it goes a lot further, trying to show how the "enlightened," view of reality ties into conceptions of human freedom, the pursuit of the sciences, art, ethics, and ultimately, conceptions of God.

It isn't perfect, but a very neat book. It draws on Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and Murdoch the most in terms of modern philosophers, along with Aristotle, Saint Augustine and Kant. Although the big sources of inspiration are in the title.

It's sort of neat to see the tie ins between Wittgenstein and Hegel, given how Russell was such a reaction against Hegel, and influenced
Wittgenstein.

Of course, how is simply recognizing the nature of being "mystical?" It's a loaded term for sure. But I'd say it fits in that we obviously have such a strong tendency NOT to see the world this way, making the turn a sort of "revaluation."

Of course, how is simply recognizing the nature of being "mystical?" It's a loaded term for sure. But I'd say it fits in that we obviously have such a strong tendency NOT to see the world this way, making the turn a sort of "revaluation." — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good question. Maybe 'mystical' isn't the ideal word. Is philosophical wonder better ? The world loses it familiarity, but as a whole. Husserl writes of the sense of a whole world being opened up by his bracketing, as if an entire dimension of reality/experience is usually ignored.

:up:

I'd be glad to hear more about your take on the perennial philosophy.

For the mystics reality and consciousness are the same phenomenon, and perhaps this is the idea you need to overcome the idea of pure subjectivity. They say the subject-object distinction is functional or conventional, and not ontological. — FrancisRay

:up:

Nice ! That's what I'm basically try to say in this thread. Of course we need account for the fact that there are many of us, each of us the being of the 'same' world from a different 'point of view.'