I once saw you exclaim that the easiest way to win a disagreement with someone else(yourself at the time you said it) was to begin by misunderstanding it. — creativesoul

Banno's law: the easiest way to critique some view is to begin by misunderstanding it.

But the issue I have here is that I havn't been able to put together what it is that you are arguing. So you insist

I've asked you several times to explain the proposition that S had an attitude towards at time t1 such that they believed it to be true. We agreed that S's attitude - at time t1 - was towards a broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. So, either S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1`- was not a belief about the broken clock or not all belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude, because broken clocks are neither propositions nor attitudes. — creativesoul

And I've replied several times, most recently with

At three o'clock, (there is a clock, that clock is broken, but S believes (that clock is accurate)). — Banno

...and tried to see what it is you are getting at, but I haven't been able to see it. You put me in the position of having to work out both what it is you are arguing and how to reply to it.

What is the relevance of time?

I dunno. There's stuff about reference here that has been dealt with elsewhere; perhaps you take "the broken clock" as some sort of rigid designator such that everyone must think the clock broke, and so conclude that S thinks the clock both broken and accurate.

But if I am not to attribute beliefs to you, there's not much more to be said.

You've given me pause to reconsider things more than once, but here I am at a loss to understand your point.

So, am I correct in thinking that you're claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock at time t1 does not count as S believing that that particular broken clock was working?

My position here is neither difficult to understand nor somehow complex. I'm simply claiming that at time t1 S believed that a broken clock was working.

Banno's law: the easiest way to critique some view is to begin by misunderstanding it. — Banno

Yeah! That 's it. I was close...

:wink:

I'll call it by name from this point forward when using it!

Banno's account of my position on belief contradicts my own position on belief. — creativesoul

Good. I am glad to be wrong here.

So, am I correct in thinking that you're claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock at time t1 does not count as S believing that that particular broken was working? — creativesoul

Let's try a slightly different approach. "The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken.

To be able to refer to the clock in S's beliefs and in our beliefs, we need to introduce a rigid designator, which I did above with "x". Let x be the clock.

In S's beliefs, x is not broken.

Hence S is not committed to the proposition "S believes that the broken clock is not broken", but to "S believes that x is not broken".

So yes.

I'm simply claiming that at time t1 S believed that a broken clock was working. — creativesoul

Indeed, you believe both that x is broken and that S believes (x is not broken). There is no contradiction here.

How's that?

As I undertsnd it a propositional attitude can be a belief even if not all propositional attitudes are beliefs. So, I searched and found this:

Propositional attitude, psychological state usually expressed by a verb that may take a subordinate clause beginning with “that” as its complement. Verbs such as “believe,” “hope,” “fear,” “desire,” “intend,” and “know” all express propositional attitudes.

So, according to that article saying that S had a belief about the clock and saying that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock could indeed be two ways of saying the same thing and would be in the case that the propositional attitude in question was a belief, rather than a hope, desire etc..

"The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken. — Banno

This looks suspiciously like unnecessarily multiplying entities.

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge.

This looks suspiciously like unnecessarily multiplying entities. — creativesoul

There is only one clock. x.

What differs is the propositions you, I and S take as being true of that clock

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge. — creativesoul

Sure. I agree entirely.

Banno holds that belief is imputed/attributed to another creature as a means for explaining its behaviour. I do not disagree completely with that idea. We do just that and we do it quite often. It's just not an explanation for how belief emerges onto the world stage nor what belief consists of. — creativesoul

Beliefs "emerge onto the world stage" as ways of expressing what folk hold as true, as opposed to what is indeed true. S beleives the clock to be broken when it isn't.

Beliefs consist in an attitude of some agent to the effect that some state of affairs holds: that some proposition is true. "S believes that the clock is not broken" means that S holds that the proposition "The clock is not broken" is true.

What is it that is missing from this account?

I think we just made a bit of progress.

Next time!

Cheers!!!

:smile:

I'm not seeing it. It seems pretty straight forward to me, but ten years of apparent disagreement seem to show that I am mistaken.

"The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken. — Banno

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge.
— creativesoul
Sure. I agree entirely. — Banno

This looks like a contradiction to me.

Then for all our sakes, set out how!

You claim that the clock in S's belief is both... broken and not. You first claimed that the clock in S's belief was not broken, then agreed entirely with me when I claimed it was.

Do you not see that?

Gotta rest, my friend. Building some furniture tomorrow, lotsa millwork needs a good night's rest!

You claim that the clock in S's belief is both... broken and not. You first claimed that the clock in S's belief was not broken, then agreed entirely with me when I claimed in was. — creativesoul

The whole apparatus developed here shows the opposite. It's pretty simple.

You believe (the clock is broken)
S believes (the clock is not broken)

As it turns out, you are correct. Nowhere in here does S believe the broken clock was not broken.


________
You might construct the odd locution "S believes that the broken clock is not broken". By that you might mean either that

You believe ((the clock is broken) and (S believes (the clock is not broken)))

Which contains no contradiction; or

S believe that (the clock is broken and the clock is not broken)

which is not justified by (does not follow from)

S believes (the clock is not broken)

...which I pointed out back at the beginning of this exchange.

...That just scratches the surface of the disagreement between Banno and myself. The differences between his position and my own are often tied to the respective notions of belief that we're working from. — creativesoul

Thank you, creativesoul, that was very helpful. :up:

---

Why can't it be said that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock; namely the belief that it was functioning. — Janus

I tend to agree with you. S holds that, "The clock is functioning," not that, "The broken clock is functioning." "Broken" does not enter into their intentional act. They do not hold a belief regarding a broken clock; they hold a belief regarding a (working) clock. They just happen to be mistaken.

But I am probably not honing in on the exact difference that Banno and creativesoul are meting out.

But I am probably not honing in on the exact difference that Banno and creativesoul are meting out. — Leontiskos

I think @creativesoul is either trading on, or confusing himself with, an ambiguity of expression: "S believes a broken clock is not broken". The belief S holds is not that a clock is both broken and not broken, so while it is correct in one sense (from our POV) that S's belief is about a broken clock, from S's POV the belief is not about a broken clock. It's all about context.

- Seems right. :up:

Yep. As in my initial reply,

There's an ambiguity here that can be expounded by getting the scope clear. It might be

There is a broken clock X and (S believes that X is not broken)

Do you see a problem with that?

Or it might be that

There is a broken clock X and S believes that (X is broken and not broken)

S is irrational or some such. — Banno

:up:

Cool. Now we're getting somewhere useful. I'm afraid it will be much later in the evening before I can take the time needed to further explain other consequences/implications, but now we can at least begin to see the importance of timestamping S's belief.

According to all three of you, and I take that as current conventional practice, at time t1, S's belief was not about a broken clock. The clock in S's belief was not broken. I ask all of you to now imagine a later time, after S became aware that at time t1 the clock was broken.

Here, at time t2, S would readily admit that at time t1, they believed that a broken clock was working.

S holds that, "The clock is functioning," not that, "The broken clock is functioning." "Broken" does not enter into their intentional act. They do not hold a belief regarding a broken clock; they hold a belief regarding a (working) clock. They just happen to be mistaken.

But I am probably not honing in on the exact difference that Banno and creativesoul are meting out. — Leontiskos

Well, the above reflects a large part of it. The differences are many but most all of them seem to be logical consequences of our respective positions regarding belief.

A question may help...

What does S's belief - at time t1 - consist of?

You all three seem to hold that S's belief - at time t1 - does not consist of a broken clock. Although Banno agrees with me that S's attitude at time t1 is towards a broken clock. You're now claiming that S does not hold a belief regarding a broken clock. Banno said much the same thing earlier. This seems to be a huge problem from my vantage point.

The particular clock that S looked at at time t1 was broken. That is true regardless of S's belief. Here, I think we all agree. On my view, if their belief was about the particular clock they looked at, and the particular clock they looked at was a broken one, then their belief was about a particular broken clock, and it does not matter if S realizes that it was broken or not.

Propositional attitude, psychological state usually expressed by a verb that may take a subordinate clause beginning with “that” as its complement. Verbs such as “believe,” “hope,” “fear,” “desire,” “intend,” and “know” all express propositional attitudes. — Janus

The above applies to speaking. According to the accounting practice under examination, S would not say "I believe that that broken clock is working", and thus would not - could not - believe that either. I'm claiming that S believed that a broken clock was working, but would not say so... until after they came to realize that the clock they looked at was broken.

So, if we're to give preference to S, what argument or reasoning would support giving preference to what S would say at time t1 instead of what they would say at time t2, after realizing that they had believed a broken clock was working?

I think it time you did the work of setting out your issue clearly.

I've laid out several, and they've yet to have been given careful consideration. You've been drowning strawmen in the poison well instead. I've no idea what your intent is. I still like to believe that you're arguing in good faith, and I ought make my words as impeccable as I can.. That's worth saying. So, here goes...

The position you're arguing for/from arrives at either self-contradiction or incoherence. Neither is acceptable. You're all over the place. Earlier you claimed that the clock in S's belief was both... broken and not. Clocks cannot be both at the same time. We're talking about S's belief at time t1. The clock that S looked at is the clock in S's belief, and it was broken. There is no grey area here. None.

But, you want to invent a completely different clock - whole cloth. As if just because S does not believe the clock is broken, as if just because S does not know that the clock is broken, as if just because S does not know they were trusting what a broken clock said, as if just because S believed that that particular broken clock was working at that particular time....

Somehow - magically - there's now two clocks instead of one(according to you). The new one is not broken, because S believes it's working...

:yikes:

So much for the distinction between truth and belief. I was surprised to see that from you, but Janus, not so much.

Unlike you to resort to ad hom and mischaracterisation. Oh, well. I don't see anything new to respond to in your post, yet your argument remains obscure. Might leave it there.

Well... that tells me that we must misunderstand one another.

:worry:

Perhaps it best to find places of agreement.

S's belief is about a broken clock. Do you agree?

There's something a bit mad in continuing here, but...

S's belief is about a broken clock. Do you agree? — creativesoul

There's an ambiguity about that, between the clock being broken and S believing it is broken. S's belief is about a clock, yes. But it's not, for S, a belief about a broken clock. As in, It's not true that "S believes that (the broken clock is not broken)"; but that, to get the scope right, "Of the clock, S believes (the clock is not broken) AND the clock is broken.

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this.



I don't think you have explained how this leads to a counterexample to belief being a propositional attitude.

I'm only guessing, but is it that you think the belief is about the clock, which is an individual, and so not propositional? But that's not right; since the belief is about whether the clock is working, or not, which is propositional.

On the one hand, if you could present a clear case of a belief that could not be put into propositional form, I'd give reconsideration to the proposal. But on the other hand, that beliefs are propositional is foundational; having a belief that p simply is having an attitude towards p such that p is the case - that's what belief is. So if you do provide a proposed example of a belief that is not propositional, it's unlikely that I would see it as a belief. It might be a sentiment, a feeling, but not a belief. You ma call this paragraph "poisoning the well" or some such, but if you will not present a coherent account of what you are claiming, I'm only left to make such guesses.

You say that my reply is all over the place. If so, that is a result of your own incoherence. The point of nearly all my replies has been to attempt to make clear the scope of the various beliefs about the clock. But again, in your most recent post, you seem to want to mash that scope. Hence again, this:

The clock is broken and S believes (the clock is not broken)

It seems to me that you cannot accept this rendering because it pretty much mashes your account.



You seem to want us to put your argument together from your hints, rather than presenting it clearly. If you are going to make accusations of straw man and so on, but not present your account, there's little more that I can do. If you really do doubt my good faith, don't bother replying.

:blush:

Ah my friend...

I've misunderstood you. My apologies for doubting your integrity. Stellar reply. Thank you for that. I'm still processing, but I think I understand a bit better now. I'll do my best to fill in the blanks that I've left. I've always been bad for mistakenly assuming everyone else is already on the same page as I am. I've become aware of the fact that I've actually not addressed your replies as they deserve to be addressed.

Again... stellar reply. Admirable. :point:

There's an ambiguity about that, between the clock being broken and S believing it is broken. S's belief is about a clock, yes. But it's not, for S, a belief about a broken clock. As in, It's not true that "S believes that (the broken clock is not broken)"; but that, to get the scope right, "Of the clock, S believes (the clock is not broken) AND the clock is broken.

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this. — Banno

Okay.

Am I correct in saying that - according to the position you're working from and/or defending - the scope of S's belief is determined by what S would say at the time?