Does the ordinary user make this claim about aliens and Trump? There is nothing ordinary about that claim. — Fooloso4
So remember, this was specifically a critique of the Private Language argument. Wittgenstein's contention is that the foundation of language is communal, but this doesn't exclude the potential for internal reflection. Nonetheless, if we accept that meaning in language comes from communal understanding and practice, a misinformed or mistaken community could indeed perpetuate misconceptions and faulty language use indefinitely, mirroring the scenario where each individual might harbor a private language incapable of self-correction. — schopenhauer1
When the interlocutor says at the start of 2: "For ..." the claim is that because a picture may be a picture of something else, the mental image is more like its object than any picture. This is not the same as simply saying a picture may be a picture of something else. Something specific is supposed to follow from the interlocutors claim that need not follow from the observation that a picture may be a picture of something other than what it is supposed to represent. — Fooloso4
The point is that one's mental image is not part of the language game; only a description of one's mental image is.
— Luke
And what follows from this? — Fooloso4
I assume you mean mental image
— Luke
No, I mean a picture, a painting or photograph. — Fooloso4
3. A mental image cannot be of anything else (but itself).
— Luke
The interlocutor's claim is not a mental image is a mental image of a mental image. It is an image of the object it is an image of. — Fooloso4
For one thing, it follows that a mental image is not a picture. — Luke
What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.
He is trying to steer us away from "an inner ostensive explanation" (PI 380). — Luke
How do I know from my mental image, what the colour really looks like?
Wittgenstein maintains a distinction between mental images and pictures at PI 389. On what grounds do you collapse this distinction? — Luke
It is the interlocutor's claim that the mental image is not representative of anything and that it is simply what it is: the image of this. — Luke
what is a Jackson Pollock painting the image of ... ; — Luke
... but what does the mental image of a Jackson Pollock painting represent? — Luke
You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse — Luke
... a mental image need not represent anything or be of anything other than what it is: this. — Luke
I would agree with you that a picture is no different to a mental image. — Luke
At PI 10 he says:
What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. — Fooloso4
367. A mental image is the image which is described when someone describes what he imagines. — PI 367
If we cannot appeal to a mental image of a color then, with regard to color, we cannot determine that the mental image of a red object is more like the object than a physical picture of the red object. — Fooloso4
The term picture is used in different ways. At PI 389 he is referring to a physical picture, something that others can see. But we can also picture things to ourselves as in PI 10. These pictures are mental images. — Fooloso4
He says that 1) a mental image must be more like its object than any picture. This is because 2) a picture may be of something other than what it is supposed to represent. But 3) a mental image can only be an image of this. "This" does not mean an image of itself, an image of an image. It is an image of the object that he claims a picture may fail to represent. — Fooloso4
You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse
— Luke
The mental image of a horse is not a horse, it is an image of a horse. — Fooloso4
A mental image need not represent anything or be of anything, but this does not mean it represents itself or is of itself. It presents itself, it does not re-present itself. — Fooloso4
What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. — Fooloso4
Note that he distinguishes between a mental image and its description at PI 367. — Luke
Otherwise, why would he include "or a description" at PI 10? — Luke
You claimed that the person on the telephone and the summer house were both unlike your mental images of them. — Luke
One wonders how you and your siblings were able to show your mental images to each other in order to compare them. — Luke
I don't agree that he is using "picture" as a verb at PI 10. — Luke
perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this. — Luke
Similarly, if someone were to ask what the Mona Lisa is a picture of, one could respond by pointing at it and saying "it's a picture of this". — Luke
However, Tomasello's empirical approach to understanding how humans are evolutionarily grounded in their cognitive abilities holds more value. — schopenhauer1
Few question or critique his ideas here, and I find this lack of critical examination reminiscent of disciples following a prophet. — schopenhauer1
“W as in Wittgenstein”
Parnet: Let’s move on to “W”.
Deleuze: There’s nothing in “W”.
Parnet: Yes, there’s Wittgenstein. I know he’s nothing for you, but it’s only a word.
Deleuze: I don’t like to talk about that… For me, it’s a philosophical catastrophe. It’s the very example of a “school”, it’s a regression of all philosophy, a massive regression. The Wittgenstein matter is quite sad. They imposed (ils ont foutu) a system of terror in which, under the pretext of doing something new, it’s poverty instituted in all grandeur (c’est la pauvreté instaurée en grandeur)… There isn’t a word to describe this danger, but this danger is one that recurs, it’s not the first time that it has happened. It’s serious, especially since the Wittgensteinians are mean (méchants) and destructive (ils cassent tout). So in this, there could be an assassination of philosophy. They are assassins of philosophy.
Parnet: It’s serious, then.
Deleuze: Yes… One must remain very vigilant. [Deleuze laughs] — Interview with Deleuze
Also, Wittgenstein's approach, characterized by presenting language errors and usage cases without explicit theory, can be seen as overly simplistic and aligned with common sense. — schopenhauer1
I read Wittgenstein as being troubled in the vernacular of Plato more than confident in the way of Aristotle...................I don't understand how "common sense" is a given in the text. Many of the examples treat what is given as commonly understood as odd when looked at as general reference. — Paine
Wittgenstein is confident in the Investigations, in the way of Aristotle, that the role of the philosopher is to bring clarity to the ordinary use of language, rather than investigating the nature of reality. — RussellA
The question is whether a description can be the content of the experience of imagining. Imagining how someone might come to regard a mental image as a superlikeness is to give a description of the steps taken. Isn't that what we are doing when we are figuring out how to respond to each other, imagining how this or that description might be persuasive? Imagining how this or that description might get the other person to see it differently? — Fooloso4
133. The concept of an ‘inner picture’ is misleading, since the model for this concept is the ‘outer picture’; and yet the uses of these concept-words are no more like one another than the uses of “numeral” and “number”. (Indeed, someone who was inclined to call numbers ‘ideal numerals’ could generate a similar confusion by doing so.) — PI 133
The core idea of Wittgenstein’s formalism from 1929 (if not 1918) through 1944 is that mathematics is essentially syntactical, devoid of reference and semantics. The most obvious aspect of this view, which has been noted by numerous commentators who do not refer to Wittgenstein as a ‘formalist’ (Kielkopf 1970: 360–38; Klenk 1976: 5, 8, 9; Fogelin 1968: 267; Frascolla 1994: 40; Marion 1998: 13–14), is that, contra Platonism, the signs and propositions of a mathematical calculus do not refer to anything. As Wittgenstein says at (WVC 34, note 1), “[n]umbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there”. This means not only that numbers are there in the use, it means that the numerals are the numbers, for “[a]rithmetic doesn’t talk about numbers, it works with numbers” (PR §109). — SEP article on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics
280. Someone paints a picture in order to show, for example, how he imagines a stage set. And now I say: “This picture has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do —– but for the informant it is in addition a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else. His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined, in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others.” — And what right have I to speak in this second case of a representation or piece of information — if these words were correctly used in the first case? — PI 280
In response to the question of the mental content I might say: "I had a picture in my mind of a man on a horse". This description can be put in the form of a public or physical picture, but a mental picture and a physical picture of that mental picture are two different things. — Fooloso4
perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this.
— Luke
The same question: an image of what? What is "this"? — Fooloso4
From what I have gathered, not only was Aristotle an advocate for using "theory" in way that Wittgenstein questioned but Aristotle considered himself able to distinguish the inquiries by kind. That endeavor is far removed from the criticism of 'scientism' put forward by Wittgenstein. And it is the matter of 'science' distinguished from philosophy that I directed my comments toward — Paine
On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined. — Luke
PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.
The implication is that the inner picture is the outer picture. — Luke
132. And above all do not say “Surely, my visual impression isn’t the drawing; it is this —– which I can’t show to anyone.” Of course it is not the drawing; but neither is it something of the same category, which I carry within myself.
... how I read sentence 3, is that the content of the mental image can only be this (i.e. whatever one imagines at a particular time) and nothing else. — Luke
663. If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind, perhaps of how I looked at him, etc.; but the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture.
664. In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in by the ear.——And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about — Philosophical Investigations
The complexity of 'philosophical' questions, that perhaps could be "shooed out of the bottle" is not the same as recognizing the complexity of the 'ordinary.' — Paine
On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined.
— Luke
PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.
The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4
The mental image is not a picture hanging on the wall of my mind. — Fooloso4
The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. — Fooloso4
The two uses of the term 'picture' belong to different categories. — Fooloso4
I take PI 280 to be denying that the picture has a double function. The picture he paints to show how he imagines the stage set does not also inform him. It does not tell him what he imagined. — Fooloso4
The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4
I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141. — Luke
The complexity of 'philosophical' questions, that perhaps could be "shooed out of the bottle" is not the same as recognizing the complexity of the 'ordinary.' — Paine
Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined? — Luke
Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'? — Luke
And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...". — Luke
2. Let us imagine a language
4. Imagine a script in which letters were used for sounds,
6. We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B
As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280. — Luke
His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined
... in addition a representation (or piece of information?)
I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141. — Luke
Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke
Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change.
...
One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4
As regards the Investigations, I read it more as an attack on "bad" philosophy than scientism. — RussellA
Wittgenstein viewed the tools of language as being fundamentally simple, and he believed that philosophers had obscured this simplicity by misusing language and by asking meaningless questions. — RussellA
You mean, project images from my mind on a screen? You don't know how many times I've thought how amazing that would be! :smile:Suppose neuroscientists were able to give you access to my mental picture and render a public physical picture so that everyone can see what the content of my mental picture is. — Fooloso4
Indeed. But this doesn't change anything. Everyone has different mental pictures of a same object in the environment. (BTW, I can't see why you call it "public"? Never heard of such a descrition.)My mental picture X rendered public at T1 may differ from my mental picture X rendered public at T2. My mental image is not immutable. — Fooloso4
That image has certainly changed, not over time in general, but --strictly speaking-- from one second to another. Thinking is a process producing a kind of energy, which is flowing, like a hologram, and the images that we see in our mind are changing on constant basis. Of course, this does not prevent us from saying, in a figurative way, "I have always this same image in my mind ".I might say that ever since I was a child I have had this image in my mind. If you asked me whether that image has changed over time I cannot give a definitive answer. I have no way of comparing that image as it was then to how it is now. — Fooloso4
Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke
Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change. — Fooloso4
PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.
The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4
Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke
One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4
And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...".
— Luke
The first few examples of many:
2. Let us imagine a language
4. Imagine a script in which letters were used for sounds,
6. We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B — Fooloso4
As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280.
— Luke
What he rejects is that:
His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined — Fooloso4
I don't think this view is supported by the text. The complaints coming from Wittgenstein regarding the excesses of science as culture is expressed as an overindulgence in generalizations. No limits upon what science could actually produce were promulgated therein. — Paine
You mean, project images from my mind on a screen? You don't know how many times I've thought how amazing that would be! — Alkis Piskas
But this doesn't change anything. Everyone has different mental pictures of a same object in the environment. — Alkis Piskas
you are talking about a different thing: the difference between an object that exists in the physical universe and that object as you yourself peceived it — Alkis Piskas
It does not matter whether the mental picture is of some object that exists in the world or not. — Fooloso4
I can't see why you call it "public"? — Alkis Piskas
the images that we see in our mind are changing on constant basis. — Alkis Piskas
Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke — Alkis Piskas
This appears inconsistent with what you quoted and said earlier — Luke
If you are saying that the mental image or imagined picture might change, then in what sense is it a "picture"? — Luke
We could think of it instead as a series of different (inner) pictures. — Luke
Instead of thinking of it in terms of a single picture that changes between t1 and t2, we could think of it as two different pictures; one at t1 and another at t2. — Luke
These are examples of the use of the word "imagine", not examples of the use of the word "picture". — Luke
PPI 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.
What he rejects is that:
His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined
— Fooloso4
Isn't this precisely what you are claiming when you say that your private picture can change? — Luke
W's rejection here is consistent with the assertion that the content of a public picture and the content of a private picture are, or can be, the same. — Luke
But you reject this assertion because you "imagine something can change"? — Luke
...you didn't explain --or I couldn't see-- why you doubted about Luke's statement that "the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined — Alkis Piskas
That image has certainly changed, not over time in general, but --strictly speaking-- from one second to another. — Alkis Piskas
Didn't get that, sorry. So, maybe I do miss something ...how can that image be the same a physical picture which remains relatively unchanged? — Fooloso4
Isn't this object the same regardless of whether and how you and I perceive it? — Alkis Piskas
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