Does the ordinary user make this claim about aliens and Trump? There is nothing ordinary about that claim. — Fooloso4

It is the ordinary user of the language rather than the philosopher who puts demands on the words they use, for example, making extraordinary claims about aliens and Trump.

Assuming that we are both ordinary users of the language, you did write that "The problem is that the Trumpsters do not want to preserve democracy.", and many would say that this is also an extraordinary claim about democracy and Trump.

IE, it is the ordinary user rather than the philosopher who puts demands on our use of words such as "know".

So remember, this was specifically a critique of the Private Language argument. Wittgenstein's contention is that the foundation of language is communal, but this doesn't exclude the potential for internal reflection. Nonetheless, if we accept that meaning in language comes from communal understanding and practice, a misinformed or mistaken community could indeed perpetuate misconceptions and faulty language use indefinitely, mirroring the scenario where each individual might harbor a private language incapable of self-correction. — schopenhauer1

But there is more to language, consider PI 242: "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.-It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement."

I believe you are describing a scenario where we are not talking about a language at all. Will there be mistakes in use, according to the community, of course. Could some mistakes remain hidden, at times, and perpetuated, of course. But to say, if it becomes all encompassing, as the skeptic would, is not to describe an inaccurate language, but to not describe a language at all. And that is similar to the problems with a private language as well, notions of "judging", "mistakes", "accuracy" lose their sense when applied to the private realm. So why even call this a language at all.

When the interlocutor says at the start of 2: "For ..." the claim is that because a picture may be a picture of something else, the mental image is more like its object than any picture. This is not the same as simply saying a picture may be a picture of something else. Something specific is supposed to follow from the interlocutors claim that need not follow from the observation that a picture may be a picture of something other than what it is supposed to represent. — Fooloso4

The interlocutor might come to believe sentence 1 based (partly) on sentence 2, but I still don't consider PI 389 to be a rejection of sentence 2. It's a non sequitir wherein sentences 2 and 3 are true (and W thinks them true) but the conclusion at sentence 1 does not follow from them.

The point is that one's mental image is not part of the language game; only a description of one's mental image is.
— Luke

And what follows from this? — Fooloso4

For one thing, it follows that a mental image is not a picture.

Many of the surrounding passages of PI 389 are discussing undescribed or unexpressed mental images and questioning how (or whether) these relate to our linguistic abilities. He is trying to steer us away from "an inner ostensive explanation" (PI 380). The distinction between a mental image held only in the mind and a mental image expressed via action or description is crucial to this.

I assume you mean mental image
— Luke

No, I mean a picture, a painting or photograph. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein maintains a distinction between mental images and pictures at PI 389. On what grounds do you collapse this distinction? Wittgenstein may argue that a mental image does not have a superlikeness to its object, but how do you infer that there is no distinction betweem a mental image and a picture?

3. A mental image cannot be of anything else (but itself).
— Luke

The interlocutor's claim is not a mental image is a mental image of a mental image. It is an image of the object it is an image of. — Fooloso4

I may have expressed that poorly. It is the interlocutor's claim that the mental image is not representative of anything and that it is simply what it is: the image of this.

I can see how you might read it as: the mental image is a representation of the represented particular object. That is, a mental image is a representation of the object that the mental image is of.

To offer an analogy (while trying not to say that pictures are identical to mental images) what is a Jackson Pollock painting the image of; or what does it represent? If I had only the mental image of a Jackson Pollock painting, what would it represent? You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse, but what does the mental image of a Jackson Pollock painting represent? My point is that I don't consider it intrinsic to a mental image that it must be of some particular object in the world. I believe that a mental image can also be of something not in the world; that a mental image need not represent anything or be of anything other than what it is: this.

However, I would more readily side with you on this point re: sentence 3 than I would agree with you that a picture is no different to a mental image. That is, I would not agree that a picture is no different to an unexpressed or undescribed mental image.

For one thing, it follows that a mental image is not a picture. — Luke

At PI 10 he says:

What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

He is trying to steer us away from "an inner ostensive explanation" (PI 380). — Luke

Right, we cannot appeal to a mental image of red. This is discussed at PI 50 and the use of samples and paradigms. At PI 388 he asks:

How do I know from my mental image, what the colour really looks like?

If we cannot appeal to a mental image of a color then, with regard to color, we cannot determine that the mental image of a red object is more like the object than a physical picture of the red object.

Wittgenstein maintains a distinction between mental images and pictures at PI 389. On what grounds do you collapse this distinction? — Luke

The term picture is used in different ways. At PI 389 he is referring to a physical picture, something that others can see. But we can also picture things to ourselves as in PI 10. These pictures are mental images.

It is the interlocutor's claim that the mental image is not representative of anything and that it is simply what it is: the image of this. — Luke

He says that 1) a mental image must be more like its object than any picture. This is because 2) a picture may be of something other than what it is supposed to represent. But 3) a mental image can only be an image of this. "This" does not mean an image of itself, an image of an image. It is an image of the object that he claims a picture may fail to represent.

what is a Jackson Pollock painting the image of ... ; — Luke

I don't know. Perhaps it is not of any thing and does not represent any thing.

... but what does the mental image of a Jackson Pollock painting represent? — Luke

A Jackson Pollock painting.

You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse — Luke

The mental image of a horse is not a horse, it is an image of a horse.

... a mental image need not represent anything or be of anything other than what it is: this. — Luke

A mental image need not represent anything or be of anything, but this does not mean it represents itself or is of itself. It presents itself, it does not re-present itself.

I would agree with you that a picture is no different to a mental image. — Luke

I would say that a mental picture is a mental image, but a physical picture is different. My claim that this animal is a horse cannot be settled by appeal to my mental picture of a horse. But a clear physical picture (contrary to 2) can settle the issue. The picture serves as a sample or paradigm.

At PI 10 he says:

What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. — Fooloso4

This is consistent with his defintion of a mental image at PI 367:

367. A mental image is the image which is described when someone describes what he imagines. — PI 367

Note that he distinguishes between a mental image and its description at PI 367. So, there is such a thing as an undescribed mental image. When he speaks of "the content of the experience of imagining" at PI 10, I consider this to be the same as "the image which is described" at PI 367. In other words, the (physical) "picture, or a description" at PI 10 is the described mental image, not the undescribed mental image. Otherwise, why would he include "or a description" at PI 10? The content of the mental image can be physically represented by a picture or description.

If we cannot appeal to a mental image of a color then, with regard to color, we cannot determine that the mental image of a red object is more like the object than a physical picture of the red object. — Fooloso4

Weren't you making these same appeals to a mental image with your examples of the person on the telephone and your siblings' summer house? You claimed that the person on the telephone and the summer house were both unlike your mental images of them. One wonders how you and your siblings were able to show your mental images to each other in order to compare them.

The term picture is used in different ways. At PI 389 he is referring to a physical picture, something that others can see. But we can also picture things to ourselves as in PI 10. These pictures are mental images. — Fooloso4

I don't agree that he is using "picture" as a verb at PI 10. Again, the addition of "or a description" is at odds with that reading.

He says that 1) a mental image must be more like its object than any picture. This is because 2) a picture may be of something other than what it is supposed to represent. But 3) a mental image can only be an image of this. "This" does not mean an image of itself, an image of an image. It is an image of the object that he claims a picture may fail to represent. — Fooloso4

Maybe you're right. I'll try this reading on for size.

You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse
— Luke

The mental image of a horse is not a horse, it is an image of a horse. — Fooloso4

I said that the image was of a horse.

A mental image need not represent anything or be of anything, but this does not mean it represents itself or is of itself. It presents itself, it does not re-present itself. — Fooloso4

To make a last gasp argument for my reading, perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this. Similarly, if someone were to ask what the Mona Lisa is a picture of, one could respond by pointing at it and saying "it's a picture of this".

It is worth noting, however, that a major difference between a mental image and a picture is that, unlike a picture, one cannot point at a mental image. Neither can one point at this object that one is looking at and compare it to one's mental image of the object (that one is having while looking at the object). This is the faulty assumption behind the idea of "superlikeness".

I should have noted earlier that '10' is from part 2 of PI, or in the 4th edition "Philosophy of Psychology
A Fragment".

What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. — Fooloso4

How else could the question be answered? More below.

Note that he distinguishes between a mental image and its description at PI 367. — Luke

Right, a description and what it describes are not the same.

Otherwise, why would he include "or a description" at PI 10? — Luke

The question is whether a description can be the content of the experience of imagining. Imagining how someone might come to regard a mental image as a superlikeness is to give a description of the steps taken. Isn't that what we are doing when we are figuring out how to respond to each other, imagining how this or that description might be persuasive? Imagining how this or that description might get the other person to see it differently?

If I say: "This is just as I pictured it would be" I am saying that my mental image is consistent with the thing pictured in that image.

You claimed that the person on the telephone and the summer house were both unlike your mental images of them. — Luke

Yes.

One wonders how you and your siblings were able to show your mental images to each other in order to compare them. — Luke

We didn't show them we described them. But I can compare my mental picture to the thing pictured.

I don't agree that he is using "picture" as a verb at PI 10. — Luke

In response to the question of the mental content I might say: "I had a picture in my mind of a man on a horse". This description can be put in the form of a public or physical picture, but a mental picture and a physical picture of that mental picture are two different things.

perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this. — Luke

The same question: an image of what? What is "this"?

Similarly, if someone were to ask what the Mona Lisa is a picture of, one could respond by pointing at it and saying "it's a picture of this". — Luke

What are you pointing to? The painting? Surely it is not a picture of the painting.

The painting is named Mona Lisa. It is believed to be a picture of Madam Lisa Giocondo. If you are pointing to the woman with that famous enigmatic smile then yes it is a picture of her. But given the smile it might be there is more to the story of what it is a picture of.

However, Tomasello's empirical approach to understanding how humans are evolutionarily grounded in their cognitive abilities holds more value. — schopenhauer1

It seems to me that you are putting the two views into competition with one another in a way that was not intended by Wittgenstein. When I asked whether: "there is no such thing as a "non-theoretical" approach?", I was also asking if only the scientific method has value for you and whether the attempt, by various philosophers to place such efforts into a larger context was a mistake.

As a point of reference, consider Bridgman's call for 'operational' definitions where the possible meanings of terms in models should be delimited at the outset of an investigation in order to avoid being sabotaged by meanings outside of the project. That approach has had a problem from the model building side as well as claiming we could proceed with certain kinds of explanation without comparing them to each other. Trying to find a way to talk about it is as much the beginning of 'metaphysics' as the speculation it encouraged.

Few question or critique his ideas here, and I find this lack of critical examination reminiscent of disciples following a prophet. — schopenhauer1

After several years participating in this forum, I have observed countless challenges and critical examination of the writings. To ascribe all the challenges to those challenges as hewing to settled doctrine runs afoul of your complaint that no firm general proposition has been provided.

It does seem likely that some have joined together in camps. It would be very campy to insist everyone has done so. There is a half-playful interview with Deleuze that illustrates both sides of the dynamic:

“W as in Wittgenstein”

Parnet: Let’s move on to “W”.

Deleuze: There’s nothing in “W”.

Parnet: Yes, there’s Wittgenstein. I know he’s nothing for you, but it’s only a word.

Deleuze: I don’t like to talk about that… For me, it’s a philosophical catastrophe. It’s the very example of a “school”, it’s a regression of all philosophy, a massive regression. The Wittgenstein matter is quite sad. They imposed (ils ont foutu) a system of terror in which, under the pretext of doing something new, it’s poverty instituted in all grandeur (c’est la pauvreté instaurée en grandeur)… There isn’t a word to describe this danger, but this danger is one that recurs, it’s not the first time that it has happened. It’s serious, especially since the Wittgensteinians are mean (méchants) and destructive (ils cassent tout). So in this, there could be an assassination of philosophy. They are assassins of philosophy.

Parnet: It’s serious, then.

Deleuze: Yes… One must remain very vigilant. [Deleuze laughs] — Interview with Deleuze

I came upon all this sort of thing later in my life and am better read in the Ancients than the new-fangled stuff. I am torn between the optimism of Aristotle that we can get a handle on our existence through careful methods and the skepticism of Plato that focuses upon what is difficult to begin. I read Wittgenstein as being troubled in the vernacular of Plato more than confident in the way of Aristotle. Does that put me in a camp?

In any case, Deleuze's complaint is not the same as yours. What is "over-explained" compared to "underexplained?"

Also, Wittgenstein's approach, characterized by presenting language errors and usage cases without explicit theory, can be seen as overly simplistic and aligned with common sense. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand how "common sense" is a given in the text. Many of the examples treat what is given as commonly understood as odd when looked at as general reference. That is the opposite approach of establishing there is a baseline of assured propositions.

I read Wittgenstein as being troubled in the vernacular of Plato more than confident in the way of Aristotle...................I don't understand how "common sense" is a given in the text. Many of the examples treat what is given as commonly understood as odd when looked at as general reference. — Paine

Wittgenstein is confident in the Investigations, in the way of Aristotle, that the role of the philosopher is to bring clarity to the ordinary use of language, rather than investigating the nature of reality.

As language is only capable of doing certain things, it is inevitable that outside what language can do there will be mysteries.
PI 38 For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.

For Wittgenstein, the role of philosophy is to be able to think clearly and clear up confusions about words such as know, believe, desire, intend, think as they are ordinarily used, not about the nature of reality, not about the validity of Realism or Anti realism .
PI 126 Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

For Wittgenstein, the philosopher starts with language as it is ordinarily used, where the meaning of a word is its agreed use, and where language is grounded in common sense.
PI 122 A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words

It is true that he does give many examples, such as imaging people around me as automata, that are much discussed within philosophy, but is making the point that, as there are limits to what language is capable of, such discussions, being outside what language is capable of, become meaningless.
PI 420 But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?................But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say!............And you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

For Wittgenstein, problems arise when the philosopher tries to use language beyond what it is inherently capable of, and beyond the common sense use of language as it is used in the everyday.
PI 133 For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.

Wittgenstein is confident in the Investigations, in the way of Aristotle, that the role of the philosopher is to bring clarity to the ordinary use of language, rather than investigating the nature of reality. — RussellA

This is a reading of Aristotle I am not familiar with. From what I have gathered, not only was Aristotle an advocate for using "theory" in way that Wittgenstein questioned but Aristotle considered himself able to distinguish the inquiries by kind. That endeavor is far removed from the criticism of 'scientism' put forward by Wittgenstein. And it is the matter of 'science' distinguished from philosophy that I directed my comments toward .

The question is whether a description can be the content of the experience of imagining. Imagining how someone might come to regard a mental image as a superlikeness is to give a description of the steps taken. Isn't that what we are doing when we are figuring out how to respond to each other, imagining how this or that description might be persuasive? Imagining how this or that description might get the other person to see it differently? — Fooloso4

I'm not questioning whether the content of the experience of imagining can be a description. On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined.

It is your position that the mental image itself can be a picture or description. If a mental image were itself a description, then a description of that mental image (such as per the definition in PI 367) would be a description of a description. Likewise, if the mental image were a picture, then the public version would be a picture of a picture.

At PPF 133, W states:

133. The concept of an ‘inner picture’ is misleading, since the model for this concept is the ‘outer picture’; and yet the uses of these concept-words are no more like one another than the uses of “numeral” and “number”. (Indeed, someone who was inclined to call numbers ‘ideal numerals’ could generate a similar confusion by doing so.) — PI 133

I note that the SEP article on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics states (my emphasis):

The core idea of Wittgenstein’s formalism from 1929 (if not 1918) through 1944 is that mathematics is essentially syntactical, devoid of reference and semantics. The most obvious aspect of this view, which has been noted by numerous commentators who do not refer to Wittgenstein as a ‘formalist’ (Kielkopf 1970: 360–38; Klenk 1976: 5, 8, 9; Fogelin 1968: 267; Frascolla 1994: 40; Marion 1998: 13–14), is that, contra Platonism, the signs and propositions of a mathematical calculus do not refer to anything. As Wittgenstein says at (WVC 34, note 1), “[n]umbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there”. This means not only that numbers are there in the use, it means that the numerals are the numbers, for “[a]rithmetic doesn’t talk about numbers, it works with numbers” (PR §109). — SEP article on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics

The implication is that the inner picture is the outer picture. If there can be any private use of pictures and descriptions as mental images, then such use follows public rules; it treats pictures and descriptions as public objects. There are not two separate descriptions or pictures where one is inner and one is outer; there is only the one description or one picture used for both inner and outer.

Then how is it that we agree that a mental image is not its description?

Perhaps a solution can be found if we agree that a picture or a description is intrinsically public (i.e. derives its meaning/use publicly), but that one can use these public instruments privately, such that one can imagine descriptions or pictures (using their public meanings).

Another way of looking at it could be that I have my private mental image (which is a private picture or description) which I then describe in our public language (or e.g. in a painting, etc). One could worry that something might get lost in translation from the private image to the public description. However, it could also be argued that nothing could possibly get lost because the mental image itself can only be publicly expressed as well as it can be privately imagined. If my private description (e.g. of directions to somewhere) is poor, then so, too, will be my public description. If the picture I imagine is hazy or indistinct, then my public description (or painting, etc) of what I imagine can only be as hazy or indistinct.

This way, a mental image is not a private picture or description (an idea I was keen to reject) and neither do we require two different versions of each picture and description: the public and the private versions (which thus avoids the need for pictures of pictures or descriptions of descriptions).

PI 280 is relevant here:

280. Someone paints a picture in order to show, for example, how he imagines a stage set. And now I say: “This picture has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do —– but for the informant it is in addition a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else. His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined, in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others.” — And what right have I to speak in this second case of a representation or piece of information — if these words were correctly used in the first case? — PI 280

In response to the question of the mental content I might say: "I had a picture in my mind of a man on a horse". This description can be put in the form of a public or physical picture, but a mental picture and a physical picture of that mental picture are two different things. — Fooloso4

I guess that the mental and physical pictures both have the same content, though? In that case, yes, I see what you are saying.

perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this.
— Luke

The same question: an image of what? What is "this"? — Fooloso4

What I've been trying to say, and how I read sentence 3, is that the content of the mental image can only be this (i.e. whatever one imagines at a particular time) and nothing else. As he is inclined to say at PI 523, "A picture tells me itself".

As I argued earlier, I see no reason why a mental image must represent anything, or be of anything in particular. Maybe the interlocutor errs by thinking sentence 3 is true (when it is false), as you suggest, but I think this reading would make more sense if sentence 2 of PI 389 was also false.

However, I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141.

From what I have gathered, not only was Aristotle an advocate for using "theory" in way that Wittgenstein questioned but Aristotle considered himself able to distinguish the inquiries by kind. That endeavor is far removed from the criticism of 'scientism' put forward by Wittgenstein. And it is the matter of 'science' distinguished from philosophy that I directed my comments toward — Paine

The Investigations is not the work of a sceptic, but that of someone confidently expounding the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. An approach more that of common sense than the metaphysical.

As Wikipedia in its article Philophical Investigations wrote:
The Investigations deal largely with the difficulties of language and meaning. Wittgenstein viewed the tools of language as being fundamentally simple, and he believed that philosophers had obscured this simplicity by misusing language and by asking meaningless questions. He attempted in the Investigations to make things clear: "Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen"—to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle.

On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined. — Luke

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content.

The implication is that the inner picture is the outer picture. — Luke

PPF 133 should be read together with:

PPF

132. And above all do not say “Surely, my visual impression isn’t the drawing; it is this —– which I can’t show to anyone.” Of course it is not the drawing; but neither is it something of the same category, which I carry within myself.

The mental image is not a picture hanging on the wall of my mind. The two uses of the term 'picture' belong to different categories.

I take PI 280 to be denying that the picture has a double function. The picture he paints to show how he imagines the stage set does not also inform him. It does not tell him what he imagined.

... how I read sentence 3, is that the content of the mental image can only be this (i.e. whatever one imagines at a particular time) and nothing else. — Luke

Rather than repeat myself, and you repeating yourself, I am going to leave this as unresolved between us.

What the Wikipedia article writer fails to understand is that 'ordinary' uses of language do not become 'simple' elements from which models may be built upon. Such a presupposition ignores paragraphs like the following:

663. If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind, perhaps of how I looked at him, etc.; but the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture.

664. In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in by the ear.——And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about — Philosophical Investigations

The complexity of 'philosophical' questions, that perhaps could be "shooed out of the bottle" is not the same as recognizing the complexity of the 'ordinary.'

This element involves the question about science that prompted my initial remarks. I don't think the effort to compare reports about 'physics' and 'psychology' were made to make science easier.

The complexity of 'philosophical' questions, that perhaps could be "shooed out of the bottle" is not the same as recognizing the complexity of the 'ordinary.' — Paine

An important point! Despite what Wittgenstein says about the ordinary it is often an overlooked aspect of his philosophy. All the focus remains on the same few linguistic tangles.

Paine. Thanks for quoting this:

663. If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind — Philosophical Investigations

What says you @Luke?

In case it was unclear, I made some concessions to your reading in my previous post. I now agree that a mental image can be a picture, but on the proviso that a private picture/description of one's mental image is not intrinsically private (or private in the same sense as a private language); that it can be made public. However, I sense that you have not gone far enough in your rejection of this "inner picture", which is why I asked: "how is it that we agree that a mental image is not its description?"

On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined.
— Luke

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

I was referring to the content of the experience. Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?

The mental image is not a picture hanging on the wall of my mind. — Fooloso4

Can you explain how it is different? I note that a moment ago you said:

The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. — Fooloso4

The two uses of the term 'picture' belong to different categories. — Fooloso4

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?

It seems to me that W is using 'picture' as a noun at PPF 133 and that he is using 'drawing' as a noun at PPF 134. It also seems that the content of both an imagined picture and a physical picture are the same, even though the "medium" of the pictures is not. Other than that one is imagined and the other is physical, I don't see what different meaning the word "picture" has when used to refer to an imagined picture compared to a physical picture. And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...".

I take PI 280 to be denying that the picture has a double function. The picture he paints to show how he imagines the stage set does not also inform him. It does not tell him what he imagined. — Fooloso4

I also take it this way. But do you consider there to be a single picture here or two different pictures? There is the (physical) picture that was painted but also the (imagined) picture of the stage set in his mind before he painted it. You appeared to be siding with the latter when you said:

The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280.

EDIT: Also, did you have any comment to make about our disagreement over sentence 2?

I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141. — Luke

The complexity of 'philosophical' questions, that perhaps could be "shooed out of the bottle" is not the same as recognizing the complexity of the 'ordinary.' — Paine

As regards the Investigations, I read it more as an attack on "bad" philosophy than scientism.

I see the key to the Investigations as PI 43: the meaning of a word is its use in the language, and this is what the Investigations considers.

Scientism is a pejorative word. Scientism is an overconfidence in the power of science, trying to explain all experiences in mechanical terms rather than accepting them as part of the inexplicable wonder and mystery of life. I am sure that the majority of scientists are also opposed to scientism. Though if anti-scientism was taken too far, beliefs such as astrology, witchcraft and aliens in Mexico would be excluded from scientific investigation and blindly accepted as fact by the un-philosophical.

When someone says "I know your pain", Wittgenstein is not attacking the scientist for wanting to carry out experiments on the brains of the speaker and listener, but rather is attacking the "bad" philosopher for questioning such an expression in the first place. A "bad" philosopher being someone who attempts to discoverer something using language that exists outside of language, and is therefore logically outside of the ability of language to discover.

For Wittgenstein the meaning of "I know your pain" in our common sense and ordinary language is given within the context of the language game being used, and cannot be explained other than being part of its language game. In science it will be an axiom of a theory. In On Certainty it will be a hinge proposition, As he wrote in OC 501: 'Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it' . In the Investigations it will be what founds language. As he writes in PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do.". These are not concessions to the scepticism of the "bad" philosopher, but are acknowledgements that most of our actions are normative.

In my terms, words such as "know" are figures of speech used in a non-literal sense. They can only be explained by understanding the wider context of the language game existing within a particular form of life. As "the language game" is a figure of speech, the "form of life" is a figure of speech, then also "know" is a figure of speech.

Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined? — Luke

Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change.

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'? — Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is.

And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...". — Luke

The first few examples of many:

2. Let us imagine a language
4. Imagine a script in which letters were used for sounds,
6. We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B

As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280. — Luke

What he rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined

it is not:

... in addition a representation (or piece of information?)

I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141. — Luke

I don't see where Wittgenstein makes the case for 2.

Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke
Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change.
...
One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4

I believe is right. However, the problem here is that you are talking about a different thing: the difference between an object that exists in the physical universe and that object as you yourself peceived it, i.e. as it exists in your mind. This is not however what @Luke says.

Suppose neuroscientists were able to give you access to my mental picture and render a public physical picture so that everyone can see what the content of my mental picture is. It does not matter whether the mental picture is of some object that exists in the world or not. My mental picture X rendered public at T1 may differ from my mental picture X rendered public at T2. My mental image is not immutable. There are lots of things that can influence and change it. The physical image, however, does not change.

I might say that ever since I was a child I have had this image in my mind. If you asked me whether that image has changed over time I cannot give a definitive answer. I have no way of comparing that image as it was then to how it is now.

As regards the Investigations, I read it more as an attack on "bad" philosophy than scientism. — RussellA

I did not intend to argue otherwise. The questions I am asking concern where philosophy ends and science begins. That is where I objected to this statement you quoted from wikipedia:

Wittgenstein viewed the tools of language as being fundamentally simple, and he believed that philosophers had obscured this simplicity by misusing language and by asking meaningless questions. — RussellA

I don't think this view is supported by the text. The complaints coming from Wittgenstein regarding the excesses of science as culture is expressed as an overindulgence in generalizations. No limits upon what science could actually produce were promulgated therein.

Suppose neuroscientists were able to give you access to my mental picture and render a public physical picture so that everyone can see what the content of my mental picture is. — Fooloso4

You mean, project images from my mind on a screen? You don't know how many times I've thought how amazing that would be! :smile:

My mental picture X rendered public at T1 may differ from my mental picture X rendered public at T2. My mental image is not immutable. — Fooloso4

Indeed. But this doesn't change anything. Everyone has different mental pictures of a same object in the environment. (BTW, I can't see why you call it "public"? Never heard of such a descrition.)

I might say that ever since I was a child I have had this image in my mind. If you asked me whether that image has changed over time I cannot give a definitive answer. I have no way of comparing that image as it was then to how it is now. — Fooloso4

That image has certainly changed, not over time in general, but --strictly speaking-- from one second to another. Thinking is a process producing a kind of energy, which is flowing, like a hologram, and the images that we see in our mind are changing on constant basis. Of course, this does not prevent us from saying, in a figurative way, "I have always this same image in my mind ".

Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke

Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change. — Fooloso4

This appears inconsistent with what you quoted and said earlier:

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4

Doesn't "picture" mean the same here? If you are saying that the mental image or imagined picture might change, then in what sense is it a "picture"?

As I questioned several posts ago, why does the picture have to change? We could think of it instead as a series of different (inner) pictures. For example, there could be a picture which is a (physically rendered) snapshot of your inner picture at t1 and then another picture which is a snapshot of your inner picture at t2. Instead of thinking of it in terms of a single picture that changes between t1 and t2, we could think of it as two different pictures; one at t1 and another at t2. In the same way that a movie reel represents change via static pictures, for example. Then there wouldn't be two different senses of the word "picture". Anyhow, I don't believe there exists a sense of the word as you believe W is using it - as a single image that changes over time. Unless you mean a movie? However, I don't believe W is using "picture" as a synonym for "movie" at PPF 10.

And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...".
— Luke

The first few examples of many:

2. Let us imagine a language
4. Imagine a script in which letters were used for sounds,
6. We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B — Fooloso4

These are examples of the use of the word "imagine", not examples of the use of the word "picture".

As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280.
— Luke

What he rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined — Fooloso4

Isn't this precisely what you are claiming when you say that your private picture can change? That your private impression of the (changing) picture tells you what you imagined?

W's rejection here is consistent with the assertion that the content of a public picture and the content of a private picture are, or can be, the same. But you reject this assertion because you "imagine something can change"?

I don't think this view is supported by the text. The complaints coming from Wittgenstein regarding the excesses of science as culture is expressed as an overindulgence in generalizations. No limits upon what science could actually produce were promulgated therein. — Paine

The Wikipedia article is about the Investigations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that whilst logic lies at the bottom of science, this is not the case for language and thought. IE, science and language/thought are different.

Where in the Investigations does he write about the excesses of science?

You mean, project images from my mind on a screen? You don't know how many times I've thought how amazing that would be! — Alkis Piskas

Be careful what you wish for!

But this doesn't change anything. Everyone has different mental pictures of a same object in the environment. — Alkis Piskas

In response to your comment:

you are talking about a different thing: the difference between an object that exists in the physical universe and that object as you yourself peceived it — Alkis Piskas

I gave an example where an object that exists the environment need not play a role.

It does not matter whether the mental picture is of some object that exists in the world or not. — Fooloso4

The image I have in my mind since I was a child need not be a mental picture of some object. It could be my own creation that no one else has a mental picture of.

I can't see why you call it "public"? — Alkis Piskas

In order to distinguish a mental picture, which is not public or accessible to anyone else, and a picture we can all see.

the images that we see in our mind are changing on constant basis. — Alkis Piskas

Then aren't you agreeing with me and rejecting the claim that?

Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke — Alkis Piskas

If the content of the images in our mind are changing on a constant basis how could that content be the same as that of a public object that is not constantly changing?

This appears inconsistent with what you quoted and said earlier — Luke

I don't see any inconsistency.

If you are saying that the mental image or imagined picture might change, then in what sense is it a "picture"? — Luke

This shows how a picture hanging on the wall differs from a mental picture.

We could think of it instead as a series of different (inner) pictures. — Luke

How do you reconcile this with PI 389?

Instead of thinking of it in terms of a single picture that changes between t1 and t2, we could think of it as two different pictures; one at t1 and another at t2. — Luke

They are at t1 and t2 my inner picture of X. My inner picture of X has changed. It should be noted
that I may not even be aware that it has changed.

These are examples of the use of the word "imagine", not examples of the use of the word "picture". — Luke

PPI 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

What he rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined
— Fooloso4

Isn't this precisely what you are claiming when you say that your private picture can change? — Luke

No. Why would I need a private impression of the picture I imagined to tell me what I imagined?

W's rejection here is consistent with the assertion that the content of a public picture and the content of a private picture are, or can be, the same. — Luke

They might be but they need not be the same.

But you reject this assertion because you "imagine something can change"? — Luke

No. I reject it because things are not always as we imagine them to be.

I don't see any problem or disagree with anything you said, except that my initial comment regarding Lukes questio/statement still applies. That is, you didn't explain --or I couldn't see-- why you doubted about Luke's statement that "the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined", by saying "Not necessarily so." And since the truth of the statement is very obvious to me, I am interested to know why it is not for you. I mean exactly about that statement. You can just summarize it, if you wish, into a single sentence. I won't complain! :smile:

...you didn't explain --or I couldn't see-- why you doubted about Luke's statement that "the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined — Alkis Piskas

If, as you say:

That image has certainly changed, not over time in general, but --strictly speaking-- from one second to another. — Alkis Piskas

how can that image be the same a physical picture which remains relatively unchanged?

how can that image be the same a physical picture which remains relatively unchanged? — Fooloso4

Didn't get that, sorry. So, maybe I do miss something ...
Let's drop Luke's "picture/description" example and use a simple object in the enviroment: a vase. Isn't this object the same regardless of whether and how you and I perceive it?

Isn't this object the same regardless of whether and how you and I perceive it? — Alkis Piskas

A vase remains the same.