It looks like it's going to end with no Palestinians in Gaza, in other words, a massacre. — frank

Yes, sadly. And most of the governments of the world are accepting and even backing up the massacre. Only a few condemned this madness and when they do so, the rest treat them as 'enemies'.

Yes, sadly. And most of the governments of the world are accepting and even backing up the massacre. Only a few condemned this madness and when they do so, the rest treat them as 'enemies'. — javi2541997

I know what you mean. I started a thread once on what's happening to the Uyghurs. I was shocked that people on this forum all acted like culture destroying abuse at the hands of the Chinese was probably for the best. So now they all show up to register shock at what's happening to Palestinians. Looks like selective shock to me.

What is 'zionism without justice' but ...?

He who sows injustice will reap violence, and the rod of his wrath will fail. — Proverbs 22:8

It looks like it's going to end with no Palestinians in Gaza, in other words, a massacre. — frank

The Allies massacred civilians on a level Israel can only dream of in WW2. Yet that did not create a moral equivalence between the Allied and Axis powers.

The Allies massacred civilians on a level Israel can only dream of in WW2. Yet that did not create a moral equivalence between the Allied and Axis powers. — RogueAI

I'm not sure what you mean.

From Reuters:

Egypt rejects calls from Israeli army for Gaza Strip's residents to leave their homes and head south

That's an interesting comparison because the Axis' military situation was about as hopeless as Hamas' well before 1945, before the strategic bombing campaigns even hit their stride really.

But there is a whole complex set of issues to unpack there. I can see though how the simple argument of "Israel has become much stronger relative to their opponent since 1948 and so they must make the concessions," does wear thin in ways here. Germany was ruined in 1945, at the mercy of Soviet and Western armies, and yet we wouldn't say they should have ceded ground back to Hitler at that point on those grounds alone.

Similarly, there is the question of: "do you immediately pull all aid from Stalin as soon as it is apparent that the Nazis won't win?" Another similar question relative to justification for intervention vis-á-vis timing.

How you answer likely depends on if you see the relevant conflict begining in 1948 or even prior, or last week, or when Hamas won a slight plurality of the vote, then axed any competition and made themselves masters of Gaza?

Imho the entire framing doesn't work, because the moral subjects are individual people, not nations.

So we have to take into consideration the reasons people issued these commands / made these plans. Which includes their knowledge at the time etc.

I think people were generally justified in wanting to defeat the Nazi / Japanese state, but plenty decisions for individual parts of this were evil. Notably the strategic bombing campaigns on both sides were often characterized by wilful ignorance, revenge and cruelty.

There also seem to be a number of historians who regard the demand of "unconditional surrender" as a mistake that unnecessarily prolonged the war, especially re Japan.

On the other hand prosecuting any kind of existential conflict clearly requires some risk taking. It's implausible to ask that noone is hurt in war. And that especially goes for the underdog, since otherwise their position gets even weaker.

So I think ultimately there's nothing to be done except to evaluate ends and means, in the traditional fashion. What's your war goal? What means do you have at your disposal? Is a given operation likely to result in robust gains? What kind of collateral damage will result?

For me the core problem with the Israeli response is not too dissimilar from the problems with the Hamas attack. I don't see how it contributes to a long term solution, and it seems to be motivated by the need to be seen as strong as capable at least as much as by actual security concerns.

The Allies massacred civilians on a level Israel can only dream of in WW2. Yet that did not create a moral equivalence between the Allied and Axis powers. — RogueAI

Well, Germany had nearly 80 million inhabitants to bomb and let's say, for the time and even now Adolf's gang was a bit more better armed than the Hamas.

I'm thinking of the hospitals in Gaza where the back up generators are running out of fuel if they haven't already. That's an atrocity, no exaggeration. I'm an Israel fan, but the people who made that decision are going to have to live with this for the rest of their lives. Their kids are going to have to carry the weight the way the children of Nazis do. It's bad joo joo.

For me the core problem with the Israeli response is not too dissimilar from the problems with the Hamas attack. I don't see how it contributes to a long term solution, and it seems to be motivated by the need to be seen as strong as capable at least as much as by actual security concerns. — Echarmion

The long term solution for Likud is to ensure a two state solution is not viable. Bombing Palestinians to the stone age is effective.

The pin in this grenade is Hamas which they themselves deliberately pulled (I was going to say "imo," but the history gainsays that being just an opinion), and before that the PLO. And the explosive has been and continues to be the commitment to the killing of Jews and the annihilation of Israel. And Hamas, et al, have forced the Israelis to become a national SWAT team, which perforce they have become and become good at. After Hamas's Saturday raid, the right attitude is one of apprehension of vicious criminals. It's that simple, a police action.

My private fantasy is that, Hamas being apprehended, the Israelis annex Gaza (my ignorance if they already own it) and offer to every Palestinian their choice of one of three passports. An Israeli passport, a Palestinian passport, or a joint Palestinian-Israeli passport. And full Israeli citizenship with full freedom of motion and all rights. And then they set about rebuilding. And maybe while they're at it, declare a joint Israeli-Palestinian state, details to be worked out.

Things to consider.. This is going to piss off both sides:

1) Violating your morals to punish those who violated morals, becomes its own contradiction.

1a) In a state of affairs of extreme violence, no one cares about this contradiction (1). Security at all costs and a response to the violence become default expectation (whether that is the Netherlends, England, France, Portugal, Brazil, Finland, or any country that thinks they are sovereign). No one is going to calmly reflect on the contradictions of using force directly after brutal attacks. No country has reached that state of blissful Buddhist repose (I don't know maybe Bhutan..Ghandistan (non-existent made up utopia)??).

2) Why didn't Hamas focus on making a prosperous Gaza for their population in terms of using support money to go to operations of daily living rather than funneled into military operations?

2a) A response I can see is that people will change the focus to the amount of aid rather than how the aid is being used, but I think this is dubious. For the people who want to make that argument, would you think things would be different if Hamas was known as a para-governmental entity that was known for administering their region properly and funneling energy into building infrastructure, economy, etc. (with whatever aid they get) rather than funneling it towards attacking Israel? Also, isn't the cycle of limited funding because it is known that the funding gets into the wrong hands in the first place, thus justifying not sending the aid in the first place?

3) Israel's problems always stemmed from its very formation. One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory.

2) Why didn't Hamas focus on making a prosperous Gaza for their population in terms of using support money to go to operations of daily living rather than funneled into military operations? — schopenhauer1

Gaza has been under a blockade for over 15 years, and the Israelis have in other ways actively tried to prevent Gaza from developing.

Hamas didn't contribute to the prosperity of Gaza either, clearly. But there's two sides to the story.

It's even commonly accepted that at various points in the past the Israeli government low-key supported Hamas in order to reduce the influence of the PLO, and thus make a two-state solution impossible.

3) Israel's problems always stemmed from its very formation. One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory. — schopenhauer1

Do note the role of the Six-Day War in 1967. That is when Israel annexed the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.

A lot has been said about the Israeli claim to self-defense, since it utterly clobbered its neighbours' militaries in a matter of days and went on to annex huge swathes of land. It bit off more than it could chew, and it did so arguably on the basis of lies.

Now, over 50 years after the fact, those things are coming back to haunt them.

Gaza has been under a blockade for over 15 years, and the Israelis have in other ways actively tried to prevent Gaza from developing.

Hamas didn't contribute to the prosperity of Gaza either, clearly. But there's two sides to the story.

It's even commonly accepted that at various points in the past the Israeli government low-key supported Hamas in order to reduce the influence of the PLO, and thus make a two-state solution impossible. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure that really answered the questions of Hamas' emphasis on para-military (terror) operations above prosperity for its people.

Do note the role of the Six-Day War in 1967. That is when Israel annexed the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.

A lot has been said about the Israeli claim to self-defense, since it utterly clobbered its neighbours' militaries in a matter of days and went on to annex huge swathes of land. It bit off more than it could chew, and it did so arguably on the basis of lies.

Now, over 50 years after the fact, those things are coming back to haunt them. — Tzeentch

Seems one can say the very same for Israel's formation in 1948, no? Didn't they accept the UN mandate (with much less land than after the 1948 war)? In 1967, wasn't there calls to wipe out Israel from Arab neighbor armies or something like this? What was the situation as far as the West Bank after Israel captured it in regards to Jordan gaining possession of it again?

Seems one can say the very same for Israel's formation in 1948, no? — schopenhauer1

In a sense, yes. But in 1948 the Israelis were very effective at ethnically cleansing the territories they annexed (Nakba). In 1967 they evidently weren't.

In a sense, yes. But in 1948 the Israelis were very effective at ethnically cleansing the territories they annexed (Nakba). In 1967 they evidently weren't. — Tzeentch

But again, that's changing the goalpost, as I was referring to before the 1948 war:

One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory. — schopenhauer1

I only sought to point out the direct link between the 1967 Six-Day War and the current situation in Gaza and the West Bank. Obviously the conflict goes further back.

Also, I am not trying to score easy points against you, . :kiss:

:blush:

Gaza has been under a blockade for over 15 years, and the Israelis have in other ways actively tried to prevent Gaza from developing.

Hamas didn't contribute to the prosperity of Gaza either, clearly. But there's two sides to the story.

Right, but that didn't happen in a bubble either, or without Hamas's very direct involvement. Development used to happen across the boundaries of Gaza. Through 1990, both the WB and Gaza tended to have unemployment rates around 4-5%. Since the 90s they have been more like 26-33%, consistently. Between 1/5th and 1/4th of the Gaza workforce used to go to Israel every single day for work. And at that time both Gaza and the WB were wealthier than many surrounding neighbors. The closure of crossings, particularly for Gaza, crashed the economy, causing it to contract by 30-40% during a population boom.

But that wasn't a decision that came out of nowhere. It was the result of an, in retrospect, obviously counter productive terror campaign that in hindsight, seems to have been more about jockeying for power within Palestine than concrete ideas of how this would make Palestine better off or stronger.

I'd argue that the closing off of the Occupied Territories were a mistake for Israel and the attacks that motivated them a mistake for the fragmented Palestinian leadership. But more cynically, you could argue that allowing Egypt to take the Sinai back without also making them take Gaza back was a bigger mistake.

But we can't say Hamas and their predecessors only act the way they do because of the economic blockade because their actions precipitated, fairly predictably, that blockade. And the pressure for Egypt came from actions that similarly could have been predicted to anger the Egyptians.

But that wasn't a decision that came out of nowhere. It was the result of an, in retrospect, obviously counter productive terror campaign that in hindsight, seems to have been more about jockeying for power within Palestine than concrete ideas of how this would make Palestine better off or stronger. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Wasn't that all the car/suicide bombings during the peace process during/after the Oslo accords in the 90s you are referring to?

I'd argue that the closing off of the Occupied Territories were a mistake for Israel and the attacks that motivated them a mistake for the fragmented Palestinian leadership. But more cynically, you could argue that allowing Egypt to take the Sinai back without also making them take Gaza back was a bigger mistake. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

Yes, generally measured from 1993-1999. And they were fairly obviously aimed at sabotaging the process. Arguably, one of the reasons Arafat rejected an opening offer that included statehood was because he feared losing control over his own side with the escalating violence, although people also chalk it up to his own ideas about his "revolutionary soldier image."

It did not help that Kuwait deported their entire Palestinian population, a not insignificant 400,000+ in the early 90s, which ratcheted up internal tensions. And then Qaddafi expelled all of Libya's Palestinians because he was upset over Oslo, asking other Arab states, where 3.5 million Palestinians lived, to follow his example and make Palestinians "camp out in the wilderness."

With allies like that...

And of course, just a generation earlier the same states had expelled and expropriated their million or so Jewish residents. So maybe Palestinians and Israeli's can both agree their neighbors are awful, given both have been expelled with "ah yes, but leave your possessions, we'll be taking those."

I bring it up because the timing of both expulsions threw gas on the fire for negotiations. In the latter, be destabilizing internal Palestinian politics, the first instance because the Jewish refugees getting expelled by the Arabs gave Israel an argument for not returning property. And the descendants of the Arab Jews ended up being far more reliable far right wing voters in Israel, so it continues to have effects.

Yes, generally measured from 1993-1999. And they were fairly obviously aimed at sabotaging the process. Arguably, one of the reasons Arafat rejected an opening offer that included statehood was because he feared losing control over his own side with the escalating violence, although people also chalk it up to his own ideas about his "revolutionary soldier image."

It did not help that Kuwait deported their entire Palestinian population, a not insignificant 400,000+ in the early 90s, which ratcheted up internal tensions. And then Qaddafi expelled all of Libya's Palestinians because he was upset over Oslo, asking other Arab states, where 3.5 million Palestinians lived, to follow his example and make Palestinians "camp out in the wilderness."

With allies like that... — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: Insightful summary of the history of that period (pre/post Oslo and the resulting actions taken by Arab neighbors against Palestinians). And excellent point regarding Arafat's rejection. Was he ever going to take a deal in good faith? But the reasons you provided make sense regarding his mindset and the possibility that he wouldn't, short of 100% concessions. Even then... you can always find one thing that will cancel the deal.

An interesting interview with former Israel PM Ehud Olmert from 11Oct23 ...

Less than you'd think. Germany almost collapsed into a war ending rout in 1944 but Western logistics just weren't quite good enough to keep the momentum going. But even as the bombing campaigns picked up it was obvious that Germany couldn't win, only delay the inevitable.

The case against the US destruction of Japanese cities is even better. The US lost hardly any bombers while demolishing hundreds of thousands of buildings and killing as many people.

But could it be justified by the higher cost of a ground invasion of Japan, maybe? That said, the comparable alternative would be to offer a conditional peace, and given what Japan had done and was likely to do again in the future, it's hard to make the case for this either.

So they're more similar than they look at first glance because the Axis was militarily defeated a long time before their cities stopped being destroyed wholesale, largely by the United States and to a lesser extent by the UK.

I'm not even saying the air war wasn't justified, although parts obviously were not. Japan likely could have been forced to terms by a full naval blockade (still forcing it to starve) rather than the incredibly destructive attacks.

In a sense, yes. But in 1948 the Israelis were very effective at ethnically cleansing the territories they annexed (Nakba). In 1967 they evidently weren't.

Yes and no. Yes, they absolutely tried to get Palestinians to flee, ethnic cleansing, but no in that a large part of the Israeli citizenry has always been Palestinian Arabs who didn't leave. That Israel granted them full citizenship and voting rights was one of the things most initially to their credit, and helped create much better prospects for peace (imagine how batshit the government would be without these voters?). But that said, that side of this has clearly soured over time, especially with the unprecedented random violence and sectarian riots lately. I can't imagine we'd be closer to peace without the effects of the Israeli Arabs on the government though, so it's really been to Israel's benefit as a state that they weren't all chased off.

The case against the US destruction of Japanese cities is even better. The US lost hardly any bombers while demolishing hundreds of thousands of buildings and killing as many people. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The development of the US bombing campaign is somewhat interesting as a case study in how the wholesale destruction of cities and the burning of their inhabitats ends up justified.

The US did suffer fairly heavy losses initially. They tried high-altitude precision bombing, but just as in Europe the results were never very spectacular. The jet stream made accuracy difficult, and increased fuel consumption. High flying through the jetstream put a lot of strain on the already unreliable engines of the B29s, and they lost many planes to engine fires (yay magnesium engines).

But flying low over the target would improve both accuracy and reliability. Planes would also be able to carry more bombs. Also, Japanese short range anti-air defenses where notoriously poor. And a low approach would be perfect for incendiary bombs. Which, since your target was so large, could also be dropped at night, when japanese defenses would be even weaker. So you had political pressure to justify the enormous resource use, and lots of little practical reasons why this approach would be much easier.

And then, once firebombing had started, the evaluation quickly changed from specific military targets destroyed to acres of cities destroyed for so and so many losses. Once the machinery was unleashed, people started to perfect it.

But could it be justified by the higher cost of a ground invasion of Japan, maybe? That said, the comparable alternative would be to offer a conditional peace, and given what Japan had done and was likely to do again in the future, it's hard to make the case for this either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Though one could argue that, compared to Germany, Japan has managed to turn it's back on that part of it's historiy with remarkable alacrity and also remarkably little cultural change. While Germany did survive as a political entity, it's self-image was mostly shattered and had to be completely remade. I have very limited knowlede of Japanese culture, but it seems far more continuous with the war era, simply channeling their energy in a different direction.

But that's off-topic here.

Less than you'd think. Germany almost collapsed into a war ending rout in 1944 but Western logistics just weren't quite good enough to keep the momentum going. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Discussion of WW2 would be interesting, but perhaps not for this thread. Count von Icarus: the failure of Market Garden and the Ardennes Offensive was actually only a logistics problem for the the Western allies. (Let's stop here) But let's take something a bit actually similar.

So they're more similar than they look at first glance because the Axis was militarily defeated a long time before their cities stopped being destroyed wholesale, largely by the United States and to a lesser extent by the UK. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Look, the only relatively similar situation to what is now taken place in Gaza in WW2 was the Warsaw Uprising done by the Polish Home Army.



- What is similar that just like the Soviet Union had no intention of helping the Polish Home Army, this battle is as onesided as the Polish Home Army was to be finished. For Stalin an independent large Polish armed entity was the last thing he wanted.


-Similarly here there is absolutely no love for Hamas with the Egyptian regime. Hamas started as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and the current Egyptian regime is made up of a junta that deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Yet naturally Sisi isn't fighting Israel as the two countries have a peace agreement. The fact is that only Iran is making a fuss about the issue while the Arab League is asking for the sides to cease hostilities.


- The fighting is in a confined to a similar urban environment, where for example sewers in Warsaw and tunnels in Gaza have an important role. Warsaw was also a city with over million people. Gaza strip (made up of many cities) has more people.

- In brutality (from the German side, for instance using units like Gruppe Dirlewanger made up of convicts) and in destructiveness of an urban fighting there can be similarities. At least Hamas has showed already brutality towards Israeli civilians that is similar to SS and other German forces when dealing with untermenschen.


-So let's put into context Gaza and Warsaw in 1944: The Warsaw Uprising held for 63 days. The Home Army had about 20000-49000 fighters (about similar actually to Hamas). That the Uprising did happen and was so successful is a feat, especially when Hitler was planning Warsaw to be one of the "fortress cities" to fight off the impending Red Army. The Germans deployed about 50000 troops to destroy the uprising. The Germans lost perhaps over 10 000 killed, the Home Army everything in killed, wounded and in prisoners.



And the population of Warsaw was . It lost about 150 000 - 200 000 civilians killed and 700 000 people were expelled from the city.

Or let's look at what the Warsaw Uprising looked like.

August 1, 1944 saw the beginning of another uprising in Warsaw. This time, the soldiers of the Polish Underground State rose up against Nazi rule. Despite being largely outnumbered by the Germans, the Poles fiercely resisted the occupying forces for 63 days. It was one of the most brutal urban battles to date. Upon learning about the revolt in Warsaw, Hitler and Himmler issued the flagitious order to kill all the inhabitants and have the city totally flattened. This total eradication of the city was supposed to deter other nations of occupied Europe from resistance. The order was executed accordingly and started in the early days of the uprising. Captured insurgents and civilians were executed throughout the city. Each district regained by the Nazis was pacified which meant that murders, rapes, and arsons were widespread. The most appalling crimes were committed in the western parts of the city, in the Wola and Ochota districts, where approximately 50,000 men, women and children were murdered within a few days. Overall, it is estimated that 130.000–150.000 civilians were killed in Warsaw. The losses sustained by the insurgents were considerably smaller, with estimated 18.000 deaths. As a result of the heavy bombings and artillery shellings, nearly 25% of the city was destroyed.

The process of Warsaw’s complete eradication was completed soon after the uprising failed. According to the cease-fire, the Home Army was to lay down weapons and surrender. The civilians were banned from Warsaw as well. Within the few days following the collapse of the uprising, columns of people marched down the suburban roads, carrying the remainder of their belongings, leaving the annihilated city behind. The city was about to go through one of the most dramatic periods in its history. In total, the Nazis displaced over 500,000 civilians, often confining them to death, hunger and aimless wander. 350.000 Varsovians deemed unfit for work were displaced within occupied Poland, the remaining 150.000 were sent to forced labor in the Third Reich and around 60.000 were deported to concentration camps. Warsaw was to be razed down to the ground and become a mere transfer point for Wehrmacht after it was carefully cleared of all material goods.

Following the displacement of Warsaw’s inhabitants, special units looted whatever was left in the city. These tasks were divided between three independent departments: the military, the civil department and the SS joined by police forces. Each specialized in a specific area. The Wehrmacht was responsible for disassembling and taking factory machinery, appliances, commodities, food, textiles, cables, electrical wires, etc. The SS plundered in search of textiles, furs, carpets, money and other valuables. Ludwig Fischer, the governor of the Warsaw district, and Artur Greiser, the governor of Wartheland, were even involved in a dispute over who was entitled to take furniture from Warsaw. One researcher, Marian Chlewski, estimates that during that period alone, the Nazis transported 45.000 train cars of looted goods from Warsaw.

And of course the Warsaw Uprising is very important to Poles even today. Americans typically have only heard of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which can annoy Polish people. The "9/11" of Israel might be so for future Israel too. Naturally for the Palestinians, it's one chapter in the Nakba.

Maybe a comparison would be the US after 9-11. Got punched in the nose, things will have to change to keep this from happening again.

In any conflict, I give this question a lot of significance: "Who would you rather live under?" In this case, the answer is obvious: Israel. Nobody here would choose to be governed by Hamas, or Hezbollah, or Iran. How much significance should we give that when determining who to back in this conflict?