It looks like it's going to end with no Palestinians in Gaza, in other words, a massacre. — frank
Yes, sadly. And most of the governments of the world are accepting and even backing up the massacre. Only a few condemned this madness and when they do so, the rest treat them as 'enemies'. — javi2541997
Well, Germany had nearly 80 million inhabitants to bomb and let's say, for the time and even now Adolf's gang was a bit more better armed than the Hamas.The Allies massacred civilians on a level Israel can only dream of in WW2. Yet that did not create a moral equivalence between the Allied and Axis powers. — RogueAI
For me the core problem with the Israeli response is not too dissimilar from the problems with the Hamas attack. I don't see how it contributes to a long term solution, and it seems to be motivated by the need to be seen as strong as capable at least as much as by actual security concerns. — Echarmion
2) Why didn't Hamas focus on making a prosperous Gaza for their population in terms of using support money to go to operations of daily living rather than funneled into military operations? — schopenhauer1
3) Israel's problems always stemmed from its very formation. One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory. — schopenhauer1
Gaza has been under a blockade for over 15 years, and the Israelis have in other ways actively tried to prevent Gaza from developing.
Hamas didn't contribute to the prosperity of Gaza either, clearly. But there's two sides to the story.
It's even commonly accepted that at various points in the past the Israeli government low-key supported Hamas in order to reduce the influence of the PLO, and thus make a two-state solution impossible. — Tzeentch
Do note the role of the Six-Day War in 1967. That is when Israel annexed the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.
A lot has been said about the Israeli claim to self-defense, since it utterly clobbered its neighbours' militaries in a matter of days and went on to annex huge swathes of land. It bit off more than it could chew, and it did so arguably on the basis of lies.
Now, over 50 years after the fact, those things are coming back to haunt them. — Tzeentch
In a sense, yes. But in 1948 the Israelis were very effective at ethnically cleansing the territories they annexed (Nakba). In 1967 they evidently weren't. — Tzeentch
One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory. — schopenhauer1
Gaza has been under a blockade for over 15 years, and the Israelis have in other ways actively tried to prevent Gaza from developing.
Hamas didn't contribute to the prosperity of Gaza either, clearly. But there's two sides to the story.
But that wasn't a decision that came out of nowhere. It was the result of an, in retrospect, obviously counter productive terror campaign that in hindsight, seems to have been more about jockeying for power within Palestine than concrete ideas of how this would make Palestine better off or stronger. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'd argue that the closing off of the Occupied Territories were a mistake for Israel and the attacks that motivated them a mistake for the fragmented Palestinian leadership. But more cynically, you could argue that allowing Egypt to take the Sinai back without also making them take Gaza back was a bigger mistake. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, generally measured from 1993-1999. And they were fairly obviously aimed at sabotaging the process. Arguably, one of the reasons Arafat rejected an opening offer that included statehood was because he feared losing control over his own side with the escalating violence, although people also chalk it up to his own ideas about his "revolutionary soldier image."
It did not help that Kuwait deported their entire Palestinian population, a not insignificant 400,000+ in the early 90s, which ratcheted up internal tensions. And then Qaddafi expelled all of Libya's Palestinians because he was upset over Oslo, asking other Arab states, where 3.5 million Palestinians lived, to follow his example and make Palestinians "camp out in the wilderness."
With allies like that... — Count Timothy von Icarus
In a sense, yes. But in 1948 the Israelis were very effective at ethnically cleansing the territories they annexed (Nakba). In 1967 they evidently weren't.
The case against the US destruction of Japanese cities is even better. The US lost hardly any bombers while demolishing hundreds of thousands of buildings and killing as many people. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But could it be justified by the higher cost of a ground invasion of Japan, maybe? That said, the comparable alternative would be to offer a conditional peace, and given what Japan had done and was likely to do again in the future, it's hard to make the case for this either. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Discussion of WW2 would be interesting, but perhaps not for this thread. Count von Icarus: the failure of Market Garden and the Ardennes Offensive was actually only a logistics problem for the the Western allies. (Let's stop here) But let's take something a bit actually similar.Less than you'd think. Germany almost collapsed into a war ending rout in 1944 but Western logistics just weren't quite good enough to keep the momentum going. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So they're more similar than they look at first glance because the Axis was militarily defeated a long time before their cities stopped being destroyed wholesale, largely by the United States and to a lesser extent by the UK. — Count Timothy von Icarus
August 1, 1944 saw the beginning of another uprising in Warsaw. This time, the soldiers of the Polish Underground State rose up against Nazi rule. Despite being largely outnumbered by the Germans, the Poles fiercely resisted the occupying forces for 63 days. It was one of the most brutal urban battles to date. Upon learning about the revolt in Warsaw, Hitler and Himmler issued the flagitious order to kill all the inhabitants and have the city totally flattened. This total eradication of the city was supposed to deter other nations of occupied Europe from resistance. The order was executed accordingly and started in the early days of the uprising. Captured insurgents and civilians were executed throughout the city. Each district regained by the Nazis was pacified which meant that murders, rapes, and arsons were widespread. The most appalling crimes were committed in the western parts of the city, in the Wola and Ochota districts, where approximately 50,000 men, women and children were murdered within a few days. Overall, it is estimated that 130.000–150.000 civilians were killed in Warsaw. The losses sustained by the insurgents were considerably smaller, with estimated 18.000 deaths. As a result of the heavy bombings and artillery shellings, nearly 25% of the city was destroyed.
The process of Warsaw’s complete eradication was completed soon after the uprising failed. According to the cease-fire, the Home Army was to lay down weapons and surrender. The civilians were banned from Warsaw as well. Within the few days following the collapse of the uprising, columns of people marched down the suburban roads, carrying the remainder of their belongings, leaving the annihilated city behind. The city was about to go through one of the most dramatic periods in its history. In total, the Nazis displaced over 500,000 civilians, often confining them to death, hunger and aimless wander. 350.000 Varsovians deemed unfit for work were displaced within occupied Poland, the remaining 150.000 were sent to forced labor in the Third Reich and around 60.000 were deported to concentration camps. Warsaw was to be razed down to the ground and become a mere transfer point for Wehrmacht after it was carefully cleared of all material goods.
Following the displacement of Warsaw’s inhabitants, special units looted whatever was left in the city. These tasks were divided between three independent departments: the military, the civil department and the SS joined by police forces. Each specialized in a specific area. The Wehrmacht was responsible for disassembling and taking factory machinery, appliances, commodities, food, textiles, cables, electrical wires, etc. The SS plundered in search of textiles, furs, carpets, money and other valuables. Ludwig Fischer, the governor of the Warsaw district, and Artur Greiser, the governor of Wartheland, were even involved in a dispute over who was entitled to take furniture from Warsaw. One researcher, Marian Chlewski, estimates that during that period alone, the Nazis transported 45.000 train cars of looted goods from Warsaw.
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