OK. Thanks.

I don't see any inconsistency. — Fooloso4

I initially asked whether you agreed that "the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined". You replied: "Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change."

However, you also quoted Wittgenstein's PPF 10 which tells us that "the content of the experience of imagining" is a picture or a description. Do you believe that this picture or description (at PPF 10) is relatively unstable and subject to the same change as your imagination?

You also said:

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

Regarding the picture or description that W mentions at PPF 10:

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

Do you think he is referring to "the picture or description that occurs in the mind" or to your drawn (physical) picture or description of that content?

If you were to draw a picture of that content or describe that content, like you say in the quote above, then is the content of the physical picture/description the same as the content of the imagined picture/description at the time that you draw/describe it? If not, then why do you suggest that you are able to "answer the question" of what the imagined content is by drawing a picture or by describing that content? If so, then when does the content between the two change?

If you are saying that the mental image or imagined picture might change, then in what sense is it a "picture"?
— Luke

This shows how a picture hanging on the wall differs from a mental picture. — Fooloso4

Does a mental description differ from a physical description in the same manner? If not, why not? If so, how does the mental description change? Is the content of the mental and physical descriptions the same at the time that the physical description is made of the mental description?

I see no reason to think that Wittgenstein is using two different meanings of "picture" here, where one is used for an internal "picture" that may contain different information from the external picture. This is just what PI 280 rejects.

We could think of it instead as a series of different (inner) pictures.
— Luke

How do you reconcile this with PI 389? — Fooloso4

I don't see there as being any internal pictures at PI 389, or in the PI at all. I believe this is something that Wittgenstein rejects. I don't see him using the word "picture" in a different sense for internal pictures than for external, public pictures. There simply are no internal pictures (which are not also external pictures). This is why I said originally that a mental image is not a picture. If what we imagine/visualise is a picture of any sort, then it is a regular sort of (in principle) public picture, or can at least be made into one. We can think to ourselves using public pictures in the same way we can think to ourselves using public language.

At PI 389, I believe Wittgenstein is referring to a public (i.e. static, unchanging) picture. He contrasts a picture with a mental image at PI 389, so how do you reconcile your view of mental pictures, mental images and public pictures? When he refers to a picture at PI 389, do you read it as being a mental picture or a public picture? Do you consider there to be any difference between a mental image and a mental picture?

They are at t1 and t2 my inner picture of X. My inner picture of X has changed. It should be noted that I may not even be aware that it has changed. — Fooloso4

But you can draw or describe it at t1 and you can also draw or describe it at t2, right? Wouldn't you then notice it has changed?

No. Why would I need a private impression of the picture I imagined to tell me what I imagined? — Fooloso4

It is not the point of PI 280 that you don't need the picture to tell you what you imagined. The point is that there is no information missing between the physical picture and what you imagined. The point is also that it's not a picture of a picture, or that the physical picture is not "the picture of his image, as it can't be for anyone else".

However, this is the opposite of your reading with its relatively static external pictures and relatively changing internal pictures.

W's rejection here is consistent with the assertion that the content of a public picture and the content of a private picture are, or can be, the same.
— Luke

They might be but they need not be the same. — Fooloso4

If they are not the same, then it would contradict PI 280 and PPF 10, which both indicate that a public picture and a private picture have the same content.

No. I reject it because things are not always as we imagine them to be. — Fooloso4

Whatever picture we draw or description we make (of things) will reflect how we imagine things to be (at the time of drawing/imagining).

Do you believe that this picture or description (at PPF 10) is relatively unstable and subject to the same change as your imagination? — Luke

The picture or description is what is imagined.

Do you think he is referring to "the picture or description that occurs in the mind" or to your drawn (physical) picture or description of that content? — Luke

The former, but to answer the question I could draw a picture or describe that content.

If you were to draw a picture of that content or describe that content, like you say in the quote above, then is the content of the physical picture/description the same as the content of the imagined picture/description at the time that you draw/describe it? — Luke

Suppose I draw a picture of or describe a picture I saw at an art show. Is that picture or description of what I saw the same as what I saw, that is, the picture? My picture might embellish or omit certain things. It is still a picture of this, that is, the picture I saw at an art show, but the pictures will not be the same.

I see no reason to think that Wittgenstein is using two different meanings of "picture" here, where one is used for an internal "picture" that may contain different information from the external picture. This is just what PI 280 rejects. — Luke

What PI 280 rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined ...

If I paint a picture of the stage set I imagine, that painting does not tell me what I imagined. It is not as if I was unaware of what I imagined until I painted it. As you go on to say:

It is not the point of PI 280 that you don't need the picture to tell you what you imagined. — Luke

I don't need the picture to tell me what I pictured in my mind. Although the painting might be a way of working out the details.

The point is that there is no information missing between the physical picture and what you imagined. — Luke

In addition to the possibility that the painting includes details missing from what was imagined, there may be, on the other hand, a great deal missing from the painting of the stage set. As I imagined it there may be actors on the set and action taking place but I did not include them because they are not part of the set, but they are part of what I imagined when I imagined the set.

However, this is the opposite of your reading with its relatively static external pictures and relatively changing internal pictures. — Luke

It is not. If we are to build the stage set we consult the painting not my mental image.

Added: I think it is time to move on. There are different uses of the term 'picture', but you seem to want to restrict that usage.

The picture or description is what is imagined. — Fooloso4

Thanks for clarifying. Is this also how he is using “picture” at PI 389? If not, how can you tell? And how can you tell he means a mental picture or description at PPF 10?

The former, but to answer the question I could draw a picture or describe that content. — Fooloso4

So it is possible for the content of the physical picture/description to match the content of the mental picture/description?

Suppose I draw a picture of or describe a picture I saw at an art show. Is that picture or description of what I saw the same as what I saw, that is, the picture? My picture might embellish or omit certain things. It is still a picture of this, that is, the picture I saw at an art show, but the pictures will not be the same. — Fooloso4

It’s not a question of whether the content of your physical picture/description matches reality; it’s a question of whether the content of your physical picture/description matches your mental picture/description.

What PI 280 rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined ... — Fooloso4

Yes, and what he also rejects is that (my emphasis):

This picture [that he painted in order to show how he imagined the stage set] has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do —– but for the informant it is in addition a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else. His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined, in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others. — PI 280

This is not saying that he doesn’t need to paint the picture in order to know what he imagined. This is saying that the picture does not serve a double function for the set painter, because it is not both a picture of the stage set as well as a picture of his mental image. It is not “for him…the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else.”

You are claiming that his private impression of the picture does tell him what he imagined in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others, because you claim that there is a private mental picture that he can compare his painting to in order to see whether their content matches.

As you noted earlier, that mental picture might change, so how could you establish whether or not the physical painting matches it? This is similar to the private language argument, where the private diarist cannot rely only on their memory to establish the meaning/use of ‘S’.

My point here is that it’s incorrect to call the mental image a “picture”, because a mental image does not inform others “as pictures or words do” (PI 280).

As you noted earlier, that mental picture might change, so how could you establish whether or not the physical painting matches it? — Luke

I would expect that in painting the picture he'd likely recognize inaccuracies to the way the painting represents the mental image and recognize that the painting is not the mental image.

I would expect that in painting the picture he'd likely recognize inaccuracies to the way the painting represents the mental image and recognize that the painting is not the mental image. — wonderer1

I don’t disagree, but I think it’s a mistake to call the mental image a picture. The mental image is not a representation and it cannot inform others.

I don’t disagree, but I think it’s a mistake to call the mental image a picture. The mental image is not a representation and it cannot inform others. — Luke

Why not approximately inform others? I guess I wouldn't expect a painting to be anything other than an approximation of the painter's mental image.

Thanks for clarifying. — Luke

I have said this more than once.

Is this also how he is using “picture” at PI 389? — Luke

The interlocutor uses it as a physical picture.

If not, how can you tell? — Luke

Because he contrasts the mental picture to the picture.

And how can you tell he means a mental picture or description at PPF 10? — Luke

We still have an interpretive disagreement here. This is how I read it:

Wittgenstein poses the question: What is the content of the experience of imagining? And answer it:
The answer is a picture, or a description.

He is not asking about how that picture can be represented or communicated.

So it is possible for the content of the physical picture/description to match the content of the mental picture/description? — Luke

it’s a question of whether the content of your physical picture/description matches your mental picture/description. — Luke

How can I tell? I can't compare them unless two conditions are met: 1) I could call up the mental picture and 2) that it will remain unchanged each time I call it to mind. I do not think those conditions can be met.

I do, however, think the physical picture/description can to a greater of lesser degree, in one way or another resemble the mental picture/description.

But we're not talking analogue here.

This:

it informs others, as pictures or words do — Luke

and this:

has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do — PI 280

are not the same. He does not reject the former but does reject the latter. It informs those who build the set.

You are claiming that his private impression of the picture does tell him what he imagined in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others, because you claim that there is a private mental picture that he can compare his painting to in order to see whether their content matches. — Luke

I claim neither of those things. I have said many times that the mental image may not be stable or unchanging. When he paints it he is satisfied enough not to do it again. Suppose the painting goes missing. Eventually they start building the set based on what they remember. He sees what they have been doing and tells them that it does not match his mental image. He paints another picture. The first picture is then found. Do the two paintings match?

My point here is that it’s incorrect to call the mental image a “picture”, because a mental image does not inform others “as pictures or words do” (PI 280). — Luke

You take one use of the term and demand that it be the only one. Look at what people say.

Why not approximately inform others? — wonderer1

How does your mental image inform others of anything?

I guess I wouldn't expect a painting to be anything other than an approximation of the painter's mental image. — wonderer1

Why only an approximation? In PI 280 is it a painting of the painter’s mental image or of the stage set or of both?

Because he contrasts the mental picture to the picture. — Fooloso4

He contrasts the picture to the mental image. He does not call it a mental picture.

Wittgenstein poses the question: What is the content of the experience of imagining? And answer it:
The answer is a picture, or a description.

He is not asking about how that picture can be represented or communicated. — Fooloso4

His question is about the content of the experience of imagining. If his question was about the experience of imagining and he answered that the experience was a picture or a description then I would agree with you. Do you deny that a mental image and a (physical) picture can have the same content? If not, then there is no reason to assume that his answer is or must be a mental picture or description.

How can I tell? I can't compare them unless two conditions are met: 1) I could call up the mental picture and 2) that it will remain unchanged each time I call it to mind. I do not think those conditions can be met. — Fooloso4

You don’t think that a mental image and a (physical) picture can have the same content? Then the set stage painter cannot paint a picture which shows how he imagined the stage set.

This:

it informs others, as pictures or words do
— Luke

and this:

has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do
— PI 280

are not the same. He does not reject the former but does reject the latter. It informs those who build the set. — Fooloso4

Yes, I agree. He rejects that the painting (i.e. a picture) has another function besides informing others of how the painter imagines the stage set. Unlike a picture or words, one’s mental image (alone) cannot inform others. Therefore one’s mental image is neither a picture nor words, although its content may be that of a picture or words.

How does your mental image inform others of anything? — Luke

By stimulating the other to develop their own mental image which is approximate to mine.

Only an approximation, because I can't create pictures with anywhere near the complexity of my mental imagery. However, approximations can easily get the message across, to someone with a mind prepared to flesh out the approximation well. Scribbles will often do well enough, under the right circumstances.

In PI 280 is it a painting of the painter’s mental image or of the stage set or of both? — Luke

I haven't read that far yet, so this is only my response and not any sort of claim about Witt's view...

I'm inclined to say that there is some degree of isomorphism between the stage set, the mental image and the picture. Seeing the stage set caused the painter to develop a mental image. That mental image played a causal role in the painter painting what he painted. I'd think this describes what it means for a painting to be "of the stage set". I'd be inclined to say it was a painting of both, but in different senses.

How does your mental image inform others of anything?
— Luke

By stimulating the other to develop their own mental image which is approximate to mine. — wonderer1

But how do others access your mental image?

The don't access my mental image. Their brain creates their own mental image in response to perceiving my picture.

The don't access my mental image. Their brain creates their own mental image in response to perceiving my picture. — wonderer1

Right but your mental image is not a picture, because others cannot access your mental image like they can access a picture. Your mental image does not inform others like a picture can. This is why a mental image does not even approximately inform others.

This might be clearer once you have read through the PI.

This might be clearer once you have read through the PI. — Luke

Perhaps.

Here is Hacker's reading of PI 280:

A final analogy to illuminate the misguided supposition of predicates of perceptual qualities (e.g. ‘red’) having a double meaning (cf. §273). A theatrical or cinema director may sketch on paper roughly (etwa) how he imagines a scene. On the model of §273 it might seem that such a picture has two distinct representative functions. For others it represents the scene they are to create as the person envisages it. It tells them how he imagines the scene. But for him it represents his mental image of the scene which only he knows (since only he has it). Indeed, his visual impression of the picture he has painted tells him what he has imagined in a way in which, for others, it cannot. For in his case, his visual impression of what he has painted must surely coincide with the mental image he had when he imagined the scene.

This is a muddle. To paint what I imagine is not to copy a picture that is already ‘painted’ in my imagination (although I can, of course, imagine painting something, and then go on to paint what I imagined painting). The director’s sketch does indeed represent how he imagines the scene; i.e. to the question ‘How do you think it should look?’ he might produce the sketch and say ‘Like that’. This is what is called ‘representing what I imagined it should look like’. But it is erroneous to think that the picture represents to him what he imagined in any different sense, for it does not represent it in virtue of resembling his mental image, any more than the verbal expression of what he thought resembles his thought. It informs others how he imagined things should look, but it does not inform him! What makes the picture a good representation of what he imagined? Not its likeness to his mental image, but rather his avowed acknowledgement that that was what he had in mind. But that acknowledgement does not rest on an ‘inner glance’ at his mental image. ‘The image is not a picture, nor is the visual impression one. Neither “image” nor “impression” is the concept of a picture, although in both cases there is a tie‐up with a picture, and a different one in either case’ (Z §638). Hence it is a mistake to think that when I paint a picture to show you how I imagine a scene, the picture is a piece of information or a representation for me. It is an articulation or expression of how I imagine the scene, not an ‘outer’ picture of an ‘inner’ picture. Moreover, an impression of a picture is not a representation of a picture (cf. PI §366).

Similarly, although hearing the word ‘red’ may call forth a mental image of red (or of a field of poppies or a sunset), the answer to the question ‘What do you mean by “red”?’ is given by pointing to a sample. And if I ask myself ‘What do I mean by “red”?’, the answer is no different. — PMS Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations), Part 2: Exegesis, Section 243-427

@Luke:

PI 6. a picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the word.

PI 37. hearing a name calls before our mind the picture of what is named

PI 73. I get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind

PI 6. a picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the word.

PI 37. hearing a name calls before our mind the picture of what is named

PI 73. I get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind — Fooloso4

I acknowledge that Wittgenstien uses the phrase "a picture (of X) before/in one's mind" synonymously with a mental image here.

However, when I asked you earlier to explain the two different uses of "picture" you were reading into the text, you responded:

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4

How do these "pictures before the mind" in the early passages you cite meet your criteria of a mental picture, viz.:

• cannot be made public;
• is relatively unstable and changing

Can these mental pictures not be made public (e.g. via a sketch or description)? Do they change immediately upon hearing the word/name? I imagine that the picture must at least remain stable enough for it to come before a person's mind when they hear the word/name or while they are having the idea of the shape of a leaf.

I note that Wittgenstein is using these examples to undermine the (then) common view that such mental images are necessary to the meaning of a word.

Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between pictures (or descriptions) and mental images in the later passages we have been discussing, especially at PI 389, PI 280, etc.

Perhaps we can agree that their content is the same while maintaining this distinction between them, as I believe he does at PPF 10?

Can these mental pictures not be made public (e.g. via a sketch or description)? — Luke

The sketch or description is not the mental picture. It is a representation of it.

Do they change immediately upon hearing the word/name? — Luke

The mental picture may or may not stay relatively stable, but there is nothing to compare it to in order to determine that. One's memory of it may be more or less reliable.

I note that Wittgenstein is using these examples to undermine the (then) common view that such mental images are necessary to the meaning of a word. — Luke

Was that in dispute in our discussion?

Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between pictures (or descriptions) and mental images in the later passages we have been discussing, especially at PI 389, PI 280, etc. — Luke

The distinction made is between an image in the mind and a physical image. But a mental image and a physical image are are both pictures.

Perhaps we can agree that their content is the same while maintaining this distinction between them, as I believe he does at PPF 10? — Luke

The distinction at PPF 10 is between a meaning and a mental image, not a mental image and a physical image. The content of the experience of imagining can be a picture or a description, but he does not know how to answer the question of the experience of a meaning.

The mental picture may or may not stay relatively stable, but there is nothing to compare it to in order to determine that. One's memory of it may be more or less reliable. — Fooloso4

In order for you to read Wittgenstein as saying that a mental image is a picture before one's mind at PI 6, PI 37 and PI 73, you must acknowledge that it can be a picture of X (before one's mind) only while it is a mental image of X. If the mental image is of Y instead of X, then the picture before one's mind must be of Y. If a mental picture changes, then it's a different picture compared to the original picture. Therefore, I don't follow your argument of relative stability with its implication that the (single) picture is potentially changing. The mental image is the picture before the mind at a given time, whatever its content may be.

Therefore, I don't see why you would assume that it's the same picture at time 2 which has changed since time 1, instead of saying that they are just two different pictures. Furthermore, how can you compare the two mental images at different times? And doesn't your argument - that the memory of mental images is unreliable - make this impossible comparison between mental images even more difficult?

The sketch or description is not the mental picture. It is a representation of it. — Fooloso4

It is neither a picture of a mental picture nor a description of a mental description.

The distinction made is between an image in the mind and a physical image. But a mental image and a physical image are are both pictures. — Fooloso4

Doesn't this imply that the meaning of "picture" is the same in both cases? Granted, one picture is mental and the other is physical. But this singular meaning of "picture" may be why we can say they both have the same content. Apart from the mental/physical distinction - which you maintain here - is there any other significant difference in the meaning of the word "picture"?

Wittgenstein may use "picture before the mind" (or a minor variant) as a synonym for a mental image at PI 6, PI 37 and PI 73, but he does not use "picture" (alone) as a synonym for a mental image.

I note that Wittgenstein is using these examples to undermine the (then) common view that such mental images are necessary to the meaning of a word.
— Luke

Was that in dispute in our discussion? — Fooloso4

I wanted to draw attention to the fact that he introduces the notion of a "picture before the mind" only to later reject it as a source of meaning or the source of a rule. I think this is important to the reading of PI 280 and PI 389, which are both still related to the private language argument on my reading.

If a mental picture and physical picture have the same content, then what is the point of PI 389 on your view? Is the point simply that it's wrong to assume mental pictures and physical pictures don't have the same content?

Do you think people often make the false assumption that an intrinsic feature of a mental image is that it's more like its object than a picture is? Do you consider this false assumption to be unrelated to the private language argument and of no philosophical interest?

If the mental image is of Y instead of X, then the picture before one's mind must be of Y. — Luke

If I mistake X for Y my mental image of X is a picture of Y.

If a mental picture changes, then it's a different picture compared to the original picture. — Luke

Yes, but even though it changes, my mental picture of Zeus is still my mental picture of Zeus.

The sketch or description is not the mental picture. It is a representation of it.
— Fooloso4

It is neither a picture of a mental picture nor a description of a mental description. — Luke

Have you changed your mind? In the prior post you asked:

Can these mental pictures not be made public (e.g. via a sketch or description)? — Luke

Was your answer no they cannot be made public?

Doesn't this imply that the meaning of "picture" is the same in both cases? — Luke

No. The word is used in various ways. If you ask me to show you the picture in one case I can but in other I can't. If I remember correctly this was why you were reluctant to call the mental picture a picture.

If a mental picture and physical picture have the same content, then what is the point of PI 389 on your view? — Luke

They are the same only is so far as they are pictures of the same thing. My mental picture of you may be very different than a photo or portrait of you. If I see that picture I might say: "You are much more handsome than I pictured".

Do you think people often make the false assumption that an intrinsic feature of a mental image is that it's more like its object than a picture is? — Luke

I don't think so.

Do you consider this false assumption to be unrelated to the private language argument and of no philosophical interest? — Luke

Mental images exist. Private languages do not.

I think Wittgenstein was very much interested in mental images.

If the mental image is of Y instead of X, then the picture before one's mind must be of Y.
— Luke

If I mistake X for Y my mental image of X is a picture of Y. — Fooloso4

My position is that W is using “picture” (as a noun) with a consistent meaning throughout the text.

As I said earlier, I acknowledge that, in the early passages you cited, W is using “mental image” synonymously with “picture before one’s mind”. Therefore, if a mental image is of X, then the picture before one’s mind must also be of X, only because “mental image” means the same as “picture before one’s mind”.

This is tautological and has nothing to do with a correspondence or resemblance to some object.

Anyhow, I don’t see that what you say follows. If you mistake your hat for a sandwich, then your mental image of a hat is a picture of a sandwich? If your mental image is of X then the picture before your mind is of nothing but X.

Yes, but even though it changes, my mental picture of Zeus is still my mental picture of Zeus. — Fooloso4

How has it changed?

No. The word is used in various ways. If you ask me to show you the picture in one case I can but in other I can't. If I remember correctly this was why you were reluctant to call the mental picture a picture. — Fooloso4

Yes, we can distinguish between a mental image (picture before the mind) and a physical picture, but how is the word “picture” being used differently here?

The sketch or description is not the mental picture. It is a representation of it.
— Fooloso4

It is neither a picture of a mental picture nor a description of a mental description.
— Luke

Have you changed your mind? In the prior post you asked:

Can these mental pictures not be made public (e.g. via a sketch or description)?
— Luke

Was your answer no they cannot be made public? — Fooloso4

I clarified earlier that I had made some concessions to your reading. However, this is consistent with my reading that mental and physical pictures can both have the same content and that “picture” has the same meaning in either case, except for the difference given by the distinction that one is physical and one is mental. But that’s why W qualifies the latter with “picture before the mind”.

They are the same only is so far as they are pictures of the same thing. My mental picture of you may be very different than a photo or portrait of you. If I see that picture I might say: "You are much more handsome than I pictured". — Fooloso4

I don’t disagree that “picture” when used as a verb (e.g. to picture) has a different meaning to “picture” when used as a noun (e.g. a picture). If that’s the extent of our disagreement then we can leave it there. But none of the passages we have been discussing or have quoted uses “picture” as a verb.

Therefore, if a mental image is of X, then the picture before one’s mind must also be of X — Luke

What follows from this tautology? We covered that pages ago.

If you mistake your hat for a sandwich, then your mental image of a hat is a picture of a sandwich? — Luke

I don't know. I would say that that this raises a problem. Wouldn't we say that if someone's mental image of a hat was a sandwich she would be mistaken?

Yes, but even though it changes, my mental picture of Zeus is still my mental picture of Zeus.
— Fooloso4

How has it changed? — Luke

It might change in various ways. Some features may become more prominent. Something left out or added. I think it might help to think of this in terms of memory. Our memory of things change.

Yes, we can distinguish between a mental image (picture before the mind) and a physical picture, but how is the word “picture” being used differently here? — Luke

If I say: "I was this picture" you might think I mean movie or photo or painting but would it cross your mind that I meant a mental image?

But none of the passages we have been discussing or have quoted uses “picture” as a verb. — Luke

Someone might do the research to see if he does.

If you mistake your hat for a sandwich, then your mental image of a hat is a picture of a sandwich?
— Luke

I don't know. I would say that that this raises a problem. Wouldn't we say that if someone's mental image of a hat was a sandwich she would be mistaken? — Fooloso4

You said that if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a picture of Y.

I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their mental image of a hat for a sandwich, or even for a picture of a sandwich. I don’t see how we could verify whether a mistake had been made.

It might change in various ways. Some features may become more prominent. Something left out or added. I think it might help to think of this in terms of memory. Our memory of things change. — Fooloso4

Maybe. Who’s to say? Can you give a specific example of how your mental picture of Zeus might have changed? What exactly has changed?

If I say: "I was this picture" you might think I mean movie or photo or painting but would it cross your mind that I meant a mental image? — Fooloso4

No, I wouldn’t think you meant a mental image. That’s why W qualifies the use of “picture” when referring to a mental image with the “picture before one’s mind” or something similar. Otherwise, he does not use “picture” and speaks only of a “mental image” instead. I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image. Instead, he clearly distinguishes between a picture and a mental image. Otherwise, he speaks of a picture or description as being the content of a mental image.

I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their mental image of a hat for a sandwich — Luke

Oliver Sacks' The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat might be of interest.

I don’t see how we could verify whether a mistake had been made. — Luke

If this person tried to eat a hat and we asked him why, we would know a mistake had been made.

Who’s to say? — Luke

Yes, that is the point!

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image. — Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture?

I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their mental image of a hat for a sandwich
— Luke

Oliver Sacks' The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat might be of interest. — Fooloso4

Except that you changed your original statement from 'if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a picture of Y' to 'if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a Y'.

You keep wanting to change the discussion to talk about resemblance to an object, but that's not what I'm talking about. I don't know what you meant when you said in your last post: "What follows from this tautology? We covered that pages ago."

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture because a mental picture might change whereas a physical picture remains relatively stable. I responded that a mental image of X is equivalent to a picture ("before the mind") of X (because the terms "mental image" and "picture before the mind" are synonymous). It might have been clearer if I had said instead - and what I meant was - that mental image 'X' is equivalent to mental picture ("before the mind") 'X'. Whatever is the content of the mental image is equivalent to the content of the "picture before the mind". There is no question of resemblance to some object here; we are simply naming an image, or different images. My point was that the "picture" aspect of a mental picture is no different to the "picture" aspect of a physical picture. W's use of "picture" does not change when he talks about a mental picture or a physical picture, because if it was mental picture 'Y' instead of mental picture 'X', then this would be no different than if it was physical picture 'Y' instead of physical picture 'X'. Therefore, saying that your mental image might change is not an argument for a different meaning of "picture" between mental and physical pictures.

I don’t see how we could verify whether a mistake had been made.
— Luke

If this person tried to eat a hat and we asked him why, we would know a mistake had been made. — Fooloso4

I don't see what this has to do with his mental image. How do we verify that?

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image.
— Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture? — Fooloso4

Yes.

You keep wanting to change the discussion to talk about resemblance to an object — Luke

If I remember correctly, this discussion began with PI 389 and you have returned to it more than once. PI 389 is about the likeness of mental image vs a picture to an object.

When you say a mental image of X, X is the object that a mental image is an image of. When you say a mental image of ... there is something that it is an image of.

When you gave the example of mistaking a hat for a sandwich both a hat and a sandwich are objects.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture — Luke

Have I made that argument?

I responded that a mental image of X is equivalent to a picture ("before the mind") of X — Luke

Again, when you say a mental image of X there is some X that it is a mental image of.

My point was that the "picture" aspect of a mental picture is no different to the "picture" aspect of a physical picture, because whatever is the content of the mental image is equivalent to the content of the "picture before the mind". — Luke

I can't follow this argument.

I don't see what this has to do with his mental image. How do we verify that? — Luke

You draw or describe your mental image and what you draw or describe looks like or sounds like a sandwich. Based on this representation of your mental image they will tell you that you are mistaken, it is not a hat its a sandwich. You might protest and say "I know it's a hat because its my mental image of a hat". If you are then asked to get a hat and put it on will you put a sandwich on your head?

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image.
— Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture?
— Fooloso4

Yes. — Luke

Isn't that because a mental picture is not a physical picture?

If I remember correctly, this discussion began with PI 389 and you have returned to it more than once. PI 389 is about the likeness of mental image vs a picture to an object. — Fooloso4

Yes, although we disagree over our reading of the third sentence of PI 389 in particular.

When you say a mental image of X, X is the object that a mental image is an image of. When you say a mental image of ... there is something that it is an image of. — Fooloso4

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3 — Fooloso4

I am interested in why you think the interlocutor might endorse sentence 3 of PI 389, viz.:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else. — PI 389, sentence 3

If the correct reading is that "X is the object that a mental image is an image of", then you and the interlocutor both appear to consider sentence 3 as true. So why do you view W as rejecting claim 3?

Also, if we accept that "X is the object that a mental image is an image of", it could follow from sentence 3 that "it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of [object X] and of nothing else." That is, it is an intrinsic feature of one's mental image that it can only ever be of X (where "X" refers to this particular object), and of no other object. But I can't imagine that anyone would hold such an absurd belief which limits all of their possible mental images to only one object, or why W would want to refute such an absurd view.

When you gave the example of mistaking a hat for a sandwich both a hat and a sandwich are objects. — Fooloso4

I never gave that example; you did.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture
— Luke

Have I made that argument? — Fooloso4

You have made that argument:

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. — Fooloso4

My point was that the "picture" aspect of a mental picture is no different to the "picture" aspect of a physical picture, because whatever is the content of the mental image is equivalent to the content of the "picture before the mind".
— Luke

I can't follow this argument. — Fooloso4

Apologies, I wasn't very clear. I was not making any reference to PI 389 with this comment. I was arguing against your claim that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture due to the fact that:

One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. — Fooloso4

My argument was that the phrases "mental image" and "picture before the mind" are synonymous. Therefore, if I have this mental image, called image X, then I must also have this mental picture, called picture X (because these terms are synonymous). My argument was that if I had another mental image instead of image X, say image Y, then it would be no different if we were talking about a physical picture instead of a mental picture/image. I could equally have another physical picture instead of picture X, say picture Y.

Their relative stability or change relates only to whether they are mental or physical, but is not relevant to whether they are both pictures, or to whether the word "picture" is being used differently in each case.

I don't see what this has to do with his mental image. How do we verify that? — Luke

You draw or describe your mental image and what you draw or describe looks like or sounds like a sandwich. Based on this representation of your mental image they will tell you that you are mistaken, it is not a hat its a sandwich. You might protest and say "I know it's a hat because its my mental image of a hat". If you are then asked to get a hat and put it on will you put a sandwich on your head? — Fooloso4

What you describe is not a verification of his mental image, but a verification of his description or drawing of his mental image. This is not about verifying his mental image, but about his correct or incorrect use of words such as "hat" or "sandwich".

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image.
— Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture?
— Fooloso4

Yes.
— Luke

Isn't that because a mental picture is not a physical picture? — Fooloso4

Of course a mental picture is not a physical picture. Neither is a physical horse an imaginary horse, but that doesn't mean that the word "horse" has a different meaning in each case.

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3
— Fooloso4 — Luke

As I have said, the three claims are part of the same argument. You can separate them as part of an analysis but you need to put them back together.

The claim at three is that it is an image of this. "This" is the object it is an image of. We cannot ignore the question of resemblance.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture
— Luke

Have I made that argument?
— Fooloso4

You have made that argument: — Luke

I should have been clearer. The picture and what it means are not the same. Whatever it might mean need not change if the picture is a mental rather than physical picture. If, however, I am talking about a picture, you might ask whether I mean a mental or a physical picture. Here the meaning of picture is different.

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3
— Fooloso4 — Luke


As I have said, the three claims are part of the same argument. You can separate them as part of an analysis but you need to put them back together.

The claim at three is that it is an image of this. "This" is the object it is an image of. We cannot ignore the question of resemblance. — Fooloso4

In order for your assertion to be true, the point of PI 389 must be to reject claims 1, 2 and 3. If it can be shown that W does not reject one of these sentences, then your assertion that "the point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1-3" is false.

Also, as I said earlier, I disagree that he rejects sentences 2 or 3.