He continues the quote above: — Fooloso4

I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.

My translation by Ross contains no such thing. What translation are you using, and what Bekker line are you talking about?

Sorry, I should have made it clearer.

The quote is a continuation of the quote from the Phaedo. 97b I just edited it.

:up: Occasionally, that's my motivation as well.

- Ah, okay. Gotcha.

A divine mind is a premise or endoxa not a conclusion. — Fooloso4

So I thought you were giving that quote in favor of this claim. But the quote is from Plato, not Aristotle, and therefore it seems you have not given any evidence in favor of your claim.

The interesting thing to me is that Aristotle himself answers many of your objections, which is what leads me to believe you have not read him at any length. It is also hard to believe that you are reading him with sympathy. For example:

If it were a matter of reasoning then, as is the case with mathematics, Aristotle could reach clear, definitive, undisputed, and necessary conclusions. — Fooloso4

Aristotle complains about the modern mathematization of philosophy (Metaphysics, 992a33); he speaks specifically about the differing precisions of different sciences (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b12); and he even speaks about those who incessantly question authority and require demonstrations ad infinitum (Metaphysics, 1011a2).

Wayfarer made a very obvious and rational comment. Do you actually disagree with it? If not, why are you objecting? — Leontiskos

So clearly you are missing the point. I did not disagree (or agree) with the observation. I pointed out that this is exactly the kind of comment elitists make when they want to marginalise alternative views. As in: "Your criticism is not valid because you are not sensitive enough or have not read the right works to understand." A secular variation of it might be, "People shouldn't be able to vote at elections unless they have the right qualifications and educational standard." You'll note, I specifically said that I didn't think it was Wayfarer's intention to be patronising, but this kind of argument can easily been understood that way.

Now is the argument rational? Sure. But a whole lot of bigotry and elitism can be rational too so that's hardly relevant.

So clearly you are missing the point. — Tom Storm

I think you are missing the point, but my last post is clear enough so we can leave it there.

:up:

But the quote is from Plato, not Aristotle, and therefore it seems you have not given any evidence in favor of your claim. — Leontiskos

My claim is that:

Mind was a well know and frequently discussed topic in the Academy and Lyceum. It is not as if it was a reasoned discovery. — Fooloso4

This is supported by reference to Plato. But if you are looking for specific reference in Aristotle by name:

Hence when someone said that there is Mind in nature, just as in animals, and that this is the cause of all order and arrangement, he seemed like a sane man in contrast with the haphazard statements of his predecessors. We know definitely that Anaxagoras adopted this view; but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with having stated it earlier. Those thinkers, then, who held this view assumed a principle in things which is the cause of beauty, and the sort of cause by which motion is communicated to things.

(Metaphysics 984b)

Aristotle complains about the modern mathematization of philosophy (Metaphysics, 992a33); — Leontiskos

What does this criticism have to do with the ability to give an apodictic reasoned argument leading to knowledge of the truth of first things?

he speaks specifically about the differing precisions of different sciences (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b12) — Leontiskos

The degree of precision is based on the subject matter. Are you saying that the science of first things necessarily lacks precision? In the paragraph cited he says:

... for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits.

What is the amount of exactness to be expected when the subject matter is first philosophy? However imprecise the reasoning must be, shouldn't it accomplish what you claim it does, that is, give us knowledge of the arche of all things?

and he even speaks about those who incessantly question authority and require demonstrations ad infinitum (Metaphysics, 1011a2). — Leontiskos

What he says at 1011a is:

they require a reason for things which have no reason, since the starting-point of a demonstration is not a matter of demonstration.

Surely if there is a line of reasoning leading to the arche of all things such reasoning would not be without reason. It may be unreasonable to expect to find it at the starting point but by the end it is reasonable that it must lead to knowledge of the source or arche of the whole.

Blessed are those who do God's work.

I have never understood what "modernism" means — Dfpolis

I understand modernity as the period between the publication of Newton's Principia and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (or more precisely, the legendary 1927 Solvay Conference where quantum theory was introduced). That marks the beginning of post-modernism. As for liberalism, I mean 'liberal democracy' as practiced in Western Europe, UK, Australia, Canada, etc (not 'liberalism' as distinct from 'conservatism' in the US sense.)

My observation was that there is often a tension between liberal democracies and modernism and classical/traditional philosophies. Hardly a novel observation. More on that below.

If I remember correctly, (Hadot) had an early interest in mysticism but later moved away from Plotinus’ Neoplatonism. — Fooloso4

He immersed himself in Plotinus' philosophy when writing his first book on that subject, but afterwards came to see it as overly other-worldly and ascetic. But his emphasis on 'philosophy as a way of life' and the principle of the transformation of the understanding remained constant throughout the remainder of his (and his wife, Iseltraut's) career. He has found a new fanbase amongst modern-day enthusiasts of stoicism. 'According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation.' :clap:

If it were a matter of reasoning then, as is the case with mathematics, Aristotle could reach clear, definitive, undisputed, and necessary conclusions. But he does not, and neither has anyone else. — Fooloso4

Says you! There are many quite unambiguous declarations of the signficance of wisdom and the contemplation of the first principles in the Nichomachean Ethics:

Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and Scientific Knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects — Nichomachean Ethics

Which, according to you, neither Aristotle nor anyone else has ever had!

I specifically said that I didn't think it was Wayfarer's intention to be patronising, but this kind of argument can easily been understood that way. — Tom Storm

I didn't take your comment pejoratively - but at the same time, there's a cultural dynamic at work in this topic. This goes back to one essential plank of liberal democracy, namely, that everyone is equal. In practice, this is often taken to extend to value judgement as well. Secular culture tends to level everyone in that sense - it questions any form of charismatic authority or any sense of there being a higher truth. Even the expression 'higher truth' is generally a red flag on this site, it invariably provokes not just criticism but often overt hostility. And it's because, in our culture, the individual is the arbiter of values, and science the arbiter of truth. (As I said, 'nihil ultra ego' - 'nothing beyond self' ;-) ) Ethical truths are subjective (decided by the individual) and relative (pertaining to cultural context. See Does Reason Know what it is Missing?, Stanley Fish, NY Times.)

I didn't take your comment pejoratively - but at the same time, there's a cultural dynamic at work in this topic. This goes back to one essential plank of liberal democracy, namely, that everyone is equal. — Wayfarer

I don't disagree. I am an elitist when it comes to art, literature and movies. I consider that there are better and worse texts - this is, of course, subject to some criterion of value and can get nebulous.

I do think everyone is equal in terms of rights and status as human beings. Not everyone is equal in terms of talent or ability. I don't have an issue with that. But good points like these can be made to do bad jobs.

Secular culture tends to level everyone in that sense - it questions any form of charismatic authority or any sense of there being a higher truth. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure what secular culture consists of. From what I can see there are a range of cultures and sub cultures which revolve around secularist notions and they don't always share presuppositions.

I do think when people reach for the term 'higher truth' we should question this as it can be used in a range of ways. And it can be used to shut down discussions. As in, 'There are higher truths you don't understand, Son.' All this aside, I particularly value your insights on these matters, even if we don't share some presuppositions.

It is also hard to believe that you are reading him with sympathy — Leontiskos

He is not speaking from on high, does not possess divine wisdom, and is not pronouncing revealed truths for us to accept and spread.

To read him sympathetically is read him as he reads others, that is carefully, critically, and not to regard him as an unquestionable authority.

I do think when people reach for the term 'higher truth' we should question this as it can be used in a range of ways. And it can be used to shut down discussions. As in, 'There are higher truths you don't understand, Son.' — Tom Storm

Well, true, it's a magnet for abusers of all kinds, as we seen amply and tragically demonstrated many times over. But as Rumi said 'there would be no fool's gold if there were no actual gold'. The subtle principle at work in any real philosophical spirituality is in the transformative value of insight. Seeing how things (your life, what you hold dear, the world) really are. The kind of understanding Carl Jung was always concerned with. Spinoza was mentioned earlier in the thread: he said '“After experience had taught me the hollowness and futility of everything that is ordinarily encountered in daily life […], I resolved at length to enquire whether there existed a true good […] whose discovery and acquisition would afford me a continuous and supreme joy to all eternity.” (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, para.1) He's referring to knowledge of higher truth.

Which, according to you, neither Aristotle nor anyone else has ever had! — Wayfarer

Yes, that is my position. It is possible that I am wrong, that I do not recognize wisdom because I am not wise. By the same token, unless someone is wise they may be wrong when attributing wisdom to Aristotle or anyone else. Is there anyone here able to make that determination?

Suppose that your experience leads you to a fork in the road. On one fork is said to be a place of great natural beauty, on the other a person you have texted with and are interested in, but not met or made any commitment to. I am saying that your choice of which fork to take is based on how you choose to value these incommensurate goods. On your theory, how is this valuation made? — Dfpolis

I have to say I don't really know. I will choose that which motivates me more, and what motivates me more is a characteristic of my nature (my nature at the specified time, since it might change). So, for example, presuming that you were referring to someone of sexual interest, the choice I make might depend on the strength of my libido at the time.

By the same token, unless someone is wise they may be wrong when attributing wisdom to Aristotle or anyone else. Is there anyone here able to make that determination? — Fooloso4

I don't think one has to claim to be enlightened (as I certainly am not) in order to see evidence of what it comprises in the literature.

Yes, that is my position. It is possible that I am wrong, that I do not recognize wisdom because I am not wise. By the same token, unless someone is wise they may be wrong when attributing wisdom to Aristotle or anyone else. Is there anyone here able to make that determination? — Fooloso4

I agree with this, and this is where faith comes in. For those who believe in higher truth it can only be a matter of faith, and even if there is a possible state of knowing higher truth, what that could mean is not clear, since it cannot be a truth in the discursive sense.

I think altered states of consciousness are certainly possible wherein one feels that one knows a higher truth, but that knowing cannot be expressed propositionally.

Yes, that is my position. It is possible that I am wrong, that I do not recognize wisdom because I am not wise. By the same token, unless someone is wise they may be wrong when attributing wisdom to Aristotle or anyone else. Is there anyone here able to make that determination? — Fooloso4

I don't see wisdom as a binary matter. I see degrees of wisdom, in different ways, in a lot of people. Was Aristotle committing a nirvana fallacy?

Well, true, it's a magnet for abusers of all kinds, as we seen amply and tragically demonstrated many times over. But as Rumi said 'there would be no fool's gold if there were no actual gold'. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I think this is the serious danger in censoring that sort of language for fear of abuse. If we pressure people to stop talking about gold because of the danger of fool's gold, then we deprive many people of the search and possession of real gold.

But there is also a lesser reason, and it has to do with inquiry. Propositions have a material sense and a formal sense. For example, the material sense of "2+2=4" is strictly mathematical. Yet capitalists could co-opt the expression as a rhetorical response to socialist economics, in which case it would become vaguely associated with capitalist economics. At that point someone might respond to a use of the expression by saying, "This is not your intention, but that does sound like capitalist propaganda." Well, the material sense has nothing to do with capitalist doctrine. The formal sense depends on the speaker's intent, but if there is no reason to believe that the intent is capitalist-inspired, then raising the spectre of capitalist propaganda is not only going to be a distraction, but it is also going to prevent people from discoursing about mathematics.

That is the practical effect: we are not able to discourse about higher truths, virtue, specialized knowledge, etc. Or rather, in order to discourse on these topics we are forced to overcome a great deal of resistance, even when there is no good reason for putting up such resistance.

So, how do thought and matter interact? They don't -- because the question is ill-formed. What we have is being, with different beings having different capabilities. — Dfpolis

Is that negation based on a distinction between Real Things and Ideal Beings?

In a previous reply, you called Descartes' dual categories "non-sensical because reality cannot be divided into res extensa and res cogitans". Yet, you say that "thought and matter" have different (dual?) "capabilities". If "capability" is taken to mean the ability to affect other "beings", how would you characterize that innate power? Extensa is a 3D spatial quantity, while Cogitans is a non-space-time quality; perhaps more like a capability? Extended Matter interacts with other things via exchanges of Energy. Do you think that Thinking Beings interact via Intention? If so, is Intention analogous to Energy in that it has effects on other minds?

The OP is titled Dualism and Interactionism. If you defined the latter term above, I missed it. So I Googled, and found that it is defined in terms of "Dualism" and "Causation"*1. Apparently, your objection to the Dualistic (proximate appearance) aspect is based on a Monistic (ultimate Ideality) worldview, in which Mind & Matter can be traced back to some primordial Origin, with the potential for both Material things and Mental beings. Is that summary anywhere close to your understanding?

If so, I can agree, although I typically use different terminology, drawn partly from sub-atomic Physics , Information theory, modern Cosmology, and ancient Philosophy. In my thesis, the Ultimate Origin (First Cause) is neither Mind nor Matter, but the Potential for evolving a plethora of material Things & living Creatures & Thinking Beings in the Real world. And I use physical Energy as a metaphor for the "interactions" between those offspring of Plato's hypothetical ideal FORM*2 (configuration ; manifestation ; design), and Aristotle's original Prime Mover (causation ; creation).

From those different aspects of Monistic Potential, I can trace Cosmology from an initial Bang of omnidirectional Causation, which transformed into the dual aspects of Energy & Matter, and thence into the manifold Darwinian "forms most beautiful". Some of those sub-forms have material Properties and some have immaterial Qualities, such as Life & Mind. Does any of that conjecture make sense from your non-dual perspective? :smile:


*1. Interactionism (philosophy of mind) :
Interactionism or interactionist dualism is the theory in the philosophy of mind which holds that matter and mind are two distinct and independent substances that exert causal effects on one another.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)

*2. Form :
noun --- Structure : a> the visible shape or configuration of something ; b> a particular way in which a thing exists or appears; a manifestation.
verb --- Creation : a> bring together parts or combine to create (something) : b> make or fashion into a certain shape or form.

Speaking of world wisdom literature, I was reading a introductory text on Proclus the other week
and was surprised to come across this remark, without there being any further elaboration or comment by the author:

I think this is the serious danger in censoring that sort of language for fear of abuse. — Leontiskos

It's not so much about censoring it - there's no prohibition on discussions of it, it's more that there's a kind of tacit disapproval because of its association with religion and or with cultic ideas.

I notice in the IEP article on Pierre Hadot, whom I've already brought up, says that 'Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” (in relation to traditional philosophy) may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion.' That's why I made a point of mentioning Nagel's essay on the fear of religion.

My view is that the process of secularisation in the West is a major factor in many of these debates. But it's like a tectonic plate movement - hard to detect on the surface but still capable of producing violent effects. I'm still working through it, and will probably never succeed in coming to a conclusion, all the more so as I'm very much a product of the very forces that I'm critiquing. :yikes:

It's not so much about censoring it - there's no prohibition on discussions of it, it's more that there's a kind of tacit disapproval because of its association with religion and or with cultic ideas. — Wayfarer

I take it that tacit disapproval is a kind of soft censorship; censorship as suppression. Or at the very least, this is what it necessarily effects.

My view is that the process of secularisation in the West is a major factor in many of these debates. But it's like a tectonic plate movement - hard to detect on the surface but still capable of producing violent effects. I'm still working through it, and will probably never succeed in coming to a conclusion, all the more so as I'm very much a product of the very forces that I'm critiquing. :yikes: — Wayfarer

Yes, but is secularization inherently tied up with strong notions of egalitarianism? If not, then where does the strong egalitarianism come from?

I am an elitist when it comes to art, literature and movies. I consider that there are better and worse texts... — Tom Storm

But when you say you are an elitist with respect to literature, are you only saying that you think there are better and worse texts? Because I don't think that's elitism.

Just saying Dan Brown is not as good a writer as George Elliot, say, may be seen by many as elitism, rightly or wrongly. And by others as a conservative remnant of a time when tradition mattered and a cannon was proposed.

Just saying Dan Brown is not as good a writer as George Elliot, say, may be seen by many as elitism, rightly or wrongly. — Tom Storm

Well do you yourself think they are right or wrong? I'm wondering what you mean when you use that term, 'elitism'.

Yes, but is secularization inherently tied up with strong notions of egalitarianism? If not, then where does the strong egalitarianism come from? — Leontiskos

I am egalitarian in believing that every individual should be treated equally by the law. The issue I was getting at was the denial of what I described as the 'vertical dimension', the axis of value (as distinct from the horizontal axis of quantitative measurement). That is required to make the sense of the idea of there being a higher truth, as without such a dimension, there could be no higher or lower.

Case in point - an excerpt from an article on the Catholic philosopher, Joseph Pieper, apparently very well-known (although not to me):

Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have, Pieper writes, “lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must undergo “perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.”

I'm not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy.

I just mean there is a hierarchy of competence. I think there is a broad intersubjective community which shares such a view.

So you would say that elitism means believing that there is a hierarchy of competence? Would not the person who believes there is a hierarchy of competence, and that they are at the very bottom of that hierarchy, then be an elitist?

I am egalitarian in believing that every individual should be treated equally by the law. The issue I was getting at was the denial of what I described as the 'vertical dimension', the axis of value (as distinct from the horizontal axis of quantitative measurement). That is required to make the sense of the idea of there being a higher truth, as without such a dimension, there could be no higher or lower. — Wayfarer

Okay, so the idea is that secularism denies this vertical dimension?

I'm not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yes, great point. And this touches on that idea of askesis.

I agree that secularism presents a flatness, and that this flatness results in strong varieties of egalitarianism. But there seems to be an additional element at play, which is egalitarian in itself and not only as a result of the flattened secular space. This additional element seems to be much more intentionally ordered towards strong egalitarianism.

Case in point - an excerpt from an article on the Catholic philosopher, Joseph Pieper, apparently very well-known (although not to me) — Wayfarer

Good quote. Pieper is great. Well-respected in scholarly circles and simultaneously accessible, which is rare. Ratzinger was the same way, although Pieper was a Thomist and Ratzinger was not.

I’m not an expert on elitism and I would imagine there are various dimensions to it. I use the word the way critic Robert Hughes used it. I’ll fish out a quote later. And yes your example would qualify - people can be willing participants in hierarchy without benefiting from it. How do you use the word?