Why would you think that (2) the physical image I draw of X may not be an image of X, but (3) the mental image I have of X must be an image of X?

There is no parity here. In the first case, the picture I draw of X may look to you like something else, but in the second, it cannot look to you like something else because you cannot see it.

In the first case, the picture I draw of X may look to you like something else — Fooloso4

In that case, sentence 2 is true. Why do you say W rejects it?

in the second, it cannot look to you like something else because you cannot see it. — Fooloso4

Cannot see what?—Something else? That would make sentence 3 true. Why do you say W rejects it?

In that case, sentence 2 is true. Why do you say W rejects it? — Luke

If I draw a picture or take a photograph of X, it is not a picture of anything else. Whether someone thinks it is a picture of something else makes no difference. It is a picture of X.

Cannot see what? — Luke

The mental image.

A second person in involved in 2 but no one else can be involved in my mental image. If 2 and 3 are to be compared on an equal bases then a second person should not enter into the comparison.

Why do you say W rejects it? — Luke

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it.

b) My mental image of X is an image of X.

What is the difference between a and b with regard to being an image of X?

If I draw a picture or take a photograph of X, it is not a picture of anything else. Whether someone thinks it is a picture of something else makes no difference. It is a picture of X. — Fooloso4

It does make a difference, because you could be wrong. You might think you've taken a photo of the Eiffel Tower when you've actually taken a photo of the Arc de Triomphe. You might think you've drawn a picture of Kanye West but everyone else says it looks just like Adam Sandler. Likewise:

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it. — Fooloso4

OC 13: "...from his utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it."

A second person in involved in 2 but no one else can be involved in my mental image. If 2 and 3 are to be compared on an equal bases then a second person should not enter into the comparison. — Fooloso4

Are these remarks intended to support a rejection of sentence 3? If so, how?

If you want to compare 2 and 3 "on an equal basis" then, in order to remain faithful to the rest of the text, this should be done from a public perspective, not from a private one.

From a public perspective, and in accordance with my argument above, this would make sentence 2 true:

For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else. — PI 389, sentence 2

If you were satisfied (or if you "knew") that the picture represented what it was supposed to represent, and if it were only up to you to decide what the picture was supposed to represent, then it would not be possible for the picture to be "of something else". But it isn't only up to you, and others may interpret it as something other than what it is "supposed to represent".

Regardless, I don't see why sentences 2 and 3 should be compared "on an equal basis". You seem to read sentence 2 as being from the private perspective and sentence 3 as being from the public perspective, whereas I take the opposite view. I read sentence 2 as being from the public perspective and sentence 3 as being from the private perspective:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else. — PI 389, sentence 3

Only I can see that my mental image is the image of this and of nothing else. From the public perspective, as you note, the mental image cannot be seen. How can sentence 3 make any sense from the public perspective where a mental image cannot be seen by anyone?

Why do you say W rejects it?
— Luke

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it.

b) My mental image of X is an image of X.

What is the difference between a and b with regard to being an image of X? — Fooloso4

The difference, I suppose, is that one image is mental and the other is physical? I can see how your "a)" contradicts or rejects sentence 2, but how does your "b)" contradict or reject sentence 3?

It does make a difference, because you could be wrong. You might think you've taken a photo of the Eiffel Tower when you've actually taken a photo of the Arc de Triomphe. — Luke

The same can be said of a mental picture. I might think my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower when it is actually a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe.

If you want to compare 2 and 3 "on an equal basis" then, in order to remain faithful to the rest of the text, this should be done from a public perspective, not from a private one. — Luke

But that is the point. It cannot be done from a public perspective.

From a public perspective, and in accordance with my argument above, this would make sentence 2 true: — Luke

It doesn't. If a group of people are standing in front of the Statue of Liberty, they will agree that it is the Statue of Liberty. If I take a photo of it it will be a photo of the Statue of Liberty. If someone sees that photo and thinks it is a photo of something else they would be wrong.

But it isn't only up to you, and others may interpret it as something other than what it is "supposed to represent". — Luke

This is why the comparison between a mental image and a physical image is misguided.

I don't see why sentences 2 and 3 should be compared "on an equal basis". — Luke

What is being compared is the likeness of the image to the object. In 2 that comparison can be made. In 3 it cannot.

In the case of 2 the image "I make" may be seen by others as a picture of something else. In the case of 3 no such ambiguity arises because no one else can see the image. If they could, the same ambiguity might arise. The mental image is not a superlikeness.

You seem to read sentence 2 as being from the private perspective and sentence 3 as being from the public perspective, — Luke

No!

How can sentence 3 make any sense if a mental image cannot be seen by anyone (from the public perspective)? — Luke

Now you are catching on.

The same can be said of a mental picture. I might think my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower when it id actually a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe. — Fooloso4

I don't see how this relates to the idea of a superlikeness, or to sentence 3 in particular. If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness?

On my reading, I think that my mental image is of this (imagined or real) object before my mind and of nothing else. I cannot possibly mistake the content of this mental image, as I am seeing or imagining it now, for anything else. That's why I make the erroneous inference that my mental image is a better representation than any physical picture, because unlike a mental picture, a physical picture is open to (mis)interpretation.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object. The mental image cannot be compared to the object for likeness or resemblance, and so the mental image cannot be said to "look like" or to resemble the object.

This is why the comparison between a mental image and a physical image is misguided. — Fooloso4

I don't see that as being the point of PI 389.

In the case of 2 the image "I make" may be seen by others as a picture of something else. In the case of 3 no such ambiguity arises because no one else can see the image. If they could, the same ambiguity might arise. The mental image is not a superlikeness. — Fooloso4

How does the conclusion follow?

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness? — Luke

It shows that the mental image need not be more like the object than a physical picture.

On my reading, I think that my mental image is of this (imagined or real) object before my mind and of nothing else. I cannot possibly mistake the content of this mental image — Luke

The mental image is not of the object before your mind. The mental object is the object before your mind. The mental object is an image of the same object that the picture is. The claim is that the mental image is more like this object than the physical picture is.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object. — Luke

Of course it is! Both the mental image and the physical image are images of the same object. The interlocutor is claiming that the mental image is more like that object than the physical image is.

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness?
— Luke

It shows that the mental image need not be more like the object than a physical picture. — Fooloso4

Was a comparison able to be made between the mental image and the Eiffel Tower? Or how was the mistake discovered?

The mental image is not of the object before your mind. The mental object is the object before your mind. The mental object is an image of the same object that the picture is. The claim is that the mental image is more like this object than the physical picture is. — Fooloso4

I find the introduction of "mental object" confusing.

Let's say I imagine a teapot. Are you saying the mental object is a teapot but that my mental image is not of a teapot? But surely it is.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object.
— Luke

Of course it is! Both the mental image and the physical image are images of the same object. — Fooloso4

But you said that the mental image is not of the object?

The interlocutor is claiming that the mental image is more like that object than the physical image is. — Fooloso4

How do you demonstrate that it isn't? You can't see their mental image. No comparison can be made between their mental image and the object that their mental image is of.

Are you saying the mental object is a teapot but that my mental image is not of a teapot? — Luke

I am saying that the mental object is not a teapot. It is an image of a teapot. The mental object and mental image are the same thing.

But you said that the mental image is not of the object? — Luke

It is not of the object if:

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower — Luke

No comparison can be made between their mental image and the object that their mental image is of. — Luke

They can make the comparison. We can't. If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake.

The mental object and mental image are the same thing.

But you said that the mental image is not of the object?
— Luke

It is not of the object if:

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower
— Luke — Fooloso4

You said earlier that:

The mental image is not of the object.... — Fooloso4

Now you have made the qualification that the mental image is of the object except where the mental image is not of the object, or when the mental image does not represent the object, or when the person has made a mistake.

What does it mean to say that the mental image does not represent the object?

If I am looking at an object and aware of it before me, then isn't my mental image of that object? If so, then the mistake is not a mismatch between my mental image and the object in front of me. So, what is the nature of the mistake?

They can make the comparison. We can't. If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake. — Fooloso4

Again (assuming normal mental functioning), there will not be any mismatch between their mental image and the object they see in front of them, so what is the mistake?

If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake.
— Fooloso4

Again (assuming normal mental functioning), there will not be any mismatch between their mental image(s) and the object(s) they see in front of them, so what is the mistake? — Luke

The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them. Before seeing them the mental image of the Eiffel Tower is a stone arch.


[Added: Years ago I visited my elementary school. It was much smaller than my mental image of it. I would have to kneel if I wanted to drink from the water fountain instead of having to stand on tip toes. The principle's office was just steps away from the first grade class, not the long endless walk it was when I was sent to the principle's office.]

The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them. Before seeing them the mental image of the Eiffel Tower is a stone arch. — Fooloso4

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, and when they stand before the Arc de Triomphe their mental image is of the Arc de Triomphe. If they visit the stone arch they might think "Wow, so this is the Eiffel Tower". And if they visit they Eiffel Tower, they might think "This impressive monument seems familiar."

They've compared the mental images to the objects in front of them but may still be none the wiser. So why do you say "the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them"?

If they visit the stone arch they might think "Wow, so this is the Eiffel Tower". — Luke

And they would be mistaken. It is not the Eiffel Tower. The mistake can be corrected when the two objects are correctly identified.

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, — Luke

Do you mean that when they see the Eiffel Tower they are actually seeing a mental image of the Eiffel Tower?

And they would be mistaken. It is not the Eiffel Tower. The mistake can be corrected when the two objects are correctly identified. — Fooloso4

You said earlier: "The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them".

The point of my last post was that this is not the case: they can be standing in front of the Arc de Triomphe having a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe and yet still think that it's the Eiffel Tower. Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object.

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower,
— Luke

Do you mean that when they see the Eiffel Tower they are actually seeing a mental image of the Eiffel Tower? — Fooloso4

No.

Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object. — Luke

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. If I am told that this object I am standing in front of is the Eiffel Tower then I can see that my mental image was not what I thought it was. What I was picturing was not the Eiffel Tower.

Wittgenstein's interlocutor says:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing
else.

Your example shows why this is not true.

Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object.
— Luke

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. If I am told that this object I am standing in front of is the Eiffel Tower then I can see that my mental image was not what I thought it was. What I was picturing was not the Eiffel Tower. — Fooloso4

This correction is not made by comparing or associating a mental image with an object, but by comparing or associating a name with an object.

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else.

Your example shows why this is not true. — Fooloso4

Sentence 3 does not mention any names. Sentence 3 only makes an ostensive reference to this.

This correction is not made by comparing or associating a mental image with an object, but by comparing or associating a name with an object. — Luke

That is what I said:

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. — Fooloso4

But what is at issue in not simply the name of the object. What is at issue is whether the mental image must be an image of "this".

Sentence 3 does not mention any names. Sentence 3 only makes an ostensive reference to this. — Luke

"This" refers to some object. At PI 389 there is only one object. There is no need to name it. The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up, but that the mental image I have is actually an image of something else, the Arc de Triomphe.

My mental image is not like its object. It is not an image of "this", that is, the Eiffel Tower.

The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up, but that the mental image I have is actually an image of something else, the Arc de Triomphe. — Fooloso4

Then why do you say the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, instead of saying the correction is made by linking the correct mental image to the object?

"This" refers to some object. At PI 389 there is only one object. There is no need to name it. — Fooloso4

If the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, then there is a need to name the object. If the object is not named, then one can stand in front of the Arc de Triomphe and think it's the Eiffel Tower and yet sentence 3 still remains true: it is an intrinsic feature of their mental image that it is an image of this (stone arch, in this case) and of nothing else. Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object.

Then why do you say the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, instead of saying the correction is made by linking the correct mental image to the object? — Luke

How is the correction between the mental image and the object to be made? In the example of the Eiffel Tower I need to become aware that the mental image I have is the image of something else. Pointing to the object my mental image is an image of I might say: "See, this is the Eiffel Tower and my mental image looks just like it". Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem.

If the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, then there is a need to name the object. — Luke

In the example of the Eiffel Tower there is, but at PI 389 there is no confusion as to what object is being referred to, and so, no need to name it.

Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object. — Luke

It is not an intrinsic feature of my mental image of the Eiffel Tower that it is the image of "this" (the Eiffel Tower) and of nothing else.

How is the correction between the mental image and the object to be made? In the example of the Eiffel Tower I need to become aware that the mental image I have is the image of something else. Pointing to the object my mental image is an image of I might say: "See, this is the Eiffel Tower and my mental image looks just like it". — Fooloso4

Are you correcting yourself? If such a "correction" cannot be verified by others, then how can we be sure that it is a correction? You might tell me that your mental image looks just like the Eiffel Tower, but I have no way of verifying it. For example, it is possible that you are still in error (e.g. you are again not standing before the Eiffel Tower). Or, the Eiffel Tower may be slightly different to how you imagined it, but you say it's exactly how you imagined it.

Moreover, why suppose that a mental image is required in order to use the name "Eiffel Tower" correctly, or that having a particular mental image is required in order to pick out the Eiffel Tower? Consider PI 151 and the different ways that the pupil may be able to continue the series of numbers. The correct result can be produced via various different associated mental images or thought processes; or there may be no thought process associated at all.

Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem. — Fooloso4

You seem to be suggesting that you can "correct the problem" by comparing your mental image to (what you correctly think is) the Eiffel Tower. But this can't be done without (also) knowing that the name of the landmark is the "Eiffel Tower".

You said earlier that:

The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up... — Fooloso4

I don't believe that you can "correct the problem" without using any names and only by comparing your mental image to the (unnamed) landmark before you. However, we can dispense with mental images here and speak only of (the name of) the landmark, and whether or not you correctly used the name.

In the example of the Eiffel Tower there is, but at PI 389 there is no confusion as to what object is being referred to, and so, no need to name it. — Fooloso4

What object is being referred to at PI 389? PI 389 makes only general statements regarding pictures and mental images and does not refer to any specific object.

Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object.
— Luke

It is not an intrinsic feature of my mental image of the Eiffel Tower that it is the image of "this" (the Eiffel Tower) and of nothing else. — Fooloso4

Sentence 3 of PI 389 does not mention the Eiffel Tower. It is a general statement about any mental image. It is not a statement about a particular mental image. "It is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that..." To use a particular example, if the mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, then it is the image of the Eiffel Tower and of nothing else. And the same goes for any other mental image (M) that one has; it is the image of (M) and of nothing else.

Or, the Eiffel Tower may be slightly different to how you imagined it, but you say it's exactly how you imagined it. — Luke

My point was, that would be a mistake. My mental image of the Eiffel Tower need not be an image of the Eiffel Tower.

Moreover, why suppose that a mental image is required in order to use the name "Eiffel Tower" correctly — Luke

You seem to have lost track of the argument. It is not required. The question is whether the mental image must of the Eiffel Tower and nothing else. You supported the claim that it must. I have been trying to provide examples of why that need not be the case.

Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem.
— Fooloso4

You seem to be suggesting that you can "correct the problem" by comparing your mental image to (what you correctly think is) the Eiffel Tower. — Luke

Why would you think I am suggesting that when I said the opposite?

What object is being referred to at PI 389? — Luke

According to the interlocutor (and you(?)), whatever object the mental image is of is what the object is.

And the same goes for any other mental image (M) that one has; it is the image of (M) and of nothing else. — Luke

If M is the mental image then M is not the image of M. It is not a mental image of itself. It is not a mental image of a mental image.

If I have a mental image of N then it is my mental image of N. But this does not mean that my mental image of N, whatever N is, must be more similar to N than any picture.

We have been over all this before. Repeating the same points is getting us nowhere.

And the same goes for any other mental image (M) that one has; it is the image of (M) and of nothing else. — Luke

As I have said before, saying that a mental image of X is an image of X and nothing else, says no more than saying a physical image of X is an image of X and nothing else.

My mental image of the Eiffel Tower need not be an image of the Eiffel Tower. — Fooloso4

Of course your mental image could be of anything and is not restricted to being an image of the Eiffel Tower.

However, in order to rightly be called a “mental image of the Eiffel Tower”, then it must be an image of the Eiffel Tower. You are saying that your mental image of the Eiffel Tower need not be a mental image of the Eiffel Tower, which is contradictory.

Moreover, why suppose that a mental image is required in order to use the name "Eiffel Tower" correctly
— Luke

You seem to have lost track of the argument. It is not required. The question is whether the mental image must of the Eiffel Tower and nothing else. — Fooloso4

My point was about use of the the name. There are no names mentioned in sentence 3 if PI 389. Sentence 3 can be true and yet still play no part in the determination of linguistic meaning. Mental images are similar to pains in this respect: they enter into our language games only via their outward expression/behaviours.

Why would you think I am suggesting that when I said the opposite? — Fooloso4

You did not say the opposite.

What object is being referred to at PI 389?
— Luke

According to the interlocutor (and you(?)), whatever object the mental image is of is what the object is. — Fooloso4

Considering that Sentence 3 does not involve the use of any names, yes. The mental image cannot be correctly associated with any object without the use of language. As we have noted, one might think that some landmark has a different name than it actually does, but there can be no errors or corrections without the use of names.

If M is the mental image then M is not the image of M. — Fooloso4

Right, but it’s difficult to distinguish a mental image from its content.

Another way to describe Sentence 3 could be:

It is an intrinsic feature of a mental image (M) that it has this content (C) which represents this object (O) and nothing else. To be true, (C) and (O) must be the same, or (C) can only represent (O). In order for that to be true, the object must be identical to whatever the content of the mental image is. You can’t say that some object is not identical to (C) because no object is named at Sentence 3.

Despite what Wittgenstein says about the ordinary it is often an overlooked aspect of his philosophy. All the focus remains on the same few linguistic tangles. — Fooloso4

I would go further and say that the 'ordinary' is precisely what is not given. This is expressed in terms of distance from understanding. From paragraph 194:

Though we may doubt whether such-and-such physical conditions make this
movement possible, we never discuss whether this is the possibility of this or of that movement: 'so the possibility of the movement stands in a unique relation to the movement itself; closer than that of a picture to its subject'; for it can be doubted whether a picture is the picture of this thing or that. We say "Experience will shew whether this gives the pin this possibility of movement", but we do not say "Experience will shew whether this is the possibility of this movement": 'so it is not an empirical fact that this possibility is the possibility of precisely this movement'. We mind about the kind of expressions we use concerning these things; we do not understand them, however, but misinterpret them.
When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it. — PI, 194

This is not the sound of knowing language as a set of facts. The statement: "closer than that of a picture to its subject'; for it can be doubted whether a picture is the picture of this thing or that" suggests that the role of 'representation' is being presented against the background of other activities we do not understand.

For anyone interested, this is PMS Hacker's exegesis of PI 389:

1. W. concludes this part of the discussion by pin‐pointing one deep aspect of the illusions that beset us here. We think of our mental images as pictures which only we can see, in fact as ‘super‐pictures’ which cannot be misinterpreted. For an ordinary picture, though it is a picture of X, may look like (and be wrongly taken to be) a picture of Y. But it is essential to a mental image of X that it is of X and nothing else. So it comes to seem like a super‐likness. Yet this is confused, for that the mental image of X is an image of X is not determined by its likeness to X. We are prone to think that it is a picture which needs no interpretation, so closely does it resemble what it is a picture of. It is true that it needs no interpretation and also that it makes no sense to suppose that I might be mistaken in my characterization of my mental image. But that is not because it looks more like its object than any picture. It is rather that it neither looks like nor fails to look like its object. It is not a picture at all. How does one know that one’s image is of X and not Y (which looks like X)? One does not know, nor can one be mistaken. One says so, without grounds, as one says what one means or what one thinks.

2. The relation between an image and what it is an image of is comparable not to the relation between a portrait and its subject (where the portrait may resemble someone or something else), but to the relation between an expectation and what fulfils it (BB 36), a thought (or proposition) and what makes it true (PG 161), or a possibility and what it is a possibility of (PI §194). It is not an image of X in virtue of a method of projection or in virtue of a similarity, let alone a ‘super‐likeness’. (Cf. LA 67.) — PMS Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations), Part 2: Exegesis, Section 243-427

PI 194 begins:

When does one have the thought that a machine already contains its possible movements in some mysterious way? Well, when one is doing philosophy.

and ends, as you quoted:

Though we do pay attention to the way we talk about these matters, we don’t understand it, but misinterpret it. When we do philosophy, we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this.

Between them we find:

And what lures us into thinking that? The kind of way in which we talk about the machine. We say, for example, that the machine has (possesses) such-and-such possibilities of movement; we speak of an ideally rigid machine which can move only thus-and-so.

Rather than give a false philosophical interpretation he is thinking like an engineer:

PI 193:

... We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. Is this how it is? Do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t think of that at all.

But it is not just the engineer who know such possibilities. The ordinary person familiar with machines knows this. Rather than the philosopher's ideal picture of a machine as something rigid, the ordinary picture of a machine is of something that will require maintenance and repair in order to move in the ways it was designed to.

[Although I am not prepared to pursue this line of inquiry, the picture of the universe as a machine supports the idea that the universe is deterministic. If, however, the universe is not an "ideally rigid machine" then we should not rule out chance.]

But it is not just the engineer who know such possibilities. The ordinary person familiar with machines knows this. Rather than the philosopher's ideal picture of a machine as something rigid, the ordinary picture of a machine is of something that will require maintenance and repair in order to move in the ways it was designed to. — Fooloso4

When you setup a straw man, you can paint anything in any way you want and use aphorisms to knock it down like you’re the anti-hero messiah :roll:. There’s an audience for all criticisms.

Yes, you can.

Wittgenstein, however, is not attaching straw men. He is addressing problems that arose in his discussions with students and colleagues.