You wrote:

No, because if it's true under one interpretation and false under another then it isn't both true and false in the same sense. It's true in one sense and false in another.

The statement is not true in one sense and false in another, because the truth of the statement is not dependent upon all interpretations thereof.

You wrote:

The idea behind truth-makers is to give a metaphysical explanation of truth in terms of entities which are language-independent (or mind independent more generally). But if you appeal to facts or states of affairs instead, then they are too much like propositions (because how do you individuate facts/states of affairs if not by the propositions describing them? - it seems that understanding what facts/states of affairs are already presupposes the understanding of propositions), and that threatens to make the correspondence theory vacuous (because why do we need to talk about correspondence at all, if all we need is to analyze propositions in order to understand what makes them true? -- the later was, incidentally, Wittgenstein's view, both early and late, at least on my understanding of his philosophy).

This could be quite interesting.

Seems that if we are to call something a "truth-maker", it would need to include everything it takes to make truth. If truth is correspondence, and correspondence is a relationship, then everything required to make that relationship would be a truth-maker. As mentioned before, the "truth-maker" notion takes but one necessary element...

The notion of mind-independence is fraught. Truth is prior to mind, but not thought/belief. Mind consists of thought/belief. Not all thought/belief is mind. Truth(as correspondence) is presupposed within all thought/belief.

Language-independence is a road less traveled it seems. On my view, we can use language to become aware of and acquire knowledge of that which is not existentially contingent upon it. Correspondence with/to fact/reality is one such thing.

The former are particulars, which indeed are numerically identical, but the latter are structured propositions, which aren't. — Pierre-Normand

You seem to be alluding to something along the lines of the ideas of thinkers such as Hegel, Brandom and McDowell, that the events: dying, being murdered or whatever, are always already in "conceptual shape". If so, then I agree would and say that that is precisely what enables what we say to correspond or fail to correspond to events.

I would want to add, though, that although the events are in "conceptual shape" (which is what I take you to mean by "structured propositions") they are such in a pre-linguistic sense, so it is a case of linguistic propositions corresponding or failing to correspond to pre-linguistically "structured" "propositions".

Again, it all depends on what one means by 'correspondence'. If it is not meant as some sort of metaphysical theory that attempts to explain the truth of statements/sentences/propositions, but merely as some sort of truism, then it could be a pretty innocuous thing to say (but then it is not clear what exactly you are gaining philosophically by talking about 'correspondence' in the first place).

8-)

You wrote:

Again, it all depends on what one means by 'correspondence'. If it is not meant as some sort of metaphysical theory that attempts to explain the truth of statements/sentences/propositions, but merely as some sort of truism, then it could be a pretty innocuous thing to say (but then it is not clear what exactly you are gaining philosophically by talking about 'correspondence' in the first place).

On my view, correspondence isn't a metaphysical theory attempting to explain the correspondence of statements/sentences/propositions.

Correspondence is truth. It is what makes statements true. The lack thereof is what makes them false.

Understanding correspondence and the role it plays in all thought/belief and statements thereof requires having a good grasp upon rudimentary thought/belief formation itself, for that is precisely when, 'where', and how it emerges onto the world stage.

Well no, it doesn't follow. If by "subjective assumption" you mean something like an unjustified or ungrounded belief, then this doesn't show that the belief itself isn't objectively true. It may be the case that my belief that there is life on Mars is ungrounded or unjustified, and yet it still can be the case that it is itself objectively true, and there is life on Mars. Here you are surely trying to derive a metaphysical conclusion from epistemic premises. — Fafner

Until you define what "objectively true" is, what you say here is meaningless. And, your definition of "objectively true" will be subjective. So all this, what you say about a belief which could be objectively true, is nonsense. "Objectively true" is a nonsense notion. Until you establish some sort of justification for this notion, which you have not yet done, you are speaking nonsense. And, as I keep telling you, even if you justify this notion of objectively true, it doesn't make it true. So your claim that there could be a belief which is unjustified yet objectively true, is indeed false, because it is not true. That is unless you do not equate not true with false.

As my example about the existence of life on Mars shows, you cannot make this inference. — Fafner

Your example about Mars shows nothing, because you assume an unjustified notion of "objectively true", and build your example on this. Until you produce a valid concept of "objectively true", you are just begging the question, assuming the reality of "objectively true", as the basis for your claim.

The fact that the word 'subject' appears in 'subjective', doesn't license you to treat everything that a subject says as itself subjective. — Fafner

What do you base this in? What the subject says, is necessarily of the subject, and therefore subjective. That the subject can say something objective is an assumption which needs to be justified.

As I explained to you already, when the subject says something which is justified, this justification provides a form of objectivity, it is agreed upon by other subjects, because of the justification. This form of objectivity is sometimes known as inter-subjectivity, and is really a form of subjectivity. To use "objective" in this way, meaning inter-subjective, is completely different from the way that you use "objective", in "objectively true", because one refers to justified while the other refers to true. So your assumption that a subject can say something, or believe something, which is "objectively true", is still completely unjustified.

You are equivocating between words with different meaning, and this is a blatant logical fallacy (it's like inferring something about the banks of a river from claims about banks as financial institutions, just on the grounds they are spelled the same). — Fafner

Clearly it is you Fafner, who is attempting to equivocate, not I. I've maintained my definition of subjective, as "of the subject", and adhered to this. You want to take an epistemological form of "objective", which we know of as "inter-subjective", and make it into an ontological form of "objective" known as "of the object". But clearly the epistemological form of objective, which means inter-subjective, is a completely different meaning of "objective", from the ontological form which means of the object. Now you want to equivocate between the two, such that when you refer to the epistemological form, the inter-subjective form of "objective", with "objective truth", you want this to mean "truth of the object".

As I've been explaining to you, truth of the object (objective truth using "objective" in that way), is an impossibility, because truth is always a property of the subject. It is a relationship between interpretations, and interpretations are property of the subject.

The statement is not true in one sense and false in another, because the truth of the statement is not dependent upon all interpretations thereof. — creativesoul

Let's take this nice and slow. Take your statement, X. Why do you insist that X must be either true or false?

Sigh...

We are both, objects in the world and subjects taking an account of it and ourselves.

The subjective/objective dichotomy adds nothing but unnecessary confusion... It is inherently incapable of taking proper account of that which consists in/of both, and is thus neither.

The statement "The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if the cat is on the mat.

The statement(within quotes) corresponds to fact/reality(is true) when(if and only if) it is the case that there is a cat on the mat(fact/reality). Easy enough. Even those not versed in philosophy readily agree with this account, and for very good reason.

Here, we need to look at more than just the statement, for being true requires more than that. Being true is akin to corresponding to fact/reality. It requires being meaningful. Thus, the statement's truth is contingent upon language as well as it's being meaningful. The statement and it's meaning are both existentially contingent upon language. Thus, the truth of the statement is as well.

The same holds good for any and all assertions, sentences, propositions, statements, and/or claims. This is part of how we become aware of truth and it's role in thought/belief. There are other considerations as well...

Truth is presupposed within thought/belief.

This is relatively uncontentious. Belief that "X", is belief that "X" is true. Likewise, assuming a sincere speaker, we could add "I believe" or "I think" to any and all statements from that speaker and not change the meaning one iota. Thus, assuming sincerity...

"I believe" and "is true" are both redundant uses of language. They become so, not strictly as a result of how we use language, but rather as a result of what thought/belief consists in/of and the role that correspondence to fact/reality plays within it.

That is not to say that either belief or truth is redundant. Rather, it is only to say that the presupposition of truth within all thought/belief formation is exactly why/how "is true" and "I believe" become redundant.

Our debate was about your claim that the truth of a statement is dependent upon interpretation of that statement. I've since argued against that.

If it was further qualified by saying something like the truth of a statement is contingent upon it's being meaningful, I would agree.

Here, we need to look at more than just the statement, for being true requires more than that. Being true is akin to corresponding to fact/reality. It requires being meaningful. Thus, the statement's truth is contingent upon language as well as it's being meaningful. The statement and it's meaning are both existentially contingent upon language. Thus, the truth of the statement is as well. — creativesoul

Being true requires being meaningful. Whether or not the statement is meaningful is contingent on interpretation. Therefore being true is contingent on interpretation.

The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. — creativesoul

In what frame of reference? Yours or mine?

By the time you utter the sentence, the cat may no longer be on the mat.

Truth is presupposed within thought/belief. — creativesoul

This is surely a subjective viewpoint. Personally, for me a belief is a belief.

"I believe" and "is true" are both redundant uses of language. — creativesoul

For me, I believe is precisely that, i.e. thoughts that I have with varying degrees of intensity. If someone thinks something is true, s/he may use the verb "know" or something to that effect.

I believe your description of your beliefs is an excellent example why beliefs are everywhere and truths exist to satisfy some desire. So truth exists as a goal for someone, but that a pretty narrow definition, akin to the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

You wrote:

Being true requires being meaningful. Whether or not the statement is meaningful is contingent on interpretation. Therefore being true is contingent on interpretation.

Let's put this into argumentative form...

p1. Being true requires being meaningful
p2. Being meaningful is contingent upon interpretation
C. Being true is contingent upon interpretation

Are you ok with that thus far?

You wrote:

...for me a belief is a belief.

"a belief is a belief" is meaningless.

No, because there are unstated premises involved which are known by principles other than stated in your argument.. If C is dependent on B, and B is dependent on A, then C is dependent on A. Do you agree with this?

Can you give an argument along those lines that you're ok with then?

I was attempting to put your words into one, based upon how they were written.

"a belief is a belief" is meaningless. — creativesoul

Not to someone who distinguishes "I believe" from "I know' and certainly a lot more meaningful that equating "I believe" to "I know".

Basically your whole post it's a personal belief presented as a truth but you don't recognize it as such. However, be that as it may, it is no surprise that yet again a subjective view of truth is presented as Truth.

That is irrelevant. A=A is utterly meaningless in and of itself. Let A be "a belief".

The argument is as stated above. Do you agree or not? Truth is dependent on meaning, and meaning is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

So, take your argument as you have stated it, and add the premise stated above. If C is dependent on B and B is dependent on A, then C is dependent on A. Then you will have the desired conclusion. Do you agree with the premise?

That is irrelevant. A=A is utterly meaningless in and of itself. Let A be "a belief — creativesoul

A belief is just a thought about some idea which we feel some personal intensity. Some people feel great intensity about their thoughts and call them truths. It's pretty common by the way. Usually experience tends to modulate such intensity of thoughts.

You changed the terms. I do not agree that truth is dependent upon meaning. Nor do I agree that meaning is dependent upon interpretation.

You wrote:

A belief is just a thought about some idea which we feel some personal intensity. Some people feel great intensity about their thoughts and call them truths. It's pretty common by the way. Usually experience tends to modulate such intensity of thoughts.

It seems to me that you're talking about conviction.

Do not "requires", and "contingent upon", both imply "is dependent on" to you?

Try this: If C requires B, and B is contingent on A, then C requires A. Therefore truth "requires" interpretation.

If some truth requires meaning and some meaning requires interpretation then....

8-)

It seems to me that you're talking about conviction. — creativesoul

Which is exactly what people who claim they know the truth display, lots of conviction.

I would readily agree with the bit about people calling their own strongly held belief "truth". Such folk are working from a very poor understanding of what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so.

Belief is not truth, for if it were there would be no such thing as false belief, but there is so it's not.

what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. — creativesoul

Makes for an interesting discussion between those who claim to know what's true. The cat is in the mat might certainly provide lots of discussion.

I would think that that's(conviction) exactly what anyone anytime making an assertion displays.

Edited for clarity's sake alone.

Indeed.

Talking about what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so does make for an interesting discussion between those who claim to know what's true.