The images whose shadows we see are not sense-data, they are: — Fooloso4
However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument. — RussellA
But Plato is claiming that we never see reality, and that's the central issue in sense-datum theory. — Ludwig V
OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data. — Ludwig V
OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data. — Ludwig V
However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument. — RussellA
He acknowledges that the craftsmen, physicians, ship captains, and others have knowledge. — Fooloso4
The cave has been discussed in other threads and, of course, a new thread can be started. — Fooloso4
There may be advocates of sense data who do believe that, but Ayers agrees with the view that what we see is real, whether it's sense data that we see, or material objects. — frank
However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position. — RussellA
That is true. If you prefer, he says that it is only sense-data that we see directly, and that "material objects" are "constructions" out of sense-data. So material objects, according to Ayer are not what we think they are. — Ludwig V
Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position. — Antony Nickles
But if the argument is that God exists and that argument is absurd, until there is another argument, there is no basis for asserting that God exists. No? — Ludwig V
So you believe both positions and that no argument can settle the issue? Basically on the grounds that any argument must be from one position or another and that it cannot therefore address the issue. H'm. That would need some explaining. — Ludwig V
Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno
I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street. — RussellA
OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in. — RussellA
OLP tends to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality. — RussellA
However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position.
The metaphysics of sense-data, which is outside of language, cannot be critiqued by an Ordinary Language Philosopher from a position that reality is established by language. — RussellA
But there is the suspicion of technical or specialized concepts. Here's the rub. It is impossible for someone who does not accept the term "quale" or "qualia" as being capable of coherent use to join in the discussion. The only possible strategy is to demonstrate the incoherence of the proposed usage. — Ludwig V
…but there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved. — Ludwig V
But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. — Ludwig V
But it seems I've jumped the gun. I'd been misled by such things as(This collection of sense-data statements) is true IFF (this statement about a material object)
...supposing that at a minimum the two languages must have some equivalence of truth value. But there is to be no such symmetry. "The material-object language must somehow be reducible to the sense-datum language".any pro- position that refers to a material thing must somehow be expressible in terms of sense-data, if it is to be empirically significant — p.107
Moore...................Wittgenstein..................but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants — Antony Nickles
OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position — Antony Nickles
Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he can — Antony Nickles
The symmetry is broken; and with it the two language theory.a statement about a 'material thing' entails 'some set ofstatements or other about sense-data'. But-and this is his difficulty-there is no definite and finite set of statements about sense-data entailed by any statement about a 'material thing'.
As no method is unbiased, using OLP as a method to investigate the philosophical nature of reality will inevitably come up with a biased answer, an answer biased by the very method being used. — RussellA
On the one hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data is independent of language, yet on the other hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data can be discussed within language. — RussellA
it was Apple who invented this keyboard command. — Banno
OLP proposes to try to reach an unbiased take on each example — Antony Nickles
I am not talking about the “metaphysical problem” (whether it exists in or out of language, or can or can not be discussed), but the metaphysician’s use of words (knowledge, intent, real, direct, etc.) in comparison to our ordinary use of those words, which reveals how and why metaphysics wants to remove context and generalize only one type of case. — Antony Nickles
Austin on Ayer, p, 119But-and this is his difficulty-there is no definite and finite set of statements about sense-data entailed by any statement about a 'material thing'.
I'm confident that Austin thought in such strategic terms. Well spotted.It’s not that Ayer is a worthy opponent, but that he explicitly hits every touchstone of errors that manifest from the desire for something incorrigible. — Antony Nickles
to defend versions of emotivism elsewhere — Banno
The absence of explicit Ethics in Austin is regrettable — Banno
OLP is a movement that believes philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations in asking such questions "what is truth" and "what is essence" — RussellA
Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, — Antony Nickles
but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles
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