where truths might include more than features of the world or how it is and so can include statements like "One ought such and such" — Moliere

Why can't this be a feature of the world?

Well, there's a subtly here that I'm now not certain about -- between truths and facts, to give a name to the distinction, where truths might include more than features of the world or how it is and so can include statements like "One ought such and such", which then can be true, and understanding the difference between them and facts is through its direction-of-fit. But that doesn't disqualify them from being real, per se, because surely our actions and volitions are real? It only disqualifies them from being facts to the extent that we understand facts to only include statements with word-to-world direction of fit. — Moliere

I recently finished reading some Kripke and he used "fact" to refer to some detectable feature of the world. Sentences and utterances are definitely detectable. That someone assigned the property of truth to an uttered sentence is detectable. What does that mean, though? Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say?

At this point there's just going to be a rift between deflationists and truth realists. One doesn't have any force over the other. It just comes down to how far out on a limb of realism one wants to go, you know what I mean? It's along the lines of a matter of taste.

Hrmm... not can't. I wouldn't reach for necessity. More just noting that this is not how we normally use the word "fact", at least -- usually we mean word-to-world, where the words are meant to set out how the world is. But we can, of course, adopt other expressions -- just they become subtle or uncertain at some level when so doing. Immediately after what you quote I note how volitions and actions are clearly real, right? And I've also said that this could just be a feature of things now, that we may find some way of dealing with ethics in the same manner that we deal with other bodies of knowledge.

The closest to "can't" might be the argument from queerness, but I have to admit that I think that argument only follows with a greater degree of certainty about how the world is. Or, also, one might contend that "truths", in the above sense as distinct from facts, are queer, and so the argument is overcome.

More just noting that this is not how we normally use the word "fact", at least -- usually we mean word-to-world, where the words are meant to set out how the world is. — Moliere

Why can't "you ought not harm another" set out how the world is? I guess I'm just not really sure what you mean by "how the world is"?

Maybe a better approach would be to address the relevant differences between these:

1. The baby exists
2. The baby is crying
3. The baby was born in October
4. The baby will be going to see the doctor tomorrow
5. The baby wouldn't have been born had her parents never met
6. You ought not eat the baby
7. 1 + 1 = 2

Which are truths? Which are facts? Is there a relevant difference between being a truth and being a fact? Does it matter if something is a fact but not a truth or a truth but not a fact?

Surely all that matters is whether or not the baby is crying, whether or not you ought not eat the baby, whether or not 1 + 1 = 2, etc.? Forget the terms "truth" and "fact" if they're causing you so much trouble.

Perhaps that one ought not harm another. — Michael

I don't understand this to be a 'feature' of anything, but a subjective judgement. I'm wanting to know what is at the bedrock of that claim, to support it, in objective terms?

Perhaps not all truths come to our sensibility through phenomenal interpretation. — Michael

I very much agree with this, though im somewhat murky on how that's the case - It seems unavoidable, despite not really groking a mechanism by which is could 'come to our attention' as opposed to assuming some innate knowledge of certain 'facts'.

I'm fine with the concept of a sort of epigenetic predisposition to certain behaviours because they are conducive to survival, let's say (though, that discussion could get very complicated in it's own right) but i can't understand that they could be 'information' or 'truth' in the sense that it's independent of the subject.

I'm wanting to know what is at the bedrock of that claim, to support it, in objective terms? — AmadeusD

There seems to be this assumption that it can be an objective brute fact that gravity exists, that pi is irrational, and that I would never have been born had one of my parents died in their childhood, but that it cannot be an objective brute fact that one ought not harm another. Why is that?

I've not made those assumptions. But my guess is that those earlier claims are general - they are objectively true, because they are ill-defined.

E.g Gravity exists as a brute fact - but we can't explain what it is. But we know it's there, having it's effect, whatever it may be. So i think that's a bad example because i would just agree its only objective in the most general possible sense (and, tied directly with language).

That Pi is irrational is actually subjective, in the sense that the criteria for a number being irrational (no a/b integer status) is just something we've decided to use that term 'irrational' for. But it is objective, in the sense that, it is - given that artificial definition - inarguably and necessarily in that category.

But i see your discomfort, and i outlined a similar feeling in another thread (or maybe it was earlier here? I forget). Discussion artificially 'true' statements can't be considered objective because without hte subject, the criteria being met vanishes.

The only difference is that some sentences use "is" and some use "ought", and that this verb indicates how we are using the word: the statements which use "is" have a direction of fit from the words to the world. What we say is made true or false because of the states of affairs of the world. It doesn't get much more specific than "states of affairs", I believe, unless we want a metaphysical exposition of facts. Here the reliance is upon language-use as opposed to metaphysics: we use the words in a manner where we want them to set out states of affairs, and this is the whole of it.

With an ought-statement, however, we use it in the reverse: We want the states of affairs to fit with our words rather than our words to set out states of affairs. So "You ought not eat the baby" is about what you ought-not do rather than what you are doing: One describes, the other proscribes, and this difference in use seems to cause some problems in thinking through ethics.

We can call it a fact, being this is a free world and we're setting out how it's best to talk, but the ethical differences seem to remain.

That someone assigned the property of truth to an uttered sentence is detectable. What does that mean, though? Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say? — frank

I'd say that it means the speaker believes it ought to be true, in the case of moral propositions. So "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true means that I believe one ought not kick puppies for fun.

But in terms of the metaphysics of morals... well, yeah, there'd be some disagreements there. And we could appeal to taste in making a case for one or another metaphysic. Though that doesn't preclude a kind of real ethic in the sense that actions are real, and metaphysics can be seen as kind of literature rather than our real actions, that it is about our actions, and so taste comes about because we're evaluating literature rather than actions, and in the case of action we might make the case that there's more to it than taste, that goodness -- and not just beauty -- is important too.

What we say is made true or false because of the states of affairs of the world. — Moliere

And why can’t it be that one such state of affairs is that we ought not harm another?

And why can’t it be that one such state of affairs is that we ought not harm another? — Michael

You can, it's just not persuasive to the person who believes we ought to harm another, so our differences remain even as you call it a state of affairs.

But it is objective, in the sense that, it is - given that artificial definition - inarguably and necessarily in that category. — AmadeusD

The same might also be true of obligation. Given the artificial definition of the words “you”, “ought”, “not”, “harm”, and “another” it is necessarily the case that you ought not harm another.

And why can’t it be that one such state of affairs is that we ought not harm another? — Michael

It is one state of affairs among many. Now what?

You can, it's just not persuasive to the person who believes we ought to harm another, so our differences remain even as you call it a state of affairs. — Moliere

Whether or not it’s persuasive is a separate matter. Flat Earthers often aren’t persuaded.

I’m only trying to explain moral realism, not argue that it’s correct. Moral realists might claim that a moral statement like “you ought not murder” is true because that you ought not murder is a brute, mind-independent state of affairs.

As for how to justify such a claim, they might accept that there is no empirical evidence, but argue that not all justifications are empirical. Certain rational truths simply have no empirical evidence.

It is one state of affairs among many. Now what? — baker

I’m not sure what you mean. Yes, there are many states of affairs: one ought not murder, my name is Michael, it will rain over my house tomorrow, etc.

@Michael
How do moral realists resolve descriptive moral relativism?
How do moral realists explain that different people have different ideas about what is right or wrong?
How do moral realists explain that some people believe that murder is wrong, but some other people believe that murder is not wrong?

Sure. I have no problem with that formulation, i would just prefer to not use the term 'objective' as neither my example, or stretching to obligation, actually speaks to a state of affairs. It speaks to a sentence uttered in command. It doesn't boil down to a state of affairs, and couldn't, given that there are no objects which aren't pure mentation except 'another' - which is still a perception, tbf, but runs into no obstacles in 100% of observations lol

I recently finished reading some Kripke and he used "fact" to refer to some detectable feature of the world. — frank

Well, why not. There's more than one way to use the word, sometimes folk use it to refer to any truth, sometimes, and especially sometimes when doing philosophy, only to those truths that have a direction of fit of word-to-world; the speaker is attempting to match there words to the way things are.

Having two differing senses is fine, provided they are used consistently.

What would be an error, and I think we can see this in the OP, would be to mix the two uses and think one had found an argument. To say that "facts" are only sentences about the material world, and that only facts are true, and therefore only sentences about the material world are true.

How do moral realists resolve descriptive moral relativism?
How do moral realists explain that different people have different ideas about what is right or wrong?
How do moral realists explain that some people believe that murder is wrong, but some other people believe that murder is not wrong? — baker

I don’t understand the relevance of your questions. People can believe different things about maths and physics and so on, but there are nonetheless right and wrong answers. So too with ethics.

People can belive falsehoods? — Michael

How does a moral realist know something is false? Because their "gut feeling" tells them so?

It seems right, though. — Moliere

There seems to be an advantage in keeping our ought statements small. Burying children under buildings is wrong, even if it helps one meet the Grand Strategy.

I have no problem with that formulation, i would just prefer to not use the term 'objective' as neither my example, or stretching to obligation, actually speaks to a state of affairs. — AmadeusD

Realists will disagree. That I ought not harm another is as much a state of affairs as that 1+1=2 and that electrons are negatively charged particles and that it will rain over my house tomorrow.

How does a moral realist know something is false? Because their "gut feeling" tells them so? — baker

Possibly.

Do you claim that it is unreasonable to claim to know that something is false because their “gut feeling” tells them so? If you do, how do you know this? Is that your “gut feeling”?

Dostoevsky's three questions — Moliere

He wrote one as well? I'll have to look for it...

:wink:

Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say? — frank

Do we have to choose? Why not both, or either depending on what you are doing?

But it patently is not a state of affairs, and at very, very best, a description of one. What state of affairs outside of the mind indicates that command is universal? As far as i know, realists don't make absolute claims to a state of affairs, by noting a perception.

Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say? — frank

This sounds a little JPB :P

Truth being functional, to my mind, removes all real meaning from the word. Then again, 'my truth' tends to be an accepted social norm these days. I just think that's bogus.

I don't understand this to be a 'feature' of anything, but a subjective judgement. — AmadeusD

A judgement, perhaps, but why "subjective"? What does that word add?

Nice summation.