Well, there's a subtly here that I'm now not certain about -- between truths and facts, to give a name to the distinction, where truths might include more than features of the world or how it is and so can include statements like "One ought such and such", which then can be true, and understanding the difference between them and facts is through its direction-of-fit. But that doesn't disqualify them from being real, per se, because surely our actions and volitions are real? It only disqualifies them from being facts to the extent that we understand facts to only include statements with word-to-world direction of fit. — Moliere
More just noting that this is not how we normally use the word "fact", at least -- usually we mean word-to-world, where the words are meant to set out how the world is. — Moliere
Perhaps that one ought not harm another. — Michael
Perhaps not all truths come to our sensibility through phenomenal interpretation. — Michael
I'm wanting to know what is at the bedrock of that claim, to support it, in objective terms? — AmadeusD
That someone assigned the property of truth to an uttered sentence is detectable. What does that mean, though? Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say? — frank
But it is objective, in the sense that, it is - given that artificial definition - inarguably and necessarily in that category. — AmadeusD
You can, it's just not persuasive to the person who believes we ought to harm another, so our differences remain even as you call it a state of affairs. — Moliere
Well, why not. There's more than one way to use the word, sometimes folk use it to refer to any truth, sometimes, and especially sometimes when doing philosophy, only to those truths that have a direction of fit of word-to-world; the speaker is attempting to match there words to the way things are.I recently finished reading some Kripke and he used "fact" to refer to some detectable feature of the world. — frank
How do moral realists resolve descriptive moral relativism?
How do moral realists explain that different people have different ideas about what is right or wrong?
How do moral realists explain that some people believe that murder is wrong, but some other people believe that murder is not wrong? — baker
I have no problem with that formulation, i would just prefer to not use the term 'objective' as neither my example, or stretching to obligation, actually speaks to a state of affairs. — AmadeusD
How does a moral realist know something is false? Because their "gut feeling" tells them so? — baker
Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say? — frank
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