But it patently is not a state of affairs — AmadeusD

How so? What does “state of affairs” mean to you?

What state of affairs outside of the mind indicates that command is universal? — AmadeusD

That one ought not harm another is the mind-independent state of affairs.

It strikes me that the claim could not be made, but for a subject perceiving it's value. That, to my, suggests it is a subjective judgement on the harming of 'others' and couldn' be otherwise as it's necessarily a posteriori

What does “state of affairs” mean to you? — Michael

To me, a state of affairs is an actual, obtaining situation in the world independent of further judgement. Something like "There are others" could be a state of affairs. "Others suffer if we harm them" could be another state of affairs. "We should not harm others" is clearly, not a state of affairs, but a proclamation derived from a set of states of affairs interpreted in certain ways.

That one ought not harm another is the state of affairs. — Michael

Per the above, I quite disagree and would just say you haven't presented a sufficient basis for this being a necessary element of the world.

Do we have to choose? Why not both, or either depending on what you are doing? — Banno

Sure. I don't think that flexibility gets us any closer to an argument for moral realism, though.

I'd say that it means the speaker believes it ought to be true, in the case of moral propositions. So "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true means that I believe one ought not kick puppies for fun. — Moliere

Too strong. It's not that the believing makes it so. If it's true, it's true regardless of the belief.

↪Michael ↪Michael The only difference is that some sentences use "is" and some use "ought", and that this verb indicates how we are using the word: the statements which use "is" have a direction of fit from the words to the world. What we say is made true or false because of the states of affairs of the world. It doesn't get much more specific than "states of affairs", I believe, unless we want a metaphysical exposition of facts — Moliere

In trying to relate the logical, propositional view with a psychological perspective, I start from the thought that ‘ought’ and ‘should’ arise where there is an indeterminate situation, with at least two outcomes being possible. In science, when we say a certain outcome ought to ensue, we mean that it is statistically likely given our knowledge of the facts involved. When we say a moral outcome ought to ensue, we dont mean one outcome is more likely than the alternatives, but that we prefer one outcome over the others. Where things get tricky from a psychological perspective is when we compare the grounds for our moral preference with the grounds for considering one empirical outcome more likely than another. Even if we believe that moral preferences can be justified on the basis of something more than whim, the social realities we might argue bind our moral preferences ( people shouldn’t happily torture dogs) would seem to be a different category than the empirical realities binding our scientific oughts. But is this distinction justified? If we say the direction of fit for empirical oughts is from the word to the world, aren’t we forgetting that the world we are relying on is already defined on the basis of the social reality of a discursive paradigmatic scheme? So it seems in both the case of the empirical ‘is’ and the moral ‘ought’ , we are relying on a grounding in a social reality that is itself the product of a pragmatic, contingent coordination of values.

It strikes me that the claim could not be made, but for a subject perceiving it's value. — AmadeusD

Well, the claim that London is in England could not be made without a subject to make the claim. Is it subjective, too?

You will have real trouble attempting to show a distinct division between subjective and objective statements. Folk assume the distinction is clear. It isn't.

Nor further away. There are moral truths.

There are moral truths. — Banno

Deflationists agree.

again, the difference between "ought' and "is" is direction of fit rather than the ambiguity of states of affairs.

To me, a state of affairs is an actual, obtaining situation in the world independent of further judgement. — AmadeusD

And the moral realist will claim that that one ought not harm another is an actual, obtaining situation in the world independent of further judgement.

Deflationists agree. — frank

Good for them.

Good for them. — Banno

They say the same thing about realists. I mentioned this earlier. It's a matter of taste.

Possibly.

Do you claim that it is unreasonable to claim to know that something is false because their “gut feeling” tells them so? — Michael

Yes. Because guts aren't reasonable.

Moral realism is actually metaethical authoritarianism/egoism.

Issues of morality are inevitably about how people treat eachother. If one person says, "This is the truth and all else is wrong" and then punishes everyone who thinks otherwise, then that's simply authoritarianism.

Again, your point, if there is one, is obtuse.

Yes. Because guts aren't reasonable. — baker

How do you know this?

But it patently is not a state of affairs, and at very, very best, a description of one. What state of affairs outside of the mind indicates that command is universal? As far as i know, realists don't make absolute claims to a state of affairs, by noting a perception. — AmadeusD

For realists, "perspective" only exists to mean 'not knowing the truth, but merely having a perspective'.
If realists would acknowledge perspectivism as valid, they would cease being realists.

@Michael
It's my gut feeling against theirs.

While your conclusion there may be correct, your example doesn't touch it.

Those are subjective terms for subjective demarcations within actual states of affairs (that there is land encompassing what is called England and subsequently London. Your statement is only 'true' in light of the subjective perception of the piece of land in question as liable to come under those labels. It doesn't, to my mind, even lend itself to an argument that it is objective - though, i have covered why i think this earlier. It's an artificial construction that can't be defeated based on arbitrary axioms (England exists within certain borders; London subsequently the same within England)

It's my gut feeling against theirs. — baker

Precisely. You have a gut feeling that moral realism is false. They have a gut feeling that moral realism is true. One of you is right and one of you is wrong. Neither has empirical or self-evident rational justification.

But there is an objective, mind-independent, non-physical fact-of-the-matter (either moral realism is correct or it isn't). So at the very least moral realism isn't inherently incoherent in arguing that there are objective, mind-independent, moral facts-of-the-matter.

And they would be wrong in every sense of the word, unless invoking a supernatural source of morality.

And they would be wrong in every sense of the word, unless invoking a supernatural source of morality. — AmadeusD

What do you mean by "supernatural"? Do you mean "non-physical"? Well, yes. Moral realists don't usually claim that moral facts are physical facts. Just as mathematical realists don't usually claim that mathematical facts are physical facts.

OK, now it's fixed. :D Oof. Thanks :) True.

Those are subjective terms for subjective demarcations within actual states of affairs — AmadeusD

"London" is a subjective term?

Sure, the boundary of the city is a convention... but that does not make it subjective.

And that's actually why I chose that example.

This supports my position.

A realist can't make a claim that a judgement is objective, because that would entail they were not realists with regarding to 'actual objects' and merely assert their existence based on perception.
Though, that particular trouble might boil down to what I accept to be true in another comment of yours - that it may be merely intuition vs intuition.

Again, your point, if there is one, is obtuse. — Banno

If you accept moral realism, it's not because of any argument. It's just built in to your assumptions about the world. There is no good argument for moral realism. That there are moral truths does not show moral realism. How many more words are necessary? :confused:

Supernatural was probably a bad word to use - 'revealed' serves my purpose better. Need not be non-physical, but certainly requires a brute fact about the source existing (God is the best example; commands from those running the simulation would be another) that can't be explained in terms of phenomena.

How could it not be subjective, if it's literally a made-up, artificial, arbitrary, only-exists-in-minds-of-those-who-accept-it demarcation? The fact London's boundaries have changed multiple times, have, technically, three definitions, and are not recognized by everyone is an issue.

I did cover this elsewhere though - I'm willing to grant 'objective' status to things that inarguably conform to abitrary criteria. But London doesn't exist, at all, let alone within certain boundaries, without subjects to accept, based on literally nothing at bed-rock, that it's true. So, in that sense sure, it can be considered objective - with reference to subjective criteria.

Apologies to all if i drop out - I am working and trying to reply between bits of work. Will try to rekindle later on if that happens.

You have a gut feeling that moral realism is false. — Michael

No. My gut feeling is that there might be a misnaming going on.
I suspect that some people merely pose as moral realists because it is often advantageous to do so.

Neither has empirical or self-evident rational justification.

I'm not sure about this. I revise my earlier statement that it's my gut feeling against theirs. I actually allow for the possibility that they might have a knowledge I don't have.

There is an objective, mind-independent, inaccessible fact-of-the-matter.

How do you know this?