Whether or not it’s persuasive is a separate matter. Flat Earthers often aren’t persuaded.
I’m only trying to explain moral realism, not argue that it’s correct. — Michael
If you accept moral realism, it's not because of any argument. It's just built in to your assumptions about the world. There is no good argument for moral realism. That there are moral truths does not show moral realism. — frank
The first answer:why "subjective"? What does that word add? — Banno
London does't work.It strikes me that the claim could not be made, but for a subject perceiving it's value. — AmadeusD
In trying to relate the logical, propositional view with a psychological perspective, I start from the thought that ‘ought’ and ‘should’ arise where there is an indeterminate situation, with at least two outcomes being possible. In science, when we say a certain outcome ought to ensue, we mean that it is statistically likely given our knowledge of the facts involved. When we say a moral outcome ought to ensue, we dont mean one outcome is more likely than the alternatives, but that we prefer one outcome over the others. Where things get tricky from a psychological perspective is when we compare the grounds for our moral preference with the grounds for considering one empirical outcome more likely than another. Even if we believe that moral preferences can be justified on the basis of something more than whim, the social realities we might argue bind our moral preferences ( people shouldn’t happily torture dogs) would seem to be a different category than the empirical realities binding our scientific oughts. But is this distinction justified? If we say the direction of fit for empirical oughts is from the word to the world, aren’t we forgetting that the world we are relying on is already defined on the basis of the social reality of a discursive paradigmatic scheme? So it seems in both the case of the empirical ‘is’ and the moral ‘ought’ , we are relying on a grounding in a social reality that is itself the product of a pragmatic, contingent coordination of values. — Joshs
In this second case, I would say yes. 'wood' is merely a symbol for a state of affairs (that being liganous plant matter existing). The table part, could certainly be considered subjective - but that's a known issue (what makes a table, such as it is?). So, the statement (taking the identity of a table for granted) is objectively true. — AmadeusD
But isn't the table also a subjective demarcation?It represents teh subjective demarcation of certain of that land, — AmadeusD
You are saying "yes", it is subjective, then concluding that it is objectively true? I don't follow this at all. — Banno
But isn't the table also a subjective demarcation? — Banno
The table part, could certainly be considered subjective - but that's a known issue (what makes a table, such as it is?). So, the statement (taking the identity of a table for granted) is objectively true. — AmadeusD
So again, what does "subjective" add to "I don't understand this to be a 'feature' of anything, but a subjective judgement"? — Banno
The time honored perspective is that we know there are moral facts because of God, and they exist in God's nature, and we discover them in the Bible. I don't think there is any other commonly accepted framework for moral facts.
I think that rejecting the above is to reject moral facts.
Why is London analogous to table, but wood isn't? London is also what it is - and that can also be boiled down to atoms, quarks etc... And the high-level organisation of those things is London.London is analogous to table. — AmadeusD
If, theoretically, there were facts embedded into God's will such that "one ought not torture puppies for fun", then it would be a moral fact and meet your criteria — Bob Ross
Perhaps i'm not seeing what you are.. But this seems a bit askance from what i saidWhy is London analogous to table, but wood isn't? London is also what it is - and that can also be boiled down to atoms, quarks etc... And the high-level organisation of those things is London. — Banno
And the reason for doing so is to show that the difference between scientific and ethical statements is not that the one is objective, the other subjective. — Banno
Firstly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then God didn’t create them.If God didn’t create them, then there is something which is greater than God—which defies the standard Leibnizian definition of God being that which there is no greater being. Perhaps, to be fair, by “no greater being”, we are strictly talking about persons—but then, even in the case Christianity (and the like) are false then the greatest person is now (by definition) God. Irregardless, it seems (to me) to undermine God’s existence. — Bob Ross
Secondly, if the moral facts are in and of God’s nature, then that warrants a (conceptual) exposition of (1) how they exist and (2) what they exactly are. To say “the moral facts are derived from God’s nature” just doesn’t cut it for me: how do I know those normative facts are morally signified? Is there a normative fact that one can derive subject-referencing norms from God’s nature? It seems, when one is faced with actually giving an explanation (of those moral facts in God’s nature), that they warrant an existence of their own...such as Platonic Forms. — Bob Ross
hirdly, I don’t believe that the Bible, if granted as true, gives us any insight into how those alleged ‘moral’ facts that exist in God’s nature: it just describes various derived ‘moral’ facts which are predicated with “God’s nature is such that He is omnibenevolent”. — Bob Ross
Interesting. Honestly, I find ethical intuitionism much more plausible than the Biblical moral realist account. — Bob Ross
It's subjective in the sense that it's people who are talking about its existence. — baker
Is there an argument for the bolded part? It sounds like you're saying that part of God is greater than God. That doesn't make much sense
The idea is that moral facts exist as an aspect of God. This isn't an argument, by the way. It's a worldview
Christianity uses the Bible as a touchstone. It's a living religion, so it doesn't reduce to scripture. It's made of history, the human psyche, and the lives of millions of people for the last 1800 years.
Are you saying that ethical intuitionism is moral realism?
Oh I see...just playing devil's advocate, eh? What did you think of my responses? — Bob Ross
Just to be sure, the concern here is not "table", the type, but "That table", with the definite pronoun. It's an individual table.London is a piece of naming, not a piece of land. As is table viz. Table is what we call certain bits of wood, used via custom for certain purposes. — AmadeusD
If you flick back through my comments in this thread, I hope it will be clear that I've argued for there being true "ought" statements, and that I would count these as "facts of the matter".I assume on this front you accept there are no 'facts of the matter' beyond impression? — AmadeusD
It's subjective in the sense that it's people who are talking about its existence. — baker
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