When did you last believe, and treat, people you see across the street from you as if they were only, e.g., 6 inches tall because that's how they appeared to be when you saw them, and thought that they became 6 feet tall when they crossed the street to speak to you? — Ciceronianus
I would presume that with my glasses off, I do not see objects as they are, but more as they are blurred. — Hanover
I don't see how this addresses my previous post. — Luke
Well, does the fact that they appear blurred to you with your glasses off persuade you they are or may be blurred? — Ciceronianus
My perception of the apple is blurred without the glasses. If I never had glasses, I would assume the apple and the blurriness were one in the same. My assumption is that there are other distortions between the apple and my perception that are not correctible or that they are correctible by means I don't yet know about. — Hanover
I think it's unlikely that the nearsighted and the blind will conclude that all are nearsighted and all are blind. — Ciceronianus
course, people will generally make concessions of weakness, fault, or deficit when it comes to small or trivial things.
But they are unlikely to believe (much less openly admit) they might be blind in some way that matters. — baker
Again, I'm referring to "affectation" as defined by Merriam-Webster online as I said in the OP:
Affectation" according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, is:
"a. Speech or conduct not natural to oneself: an unnatural form of behavior meant especially to impress others; b. the act of taking on or displaying an attitude not natural to oneself or not genuinely felt."
I wouldn't consider it "natural to myself" to believe that someone across the street from me is 5 inches tall, but would consider it "natural to myself" to by surprised by, and to dispute, someone who did believe that. — Ciceronianus
Again, by what criteria do you judge whether some belief or assumption or philosophy is an affectation? — Luke
We are in fact "blind in some regard" whether you believe. You can't see ultraviolet, hear high frequencies, taste certain flavors, feel minute variations, or smell certain smells. — Hanover
Which is merely to say that we're human beings. One might say the same of any living creature. Are they "blind" as well? We must be omnipotent, be God then, in order not to be "blind"? It seems a rather unusual way to use the word. — Ciceronianus
If that's the case, though, why purport to think, or believe, otherwise, i.e. contrary to the way in which you actually live your life? — Ciceronianus
Your question, as I took it, was why we should ever doubt the accuracy of what we see before us, and that should we so doubt, we do it disingenuously. — Hanover
The point of all of this is responsive to what I think is the larger inquiry, and that is whether folks like Descartes are foolish to question that which no one has a basis to question. I think the above discussion does provide such a basis. — Hanover
When we say we can't know what the world really or actually, I think we make certain assumptions, the primary of which is the assumption that there is something that is real behind what we experience which can't be determined. Something hidden from us because of our nature. It's a kind of religious view, perhaps. — Ciceronianus
We see in most cases exactly what we should see, being human. If that's the case, why is it that what we see isn't really what's there?
When we say we can't know what the world really or actually, I think we make certain assumptions, the primary of which is the assumption that there is something that is real behind what we experience which can't be determined. Something hidden from us because of our nature. It's a kind of religious view, perhaps. — Ciceronianus
course, people will generally make concessions of weakness, fault, or deficit when it comes to small or trivial things.
But they are unlikely to believe (much less openly admit) they might be blind in some way that matters.
— baker
I'm pretty sure the vast majority of people admit they can't smell an intruder like a dog. — Hanover
People who have significant eyesight problems generally know this is the case. Someone nearsighted will come to understand that what appears blurry to them at a distance won't appear blurry when closer to them, and as they live in an environment with others with no such problems, will come to know that they have a problem others don't have. Someone blind will come to know others are not. I think it's unlikely that the nearsighted and the blind will conclude that all are nearsighted and all are blind. — Ciceronianus
Cunning.What can be more natural to us than how we live, how we actually interact with the rest of the world? — Ciceronianus
The salient point here is that sometimes we have to take it on trust that there is or might be something wrong with us, or that we have a blindness of some kind, even though we can at best recognize this blindness only indirectly. This having to take things on trust is a significant vulnerability. — baker
The question will always be left open as to what extent the mind makes contact with external substance. We only escape this doubt when we cease to assume the idea of intrinsic substance, and opt instead for a radical interconnectedness of subject and object ( Hegelian dialectics, phenomenology, pragmatism, hermeneutics). — Joshs
It's not about others lying or being mistaken.I'm not sure if "on trust" is entirely accurate. I think it would be more a case of making a judgment based on the weight of the evidence, which may be indirect. What's the probability that everyone without the problem would lie to us, or be mistaken? — Ciceronianus
It seems to me that the view that we can never know the extent to which we (I don't think our minds are separate from us) make contact with the rest of the world is far more radical than the view that we do. The latter is based on what actually takes place to our knowledge when we interact with the rest of the world; the former is based on the belief that what takes place when we do so doesn't matter. What actually happens when we interact with the "external world" is apparently of no value. — Ciceronianus
When we say we can't know what the world really or actually, I think we make certain assumptions, the primary of which is the assumption that there is something that is real behind what we experience which can't be determined. Something hidden from us because of our nature. It's a kind of religious view, perhaps. — Ciceronianus
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