OK! Fair enough, I understand what David Pears is about on the very first pages of his book. I really appreciate your commitment to explaining both tautologies and David Pears' commentary. I probably will have some questions while continuing the reading. So, if you don't mind, I would like to share them with you.
Until then. Nice to meet you and welcome to TPF! :up: — javi2541997
3.323
In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification—and so belongs to different symbols—or that two words that have different
modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
...
(In the proposition, ‘Green is green’—where the first word is the proper name of a person
and the last an adjective—these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)
3.324
In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them).
3.325
In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by
not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way
signs that have different modes of signification:
that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar—by logical syntax.
4.4611
Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.
4.462
Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations, and latter none.
In a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world—the representational relations—cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality.
A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And that is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world.
What was the origin of Y, the so-called picture theory of prepositions? Wittgenstein's explanation of logical neccesity, which depends on Y, still to be given.
What does Y is about? To present truths in logical space? Or does David Pears refers to X and Y logical structure? — javi2541997
but I can talk a little about this point and see if it helps. — 013zen
They use a complex vocabulary which seems to only be sent to their 'Vienna' group. They make premises and arguments which are interesting, but nonetheless are difficult to follow if someone - like me - is not used to logical language.
On the other hand, I don't consider Wittgenstein 'senseless' (I read this adjective about him a lot) but complex to follow. — javi2541997
To be happy is to see the world of facts as a whole with expanding limits, whereas an unhappy man feel that the same limits, enclosing the same facts, were pressing on him.
another type of tautology emerges, referred to as 'deep.' — javi2541997
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