And again I will suggest that these are issues of convention, which have broad agreement across speakers of English, and so are not, as you suggested, subjective. — Banno
So here you claim that "'London' is what we call a certain bit of land which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called 'London'". and I'll reply "'That table' is what we call a certain bit of the room, which, via custom for certain purposes, has been called 'that table'". — Banno
What do you mean? I feel like you just sidestepped the questions I asked. It still stands: how do we "discover", "figure out", "decipher", etc. which moral propositions are true (under your view)? — Bob Ross
We don't discover them.So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? — Bob Ross
There can be no algorithmic process here, that sets out which moral propositions are true and which are not....how do we evaluate which moral propositions are actually true? — Bob Ross
In our example, you are supposing that "London" refers only by some convention, and so is subjective; but that "that table" has something that makes it objective. — Banno
I don't want moral statements to "escape from being subjective", any more than I want them to escape from being green. I'm saying that the framing of the issue in terms of "objective" and "subjective" is misleading.I don't understand how that description provides an escape from being subjective? Wide-spread acceptance of a custom doesn't make it an objective fact about the state of affairs underlying it, does it? — AmadeusD
I have taken you to be arguing that the distinction between ethical and physical sentences is that ethical sentences are subjective and moral sentences are objective — Banno
I've been following up on that by trying to have you give a clear account of the difference between "subjective" and "objective" — Banno
It isn't one, unless you accept that the object is actually a table. But both the object being a table, and being made of wood are liable to this discussion. I concede the 'table' element is not at all objective unless referring to custom (as noted above wrt London).Ok. What is it that makes "This table is made of wood" an objective sentence? — Banno
Oh, my bad. That should have read "physical", not "moral".Not the case. — AmadeusD
I know. But I'm attempting to have you do so, so as to show that the distinction cannot be made do the work you set for it.My intention was never to give a distinct account of subjective vs objective — AmadeusD
Ok, why is "This is a table" not objective? Seems to me that its being a table is at least as clear as its being made of wood.I concede the 'table' element is not at all objective... — AmadeusD
Ok, why is "This is a table" not objective? Seems to me that its being a table is at least as clear as its being made of wood. — Banno
Ok, so your argument is that facts about an objects constitution are objective, but facts about an object's identity are subjective? And further we "discover" what things are constituted of, but we "perceive" their identity?To my mind, that fact of any object being 'wood' is a fact about the object's constitution, not it's identity. — AmadeusD
Ok, so your argument is that facts about an objects constitution are objective, but facts about an object's identity are subjective? And further we "discover" what things are constituted of, but we "perceive" their identity? — Banno
Ok. Have you been following the discussion here about direction of fit? If not, have a read of
↪Moliere
To "discover" something, it has to already be there to be uncovered. So the direction of fit for making a discovery is that one produces sentences that set out what it is that has been discovered.
But this is not what we do when we talk of ethics. We reverse the process, setting out how the world ought to be, then hopefully implementing our words.
You asked:
So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? — Bob Ross
We don't discover them.
...how do we evaluate which moral propositions are actually true? — Bob Ross
There can be no algorithmic process here, that sets out which moral propositions are true and which are not.
I would say this is true for objects which are customary, rather than symbolic (i.e 'table' is customary, 'tree' is symbolic) — AmadeusD
I wasn't playing devil's advocate. I was just saying that religion is the only legit moral realism. I think what you're saying is that religion doesn't provide for moral realism either. My point was that it does if it's your worldview.
A moral anti-realist says Neanderthals aren't evil. Let's see if we can understand why they became cannibals. Was it climate change? Was it encroachment by those Homo Sapiens? What happened? And this is the grand payoff for moral anti-realism. It gives you space to understand. Moral realism gives you no such space. Understanding is the beginning of mercy and compassion, both of which are anathema to moral realism.
isn't not counting it as a tree a matter of convention? — Banno
but there are non-theistic views (albeit probably still religious) which equally purport such claims and (I would say) with equal (if not more) plausibility. — Bob Ross
I disagree. Both anti-realists and realists can attempt to understand why they became cannibals, and a moral anti-realist can condemn them as evil (if they want). — Bob Ross
Like what?
If you look closely at anyone who strongly believes in moral realism, you'll find a bit of a misanthropist. They're stuck on the realism side because their psyche is full of hatred and condemnation. The compulsion to condemn is so strong that they can't tolerate any notion of relativity. Or so it seems to me. :razz:
One has to come to terms with how different, and how similar, moral statements are from physical statements....how do we know we are actually abiding by the moral facts then? — Bob Ross
yetThe symbolism "tree" or "plant" are customary as English-speakers have agreed to use them to refer, but they refer to an object, without custom, that has necessarily limited distribution. — AmadeusD
There's nothing here that helps us see a difference. One might as well claim:A 'table' is merely a concept of mentation, attached, by custom, to objects with various and ill-defined forms and uses. — AmadeusD
andThe symbolism table is customary as English-speakers have agreed to use it to refer, but they refer to an object, without custom, that has necessarily limited distribution
Is this supposedly the justification...?A 'tree' is merely a concept of mentation, attached, by custom, to objects with various and ill-defined forms and uses
The Dicksonia example shows the murkiness is right there - it's a tree but not a tree. What counts as a tree is an issue of convention.The fact of their constitution (wood, glass, resin(that one's murky) etc..) aren't liable to the same murkiness and so whether we think your object is a tree or plant can be, definitively, shown to be true or false with reference to the actual circumstances of its constitution. — AmadeusD
There's more than one way to use (the word "fact"), sometimes folk use it to refer to any truth, sometimes, and especially sometimes when doing philosophy, only to those truths that have a direction of fit of word-to-world; the speaker is attempting to match there words to the way things are.
Having two differing senses is fine, provided they are used consistently.
What would be an error, and I think we can see this in the OP, would be to mix the two uses and think one had found an argument. To say that "facts" are only sentences about the material world, and that only facts are true, and therefore only sentences about the material world are true. — Banno
The Dicksonia example shows the murkiness is right there - it's a tree but not a tree. What counts as a tree is an issue of convention. — Banno
I've lost you somewhere.Your response seems to boil down to this - some labels are ill-defined. — AmadeusD
It would be a surprise if analytic considerations, or philosophical considerations generally, could tell us which statements about the physical world are true and which false
…
No grand moral programs; just a path.
But this view is compatible with platonism: we intuit the moral facts which are platonic forms. — Bob Ross
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