how dark can it be? Besides, given the overwhelming commonality in human thought that we’re all fundamentally the same between the ears gains credence. So if we all happen to be solipsists, big deal, right? — Mww

Was Kant a solipsists? No. he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. So he was not a solipsist. Some says he was a transcendental idealist, and some says he was a transcendental realist, but not a solipsist. Neither was Hume.

Hell, that guy can say anything he wants about me. If he said that, I’d say, imitating my ol’ buddy Col Jessup….you damn right I am!!!!! Seriously though, I should hope he’d call me a transcendental idealist, insofar as I have not drank the real for merely logical predicate Kool-Aid. — Mww

The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. Because concepts don't exist as the physical objects do. All existing objects have properties and essence. What are the properties and essence of your world as a concept? And one applies concept to the perceived objects for experiencing. How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist?

Regarding solipsistic mentality though, it is foolish of me to deny to any cogent rationality a mind as functional as my own, just as it is foolish of that mind to think to know me as well as I know myself. It never should be a matter of capacity, which is granted, but of accessibility, which is denied. — Mww

Yes, solipsistic mind is anti-scientific, because it lacks objectivity.

The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience?’ — I like sushi

Can we know something without experience? What was his verdict?

As for Noumenon. It is pretty bloody obvious you know how this relates to ideas of existence so why are you asking me to explain? — I like sushi

Did you not claim that Noumenon is important with the concept of 'existing' in your previous messages? I did a few quotes from your message for that.
Noumenon is the objects of the intuition, not perception. So it doesn't exist and is inconceivable.
I was wondering why you were keep bringing up Noumenon in relation to 'existing'. I was expecting your explanations on that point, because it was you who made the claim.

We can talk of what we know not of what we do not.
We can never talk of what we can never know. — I like sushi

But we can guess, infer and imagine.

The point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term ‘existing’. — I like sushi

I am quoting your message again where you made the claim. I have been asking you to clarify and explain what that meant. :nerd: :pray:

1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument

I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.

It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).

Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists"). — Michael

""All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument" is true, just as "all bachelors are unmarried" is true; that is, it would seem to be a tautology. I'm not sure what the word "objectively" is doing there, but it does suggest that there must be some state of affairs that acts as a truth maker. What makes tautologies true if not some fact or facts about language use, and is not language use an external world phenomenon?

To be sure facts about language use are not material objects, but language use itself is dependent on the existence of spacetime just as material objects are. You might object that facts about language use are not necessarily dependent on spacetime, but then facts about material objects are not necessarily dependent on spacetime either.

but then I realised English is better language — Corvus

That is a great mistake. English must be among the worst languages to read philosophy in, especially compared to German with its wonderful accuracy. One obvious example being the absence of kennen X wissen distinction. Not to bring up the essential ser X estar in Iberian Latin languages. English depends almost wholly on the abuse and semantic deturpation (an example right here!) of French vocabulary in order to express more complex concepts.

Were Kant a solipsists? No. — Corvus

By what measure? By whose standard? I’d never be so bold as to call him, or deny to him, anything he wasn’t on record as calling himself, re: a dualist, at least with regards to empirical determinations. He called himself other things in regards to other considerations, which don’t concern us here.

he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. — Corvus

You realize that every word represents a concept, right? The fun part is figuring out that “world”, while an empirical concept arising from understanding alone, as do all concepts, doesn’t conform to the rules by which experience is possible given such empirical concept. Reason now intercedes, and because “world” is a valid concept, but does not lend itself to a synthesis with phenomenal representations, hence can never be an experience, becomes an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea. That “world” is a subject of cosmology has to do only with how Kant uses the term, and he means by it only its relation to the regressive series of empirical conditions, re: that which we do experience as objects in the world, to the unconditioned totality of all possible things in the world, which makes the world itself, unconditioned. For Kant, then, world and Universe are pretty much the same thing, or, rather, reason must treat them as the same kind of transcendental idea.
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The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. — Corvus

Correct, according to the very specific tenets of a very specific metaphysical philosophy. The world doesn’t exist; things which can be phenomena for us necessarily do exist, and those things are conceived as belonging to the manifold of all possibly existing things, the totality of which is conceived as represented by the word “world”.

Beauty doesn’t exist, yet there are beautiful things. Justice doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of that which is just. Morality doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of moral agency. You get the picture.

How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist? — Corvus

I don’t. I apply the concept of “world” as the representation of the totality of possible existences. I, as most regular folk, use the word conventionally as a matter of linguistic convenience. Which is fine, insofar as most regular folk aren’t doing philosophy when we speak conventionally.

Real physical objects, irrespective of how they are represented, when predicated with the pure category “existence”, or one of its derivatives, is a separate and entirely distinct problem, having its relation, not with pure reason, but with understanding and the logic of judgements.

but then I realised English is better language
— Corvus

That is a great mistake. English must be among the worst languages to read philosophy in, especially compared to German with its wonderful accuracy. — Lionino

I meant in terms of popularity ( number of the speakers in the world) and the availability and price of the books on the subject. For accuracy, you are correct.

By what measure? By whose standard? I’d never be so bold as to call him, or deny to him, anything he wasn’t on record as calling himself, re: a dualist, at least with regards to empirical determinations. He called himself other things in regards to other considerations, which don’t concern us here. — Mww

I have not come across any of Kant commentary books describing Kant as a solipsist. But from my own view he was anything but a solipsist. What is the proof Kant's solipsism?

Will be back with the other points :)

For Kant, then, world and Universe are pretty much the same thing — Mww

To me, this is basically the key to understanding your point/Kant's point. As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty.

“world” is a valid concept, but does not lend itself to a synthesis with phenomenal representations, hence can never be an experience, becomes an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea. — Mww

Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is?
But before that, how can the world be a concept, when it renders no meaning, or definition?

The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience?’
— I like sushi
Can we know something without experience? What was his verdict? — Corvus

I think that's a little misleading. A priori truths are those you know by dint of reason alone, 'prior to' or not requiring validation by experience (e.g. mathematical proofs). A posteriori facts are known by experience gained through observation and are not necessarily universally true but contingent on real-world conditions. For example, knowing that "the sun rises in the east" is an a posteriori fact because it is based on observation.

How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is? — Corvus

‘The world’ is just shorthand for ‘everything that is’. Although I think the question ‘does the world exist?’ is a nonsense question.

A priori truths are those you know by dint of reason alone, 'prior to' or not requiring validation by experience (e.g. mathematical proofs). — Wayfarer

But doesn't math still need empirical sensibility to work? The need work together to produce knowledge i.e. synthetic apriori. e.g. 5+7=12, "5+7" itself doesn't contain 12, but comes from sensibility.

‘The world’ is just shorthand for ‘everything that is’. Although I think the question ‘does the world exist?’ is a nonsense question. — Wayfarer

Yes, this seems what Kant had been trying to say in CPR.

Correct, according to the very specific tenets of a very specific metaphysical philosophy. The world doesn’t exist; things which can be phenomena for us necessarily do exist, and those things are conceived as belonging to the manifold of all possibly existing things, the totality of which is conceived as represented by the word “world”.

Beauty doesn’t exist, yet there are beautiful things. Justice doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of that which is just. Morality doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of moral agency. You get the picture. — Mww

Yes, we seem to agree at this point. :cool: :up:

I don’t. I apply the concept of “world” as the representation of the totality of possible existences. I, as most regular folk, use the word conventionally as a matter of linguistic convenience. Which is fine, insofar as most regular folk aren’t doing philosophy when we speak conventionally.

Real physical objects, irrespective of how they are represented, when predicated with the pure category “existence”, or one of its derivatives, is a separate and entirely distinct problem, having its relation, not with pure reason, but with understanding and the logic of judgements. — Mww

Ok, fair enough. Will think on it, and get back to you if there are any points to add or ask. Thanks. :cool: :up:

If you care to say what languages you speak/understand, I may be able to give some suggestions. If you don't want to for privacy reasons or any other reason, that is fine.

‘The world’ is just shorthand for ‘everything that is’. Although I think the question ‘does the world exist?’ is a nonsense question. — Wayfarer

If 'world' and 'everything' are synonymous, and things exist, then why would we say the world does not exist? If you narrowly define existence as pertaining only to things which can be objects of the senses, and since everything cannot be an object of the senses then, in that sense, it might make sense to say the world does not exist; but then all we would be saying is that the world does not exist for us as an object of the senses.

I would say The Intuitions. Although ‘know’ is not exactly the correct way to put it. Otherwise, no. We know of of nothing prior to experience.

I think he more or less found something more interesting to look at. The journey was more important. The question was kind of futile in the same sense that asking ‘Does the world exist?’.

But we can guess, infer and imagine. — Corvus

We can imagine only what we are capable of imagining. Beyond that … well … you get the idea (or rather not!) which is the entire - obvious - point.

Noumenon is the objects of the intuition, not perception. — Corvus

Well, no, not really. That makes it sound like it is comprehended. The ‘thing-in-itself’ is an illusionary term just like talk of ‘square circles’ or ‘upside down trouser memories’. You know this though I believe so baffled why you are asking?

What is the quote? “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”

It relates to what exists in the sense that we can convince ourselves, or fool ourselves, about the knowledge we possess. This in turn frames what we mean by ‘existence’. Kant clearly demarcates between Rational and Empirical.

For myself, I find the entire idea of ‘existing’ fruitless if one expects a conclusive answer. We are limited. We are able due to limits. What is directly in the mind’s eye is up for scrutiny and we are able to ask questions of it. What is not in the mind’s eye (conscious focus) is accepted.

We are ‘roused from our slumber’ by existence when focus is shifted - and it is constantly shifting to some degree or another.

↪AmadeusD I think he more or less found something more interesting to look at. The journey was more important. The question was kind of futile in the same sense that asking ‘Does the world exist?’. — I like sushi

Sorry, perhaps i'm just frazzled but I can't quite grok what this is in response to?

The ‘thing-in-itself’ is an illusionary term just like talk of ‘square circles’ or ‘upside down trouser memories — I like sushi

I understand the term to signify the sheer existence of a thing as distinct from its existence for us. We cannot know what that existence is because anything all we can know is what a thing's existence is for us.

So, what we perceive are things as they exist for us, but we can say that it is reasonable to believe that we are precognitively affected by things in themselves (including what we are in ourselves) such as to give rise to the perceptions of things as appearances. In terms of our scientific understanding, we can investigate and analyze how things affect us such as to give rise to perceptions, but this investigation and analysis is still possible only in terms of how things appear to us, and the sheer existence of things, of ourselves and how it all interacts need not be the same as how it all appears to us.

But doesn't math still need empirical sensibility to work? The need work together to produce knowledge i.e. synthetic apriori. e.g. 5+7=12, "5+7" itself doesn't contain 12, but comes from sensibility. — Corvus

How so? ‘Sensible’ objects are those perceived by sense. Numbers are not perceived by sense.

I understand the term to signify the sheer existence of a thing as distinct from its existence for us. — Janus

Which is necessarily nothing to us. Hence it is non-existent.

We talking about something existing based on human experience because, frankly, that is all we have and therefore all there ever is for us. It is a subtle obviousness easily missed.

It is not that we do not know what we cannot know - which is contrary! We cannot even refer to what we cannot know in any meaningful way.

What is the proof Kant's solipsism? — Corvus

Of course there isn’t one. What is irrefutable, is the fact Kant writes most importantly on the critique of reason in its various forms, all of which belong to a subjective entity of some specified kind. If your entire raison d’etre, as demonstrated by your philosophical catalog, concerns the individual rational subject and his abilities, then you are writing with respect to each and every instance of that subject, for and by itself, which in turn, approaches the concept of solipsism. The clues are in the catalog..…the metaphysics of morals, the metaphysics of ethics, the metaphysics of natural science.

Solipsism has a varied history, so…best be careful with the concept generally employed.
————

…..an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea.
— Mww
Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? — Corvus

More than that. It is that there is no world, as such, of which to know. It isn’t that you don’t know the world because you’ve never perceived it, but you don’t know the world because it isn’t ever going to be a perception. Pretty simple, innit? If it is impossible to know each and every single thing a world might contain, how is it possible to know the world as it is? Hence, the unconditioned reason seeks but never finds.
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How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is? — Corvus

The fundamental example of the dreaded transcendental illusion: saying something about something, when the warrant you’re using to justify the claim, doesn’t. The reconciliation of the illusion, is don’t say a thing exists when it is impossible to know what it is. This is the converse of the logical necessity, that all that can be known a posteriori, is that which exists.

The critique of reason is not a denial of its abilities, as demonstrated by: “…I can think whatever I please….”, but rather, it is an exposition on its methodological limits, re: “….provided only that I do not contradict myself…”.
————-

As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty. — AmadeusD

Part of the whole critical deal is to expose the errors in doing just that, bearing in mind none of this works under the tenets of a different theory.

Part of the whole critical deal is to expose the errors in doing just that, — Mww

Do you mean by "just that" the act of trying to use terms in their incompatible context? Just for clarity - Can't be sure if you're decrying that, or my delineation between contexts lol

Which is necessarily nothing to us. Hence it is non-existent.

We talking about something existing based on human experience because, frankly, that is all we have and therefore all there ever is for us. It is a subtle obviousness easily missed.

It is not that we do not know what we cannot know - which is contrary! We cannot even refer to what we cannot know in any meaningful way. — I like sushi

It doesn't follow that because something is "nothing to us" that it is non-existent. In any case the in itself is not nothing to us except sensorially; we do generally tend to think that things have their own existences independently of us. The fact that we (obviously) cannot determine the total or absolute nature of that existence does not entail that it is "nothing".

You say we cannot refer to such things in a meaningful way, but that is just your opinion; it seems obvious to me that we can refer to such things apophatically as indeterminate existences or indeterminate aspects of things the aspects of the natures of which we can determine only via being sensorially affected by them.

Yeah, sorry. A judgement is the synthesis of conceptions. A cognition is the synthesis of judgements. The use of one judgement authorizing only this cognition cannot be used to justifying any cognition not related to it. What we’re dealing with here, then becomes…a judgement used to authorize a cognition regarding sensible objects, cannot be used to authorize cognitions on non-sensible objects, which are concepts. Or, ideas.

Gotcha. Thank you.

It doesn't follow that because something is "nothing to us" that it is non-existent. In any case the in itself is not nothing to us except sensorially; we do generally tend to think that things have their own existences independently of us. The fact that we (obviously) cannot determine the total or absolute nature of that existence does not entail that it is "nothing".

You say we cannot refer to such things in a meaningful way, but that is just your opinion; it seems obvious to me that we can refer to such things apophatically as indeterminate existences or indeterminate aspects of things the aspects of the natures of which we can determine only via being sensorially affected by them. — Janus

No no no. You misunderstand, I promise!

We know the world via space and time (a roughshod paraphrasing of Kantian Intuitions). We can only speculate on the canvas of these intuitions. ‘Beyond’ is meaningless/nought.

You cannot imagine something you cannot imagine - by definition. This follows the same principles. The ‘existence of’ some otherly, wholly incomprehensible item is the very same manner of word play. Just to be clear this is not as stating something currently beyond our ken, that may always remain beyond our ken BUT it a possibility of perception directly or indirect via instrumentation (microscopes, telescopes, etc.,.).