Was Kant a solipsists? No. he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. So he was not a solipsist. Some says he was a transcendental idealist, and some says he was a transcendental realist, but not a solipsist. Neither was Hume.how dark can it be? Besides, given the overwhelming commonality in human thought that we’re all fundamentally the same between the ears gains credence. So if we all happen to be solipsists, big deal, right? — Mww
The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. Because concepts don't exist as the physical objects do. All existing objects have properties and essence. What are the properties and essence of your world as a concept? And one applies concept to the perceived objects for experiencing. How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist?Hell, that guy can say anything he wants about me. If he said that, I’d say, imitating my ol’ buddy Col Jessup….you damn right I am!!!!! Seriously though, I should hope he’d call me a transcendental idealist, insofar as I have not drank the real for merely logical predicate Kool-Aid. — Mww
Yes, solipsistic mind is anti-scientific, because it lacks objectivity.Regarding solipsistic mentality though, it is foolish of me to deny to any cogent rationality a mind as functional as my own, just as it is foolish of that mind to think to know me as well as I know myself. It never should be a matter of capacity, which is granted, but of accessibility, which is denied. — Mww
Can we know something without experience? What was his verdict?The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience?’ — I like sushi
Did you not claim that Noumenon is important with the concept of 'existing' in your previous messages? I did a few quotes from your message for that.As for Noumenon. It is pretty bloody obvious you know how this relates to ideas of existence so why are you asking me to explain? — I like sushi
But we can guess, infer and imagine.We can talk of what we know not of what we do not.
We can never talk of what we can never know. — I like sushi
I am quoting your message again where you made the claim. I have been asking you to clarify and explain what that meant. :nerd: :pray:The point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term ‘existing’. — I like sushi
1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument
I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.
It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).
Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists"). — Michael
but then I realised English is better language — Corvus
Were Kant a solipsists? No. — Corvus
he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. — Corvus
The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. — Corvus
How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist? — Corvus
but then I realised English is better language
— Corvus
That is a great mistake. English must be among the worst languages to read philosophy in, especially compared to German with its wonderful accuracy. — Lionino
I have not come across any of Kant commentary books describing Kant as a solipsist. But from my own view he was anything but a solipsist. What is the proof Kant's solipsism?By what measure? By whose standard? I’d never be so bold as to call him, or deny to him, anything he wasn’t on record as calling himself, re: a dualist, at least with regards to empirical determinations. He called himself other things in regards to other considerations, which don’t concern us here. — Mww
Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is?“world” is a valid concept, but does not lend itself to a synthesis with phenomenal representations, hence can never be an experience, becomes an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea. — Mww
The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience?’
— I like sushi
Can we know something without experience? What was his verdict? — Corvus
But doesn't math still need empirical sensibility to work? The need work together to produce knowledge i.e. synthetic apriori. e.g. 5+7=12, "5+7" itself doesn't contain 12, but comes from sensibility.A priori truths are those you know by dint of reason alone, 'prior to' or not requiring validation by experience (e.g. mathematical proofs). — Wayfarer
Yes, we seem to agree at this point. :cool: :up:Correct, according to the very specific tenets of a very specific metaphysical philosophy. The world doesn’t exist; things which can be phenomena for us necessarily do exist, and those things are conceived as belonging to the manifold of all possibly existing things, the totality of which is conceived as represented by the word “world”.
Beauty doesn’t exist, yet there are beautiful things. Justice doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of that which is just. Morality doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of moral agency. You get the picture. — Mww
Ok, fair enough. Will think on it, and get back to you if there are any points to add or ask. Thanks. :cool: :up:I don’t. I apply the concept of “world” as the representation of the totality of possible existences. I, as most regular folk, use the word conventionally as a matter of linguistic convenience. Which is fine, insofar as most regular folk aren’t doing philosophy when we speak conventionally.
Real physical objects, irrespective of how they are represented, when predicated with the pure category “existence”, or one of its derivatives, is a separate and entirely distinct problem, having its relation, not with pure reason, but with understanding and the logic of judgements. — Mww
‘The world’ is just shorthand for ‘everything that is’. Although I think the question ‘does the world exist?’ is a nonsense question. — Wayfarer
But we can guess, infer and imagine. — Corvus
Noumenon is the objects of the intuition, not perception. — Corvus
↪AmadeusD I think he more or less found something more interesting to look at. The journey was more important. The question was kind of futile in the same sense that asking ‘Does the world exist?’. — I like sushi
The ‘thing-in-itself’ is an illusionary term just like talk of ‘square circles’ or ‘upside down trouser memories — I like sushi
But doesn't math still need empirical sensibility to work? The need work together to produce knowledge i.e. synthetic apriori. e.g. 5+7=12, "5+7" itself doesn't contain 12, but comes from sensibility. — Corvus
I understand the term to signify the sheer existence of a thing as distinct from its existence for us. — Janus
What is the proof Kant's solipsism? — Corvus
…..an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea.
— Mww
Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? — Corvus
How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is? — Corvus
As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty. — AmadeusD
Which is necessarily nothing to us. Hence it is non-existent.
We talking about something existing based on human experience because, frankly, that is all we have and therefore all there ever is for us. It is a subtle obviousness easily missed.
It is not that we do not know what we cannot know - which is contrary! We cannot even refer to what we cannot know in any meaningful way. — I like sushi
It doesn't follow that because something is "nothing to us" that it is non-existent. In any case the in itself is not nothing to us except sensorially; we do generally tend to think that things have their own existences independently of us. The fact that we (obviously) cannot determine the total or absolute nature of that existence does not entail that it is "nothing".
You say we cannot refer to such things in a meaningful way, but that is just your opinion; it seems obvious to me that we can refer to such things apophatically as indeterminate existences or indeterminate aspects of things the aspects of the natures of which we can determine only via being sensorially affected by them. — Janus
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