OBS: Even though it may be that I feel as though I am the same person as I were yesterday, that might simply be an illusion created by the neurological conditions of the body, which are the memories I/we hold. — Lionino
e are constantly changing, all the cells that constitute our bodies replaced every seven or so years according to some accounts. On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes? — Janus
On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes? — Janus
I’m certainly not the same entity I was 20, 30, 50 years ago. I would need a substantive reason to accept some permanent substance/consciousness that persists across the ages, above and beyond personal identity. — Tom Storm
what reason do I have to believe in the maintenance of the self as opposed to its constant creation and subsequent destruction and replacement by another self?". — Lionino
I don't think the same criteria for identity that apply to self-organizing systems such as biological organisms are relevant in the case of ships. — Janus
A relevant strip from Existential Comics. — wonderer1
If all the cells in our bodies, in organisms generally, contain a unique DNA sequence that defines them then that is different than the 'ship of Theseus' — Janus
I had in mind self-regulation, homeostasis and metabolism, so my point holds — Janus
Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences. — Janus
And how is metabolism a metaphysically important process while the wooden planks shifting around is not? What makes it special from all the other processes in nature? — Lionino
Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences.
— Janus
Right, so then DNA is not the deciding factor then. — Lionino
In the third metaphysical meditation of Descartes — Lionino
All that is here required, therefore, is that I interrogate myself to discover whether I possess any power by means of which I can bring it about that I, who now am, shall exist a moment afterward: for, since I am merely a thinking thing (or since, at least, the precise question, in the meantime, is only of that part of myself), if such a power resided in me, I should, without doubt, be conscious of it; but I am conscious of no such power, and thereby I manifestly know that I am dependent upon some being different from myself
And though I were to suppose that I always was as I now am, I should not, on this ground, escape the force of these reasonings, since it would not follow, even on this supposition, that no author of my existence needed to be sought after. For the whole time of my life may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of which is in no way dependent on any other; and, accordingly, because I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me anew as it were, that is, conserve me. In truth, it is perfectly clear and evident to all who will attentively consider the nature of duration, that the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to create it, supposing it were not yet in existence; so that it is manifestly a dictate of the natural light that conservation and creation differ merely in respect of our mode of thinking and not in reality. All that is here required, therefore, is that I interrogate myself to discover whether I possess any power by means of which I can bring it about that I, who now am, shall exist a moment afterward: for, since I am merely a thinking thing (or since, at least, the precise question, in the meantime, is only of that part of myself), if such a power resided in me, I should, without doubt, be conscious of it; but I am conscious of no such power, and thereby I manifestly know that I am dependent upon some being different from myself.
Even though it may be that I feel as though I am the same person as I were yesterday, that might simply be an illusion created by the neurological conditions of the body, which are the memories I/we hold. — Lionino
This is also one of the primary sources of Descartes' ontological argument, is it not? That because he is able to conceive of such a perfect being as God, then it is inconceivable that this God could not exist, as non-existence would be an imperfection. — Wayfarer
That there is or isn't an agent who persists through time, such that he or she sets in motion acts that they will then reap the consequences of at some time in the future. The sense in which this agent is or is not the same from one moment to the next, is the point at issue. — Wayfarer
I feel that the argument that the agent is illusory must fail at the first step, as illusions are suffered by conscious agents, who mistake one thing for another. — Wayfarer
Like synapse between neurons. — JuanZu
What I am putting in question is whether the agent at time t is the same as the agent that perfectly proceeds that one temporally and spatially in time t+1. — Lionino
That would be a part of the whole as it is physica — Lionino
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