OBS: Even though it may be that I feel as though I am the same person as I were yesterday, that might simply be an illusion created by the neurological conditions of the body, which are the memories I/we hold. — Lionino

We are constantly changing, all the cells that constitute our bodies replaced every seven or so years according to some accounts. On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes?

e are constantly changing, all the cells that constitute our bodies replaced every seven or so years according to some accounts. On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes? — Janus

I was making this point to my wife yesterday. Persistence overnight might be fairly easy to deal with but me now is my e when I was nine via persistence of self? Seems utterly absurd. But I am clearly the same person so wtf haha

:ok:

My intuition is the we are a brief flash of light in the infinite darkness. I’m certainly not the same entity I was 20, 30, 50 years ago. I would need a substantive reason to accept some permanent substance/consciousness that persists across the ages, above and beyond personal identity. And even if it does, my next question would be how does it matter in terms of how we live? How do we get from this to reincarnation or consequences for choices? Or some other cosmology and metaphysics which seeks to exploit this murky model?

And even if it does, my next question would be how does it matter in terms of how we live? — Tom Storm

Parfit? Is that you? :nerd:

Call me Derek.

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what reason do I have to believe in the maintenance of the self as opposed to its constant creation and subsequent destruction and replacement by another self?". — Lionino

I guess my response is another question- What reason should we care about that question? What experiences are you having where this is important?

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That is a philosophical response. Pragamatism. Read more and try to think before you get lost in your own baggage.

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Because of that, I summon Theseus' ship. I ask you: is it the same ship? — Lionino

I don't think the same criteria for identity that apply to self-organizing systems such as biological organisms are relevant in the case of ships.

A relevant strip from Existential Comics.

Nice!

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If all the cells in our bodies, in organisms generally, contain a unique DNA sequence that defines them then that is different than the 'ship of Theseus'. It is also a matter of metabolism. Look up 'self-organization' and you will see why it does not apply to ships or to anything other than organisms..

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I had in mind self-regulation, homeostasis and metabolism, so my point holds. Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences.

You're right about DNA; it was careless of me to say "all cells...", although I find it implausible that all the DNA in his body was destroyed: do you have a reference for this claim?

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And how is metabolism a metaphysically important process while the wooden planks shifting around is not? What makes it special from all the other processes in nature? — Lionino

Metabolism and homeostasis are internally regulated. Another point is that the ship of Theseus could be considered to be the same ship or a different ship depending on your perspective, on what criteria you accept. Think about two examples of the same model of motor vehicle; are they the same or not?

Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences.
— Janus

Right, so then DNA is not the deciding factor then. — Lionino

Identical twins do not have the same DNA according to some sources. Do a search if you don't believe me. In any case I didn't claim that DNA is the only criterion for determining identity. Throughout your life you have a unique set of experiences. Even if identical twins were exactly the same at birth, divergence from that sameness begins immediately simply on account of them inhabiting different regions of space and experiencing different things through time.

In the third metaphysical meditation of Descartes — Lionino

Is this (.pdf) the one you're referring to? In particular, this passage:

All that is here required, therefore, is that I interrogate myself to discover whether I possess any power by means of which I can bring it about that I, who now am, shall exist a moment afterward: for, since I am merely a thinking thing (or since, at least, the precise question, in the meantime, is only of that part of myself), if such a power resided in me, I should, without doubt, be conscious of it; but I am conscious of no such power, and thereby I manifestly know that I am dependent upon some being different from myself

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We are not only parts, we are relationships between parts. The parts that make up us are not simply aggregated, but also have functions around a directing teleology.

Probably what we call soul (or that "I" that endures through all my representations) is nothing more than a relationship that endures through constituent parts that possess functions.

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This is also one of the primary sources of Descartes' ontological argument, is it not? That because he is able to conceive of such a perfect being as God, then it is inconceivable that this God could not exist, as non-existence would be an imperfection. (It was just about this argument that Kant denied that existence was a predicate.)

Even though it may be that I feel as though I am the same person as I were yesterday, that might simply be an illusion created by the neurological conditions of the body, which are the memories I/we hold. — Lionino

I'd treat that question without reference to Descartes, as it is really being dealt with in a way that is quite alien to Descartes' line of argument, which is predicated on the indubitable reality of God and of the soul as 'res cogitans' and as having been created by God. (That said, again, it is just the kind of metaphysical argument that Kant objects to, on the basis of the absence of warrant for such claims, as distinct from religious sentiment.)

But leaving Descartes aside, the problem you're raising is one of agency, isn't it? That there is or isn't an agent who persists through time, such that he or she sets in motion acts that they will then reap the consequences of at some time in the future. The sense in which this agent is or is not the same from one moment to the next, is the point at issue.

This conundrum is also associated with the Ship of Theseus dilemma, which concerns an imaginary ship whose parts are replaced so often as to result in a wholly new vessel, and whether this is the same or a different ship at that point.

I feel that the argument that the agent is illusory must fail at the first step, as illusions are suffered by conscious agents, who mistake one thing for another.

What relationships? — Lionino

Like synapse between neurons.

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What I am putting in question is whether the agent at time t is the same as the agent that perfectly proceeds that one temporally and spatially in time t+1. — Lionino

Does it have to be, to qualify as 'an agent'? Something can change continually and still maintain an identity, can't it? In fact, isn't that what every compound being is doing?

If Buddhists are asked whether the person who is born as a consequence of past karma is the same as the person in the previous existence that generated said karma, the answer you'll often get is, not the same person, but also not different. Identity is like that.

That would be a part of the whole as it is physica — Lionino

If one system belongs to another it does not imply equality between the identities of each system. For example, a living system may seek survival and reproduction; But, although the living system belongs to the solar system, we cannot say that the solar system seeks to reproduce and survive.