Quote 1. If it is a fact that kicking a puppy hurts/harms the puppy, then that's just a fact of hte matter. So, that's not a further moral "fact" - it's an empirical fact subsequent to the act of kicking (which others are making a moral judgment on, rather than I). I ascribed no value to the harm/hurt (in fact, i think that might be what sets me on the anti-realist bent.. I do not see that it matters). Had I said that the harm is the wrong-maker, I could agree - but again, I don't see how the puppy being hurt imparts any truth to the initial statement.
Quote 2. Is him ascribing something to me which I don't think or feel but that may be explained by the above - I did not, and do not, believe the harm the puppy experiences is a fact that gives moral statements about kicking a puppy value or truth (morally speaking). It is just a fact (or, an effect).
Quote 3. Similar to above. I've never tried to prove that the fact of the puppy's harm would make it wrong or right. Though, it appears to me that's a result of my larger-scale misunderstanding being read as if i know what im talking about LOL. The only reason I was bringing up that underlying fact was because I was under the impression that i could apply the concept (that the statement is not brute) to the framework being used to allow 'One ought not kick puppies' being considered somehow 'true'. I don't think either that statement of itself, or the resulting harm/hurt impart 'truth' beyond it being empirically true that a puppy is hurt by being kicked. — AmadeusD
3. It would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so (subjectivism) — Michael
This feels like a narrow account of subjectivism that few would endorse.
In my view, people ultimately make moral judgements and decisions according to their own values and moral sense. These values and this sensibility are in turn informed by enculturation and group-think, but also by biologically based moral instincts (innate senses of fairness and justice, empathy), as well as individual experiences and preferences. This is "subjectivism" as none of these are objective features of the world (right?), but seems poorly captured by "if everyone were to say so". — hypericin
This feels like a narrow account of subjectivism that few would endorse. — hypericin
But the other difficulty is that I don't think anyone in this thread has taken morality to be a form of consensus... — Leontiskos
Imagine a tribe of smallish monkeys in a jungle environment; they have various calls of social identification, and perhaps some to do with dominance and other stuff, but in particular, they have two alarm calls, one warning of ground predators, and one warning of sky predators. One day, one rather low status monkey, who aways has to wait for the others to eat and often misses out on the best food, spots some especially tasty food on the ground, and gives the ground alarm call. The tribe all rush to climb up high, and the liar gets first dibs for once on the treat. This behaviour has been observed, but I won't trouble you myself with references.
Here, one can clearly see that dishonesty is parasitic on honesty. Overall there is a huge social advantage in a warning system, but it is crucially dependent on honesty, and is severely compromised by individual dishonesty. Hence the social mores, that become morality. Society runs on trust, and therefore needs to deter and prevent dishonesty. And this cannot be reversed because the dependence is one way, linguistically. If dishonesty were ever to prevail and be valorised, language would become non-functional. The alarm call would come to mean both 'predator on the ground', and 'tasty food on the ground'. that is, it would lose its effective warning function and its function as a lie. — unenlightened
Like 'subjective truth', 'moral subjectivism' is chimerical. — Leontiskos
Great. You think it's "chimerical". Wow. Everyone take note, Leontiskos thinks moral subjectivism is chimerical.
Like so many of your "devastating critiques" or whatever you like to call them, this is empty of content. — hypericin
My point was that, "The diamond is worth $1,000," is not made true by everyone saying so. — Leontiskos
Anti-naturalists like Michael, @Banno, @Leontiskos have to demonstrate why accounts like this fail so utterly that, ontological parsimony be damned, it is preferable to introduce a whole new category of reality. — hypericin
Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasant” or “x is pleasure.” If this claim were true, he argued, the judgement “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. Alternatively, if this naturalist claim were true, “x is pleasant but x is not good” would be self-contradictory. Once it was established that x is pleasant, the question whether it is good would then be closed, or not worth considering, whereas, he argued, it remains open.
If you don't think the worth of a diamond is a good example then consider the rules of chess. We can change them by collective decision. Can we change moral rules by collective decision? — Michael
I don't think we can change moral rules by collective decision. I don't know if anyone believes that...? I am not following you here. — Leontiskos
Moral subjectivists might. They might argue that moral rules are the collectively decided rules of social behaviour. — Michael
If we all agree that X is morally wrong, does that agreement make X morally wrong? — Leontiskos
This to me is a good example of an anti-realist account. Morality is a conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior. If moral claims are to be considered "true", they are only true in terms of this system. — hypericin
"Such-and-such is socially advantageous behaviour" and "such-and-such is morally wrong" seem to mean different things. — Michael
The summary of these facts is that one ought to be honest, because otherwise communication ceases, language is useless, and society collapses. This a physical reality. — unenlightened
You conclude that their moral conventions are a socially advantageous strategy designed to foster cooperation. This account in no way requires that the apes themselves take this view. — hypericin
If we change the rules of chess then we are playing a different game. Calling it "chess" is misleading. — Leontiskos
If we speak about consensus, then we are not speaking about morality. — Leontiskos
You said that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. How is this to be interpreted as anything other than you ascribing moral value to hurting the puppy? — Michael
By analogy, consider if someone were to say that one ought not kick the puppy because the puppy has brown fur. It is certainly true that the puppy has brown fur, but this has nothing to do with whether or not one ought not kick the puppy, and so the use of the term "because" here is fallacious. — Michael
If you only meant to say that one ought not kick the puppy and kicking the puppy would hurt the puppy then I wouldn't object. But of course this doesn't even address the issue of whether or not moral facts are brute facts, so it certainly doesn't rebut the claim that there are brute moral facts. — Michael
There can be non-moral obligations. I ought to brush my teeth otherwise they will fall out, but it's not immoral to not brush my teeth. — Michael
Well this isn't true. The (official) rules of chess last changed in 2014 (I think) to replace the fifty-move rule with a seventy-five move rule. — Michael
Some moral subjectivists disagree. They argue that that is exactly what morality is. — Michael
The reality is that communication happens, and is advantageous, and can only happen in a largely truth-telling community. The summary of these facts is that one ought to be honest, because otherwise communication ceases, language is useless, and society collapses. This a physical reality. — unenlightened
Only if the rules of a game do not constitute the game would this argument succeed. That seems highly implausible. — Leontiskos
If morality is nothing more than consensus, then the origins of the consensus (the votes) are non-moral (or pre-moral). I don't have a problem with the idea that consensus carries moral weight, but I believe the circularity argument proves that morality cannot be simply reduced to consensus. If a consensus of 10 votes carries moral weight, then so does a single vote. The moral weight can't just materialize out of nowhere upon the reaching of a consensus. — Leontiskos
Are you saying that the rules didn't change? Because they did. — Michael
I don't understand what's circular about it? — Michael
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