What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable." — Michael
I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality. — Michael
This is where I think things get tricky. I think moral language comes in two varieties:
1. X is wrong
2. One ought not X
Do these mean the same thing? If not, does the one entail the other? — Michael
I don't think that this is necessarily the case. There is a normative component to the rules of chess and to laws even though these are manufactured. I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality. — Michael
But morality is not conceived of as a voluntary activity, whereas chess is. — Leontiskos
Again, it's not clear to me what it is you are suggesting, both in that post and in your recent line of thought. — Banno
But rather than chess, perhaps laws a good example. We ought to obey the law, and not just for practical reasons. — Michael
I don't have a problem with the idea that consensus carries moral weight, but I believe the circularity argument proves that morality cannot be simply reduced to consensus. — Leontiskos
And yet sometimes we ought not obey the law. It's never simple. — Banno
Yes, sometimes some other rule demands us to break the law. And perhaps this other rule is yet another manufactured rule. I can understand the moral subjectivist taking issue with the claim that there are rules that are simply "built in" to the world or whatever it is (robust) moral realists believe. — Michael
Kant introduces the idea of "legislating for oneself," which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is over-whelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator. — Elizabeth Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 2
No one here is being as escalating or trollish as you are. — Leontiskos
↪hypericin I find myself constantly lowering my expectation of what you understand of philosophy. — Banno
We can never manufacture binding rules for ourselves. Self-legislation does not bind — Leontiskos
Well, I know lawmakers like to think themselves above the law, but they're not. — Michael
Whether or not these are the rules that we refer to when we talk about morality is the very issue that (robust) moral realists and moral subjectivists disagree on. — Michael
You're not just saying, "Morality is just the laws we pass;" you are saying, "Morality is the laws we pass and we ought to obey those laws." — Leontiskos
This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. — Banno
I'll join Philippa Foot in changing my mind every couple of years. — Banno
Then you would go along with the modus tollens reading...?
(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2b) It is not the case that virtue ethics is the way to develop moral philosophy
(3b) Therefore, it is not the case that religiously based ethics is false. — Banno
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