Maybe our understanding of necessity differs? To my mind if you can switch a part of the code and have the same results then there is not a necessary relationship between code and an organism's identity. Since you can do that -- not in science fiction but in science -- it just doesn't strike me as something I'd call necessary for personal identity. That is I can see it plausible that if I had a different code I could still be the same person in a counter-factual scenario because I don't think identity is necessitated by code. It would depend upon which part of the code was switched -- I could also have a genetic disease due to this, for instance, and I'd say I'm a different person then. But if one base got switched out in an intron then that is a scenario that seems plausible to me to possibly make no difference in the course of my life, and in relation to the topic, for my personal identity. — Moliere

Sure there are possible different genetic codes that result in the same phenotype, but the scenario under consideration here is not one of minimal DNA substitution, but of relatively wide spread differences in DNA resulting from random selection of gametes.

Consider the uniqueness of the fingerprints of siblings.

Regarding the uniqueness of brains:

With our study we were able to confirm that the structure of people's brains is very individual," says Lutz Jäncke on the findings.

"The combination of genetic and non-genetic influences clearly affects not only the functioning of the brain, but also its anatomy.

Did y'all know, counterfactuals are all false? they have the form, If [false stipulation] then [false plausible consequence].

If [wishes were horses] then [beggars would ride].

But wishes cannot be horses {because they do not have the right DNA???}. and therefore, beggars go on foot unless they can steal a horse, and then they become horse thieves, not beggars.

It is in fact impossible for anyone to have been born other than how and when they were born simply because one is only born once. But this need not prevent me from declaring that 'if I were twenty years younger, I'd give y'all a good kicking to knock some sense into you.' because such counterfactuals are not claims of fact but stipulations of an imaginary scenario, which can be whatever the fuck I want to fantasise, thank you very much.
Unsurprisingly, I am not in fact twenty years younger than I am, so you don't have to worry about covering your arses.

Some stipulated counterfactuals are more plausible than others, as here:

So when we try to say that some things that happen could have been prevented; that some drownings, for example, would not have occurred had their victims learned to swim, we seem to be in a queer logical fix. We can say that a particular person would not have .drowned had he been able to swim. But we cannot quite say that his lamented drowning would have been averted by swimming- lessons. For had he taken those lessons, he would not have drowned, and then we would not have had for a topic of discussion just that lamented drowning of which we want to say that it would have been prevented. We are left bereft of any 'it' at all. — Ryle

(my bold)

At this level of plausibility, such a counterfactual can function as part of an argument for - swimming lessons in schools, for example. And speaking of schools it a common part of history lessons to "Imagine you were a Roman citizen of the 1st century AD, and describe how you would have lived on a typical day" and similar counterfactual tasks. Counterfactuals can be instructive and interesting in spite of all being false.

At this level of plausibility, such a counterfactual can function as part of an argument for - swimming lessons in schools, for example. And speaking of schools it a common part of history lessons to "Imagine you were a Roman citizen of the 1st century AD, and describe how you would have lived on a typical day" and similar counterfactual tasks. Counterfactuals can be instructive and interesting in spite of all being false. — unenlightened

Yeah I never made a claim that it's not useful as an imaginative exercise. However there is a type of thinking that seems to naively think that you could have been different than who you are. It's sort of a naive notion that one can keep one's personhood transposed in various scenarios. There is only a very precise avenue for "you" to be "you". And that quote there is illustrative of the fact that if someone had an altered situation, they wouldn't even be the person who is doing the counterfactual thinking.

It actually also demonstrates the preciseness for which the causal origination of your own personhood had to happen. Everything basically had to causally lead up to that point, otherwise, no you look back upon one's life in the first place.

It brings up another point too, that there may be some things that can be counterfactual without completely destroying one's identity. However, up to the point of one's own conception, that certainly cannot be the case.

If I, in a counter-factual, was born with blonde hair but basically lived the same life as I've lived up until now then I'd say that my personal identity wasn't different -- the unique description of my life has a different fact in the counter-factual but I still lived my life basically as I do, except I was born with blonde hair so I'd say my personal identity is the same.

That is there has to be some difference in the counter-factual that makes sense as having an effect upon our personal identity, not just any difference at all. And DNA is certainly closer to the causes we'd consider in thinking about personal identity than, say, what color the nurses' eyes were who helped deliver me (though I think that this is just as much a fact of my history as the unique code). But claims to necessity are a bit hard for me to accept, at least.

Similarly our fingerprints may be unique to us, but if I was born with a different unique finger-print pattern I don't think my personal identity has shifted. The particulars of the finger-print pattern have not been a significant source of identity, even if they are a unique pattern inscribed upon my palm. And this is exactly the sort of thing that comes to mind with DNA for myself: the specific and unique pattern clearly can have effects, but I'm not so certain that those effects are related to personal identity in a necessary relationship.

But you've already admitted as much so my best guess at your claim now is that there is a unique description of who we are, and any change in that description in a counter-factual would yield a different unique description, and that unique description is one's personal identity. Is that right? Also, do you believe we're sharing the same notion of necessity, or the same notion of personal identity, or is there something else that I'm missing?

These are good observations. I think you're right to bring up how we think about counter-factuals. They are kind of funny in that they can seem real-ish in that we are judging them on the basis of what's plausible, and so they rely upon our notions about reality in some sense but then they are actually all false.

So part of the confusion may not even be in what's being said, but rather in our notions of what is plausible or how we should think about these false sentences -- when they are more or less relevant.

I don't have any clear idea of your theory of mind, and I don't expect the points I raise to get much traction in the minds of people unable to seriously consider physicalism. However, my point is that individual variation, that might be seen as being on the order of the variation in fingerprints, can have profound effects in the case of the 'wiring' of our brains. Furthermore the idiosyncracies to brain wiring play a huge role in who we are.

For example, consider these two images, where the difference might appear as superficial as that between fingerprints:



I speak from experience in saying that sort of difference has a profound effect on who one is. Of course I understand most people can get away with being blissfully ignorant of how their own idiosyncratic neural wiring results in them being who they are, but such naivete is not an option for me. And I don't have to make it easy for others to remain naive. :wink:

Edit: Image Source - https://autismsciencefoundation.wordpress.com/2015/08/30/minicolumns-autism-and-age-what-it-means-for-people-with-autism/

I think about my theory of mind from time to time, but I cannot say I have a firm position staked out. I think it's one of those questions that's incredibly difficult to answer. But hopefully I can at least take physicalism seriously enough that we can figure out some thoughts together -- and also thanks for pointing out that a physicalist theory of mind may be what's at stake. I'm a bit confused, now, as to what we're disagreeing upon because I thought I had said some fairly sensible things, but it seems not to be clicking.

There are physical differences which can account for differences in personal identity. I wouldn't go so far as to say that these are irrelevant. My question has more to do with when or what is relevant, and since there is a question of when or what I'd instinctively rule out a necessary relationship between the two. But here what you show I'd agree is a significant physical pattern that accounts for difference in personal identity. Sometimes the physical facts matter, and they matter significantly.

But if they only sometimes matter then I wonder what it is we mean by necessity.

And I don't have to make it easy for others to remain naive. :wink: — wonderer1

:D

I wouldn't have it any other way. Why else come to a philosophy forum unless you want to be disabused of your* ignorance?

*(EDIT: for clarity, "your" meaning mine or anyone's -- not *you*. Should have thought that through)

But claims to necessity are a bit hard for me to accept, at least. — Moliere

I'm not sure why. It is the blueprint for which our bodies function. No one is doubting that it combines with contingent circumstances, but as I stated, circumstances aren't combining on a tabula rasa, but a blueprint from which the genetic combination is comprised of.

Similarly our fingerprints may be unique to us, but if I was born with a different unique finger-print pattern I don't think my personal identity has shifted. The particulars of the finger-print pattern have not been a significant source of identity, even if they are a unique pattern inscribed upon my palm. And this is exactly the sort of thing that comes to mind with DNA for myself: the specific and unique pattern clearly can have effects, but I'm not so certain that those effects are related to personal identity in a necessary relationship. — Moliere

No, fingerprints are not part of your identity, but DNA is. Just because both are physical, doesn't mean they are both either valid or not valid. DNA is more foundational to your uniqueness as it holds various blueprints for your physical and psychological makeup. Again, you are not a complete blank slate.

But it goes beyond that, because there is a causal aspect to it in terms of individuality. It's not just "identity" but it's also "uniqueness". I am going to differentiate that in the idea that each set of gametes hold variations that are unique to it, that when combined are not like other, even similar cells. But it goes beyond that even. As, the timing of when the gametes are meeting actually make a huge difference. One second earlier or later, and it was no longer you, but someone else. So it is almost an instance in time, combined with the unique set of gametes that is part of the uniqueness, along with its role as blueprint for the functions of your physical development and ongoing regulation.

But, I also explained that it's not the end of the story in regards to "identity", because yes, experience and contingency plays a role in how your personality, memories, relationships, beliefs, and sense of self is shaped.

That is, sometimes you can switch out an A for a T or a G and have nothing happen other than this replacement, but the organism will continue to function even though the code is slightly different. — Moliere

Does this change the fact that each organism has a unique genotype?

No I don't think so, though that might depend upon how we understand "genotype"

Or, now that I think of it -- organism. Or "unique"!

The usages of all of those are clear enough to know what we are talking about, no?

Ok, fair. Yes, I think so, and I'm wandering too much there.

I'm willing to grant the premise you started with to see where it goes, though. I'm probably getting caught up in details that don't matter.

I'm not sure where it goes from there. It seems reasonable to think that each organism can be identified by its particular genotype (apparently there are some divergences even in the case of identical twins).

That said, identifiability is not exhaustive of what we mean by identity (at least in the case of humans), so perhaps we could say it is necessary to establish, but not sufficient to explain, a human identity. If this is right then @schopenhauer1 is right to say that if my genotype were different then I would not be, could not be, the same organism, and therefore could not be the same person.

Does this change the fact that each organism has a unique genotype? — Janus

Hopefully, it means that one might sometimes survive gene therapy. But if I have established that there is never any difficulty distinguishing oneself from an imaginary person, then we can really drop genetic integrity as the necessary feature of identity, and stick with actual existence as the defining feature, which is easier to detect.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-43674270

You frame this issue as "... but that wouldn't have YOU". In brief, I think the issue is partly created by the way it is framed. Given that I exist, my possible supposition that my gametes could have been different from the ones I actually have is hampered by the absolutely certain fact that they weren't. If the question was differently framed, I think it would get a different answer. Suppose you are a parent trying to make a baby. Do you seriously think that whether you performed the action 5 minutes ago or in 5 minutes time matters. You may realize that there may be some differences - even serious differences, but do they make any difference? I don't think so. The difference is that there's no me to make any difference. (cf. Ryle)

Do you seriously think that whether you performed the action 5 minutes ago or in 5 minutes time matters. You may realize that there may be some differences - even serious differences, but do they make any difference? I don't think so. The difference is that there's no me to make any difference. (cf. Ryle) — Ludwig V

It makes a difference because indeterminate future is one without you. The five minutes changes the gamete to someone else’s genetics.

Very interesting thread with some good posts. Don't think I have any interesting insights beyond what others have already mentioned. I think without a well-defined, self-consistent, non-trivial notion of identity for a person, it *(the gamete thing)* might just be moot. I personally don't subscribe to such a thing. I do get the intuition about the gamete thing though, but maybe the intuition gets a bit hazy when we start talking about very precise timing effects and things like that. At the same time, I think arguments similar to the gamete point could possibly be applied to points all along the causal history in different ways but where the consequence for identity would plausibly be different.

Given that I exist, my possible supposition that my gametes could have been different from the ones I actually have is hampered by the absolutely certain fact that they weren't. — Ludwig V

But this is a universal objection that applies to chess moves or anything whatsoever. If I had moved my bishop on move 17 thus and so, it would have been checkmate and I would have won. But I didn't, and it is certain that I lost. This is simply how counterfactuals work by imaging a world that is not this world and stipulating a difference and drawing more or less plausible and significant conclusions as to how the difference pans out. In saying "if I had been born in ancient Rome..." I am not saying anything about my DNA because I don't have a clue what it is. I am imagining having been in Rome at that time in the same way that I can imagine being a woman, or a dog, or Superman.

It makes a difference because indeterminate future is one without you. The five minutes changes the gamete to someone else’s genetics. — schopenhauer1

This is a stipulation of your own about an imaginary situation that didn't happen because - here we all are. You are free to imagine that happening, and someone else is free to imagine exactly that sperm and egg coming together at any other time they care to stipulate. What you cannot do is declare that your imagination is the only real one, without me at least saying, "yeah, as if..."

I think arguments similar to the gamete point could possibly be applied to points all along the causal history in different ways but where the consequence for identity would plausibly be different. — Apustimelogist

I am claiming that it is necessary not sufficient, which is harder to say about almost any of the other subsequent things in the causal history. If we took those away, they might or might not contribute to identity, but what is absolutely needed is that initial gamete combination and blueprint.

Good thinking.

Though in my mind your argument is unequivocal, you touch on some other principles of individuation which may suffice better than DNA because DNA also shows that we are mostly alike. And then we get events like blood transfusions or transplants, or where DNA can become mixed, which confuses the matter.

You mentioned time, for instance. Times implies space or location. Location suffices to distinguish one system from another, and as such, to distinguish the identity of one system from another. I would say that the DNA of that specific system of that specific time and space, is but further evidence of its individuation.

This is a stipulation of your own about an imaginary situation that didn't happen because - here we all are. You are free to imagine that happening, and someone else is free to imagine exactly that sperm and egg coming together at any other time they care to stipulate. What you cannot do is declare that your imagination is the only real one, without me at least saying, "yeah, as if..." — unenlightened

So, one of the original points I was making was about counterfactuals that are possible, and ones that are not. There are counterfactuals that may be possible. For example, it may be possible that you could have won a game had you trained better. However, perhaps your capacity for winning was never going to allow you to win the game, no matter how much you practiced. That one was something that could be possible or not possible depending on which factors were involved.

In the case of a counterfactual person, there is no possibility that you could have been anything else had the causal history been different prior to your conception. That is just a non-starter. You can imagine all you want, but that is just hindsight fantasy. So we can distinguish between counterfactuals that are real possibilities versus ones that can never be real possibilities. Being born in different causal circumstances is not a real possibility.

Though in my mind your argument is unequivocal, you touch on some other principles of individuation which may suffice better than DNA because DNA also shows that we are mostly alike. And then we get events like blood transfusions or transplants, or where DNA can become mixed, which confuses the matter. — NOS4A2

Yes I mentioned the Ship of Theseus. But this doesn't discount the causal-temporal nature of those two gametes creating the initial template for which changes occur contingently through life-history of the person, combined with experiences.

You mentioned time, for instance. Times implies space or location. Location suffices to distinguish one system from another, and as such, to distinguish the identity of one system from another. I would say that the DNA of that specific system of that specific time and space, is but further evidence of its individuation. — NOS4A2

Yes, I think it needs to be a factor as it was that particular instance of gametes combining that made you.

There are counterfactuals that may be possible. — schopenhauer1

I'm gonna stick my neck out and say that no counterfactual about the past (or the present) is possible. History can be rewritten, but the past is fixed and determined . Only what happened can have happened, and no amount of thought can change it. And of course the future is open just to the extent that there are no facts about it yet.

It is impossible that I moved the bishop and won the game, because I moved another piece and lost. What is being made clear is that it is very easy to get confused between the imagination and the real, and this is because imagination is in use all the time to model and predict the world as it unfolds. If I do this, you will do that, if I say this you will say that, If I go to the shop, I can buy some beer. If I hurry, I can catch the bus. and part of the learning process is to imagine past counterfactuals and 'run them'. If only I had hurried, I could have caught the bus. Next time...

The professional gambler has a talent for using the form book to imagine the race being run and pick the winner with better odds than the bookmaker; the amateur just guesses at random. The architect draws imaginary buildings that may sometimes be realised. Philosophers live almost entirely in their imagination, and get annoyed when reality has other ideas.

I'm a bit confused, now, as to what we're disagreeing upon because I thought I had said some fairly sensible things, but it seems not to be clicking. — Moliere

I expect the lack of 'clicking' is mostly a matter of me trying to get by without providing enough details. The point I was hoping to get across was that the role that gamete roulette plays in neurological differences, while for practical purposes invisible (by comparison with say, hair color), is on a whole nother level in determining what it means to be the individual result of the spin of the wheel.

I don't want to go in depth in trying to make a case, but some additional info on my basis for thinking so...

At least a third of the approximately 20,000 different genes that make up the human genome are active (expressed) primarily in the brain. This is the highest proportion of genes expressed in any part of the body. These genes influence the development and function of the brain, and ultimately control how we move, think, feel, and behave.

https://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-information/patient-caregiver-education/brain-basics-genes-work-brain

What is being made clear is that it is very easy to get confused between the imagination and the real, and this is because imagination is in use all the time to model and predict the world as it unfolds. — unenlightened

:up:

I'm gonna stick my neck out and say that no counterfactual about the past (or the present) is possible. History can be rewritten, but the past is fixed and determined . Only what happened can have happened, and no amount of thought can change it. And of course the future is open just to the extent that there are no facts about it yet. — unenlightened

Sure, I think that's more-or-less Ryle's point. And I'd largely agree. However, I think as Ryle also points out, we are mixing up cause-and-effect with logical necessity. I am moving from the realm of cause-and-effect (which indeed would seem to work along the lines you are describing about past and future), and into the realm of logical necessity. That is to say, there are possibilities that in theory could have happened given various circumstances, but were not actualized. However, there are some things which by necessity were never going to be possibilities even going forward into the future or otherwise.

It is impossible that I moved the bishop and won the game, because I moved another piece and lost. What is being made clear is that it is very easy to get confused between the imagination and the real, and this is because imagination is in use all the time to model and predict the world as it unfolds. If I do this, you will do that, if I say this you will say that, If I go to the shop, I can buy some beer. If I hurry, I can catch the bus. and part of the learning process is to imagine past counterfactuals and 'run them'. If only I had hurried, I could have caught the bus. Next time... — unenlightened

For sure.

The professional gambler has a talent for using the form book to imagine the race being run and pick the winner with better odds than the bookmaker; the amateur just guesses at random. The architect draws imaginary buildings that may sometimes be realised. Philosophers live almost entirely in their imagination, and get annoyed when reality has other ideas. — unenlightened

Indeed. Philosophers play hypotheticals all the time. But I think the broader implication here is interesting in terms of what it means to be in the first place. Your circumstance for living is non-transposable. It is not a repeatable event.

It makes a difference because indeterminate future is one without you. The five minutes changes the gamete to someone else’s genetics. — schopenhauer1

No, it does not. Because the person who would have been born 5 minutes earlier never existed and never could have existed. There's only person one who exists. You can say that there are possible people who would have existed if I had been conceived 5 minutes earlier or 5 minutes later. But you can't say anything about them, not even whether they would have been the same or different - except by arbitrarily stipulating that they would. Where would your evidence be for saying that they were the same as me, or different from me in ways that matter or different from me in ways that don't matter?

No, it does not. Because the person who would have been born 5 minutes earlier never existed and never could have existed. There's only person who exists. You can say that there are possible people who would have existed if I had been conceived 5 minutes earlier or 5 minutes later. But you can't say anything about them, not even whether they would have been the same or different - except by arbitrarily stipulating that they would. Where would your evidence be for saying that they were the same as me, or different from me in ways that matter or different from me in ways that don't matter? — Ludwig V

I think your interpretation of what I am saying is 180 degrees off. I am saying what you are saying I think. That is to say, the person born five minutes earlier or later is NOT you. It would have been someone else.