The salient bit is a subtle argument from Kripke, summarised in the SEP.I have to confess that I don't really understand what modal identity is. A brief explanation or a reference would help me a lot. — Ludwig V
(K1) If Hesperus = Phosphorus, then necessarily (Hesperus = Phosphorus)
(K2) Hesperus = Phosphorus
(K3) Necessarily, (Hesperus = Phosphorus)
K1 if schopenhauer1 has such-and-such a genome, then necessarily schopenhauer1 has such-and-such a genome.
I suspect schopenhauer1, ↪wonderer1, too, think they are making an observation, but it doesn't look that way to me. More generally, if folk do not accept that we bring things about using words - that there are commissive utterance - they will have a hard time understanding what is going on here. — Banno
By way of trying, what status, what sort of sentence, do you think the one labeled K1 has? Do you think it an observation? Something that is empirically verifiable? — Banno
On what grounds would any entity in some imagined universe count as being schopenhauer1? — Janus
So have you looked into every possible universe and seen that all the schopenhauer1's have the same genome?
Or is it rather that you have specified that any posited schopenhauer1 with a different genome is not a schopenhauer1? — Banno
It's not an observation; so in what way could it be considered empirical? — Banno
Because I'm suggesting it is not empirical, but a choice about how you would use the name "schopenhauer1". — Banno
Cool. That's closer to Kripke than to Lewis. I think this the best way for you to defend your account. I wasn't expecting you to take that option. — Banno
I don't quite agree, but it's now a fairly trivial point. If someone were to ask "What if schopenhauer1 had had a different genetics", your answer is that the question cannot be asked, that a schopenhauer1 with a different genetics is a different being, not a schopenhauer1, but something else which still might have the name "schopenhauer1". I'd say that the question can be sensibly asked, and that if it is it is a question about schopenhauer1. — Banno
Hand waving. Are you saying it is an induction, like "all swans are black"? If not, what? — Banno
My only purpose here was to try to make the nuance clear. — Banno
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/case-lydia-fairchild-and-her-chimerism-2002In 2002, after applying for government assistance in the state of Washington, Lydia Fairchild was told that her two children were not a genetic match with her and that therefore, biologically, she could not be their mother. Researchers later determined that the genetic mismatch was due to chimerism, a condition in which two genetically distinct cell lines are present in one body. The state accused Fairchild of fraud and filed a lawsuit against her. Following evidence from another case of chimerism documented in The New England Journal of Medicine in a woman named Karen Keegan, Fairchild was able to secure legal counsel and establish evidence of her biological maternity. A cervical swab eventually revealed Fairchild’s second distinct cell line, showing that she had not genetically matched her children because she was a chimera. Fairchild’s case was one of the first public accounts of chimerism and has been used as an example in subsequent discussions about the validity and reliability of DNA evidence in legal proceedings within the United States.
(schopenhauer1 has genome G) ⊃ ☐(schopenhauer1 has genome G)
For me here I think it gets hazy because since in my example everything is completely identical except for this gamete part, it seems to me I could plausibly say they are the same person. — Apustimelogist
Taking "imaginary" to mean "possible"...on what grounds, other than sharing the same genome, would any entity in an imagined universe count as being schopenhauer1? — Janus
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