You were asking how there could be necessarily true statements known a posteriori. Did you understand the answer? — frank

No, because as soon as you introduce God all bets are off. Rather than argue against it I'd like to consider the implications.

Love. — frank

What's the motivation to be loving?

Love. — frank

And what if God commands that love is immoral?

No, because as soon as you introduce God all bets are off. — Michael

Read the SEP link.

What's the motivation to be loving? — Michael

There is none. You either do or you don't.

And what if God commands that love is immoral? — Michael

You seem to be spinning off questions without having read anything I wrote. Too busy?

I did read what you wrote. You said that "the difference between good and evil ... [is learned] by becoming acquainted with God's laws."

So I'm asking what you would do if God's laws commanded that love is immoral. What if he commanded that we ought kill every second baby?

This is pretty much exactly what I was asking in the OP:

Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true.

...

Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't [categorically immoral], you wouldn't kill babies.

So what is the motivation to obey God's moral laws?

So what is the motivation to obey God's moral laws? — Michael

I don't believe in God. I was explaining how there can be aposteriori necessity in the moral realm. You had suggested that I should get a nobel philosophy prize for discovering it.

Everyone is going to answer questions about morality their own way. We have a variety of well worn paths that have been passed down to us because Christianity was a fusion of different cultural perspectives.

I can give you my own thinking, but I wouldn't be trying to convert you. Just explaining. You probably have your own answers as well, though sometimes old fashioned contemplation is necessary to bring it into focus.

I was explaining how there can be aposteriori necessity in the moral realm — frank

You asserted that if there is God then moral truths are a posteriori necessities but I don't think you explained how this follows. Why can't it be that in one possible world God commands that eating meat is immoral and in another possible world God commands that eating meat is not immoral?

You asserted that if there is God then moral truths are a posteriori necessities — Michael

I most certainly did not. You didn't read anything I wrote. You didn't read the SEP quote, much less the link. I'm out.

I most certainly did not. You didn't read anything I wrote. — frank

You said this:

This is the primary root of moral realism: that it comes from God. Some cultures maintained that we're born knowing the difference between good and evil (Persians), but in the Hebrew outlook, we aren't. We have to learn it by becoming acquainted with God's laws. That would be a form of a posteriori necessity. — frank

How is that a form of a posteriori necessity?

Thanks, .

Firstly, just to be sure, what I am suggesting here is that your approach of introducing modalities into the discussion serves not to clarify but to further complicate the issues around morality.

I'll illustrate his with a few examples from your post.

That's because "H2O" and "water" are rigid designators that refer to the same thing. — Michael

Rigid designation works primarily with individuals. "Michael" refers to Michael in every possible world in which Michael exists. But H₂O and water are kinds, not individuals. Whether "H₂O" and "water" rigidly refer to H₂O and water is a contentious issue. This is leaving aside the problem of whether to differentiate kinds such as these from predicates such as green, or whether green should be considered a kind and ...is green a predicate, and so on. On top of that we have the problem that "immoral" ranges over actions, and it is not entirely uncontroversial that actions are individuals of the sort that can be referred to rigidly. is perhaps saying something along these lines.

If ethical non-naturalism is true then "immoral" and "harmful" are not rigid designators that refer to the same thing. — Michael

This doesn't quite follow, both because "immoral" and "harmful" might be neither individuals nor kinds, and because as mentioned in previous posts "immoral" and "harmful" might well be set up as extensionally equivalent - for example, consequentialists might well do this. It's one way they try to negate the open question.

Considering deontic logic, is OA → ◻OA an axiom?

If it is, is it an axiom by choice or by necessity? — Michael

Neither: p⊃☐p not even valid. That's why it was interesting and controversial. That water is always H₂O was found to be true by observation, but thereafter, after Kripke, seen as a necessary truth - necessary a posteriori...

Again, there is a lot more going on here than one might suppose, and introducing alethic modality doesn't help.



Secondly, the presumption that differences must be observable has been addressed elsewhere, with Anscombe's shopping list. The list complied by the cash register as it rings off your items may well be identical to the shopping list in your hand, of items you intended to purchase. While there may be no observable difference between the two lists, there is a profound difference in terms of what we do with each.

Hence,

I believe that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. If my belief is true then... what? If my belief is false then... what? In either case I just eat meat. — Michael

is in a sense numb to the issue. There is a profound difference, for the vegetarian.

That numbness apparently extends to your general approach here. You are asking for an observable difference where the difference at hand is on of attitude, of intent. Making observations is using the wrong tool.


Thirdly, your strategy of asking for motivation is... problematic. At some stage, ratiocination must be replaced by action. And this will happen even if there is no reasoned account for the action. Buridan's Ass will not starve, it will eat.

This doesn't quite follow, both because "immoral" and "harmful" might be neither individuals nor kinds, and because as mentioned in previous posts "immoral" and "harmful" might well be set up as extensionally equivalent — Banno

If they're extensionally equivalent then it would be naturalism, not non-naturalism? I'm specifically talking about non-naturalism.

Secondly, the presumption that differences must be observable has been addressed elsewhere — Banno

I'm not saying that differences must be observable. I'm only saying that there don't appear to be any observable differences.

You are asking for an observable difference where the difference at hand is on of attitude, of intent. — Banno

I'm not sure what attitudes and intent have to do with moral truth, unless we're talking about moral subjectivism, which we're not.

Thirdly, your strategy of asking for motivation is... problematic. At some stage, ratiocination must be replaced by action. And this will happen even if there is no reasoned account for the action. Buridan's Ass will not starve, it will eat. — Banno

I don't get what you're saying here. Yes, either I will eat meat or I won't. And either it is immoral to eat meat or it isn't. But whether or not I will eat meat and whether or not it is immoral to eat meat are two different considerations, and I'm interested in discussing the latter and the implications of its answer.

Rigid designation works primarily with individuals. "Michael" refers to Michael in every possible world in which Michael exists. But H₂O and water are kinds, not individuals. Whether "H₂O" and "water" rigidly refer to H₂O and water is a contentious issue. This is leaving aside the problem of whether to differentiate kinds such as these from predicates such as green, or whether green should be considered a kind and ...is green a predicate, and so on. On top of that we have the problem that "immoral" ranges over actions, and it is not entirely uncontroversial that actions are individuals of the sort that can be referred to rigidly. ↪frank is perhaps saying something along these lines. — Banno

You brought up the case of water necessarily being H₂O. I was simply explaining that I don't think the explanation for how this works applies to the case of ethical non-naturalism.

If a posteriori necessity depends on rigid designators referring to the same thing and if "immoral" and "harmful" are not rigid designators referring to the same thing then "harm is immoral" is not an a posteriori necessity.

If you think that there can be a posteriori necessities without rigid designators referring to the same thing then I'd be interested in hearing an explanation of it.

Again, there is a lot more going on here than one might suppose, and introducing alethic modality doesn't help. — Banno

We're not infallible, and so it's possible that some of our moral beliefs are wrong.

I don't think this at all a controversial claim.

So with that in mind, I'm asking about the practical implications of our moral beliefs being true and of those same moral beliefs being false. I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications and I don't think that eating meat not being immoral has any practical implications. So why would it matter to us if eating meat is immoral or not? Is it simply philosophical curiosity?

I'm not sure what attitudes and intent have to do with moral truth — Michael

How could they not?

I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications — Michael

:rofl:

, I think your take here quite weird.

Edit: it's as if you have not understood the difference between "is" and "ought", and so can only formulate your ethical considerations in terms appropriate to "is", hence entirely missing the whole field of human action.

I think there are two moral "lanes," one where morality is transcendent and opaque (Kantianism), and another where morality is transparently rational (consequentialism, virtue ethics, etc.). The OP makes sense with regard to Kantianism, but I don't think it makes sense with regard to transparently rational moralities (cf. ).

This is what happens when you try to run the OP against, say, a form of consequentialism:

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that. — Leontiskos

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad — Michael

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction.

One of the deeper problems that I perceive is the separation between oughtness and motivation, as noted in the other thread... — Leontiskos

Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?

I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds? — Michael

At this point "moral" is actually defined to be that which has no reason. If a claim has a reason, then apparently for @Michael it cannot be considered moral. This is understandable insofar as it is a Kantian inheritance, but at the same time it makes no sense. If moral claims are, by definition, claims without reasons, then the counterfactual test will necessarily fail for moral claims.

Note too that this consequentialist in question is not necessarily a "non-naturalist." I don't see that the naturalism/non-naturalism distinction is overly relevant to this question. The question is whether any given first principle of moral reasoning is rationally transparent or rationally opaque.

I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications and I don't think that eating meat not being immoral has any practical implications. — Michael

But how could you hold such a thing? The obvious practical implications are 1) how much meat is eaten, and 2) how many animals are harvested. These are practical implications, and for many vegetarians they are also moral implications.

Morality pertains to how we act, and therefore all moral precepts will have "practical" implications insofar as all human acts have "practical" effects.

The obvious practical implications are 1) how much meat is eaten, and 2) how many animals are harvested. — Leontiskos

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications.

The SEP article on moral motivation explains it better:

If we are to explain moral motivation, we will need to understand not only how moral judgments so regularly succeed in motivating, but how they can fail to motivate, sometimes rather spectacularly. Not only do we witness motivational failure among the deranged, dejected, and confused, but also, it appears, among the fully sound and self-possessed. What are we to make of the “amoralist”—the apparently rational, strong willed individual who seemingly makes moral judgments, while remaining utterly indifferent?

...

Although contemporary philosophers have been divided with respect to Mackie’s moral skepticism, they have mostly agreed in rejecting his extremely strong claims about what moral motivation, and the objective moral properties that figure in our moral judgments, would have to be like. They have uniformly rejected the suggestion that a grasp of morality’s requirements would produce overriding motivation to act accordingly. And most have rejected efforts to explain moral motivation by appealing to a motivating power emanating from moral properties and the acts and states of affairs that instantiate them.

...

No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. And realists certainly need not take the view that Mackie ascribes to Plato, that seeing objective values will ensure that one acts, “overruling any contrary inclination” (Mackie 1977,23). An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts. Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated. As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification (alluded to earlier) that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.

I'm asking why there is a motivation to be moral if moral facts have no practical implications.

I'm impressed with Michael's patience in the face of incomprehension

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications. — Michael

The two are connected. Moral realities need to be appropriated by moral subjects, just as scientific realities need to be appropriated by scientific subjects.

For example, if people believe there is fire in the fire pit they will avoid it for fear of being burned. It is the fire itself that ultimately has this effect, and it has the effect by being appropriated by human subjects. For the moral realist morality is parallel, for in that case one is recognizing a moral reality and responding to it. The vegetarian does not create a moral precept so much as respond to animal suffering and factory farming and whatnot, which they hold to be moral realities.

So on the vegetarian account <meat actually being immoral> is the reason one believes meat-eating to be immoral, and is therefore precisely what produces the "practical" effects.

To anticipate your next post, moral realism and ethical naturalism are simply not co-extensive. That one believes there are moral realities which one recognizes does not mean that they are an ethical naturalist or an ethical non-naturalist. And in any case, these terms require more precision given that the is-ought distinction requires more precision.

I'm impressed with Michael's patience in the face of incomprehension — bert1

Same.

You're arguing that moral realists behave differently from anti-realists. Even if that's true, it doesn't answer the OP. It's not the reality of the moral rules that matters, it's the psychology of believing realism. That said, I don't think it's true that moral realists behave differently. Again, it's all psychology.

There's no fact about which rules anyone follows anyway.

You're arguing that moral realists behave differently from anti-realists. Even if that's true, it doesn't answer the OP. It's not the reality of the moral rules that matters, it's the psychology of believing realism. That said, I don't think it's true that moral realists behave differently. Again, it's all psychology. — frank

In that post I was arguing that the intention of the moral realist differs from the intention of the moral non-realist, for the moral realist understands themselves to be responding to a real reality. Michael's separation of effects-of-moral-agents from moral truths was begging the question, assuming either anti-realism or else the unknowability of moral truths. Supposing moral truths exist and can be known (as moral realists hold), then the moral truths have practical effects.

(Again, I am not a fan of this word "practical," because for Michael every effect is practical.)

In that post I was arguing that the intention of the moral realist differs from the intention of the moral non-realist, for the moral realist understands themselves to be responding to a real reality. — Leontiskos

Could we verify this empirically? What sort of research project would we construct?

Could we verify this empirically? What sort of research project would we construct? — frank

Are moral truths the product of empirical scientific research? Do we go to the physicists with our moral questions? In many ways this whole thread is an ignoratio elenchi, and you've highlighted that fact with this post.

Are moral truths the product of empirical scientific research? Do we go to the physicists with our moral questions? In many ways this whole thread is an ignoratio elenchi, and you've highlighted that fact with this post. — Leontiskos

Kripke agrees with you. There is no fact about what a moral realist intends at any given time.

But this issue doesn't answer the OP. You're pointing to the practical outcome of believing in moral realism, not the practical outcome of the existence of objective moral rules.

Either eating meat is immoral or it isn't.

Some people believe that eating meat is immoral and some people believe that eating meat is not immoral.

One of these groups is right and one of these groups is wrong.

What are the practical implications if the former are right? What are the practical implications if the latter are right?

I can't see that there are any in either case.

Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, those who believe that eating meat is immoral probably won't eat meat and those who believe that eating meat is not immoral probably will eat meat.

If you told me baby murdering were ethical, I guess I'd have to murder babies even if it made me sad to wrestle them from the hands of their mothers and dash them upon rocks. — Hanover

While you believe in a god who kills babies en masse.

Perhaps we could say that it is best for us to live the truly moral life. But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible?
/.../
Would you accept a morality that stands in stark opposition to your personal values? What would it mean for you if you'd found this to be the case? — Michael

Insanity.

And what difference would it make if there was no morality at all?

Insanity.

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make?

It seems to me that the implicit assumption in all this is that people don't know, aren't sure about what is moral and what isn't. That there is a fundamental possibility of moral doubt (in every person?).

Usually, people don't seem to indulge in such moral skepticism, so your thought experiment is moot for them. A philosopher cannot just ignore such things about people. It seems that most people are intuitively and absolutely sure about their sense of right and wrong, and this surety being intuitive and absolute is essential to their sense of morality.