Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true.
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Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't [categorically immoral], you wouldn't kill babies.
So what is the motivation to obey God's moral laws? — Michael
I was explaining how there can be aposteriori necessity in the moral realm — frank
I most certainly did not. You didn't read anything I wrote. — frank
This is the primary root of moral realism: that it comes from God. Some cultures maintained that we're born knowing the difference between good and evil (Persians), but in the Hebrew outlook, we aren't. We have to learn it by becoming acquainted with God's laws. That would be a form of a posteriori necessity. — frank
Rigid designation works primarily with individuals. "Michael" refers to Michael in every possible world in which Michael exists. But H₂O and water are kinds, not individuals. Whether "H₂O" and "water" rigidly refer to H₂O and water is a contentious issue. This is leaving aside the problem of whether to differentiate kinds such as these from predicates such as green, or whether green should be considered a kind and ...is green a predicate, and so on. On top of that we have the problem that "immoral" ranges over actions, and it is not entirely uncontroversial that actions are individuals of the sort that can be referred to rigidly. is perhaps saying something along these lines.That's because "H2O" and "water" are rigid designators that refer to the same thing. — Michael
This doesn't quite follow, both because "immoral" and "harmful" might be neither individuals nor kinds, and because as mentioned in previous posts "immoral" and "harmful" might well be set up as extensionally equivalent - for example, consequentialists might well do this. It's one way they try to negate the open question.If ethical non-naturalism is true then "immoral" and "harmful" are not rigid designators that refer to the same thing. — Michael
Neither: p⊃☐p not even valid. That's why it was interesting and controversial. That water is always H₂O was found to be true by observation, but thereafter, after Kripke, seen as a necessary truth - necessary a posteriori...Considering deontic logic, is OA → ◻OA an axiom?
If it is, is it an axiom by choice or by necessity? — Michael
is in a sense numb to the issue. There is a profound difference, for the vegetarian.I believe that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. If my belief is true then... what? If my belief is false then... what? In either case I just eat meat. — Michael
This doesn't quite follow, both because "immoral" and "harmful" might be neither individuals nor kinds, and because as mentioned in previous posts "immoral" and "harmful" might well be set up as extensionally equivalent — Banno
Secondly, the presumption that differences must be observable has been addressed elsewhere — Banno
You are asking for an observable difference where the difference at hand is on of attitude, of intent. — Banno
Thirdly, your strategy of asking for motivation is... problematic. At some stage, ratiocination must be replaced by action. And this will happen even if there is no reasoned account for the action. Buridan's Ass will not starve, it will eat. — Banno
Rigid designation works primarily with individuals. "Michael" refers to Michael in every possible world in which Michael exists. But H₂O and water are kinds, not individuals. Whether "H₂O" and "water" rigidly refer to H₂O and water is a contentious issue. This is leaving aside the problem of whether to differentiate kinds such as these from predicates such as green, or whether green should be considered a kind and ...is green a predicate, and so on. On top of that we have the problem that "immoral" ranges over actions, and it is not entirely uncontroversial that actions are individuals of the sort that can be referred to rigidly. ↪frank is perhaps saying something along these lines. — Banno
Again, there is a lot more going on here than one might suppose, and introducing alethic modality doesn't help. — Banno
I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that. — Leontiskos
Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:
1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad — Michael
I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction.
One of the deeper problems that I perceive is the separation between oughtness and motivation, as noted in the other thread... — Leontiskos
Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?
I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds? — Michael
I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications and I don't think that eating meat not being immoral has any practical implications. — Michael
The obvious practical implications are 1) how much meat is eaten, and 2) how many animals are harvested. — Leontiskos
If we are to explain moral motivation, we will need to understand not only how moral judgments so regularly succeed in motivating, but how they can fail to motivate, sometimes rather spectacularly. Not only do we witness motivational failure among the deranged, dejected, and confused, but also, it appears, among the fully sound and self-possessed. What are we to make of the “amoralist”—the apparently rational, strong willed individual who seemingly makes moral judgments, while remaining utterly indifferent?
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Although contemporary philosophers have been divided with respect to Mackie’s moral skepticism, they have mostly agreed in rejecting his extremely strong claims about what moral motivation, and the objective moral properties that figure in our moral judgments, would have to be like. They have uniformly rejected the suggestion that a grasp of morality’s requirements would produce overriding motivation to act accordingly. And most have rejected efforts to explain moral motivation by appealing to a motivating power emanating from moral properties and the acts and states of affairs that instantiate them.
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No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. And realists certainly need not take the view that Mackie ascribes to Plato, that seeing objective values will ensure that one acts, “overruling any contrary inclination” (Mackie 1977,23). An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts. Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated. As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification (alluded to earlier) that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.
Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.
I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications. — Michael
You're arguing that moral realists behave differently from anti-realists. Even if that's true, it doesn't answer the OP. It's not the reality of the moral rules that matters, it's the psychology of believing realism. That said, I don't think it's true that moral realists behave differently. Again, it's all psychology. — frank
In that post I was arguing that the intention of the moral realist differs from the intention of the moral non-realist, for the moral realist understands themselves to be responding to a real reality. — Leontiskos
Could we verify this empirically? What sort of research project would we construct? — frank
Are moral truths the product of empirical scientific research? Do we go to the physicists with our moral questions? In many ways this whole thread is an ignoratio elenchi, and you've highlighted that fact with this post. — Leontiskos
Insanity.Perhaps we could say that it is best for us to live the truly moral life. But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible?
/.../
Would you accept a morality that stands in stark opposition to your personal values? What would it mean for you if you'd found this to be the case? — Michael
Insanity.And what difference would it make if there was no morality at all?
It seems to me that the implicit assumption in all this is that people don't know, aren't sure about what is moral and what isn't. That there is a fundamental possibility of moral doubt (in every person?).It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make?
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