He doesn't think she should do what he wants him to do? — Leontiskos
No. In fact he might think that she shouldn't do what he wants her to do because he knows that what he wants her to do is wrong. — Michael
He might think, "She should not give me the money if she doesn't want to get conned," but does this mean that he cannot simultaneously think that she should give him the money? — Leontiskos
Your very question has introduced two different senses of "should", else it would be a contradiction to claim that she both should and shouldn't give him the money. — Michael
What we have are two rationales:
1. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.
When the robber acts to influence Bonita's behavior he is acting on judgment (1). It doesn't matter if he is aware of (2). Knowledge of (2) does not preclude (1). — Leontiskos
So what does "should" mean in this context? It certainly doesn't seem to mean that there is an obligation to behave a certain way, — Michael
Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. — Leontiskos
but to say that someone should act in a certain way does not necessarily involve obligations. — Leontiskos
Why does it matter that I ought not kill wild animals for food? What is my motivation to be moral? Perhaps I simply don't care that I ought not kill wild animals for food; I'm going to do it anyway because I like the taste of meat. — Michael
As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed) — Michael
You're asking a question Moore doesn't ask. — Hanover
That is, Moore was a non-naturalist and a consequentialist, which means he cared what the consequence of his behavior was. What made him a non-naturalist was his refusal to provide an essentialist definition of "the good. "
Per Moore, your motivation not to kill wild animals for food (as you have posited that it is immoral) is that by not killing animals, you will promote more good through time. That means you have a goal and purpose for your behavior, which is to maximize the good. — Hanover
22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. — Michael
My argument in this discussion is specifically related to the supposed existence of obligations. I have often given examples of "should" claims that do not involve obligations, e.g. "you should brush your teeth", that are not the target of my enquiry. — Michael
The existence or non-existence of obligations does not affect the outcome of the decisions we make. The consequences of eating meat are the same whether or not I have an obligation to not eat meat. — Michael
So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael
And when I say that I would like it if you were to make others happy I am not saying (either explicitly or implicitly) that you have an obligation to make people happy. — Michael
That's not to say that I am necessarily averse to any proposition that includes the word "should". As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed):
Given these propositions:
1a. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2a. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.
Perhaps they are best interpreted as such:
1b. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2b. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money
These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative. I can accept 1a) and 2a) if they are to be interpreted as 1b) and 2b). — Michael
Or: "You should give me money for this bridge." "Okay, here you go!" "You shouldn't have done that!"
Is this possible? Yes, of course. The conman either changed his mind and returned the money, or else the second 'should' was used with a different rationale (ratio). In this case there will be two judgments, one for each discrete 'should'. But 'should' simpliciter pertains to what ultimately should be done, and this is most clearly seen in what is actually wished or chosen. Conflicting options, desires, or interests are naturally adjudicated when we actually make a choice and act. — Leontiskos
my concern here is that even if we found the magical formula for goodness, Michael would immediately, given his approach in these threads, say, "I admit that X is good, but why should I do/seek what is good?" — Leontiskos
Even if Moore's question were resolved, my contention is that this would in no way resolve Michael's inquiry in the OP. For Michael the definition of good will not suffice to provide rationale for moral 'oughts'. — Leontiskos
Whether or not pleasure is good makes no difference to our experience of pleasure. Whether or not suffering is bad makes no difference to our experience of suffering.
[...]
So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael
I know. This discussion is intended to show that if theories like Moore's are correct then moral facts don't matter, and so perhaps works as a reductio ad absurdum against such theories. I do not endorse Moore's ethical non-naturalism. — Michael
So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael
Then you need to revise your definition, because you are deviating from it ('Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this"'). — Leontiskos
the assertion ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe’
It's one thing to refuse to define these things, and quite another to claim that they have no bearing on motivation. Everyone who has an inkling of what 'good' or 'moral' means knows they bear on motivation. If your arguments have led you to a contrary conclusion then you have coined new words that no one is familiar with, and it's no wonder that you are causing a great deal of confusion. — Leontiskos
No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. And realists certainly need not take the view that Mackie ascribes to Plato, that seeing objective values will ensure that one acts, “overruling any contrary inclination” (Mackie 1977,23). An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts. Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated. As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification (alluded to earlier) that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.
But you are saying that I ought to make others happy, and that was the point I was at pains to demonstrate. — Leontiskos
you moved the goalposts and started talking about obligations. — Leontiskos
Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true. What then?
Why does it matter if good increases? It's a non-natural property that has no practical affect on us or our lives. Unlike nutrition. — Michael
We cannot tell what is possible, by way of proof, in favour of one judgment that ‘This or that is good,’ or against another judgment ‘That this or that is bad,’ until we have recognised what the nature of such propositions must always be. In fact, it follows from the meaning of good and bad, that such propositions are all of them, in Kant’s phrase, ‘synthetic’: they all must rest in the end upon some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be logically deduced from any other proposition.
1. Assumption: Ethical non-naturalism
2. Assumption: Ethical truths affect choices
3. Assumption (but argued for in this thread): If ethical non-naturalism is true then ethical truths cannot affect choices
4. Therefore, both (ethical truths affect choices) and not (ethical truths affect choices)
5. Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is false. — bert1
It's not that ethical truths don't affect choices but that ethical truths don't affect the outcome of choices. If I choose to eat meat then the outcome of eating meat is the same whether or not I ought not eat meat. — Michael
he is specifically stating a moral outcome does affect the world and the world will be different if the outcome is different — Hanover
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