He doesn't think she should do what he wants him to do? — Leontiskos

No. In fact he might think that she shouldn't do what he wants her to do because he knows that what he wants her to do is wrong.

As a very simple real life example, plenty of people who have affairs believe that they shouldn't be having an affair. They believe that what they are doing is wrong. But they do it anyway because it's what they want. Their desires are stronger than their moral convictions.

No. In fact he might think that she shouldn't do what he wants her to do because he knows that what he wants her to do is wrong. — Michael

He might think, "She should not give me the money if she doesn't want to get conned," but does this mean that he cannot simultaneously think that she should give him the money?

He might think, "She should not give me the money if she doesn't want to get conned," but does this mean that he cannot simultaneously think that she should give him the money? — Leontiskos

Your very question has introduced two different senses of "should", else it would be a contradiction to claim that she both should and shouldn't give him the money. I'll need you to explain what you mean by this second (and maybe the first?) "should" before I can answer.

Your very question has introduced two different senses of "should", else it would be a contradiction to claim that she both should and shouldn't give him the money. — Michael

No, there is no equivocation on 'should' (you are the one doing that).

What we have are two rationales:

1. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

When the robber acts to influence Bonita's behavior he is acting on judgment (1). It doesn't matter if he is aware of (2). Knowledge of (2) does not preclude (1).

What we have are two rationales:

1. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

When the robber acts to influence Bonita's behavior he is acting on judgment (1). It doesn't matter if he is aware of (2). Knowledge of (2) does not preclude (1). — Leontiskos

So what does "should" mean in this context? It certainly doesn't seem to mean that there is an obligation to behave a certain way, as these sentences don't seem to make sense (or at least don't seem true):

1. She has an obligation to give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She has an obligation to not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

Perhaps what you mean is this:

1. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money

These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative.

So what does "should" mean in this context? It certainly doesn't seem to mean that there is an obligation to behave a certain way, — Michael

Here is what I said earlier:

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. — Leontiskos

Perhaps the conman believes she has an obligation to make him rich, but to say that someone should act in a certain way does not necessarily involve obligations. "Should" is a primitive concept, expressing some sort of optimal future.

A key here is that a conman does not believe that (other) people should not be conned. He thinks other people should be conned, and that he should get rich. If he simply thought that people should not be conned, then he would not con. And even a conflicted conman judges that his victim should give him money. He holds this judgment even if he simultaneously believes that he should not con people. This is an example of either akrasia or else conflicted human reasoning; it is not an exception to the rule that when we attempt to influence behavior we involve ourselves in ought/should judgments.

Or: "You should give me money for this bridge." "Okay, here you go!" "You shouldn't have done that!"

Is this possible? Yes, of course. The conman either changed his mind and returned the money, or else the second 'should' was used with a different rationale (ratio). In this case there will be two judgments, one for each discrete 'should'. But 'should' simpliciter pertains to what ultimately should be done, and this is most clearly seen in what is actually wished or chosen. Conflicting options, desires, or interests are naturally adjudicated when we actually make a choice and act.

but to say that someone should act in a certain way does not necessarily involve obligations. — Leontiskos

My argument in this discussion is specifically related to the supposed existence of obligations. I have often given examples of "should" claims that do not involve obligations, e.g. "you should brush your teeth", that are not the target of my enquiry.

The existence or non-existence of obligations does not affect the outcome of the decisions we make. The consequences of eating meat are the same whether or not I have an obligation to not eat meat.

There appear to be no practical benefits to "obeying" an obligation, and no practical detriments to "disobeying" an obligation. So I would like to understand the motivation of those who choose to "obey" obligations (for no other reason than that the obligation exists).

And when I say that I would like it if you were to make others happy I am not saying (either explicitly or implicitly) that you have an obligation to make people happy.

That's not to say that I am necessarily averse to any proposition that includes the word "should". As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed):

Given these propositions:

1a. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2a. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

Perhaps they are best interpreted as such:

1b. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2b. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money

These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative. I can accept 1a) and 2a) if they are to be interpreted as 1b) and 2b).

Why does it matter that I ought not kill wild animals for food? What is my motivation to be moral? Perhaps I simply don't care that I ought not kill wild animals for food; I'm going to do it anyway because I like the taste of meat. — Michael

You're asking a question Moore doesn't ask. Again quoting from the article you cited:

"In applying this view, Moore gave it the form of what today is called “indirect” or “two-level” (Hare 1981) consequentialism. In deciding how to act, we should not try to assess individual acts for their specific consequences; instead, we should follow certain general moral rules, such as “Do not kill” and “Keep promises,” which are such that adhering to them will most promote the good through time"[/quote]

That is, Moore was a non-naturalist and a consequentialist, which means he cared what the consequence of his behavior was. What made him a non-naturalist was his refusal to provide an essentialist definition of "the good. "

Per Moore, your motivation not to kill wild animals for food (as you have posited that it is immoral) is that by not killing animals, you will promote more good through time. That means you have a goal and purpose for your behavior, which is to maximize the good.

"The good" you wish to promote is real (as Moore is a moral realist), even if the definition is subject to a plurality of goals (i.e. not just one, like a hedonist, who isolates pleasure as the only objective).

As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed) — Michael

I added an edit after I saw your edit.

I have to get going here, but it is worth considering that the thoroughgoing conman does not see his 'ought' judgment as immoral. If he did then certainly your definition would win out.

You're asking a question Moore doesn't ask. — Hanover

I know. This discussion is intended to show that if theories like Moore's are correct then moral facts don't matter, and so perhaps works as a reductio ad absurdum against such theories. I do not endorse Moore's ethical non-naturalism.

That is, Moore was a non-naturalist and a consequentialist, which means he cared what the consequence of his behavior was. What made him a non-naturalist was his refusal to provide an essentialist definition of "the good. "

Per Moore, your motivation not to kill wild animals for food (as you have posited that it is immoral) is that by not killing animals, you will promote more good through time. That means you have a goal and purpose for your behavior, which is to maximize the good. — Hanover

And the argument I am making is that this simple, indefinable "good" is of no practical consequence. A world that contains lots of this "good" is empirically indistinguishable from a world without this "good". Whether or not pleasure is good makes no difference to our experience of pleasure. Whether or not suffering is bad makes no difference to our experience of suffering.

It may be factually the case that pleasure has this non-natural property of goodness and that suffering does not have this property (and perhaps has some non-natural property of badness), but these non-natural properties are inconsequential.

So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations.

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. — Michael

10% are confused.

My argument in this discussion is specifically related to the supposed existence of obligations. I have often given examples of "should" claims that do not involve obligations, e.g. "you should brush your teeth", that are not the target of my enquiry. — Michael

Then you need to revise your definition, because you are deviating from it ('Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this"').

The existence or non-existence of obligations does not affect the outcome of the decisions we make. The consequences of eating meat are the same whether or not I have an obligation to not eat meat. — Michael

So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael

It's one thing to refuse to define these things, and quite another to claim that they have no bearing on motivation. Everyone who has an inkling of what 'good' or 'moral' means knows they bear on motivation. If your arguments have led you to a contrary conclusion then you have coined new words that no one is familiar with, and it's no wonder that you are causing a great deal of confusion.

And when I say that I would like it if you were to make others happy I am not saying (either explicitly or implicitly) that you have an obligation to make people happy. — Michael

But you are saying that I ought to make others happy, and that was the point I was at pains to demonstrate. When I succeeded you moved the goalposts and started talking about obligations. Ought/should and obligation are not identical, and if you had used obligation in your original definition to the definition would have been tautologous, and would not have answered his query.

That's not to say that I am necessarily averse to any proposition that includes the word "should". As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed):

Given these propositions:

1a. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2a. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

Perhaps they are best interpreted as such:

1b. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2b. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money

These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative. I can accept 1a) and 2a) if they are to be interpreted as 1b) and 2b). — Michael

My edit:

Or: "You should give me money for this bridge." "Okay, here you go!" "You shouldn't have done that!"

Is this possible? Yes, of course. The conman either changed his mind and returned the money, or else the second 'should' was used with a different rationale (ratio). In this case there will be two judgments, one for each discrete 'should'. But 'should' simpliciter pertains to what ultimately should be done, and this is most clearly seen in what is actually wished or chosen. Conflicting options, desires, or interests are naturally adjudicated when we actually make a choice and act. — Leontiskos

'Should' in its most basic sense means what should be done all things considered. So when the conman decides to con he decides, all things considered, that the lady should give him money for a fake bridge. In that case he obviously thinks she should do what he wants her to do (). Your claim that he doesn't think she should do what he wants her to do is simply false ().

I guess the barebones reductio is something like this:

1. Assumption: Ethical non-naturalism
2. Assumption: Ethical truths affect choices
3. Assumption (but argued for in this thread): If ethical non-naturalism is true then ethical truths cannot affect choices
4. Therefore, both (ethical truths affect choices) and not (ethical truths affect choices)
5. Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is false.

3 is the subject of this thread.

- The reason the "morality" of "non-naturalism" cannot affect choices is because this "morality" is by definition undefined. For Michael a "non-naturalist" is just someone who has no idea what the word "moral" is supposed to mean. Anyone who has a definition of the word "moral" thereby fails to be a "non-naturalist." It's basically, "If you have an answer to my question, then you don't have an answer to my question. I'm only accepting answers from those who don't have answers."

So this is one of those cases where someone who doesn't know what a word means can't do things with that word. There is nothing strange about this.

- :lol:

- Told you so:

my concern here is that even if we found the magical formula for goodness, Michael would immediately, given his approach in these threads, say, "I admit that X is good, but why should I do/seek what is good?" — Leontiskos

Even if Moore's question were resolved, my contention is that this would in no way resolve Michael's inquiry in the OP. For Michael the definition of good will not suffice to provide rationale for moral 'oughts'. — Leontiskos

. . .17 hours later:

Whether or not pleasure is good makes no difference to our experience of pleasure. Whether or not suffering is bad makes no difference to our experience of suffering.

[...]

So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael

---

Do you see how reliable and trustworthy I am? Would you like to buy a bridge?

I've contributed plenty to this thread, so I'll call it "good." A-dios.

I know. This discussion is intended to show that if theories like Moore's are correct then moral facts don't matter, and so perhaps works as a reductio ad absurdum against such theories. I do not endorse Moore's ethical non-naturalism. — Michael

But Moore holds that moral facts do matter because when people do as they ought to, societal good increases. So why does it matter if killing babies is moral? Because if you do it, the good will be maximized.

So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael

Your question is equivalent to this:

If we want to promote nutrition, and nutrition is promoted by increasing vitamin C intake, then why don't we just promote vitamin C and not nutrition? What is added by saying we want to promote nutrition if nutrition happens to equal vitamin C?

The reason is that we don't just happen to like vitamin C, but it's that we like nutrition and vitamin C is our vehicle for getting there.

We might deny immediate pleasure (e.g. drug use) not because we think denial of immediate pleasure is the good, but because it promotes greater pleasure, which is the good.

You will always act in your own self-interest, according to your understanding. Morality is a social construct, common to many kinds of creatures, and their various societies. It is an understanding of like kinds for the mutual survival and well-being of the individual. An individual alone with no one to relate to, has no use whatever for morality, he/she is alone.

But Moore holds that moral facts do matter because when people do as they ought to, societal good increases. — Hanover

Why does it matter if good increases? It's a non-natural property that has no practical affect on us or our lives. Unlike nutrition.

Then you need to revise your definition, because you are deviating from it ('Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this"'). — Leontiskos

Despite what I said here, I tend to use "ought" and "should" slightly differently. I use "ought" when I intend to assert the existence of an obligation and "should" otherwise, which is why I say "you should brush your teeth" and not "you ought brush your teeth".

But if you want me to be more explicit then I'm assuming that "this is immoral" means "we have an obligation to not do this". This is somewhat similar to Moore's definition where he states:

the assertion ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe’

Although whereas I am defining a descriptive claim as a normative claim, he is defining a normative claim as a descriptive claim. That itself, I believe, introduces a problem with the very notion of obligations under Moore, but for the sake of this discussion I'm letting it slide and assuming for the sake of argument that normative obligations are sensible and true.

It's one thing to refuse to define these things, and quite another to claim that they have no bearing on motivation. Everyone who has an inkling of what 'good' or 'moral' means knows they bear on motivation. If your arguments have led you to a contrary conclusion then you have coined new words that no one is familiar with, and it's no wonder that you are causing a great deal of confusion. — Leontiskos

I know they bear on motivation. I'm asking why they bear on motivation if we're ethical non-naturalists. It's not a given that if (we believe that) we are obligated to behave a certain way then we will behave that way. See the article on moral motivation:

No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. And realists certainly need not take the view that Mackie ascribes to Plato, that seeing objective values will ensure that one acts, “overruling any contrary inclination” (Mackie 1977,23). An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts. Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated. As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification (alluded to earlier) that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.

But whereas that article asks about the reasons for motivational "failure" I'm asking about the reasons for motivational "success".

But you are saying that I ought to make others happy, and that was the point I was at pains to demonstrate. — Leontiskos

I am explicitly telling you right here and right now that I would like it if you were to make people happy but that you do not have an objectively binding moral obligation to make people happy. Nothing about this is a contradiction.

you moved the goalposts and started talking about obligations. — Leontiskos

From the OP:

Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true. What then?

It's always been about obligations. I just often you the phrase "you ought do this" rather than "you have an obligation to do this" because it's quicker to write.

And if you want, we can do away with all talk of "good" and "bad", "moral" and "immoral", "right" and "wrong", "ought" and "ought not", "should" and "should not", and just say this:

1. Whether or not we have an obligation to not eat meat does not affect the outcome of our decision to eat or not eat meat.

2. Given my recognition of (1), whether or not I have an obligation to not eat meat does not factor into my motivation to eat or not eat meat.

3. If you recognize (1), and if whether or not you have an obligation to not eat meat does factor into your motivation to eat or not eat meat, then why? Why are you motivated to obey an obligation when the outcome of your decisions is not affected by the "existence" of such an obligation? Is it simply a matter of principle?

Why does it matter if good increases? It's a non-natural property that has no practical affect on us or our lives. Unlike nutrition. — Michael

That's not how Moore describes the non-natural. Show me where non-naturalism is defined as having no effect on our lives.

Non-naturalism is that which can't be provided an essentialist definition and whose properties are not sensible in terms of natural (physical) properties. That I can't touch the righteousness of an act doesn't mean it doesn't exist or that it has no impact on the world.

If the good had a practical affect on our lives then the good could, in principle, be determined empirically, but as Moore says:

We cannot tell what is possible, by way of proof, in favour of one judgment that ‘This or that is good,’ or against another judgment ‘That this or that is bad,’ until we have recognised what the nature of such propositions must always be. In fact, it follows from the meaning of good and bad, that such propositions are all of them, in Kant’s phrase, ‘synthetic’: they all must rest in the end upon some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be logically deduced from any other proposition.

We just either accept or reject the proposition that this is bad (and we're just either right or we're wrong). It's not the case that if this is bad then it will affect us this way, otherwise it will affect us that way, and that because it has affected us this way then it must be that this is bad.

1. Assumption: Ethical non-naturalism
2. Assumption: Ethical truths affect choices
3. Assumption (but argued for in this thread): If ethical non-naturalism is true then ethical truths cannot affect choices
4. Therefore, both (ethical truths affect choices) and not (ethical truths affect choices)
5. Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is false. — bert1

It's not that ethical truths don't affect choices but that ethical truths don't affect the outcome of choices. If I choose to eat meat then the outcome of eating meat is the same whether or not I ought not eat meat.

Whereas the viability of antibiotics can very much affect the outcome of my choice to take antibiotics when sick.

It's not that ethical truths don't affect choices but that ethical truths don't affect the outcome of choices. If I choose to eat meat then the outcome of eating meat is the same whether or not I ought not eat meat. — Michael

This doesn't follow from Moore’s quote in the post above it. If Moore is adopting a Kantian view where he claims moral principles are synthetic, then he is specifically stating a moral outcome does affect the world and the world will be different if the outcome is different. This isn't to say the basis for the principle (in Kant's case, the categorical imparative) is known by evaluating the world and gauging it's consequences (i.e. that it's known a posteriori), but instead that it is a synthetic a priori truth (which is what Kant considered the categorical imparative to be).

The fact that I know something purely from intuition (which is what Moore is noted to be:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/#:~:text=Moore%20is%20the%20intuitionist%20who,on%20goodness%20rather%20than%20rightness.) or a priori (per Kant) doesn't mean the consequence isn't measurable.. It simply means epistemologically, I know it's rightness without having had to experience it and that its outcome is not what made it good or bad.

he is specifically stating a moral outcome does affect the world and the world will be different if the outcome is different — Hanover

This wording is ambiguous.

If pleasure is moral and suffering is immoral then a pleasurable outcome will be a moral outcome and a sufferable outcome will be an immoral outcome, and a pleasurable outcome does indeed have a practical difference to a sufferable outcome, and so according to an extensional reading there is a practical difference between a moral outcome and an immoral outcome.

But that’s not what I’m arguing. I’m arguing that a pleasurable outcome where pleasure is moral has no practical difference to a pleasurable outcome where pleasure is immoral (or just not moral). According to an intensional reading there isn’t a practical difference between a moral outcome and an immoral outcome.

If there were a practical difference then we could empirically distinguish the presence or absence of moral goodness but given that moral goodness is said to be a non-natural property it then follows that we cannot empirically distinguish the presence or absence of moral goodness.

Although, in fact, I could accept that there is an empirical difference between moral pleasure and immoral pleasure but still argue that there is no practical difference, much like there is an empirical difference between a red umbrella and a yellow umbrella but no practical difference.

Why does it matter if my umbrella is red or yellow? Why does it matter if pleasure is moral or immoral?