I can't see any distinction between this idea of a collective consciousness and the idea of "mind at large". What would you say is the difference? — Janus

That 'mind at large' suggests an objective reality. That is the reification involved. A subtle but important point, discussed extensively in Buddhist scholastic philosophy and in debates with the Brahmins.

Oh, and Happy New Year to you, although it's already an old year, I copped a traffic radar booking on Day One. :fear: complete with double points.

That 'mind at large' suggests an objective reality. That is the reification involved. A subtle but important point, discussed extensively in Buddhist scholastic philosophy and in debates with the Brahmins.

Oh, and Happy New Year to you, although it's already an old year, I copped a traffic radar booking on Day One. :fear: complete with double points. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by "objective reality"? A mind at large in the 'God' or 'universal mind' sense is not an object, but if we want to say it is real, then we are positing it as an actuality, no?

Bad luck about the traffic fine...it appears that traffic radars have no conception of "happy new year".

What do you mean by "objective reality"? — Janus

That particular essay is attempting to stay within the guidelines of Madhyamaka philosophy - 'middle way'. When asked if the self exists or does not, the Buddha does not reply, but maintains a noble silence.

That particular essay is attempting to stay within the guidelines of Madhyamaka philosophy - 'middle way'. When asked if the self exists or does not, the Buddha does not reply, but maintains a noble silence. — Wayfarer

Yes, I understand that, but such silence does not constitute a philosophical position. That said, bear in mind that I am no advocate of holding philosophical positions, but the subject of the thread was as to what is the best argument for physicalism, and I stated that physicalism, understood as the idea that there are mind-independent existents, seems to me the most plausible inference to explain the world we experience.

I don't see a cogent distinction between the idea of an 'Alaya' or 'storehouse' consciousness and the notions of a universal or collective consciousness, deity or God; they all seem to me to be variations of the same theme with few differences between them that make a difference. The only difference that makes a significant difference seems to me to be the idea of a personal God.

Hang on, wrong thread.

O right, sorry—I've merged two discussions here, so it's a case of 'half-wrong thread'. That said, the topics are closely related; "mind-created world" vs 'physically existent world'.

Your original post (and subsequent responses) are very compelling to me, Wayfarer. Well done!

And although the unified nature of our experience of this ‘world-picture’ seems simple and even self-evident, neuroscience has yet to understand or explain how the disparate elements of experience , memory, expectation and judgement, all come together to form a unified whole — even though this is plainly what we experience. — Wayfarer

Too many times when science is challenged, it is on the basis that it is inadequate in some way – that religious faith, for example, is needed to shore up the shortcoming of science to explain how the universe works.

But the inability of neuroscience to explain what we all experience in our respective consciousnesses (e.g., perceptions, pain) is not a shortcoming; it’s simply not the domain of neuroscience. Similarly, the fact that gravity does not rake leaves is not a shortcoming of gravity. Leaf-raking is not relevant to the concept of gravitation.

On the other hand, neuroscience does play a role in our conscious experience. As I’ve written in another Forum discussion, I am unable to project my (conscious) feeling of pain onto a screen for you to experience – even though I am able to project an MRI scan of my brain onto a screen, showing you certain neurological biomarkers that correspond to my feeling of pain. Although I can (scientifically) describe and explain my pain, I am unable to provide you with the experience of my pain. So neuroscience plays a role in all this – just not the only role.

Your thought-experiment was brilliant.

One of the thought-experiments I sometimes consider is imagine having the perspective of a mountain (were a mountain to have senses). As the lifespan of a mountain is hundreds of millions of years, you wouldn't even notice humans and animals, as their appearances and dissappearances would be so ephemeral so as to be beneath your threshold of awareness. Rivers, you'd notice, because they'd stay around long enough to actually carve into you. But people and animals would be ephemera. At the other end of the scale, from the perspective of micro-organisms, humans and animals would be like solar systems or entire worlds. — Wayfarer

The blend of imagination, science and philosophy is both thought-provoking and great fun!

Thank you Thales, very much appreciate the feedback :pray:

What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer

Meaningless to us, whose every thought is conditioned by our perspective. We are perceptive and limited creatures with central nervous systems, and as you point out perspective is deeply woven into the fabric of our understanding. But just because we cannot truly think beyond perspective, isn't it injudicious to thereby conclude that reality itself is incoherent outside of perspective?

But just because we cannot truly think beyond perspective, isn't it injudicious to thereby conclude that reality itself is incoherent outside of perspective? — hypericin

What does 'coherent' mean?

Coherent

1. (of an argument, theory, or policy) logical and consistent - "they failed to develop a coherent economic strategy" Similar: logical, reasoned, reasonable, well reasoned, rational, sound, cogent, consistent, well organized, systematic, orderly, methodical, clear, lucid, articulate, relevant, intelligible, comprehensible, joined-up Opposite: incoherent, muddled,

2. forming a unified whole, "the arts could be systematized into one coherent body of knowledge"

Absent a perspective, how could there be coherence? As I said at the outset, we can imagine an empty cosmos, but that imaginative depiction still relies on an implicit perspective, or else there is nothing nearer or further, larger or smaller. The mind brings that order to any such depiction.

I also refer to a recent book I've mentioned a number of times, Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles C. Pinter (Routledge Feb 2021). Pinter, a mathematician who had an interest in cognitive science, shows in great detail how it is the mind that operates in terms of gestalts (meaningful wholes) and brings the order we perceive to the universe:

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer. — Introduction

As I said at the outset, we can imagine an empty cosmos, but that imaginative depiction still relies on an implicit perspective, or else there is nothing nearer or further, larger or smaller. — Wayfarer

Are you conflating a frame of reference with a mental perspective? Nothing can be nearer or further, larger or smaller, independent of a frame of reference. But a frame of reference is not a mind, even though a mind can furnish one.

A boulder and a stump is not inherently nearer or further. But if I drive a stake in the ground, the boulder might then be nearer to it than the stump. Similarly, the stake might be taller than the boulder and shorter than the stump. But a stake is not a mind, merely a frame of reference.

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds — Introduction

It is clear that appearance is something created by minds. But shape? I struggle with that. Shapes unlike colors have properties that are mind-independent. Bowling balls roll by virtue of their shape, whether or not a mind is there to observe it.

Are you conflating a frame of reference with a mental perspective? Nothing can be nearer or further, larger or smaller, independent of a frame of reference. But a frame of reference is not a mind, even though a mind can furnish one. — hypericin

Isn't positing 'a frame of reference' without their being a mind to conceive it, merely speculation?

It's difficult to convey Pinter's argument in a few sentences. But further on in the text, he notes:

We are misled by common sense to assume that we see in Gestalts because the world itself is constituted of whole objects. In actual fact, the manner in which physical objects are related to one another and come together rests on an entirely different principle, called the Addition of Simples, which is explained above. The reason events of the world appear holistic to animals is that animals perceive them in Gestalts. The atoms of a teacup do not collude together to form a teacup: The object is a teacup because it is constituted that way from a perspective outside of itself. In a similar way, a photograph consists of a large number of tiny dots of different colors, called pixels. The little dots do not conspire together to give rise to Grandma’s portrait. The portrait comes to exist in visual awareness when the whole of it is seen from an external perspective. The existence of an object as an individual whole is always something external to the object, not inherent in the object itself. — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter

In respect of the 'addition of simples'

Newton’s equations, which apply to pairs of bodies in space, determine the trajectories of planets around the sun. However, these trajectories are meaningful only to beings who see and conceive in Gestalts. The shape of an orbit, though it exists only in the eyes of a Gestalt observer, is a direct consequence of Newton’s laws, and no further principle is needed to account for it. Although the shapes of orbits are fully determined by the underlying physics (that is, by addition of simples), orbits exist only in the scheme of reality of Gestalt observers. The reality which a Gestalt observer perceives is quite different from that of the underlying physical world. In the Gestalt whole, the observer sees patterns—and these patterns do not exist in the ground reality because patterns emerge only in spread-out wholes and exist only in Gestalt perception.

I've had a few debates about this point with others here, and I agree it's a difficult point to convey. But what I think it means is that what we attribute to the world, as being the intrinsic property of objects, is actually an artefact of perception which is constructed from the (unconscious) tendency of the mind to construe objects as meaningful wholes. So what is thought to be 'inherent in the object' such as its perceived roundness, does not exist on the level of the primitive constituents of that object as described by science, but is imputed to it by the observer. And the reason that is difficult to see, is because we are accustomed to looking through that perspective, whereas here we're being asked to look at it. That's why I say at the outset of Mind Created World that the approach is mainly perspectival - that it requires a perspective shift (indeed, something very like a gestalt shift).

My essay ends with a quote (thanks to @Joshs for bringing it to attention):

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned — Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, Dan Zahavi

There are principles in the occults saying, The Universe is Mental. Mentality does hold primacy over physicality. Yet there is still a higher one, the One or Echad. That which transcends even mentality and physicality.

Isn't positing 'a frame of reference' without their being a mind to conceive it, merely speculation? — Wayfarer

Speculation? I don't see how. It takes a mind to mark something as a frame of reference. But it takes a mind to formulate a proposition at all. Does that imply that the truth of all proposition are mind dependent? In what sense would "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" no longer be true when sentient life is gone?

The little dots do not conspire together to give rise to Grandma’s portrait. The portrait comes to exist in visual awareness when the whole of it is seen from an external perspective. The existence of an object as an individual whole is always something external to the object, not inherent in the object itself. — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter

How is it then possible for the picture to inform? Suppose I have never seen Grandma, and the portrait includes the hairy mole on her cheek. Now I know it is there. If there is no mind independent feature of the picture as a whole, how can it tell me something that was not previously in my mind?

Similarly I had know foreknowledge that you would reply to me exactly as you did. Now I know your reply. Does that knowledge come from me alone, merely my personal interpolation, when in truth the words on my screen are just assemblages of pixels?

So what is thought to be 'inherent in the object' such as its perceived roundness, does not exist on the level of the primitive constituents of that object as described by science, but is imputed to it by the observer. — Wayfarer

This division between "simples"/primitive constituents, and "Gestalts", seems to be doing exactly what this quote says is impossible:

it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” — Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, Dan Zahavi

For my part, I don't see why the roundness of the bowling ball should not be included among the " primitive constituents of that object as described by science". The roundness determines its Newtonian behavior, after all.

I don't see how. It takes a mind to mark something as a frame of reference. — hypericin

A frame of reference is clearly an artificial creation. From Wikipedia: "In physics and astronomy, a frame of reference (or reference frame) is an abstract coordinate system whose origin, orientation, and scale are specified by a set of reference points―geometric points whose position is identified both mathematically (with numerical coordinate values) and physically (signaled by conventional markers).[1]"

How do you think that something other than a mind could mark a frame of reference?

How do you think that something other than a mind could mark a frame of reference? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sentence "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" , the sun is the frame of reference in which the relation "further" operates. It takes a mind to formulate any proposition; in this one, the Sun is marked as a frame of reference, without which "further" would be meaningless. But does the proposition hold independently of minds, or not?

In what sense would "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" no longer be true when sentient life is gone? — hypericin

That is one example of an empirical fact. As I said in the OP I don't deny empirical facts. What I'm criticizing is the attempt to absolutize them as self-existent in the absence of any mind. The nature of the universe absent any mind....well, what can be said?

Kant, to whose philosophy I refer, was an empirical scientist as well as philosopher. His theory of nebular formation, modified by Laplace, is still considered scientifically respectable, even if superseded in many ways by subsequent discoveries.

In relation to empirical science, Kant believed that our scientific knowledge is valid within the realm of phenomena. He acknowledged the importance and validity of empirical science in understanding the natural world, as it deals with how things appear to us through our senses and rational faculties. His own work in the field of physical geography and the nebular hypothesis reflects this belief in the value of empirical investigation.

Kant’s philosophy essentially proposes a framework in which empirical science can coexist with transcendental idealism. Empirical science investigates and explains the world of phenomena, which is the world as structured by our sensory and cognitive faculties. On the other hand, transcendental idealism addresses the fundamental nature of these faculties themselves and the limits of what we can know, as well as the sense in which what we know is moulded or constructed by our knowing of it. ‘Things conform to thoughts, not thoughts to things’ as it is sometimes said.

Likewise it’s important to understand that what I propose in the OP is not in conflict with empirical science.

For my part, I don't see why the roundness of the bowling ball should not be included among the "primitive constituents of that object as described by science". — hypericin

The mathematical description of a sphere in three-dimensional space is given by:

x²+y²+z²=r ²

Here x, y and z are the coordinates of any point on the surface of the sphere, and r is the radius of the sphere. This equation ensures that every point on the surface of the sphere is exactly r units away from the origin.

What about that equation ‘looks spherical?’ Rhetorical question of course but makes the point that a sphere can be perfectly described by an equation as can all of the primitive elements described by mathematical sciences without ‘looking like’ anything. Its appearance as spherical is imputed by the observing mind - which is not to deny that it is spherical, but to recognise the constructive contribution of the observer.

The deeper point about this essay, is that it draws attention to the naturalistic notion of the purported mind-independent nature of objects. Where this arises, is in the fact of our existence as subjects in the domain of objects. Scientific method seeks to eliminate all trace of the personal, the idiosyncratic, and, in that sense, the subjective, so as to ascertain the quantifiable attributes of the objects of scientific analysis which will be the same for any observer. This is why physics and physicalism have been paradigmatic for the scientific outlook generally. Furthermore, it puts aside the existential question of existence in favour of instrumental utility, of mastering the forces that beset us. (Hence the emphasis on the quantitative rather than qualitative.)

But what this conceals or overlooks is that objectivity is a methodological axiom which is then taken for a metaphysical principle. That is the point at which it becomes metaphysical, as distinct from methodological, naturalism. Methodological naturalism can be, in fact should be, circumspect with regards to metaphysical questions, of which ‘the role of the mind in the construal of experience’ is an example par excellence. But due to the generally dismissive attitude of modern culture to such questions, they are subjected to the Procrustean bed of empirical judgement, even though they transcend the bounds of empirical experience. This is what the OP is drawing attention to.

In the sentence "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" , the sun is the frame of reference in which the relation "further" operates. It takes a mind to formulate any proposition; in this one, the Sun is marked as a frame of reference, without which "further" would be meaningless. But does the proposition hold independently of minds, or not? — hypericin

I'm not as forgiving as Wayfarer on this issue. The simple answer is no. No proposition cannot be said to "hold" independently of minds. Each proposition needs to be interpreted for meaning, and a judgement made concerning the truth or falsity of what is meant, in order to determine whether or not it holds.

It appears to me, like you have made that judgement concerning the stated proposition, and you conclude that the proposition is true. You also appear to believe that the proposition will continue to be true into the future, indefinitely, if at some time in the future there would be no minds to interpret it. I see two distinct epistemological problems here.

First, there is the matter of your judgement that the proposition is true. How can we know the correctness of this judgement? Even if all currently living human minds agree with you, a new way of understanding the reality of the solar system might demonstrate that this judgement of the proposition as true, was based in a form of misunderstanding. This is what happened when the geocentric model was replaced by the heliocentric. We really have no idea of how our understanding of spatial-temporal relations may change in the future. And, problems like quantum uncertainty, entanglement, wave-particle duality, wave-function collapse, and spatial expansion, demonstrate very clearly that change to this understanding is inevitable. Remember what happened to Pluto, it was a planet and now it's not.

The second problem is the issue of the indefinite continuation of sameness into the future, as time passes. This problem Hume elucidated in his discussion of causation and inductive reasoning. Things have continued through time, in the past, to exist in a very specific way, and this supports the supposed continuation of the truth of your proposition, into the future. However, we do not know or understand the true nature of passing time, so we cannot make the proposition required to support the claim that your proposition "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" will continue to be true indefinitely into the future, even if it is true now. What we know is that the future is full of possibility and we only apprehend an extremely small portion of the magnitude of that possibility. Because the future is full of possibility and we only apprehend a very small portion of it, we ought not expect that true or false can be attributed to any statements about future conditions. This was covered by Aristotle when he discussed the conditions under which the law of excluded middle must be forfeited.

Unless solipsism obtains, mind is dependent on (ergo, inseparable from) More/Other-than-mind, no? — 180 Proof

Could you please elaborate on the relationship between the two parts of the sentence? I am interested in hearing why.

... "hearing why" what?

In hearing why you think it is the case that mind is not dependent on non-mind if solipsism is the case. It is an interesting argument to me so I'd like to know more about it.

Tip of the hat to @Gnomon for pointing out a book recently, Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics which I have subsequently acquired. Chapter 5, Idealism Without God, seems relevant to the argument presented here. I googled the author, as you do, and found the website of Helen Yetter-Chappell (why does everyone look so young all of a sudden :yikes: ), which also contains a link to her (presumably yet to be published book) The View from Everywhere (readers will spot the allusion.)

reality is a vast unity of conscious experiences, that binds together experiences as of every object from every perspective: a “tapestry” woven out of experiential “threads”. — Helen Yetter-Chappell

Chapter 11 is on Buddhist Idealism, which I've not started yet, but which is another influence on this OP.

//ps Meh. Read that Yetter-Chappell chapter, not *that* impressed by it. But it's good to know there are young up-and-coming academics defending idealism.//

... why you think it is the case that mind is not dependent on non-mind if solipsism is the case. — Lionino

By "solipsism" I understand – ontologically, not epistemologically – that only one mind exists and that all else are merely thoughts, ideas or dreams in that one mind. Thus, for the (ontological) solipsist, there is not any "non-mind" for her mind to be "dependent on". No doubt, however, this is not the case.

By "solipsism" I understand – ontologically, not epistemologically – that only one mind exists and that all else are merely thoughts, ideas or dreams in that one mind — 180 Proof

I see now.

What about that equation ‘looks spherical?’ Rhetorical question of course but makes the point that a sphere can be perfectly described by an equation as can all of the primitive elements described by mathematical sciences without ‘looking like’ anything. Its appearance as spherical is imputed by the observing mind - which is not to deny that it is spherical, but to recognise the constructive contribution of the observer. — Wayfarer

Is this not just indirect realism? We agree that appearance is mind-created. Here we also seem to agree that the appearance is a perspective on mind-independent reality.

But contrast with:

hat is one example of an empirical fact. As I said in the OP I don't deny empirical facts. What I'm criticizing is the attempt to absolutize them as self-existent in the absence of any mind. The nature of the universe absent any mind....well, what can be said? — Wayfarer

Why is the equation describing the sphere mind independent, but the equations describing planetary orbits somehow dependent on there being minds?

Methodological naturalism can be, in fact should be, circumspect with regards to metaphysical questions, of which ‘the role of the mind in the construal of experience’ is an example par excellence. — Wayfarer

Sometimes I feel you vacillate between a kind of (weak?) idealism and indirect realism. An indirect realist would also emphasize the ‘the role of the mind in the construal of experience’, while acknowledging external reality. You do as well. Is the difference between your position and indirect realism just a difference in emphasis? An emphasis on the mind's role, and a deemphasis on the determining role of external reality?

Fair points, I’ll think it over. But I don’t think it’s indirect realism, as the external world can’t be said to exist outside of or independently of the mind. But neither does it not exist.

The chapter one abstract of Pinter, again:

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies—but all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds.

Is that ‘indirect realism’?

Is that ‘indirect realism’? — Wayfarer

To my understanding, yes actually.

Without minds, "Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now", but "Objects ... have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds."

So, it it were idealist instead of indirect realism, what would be the difference?