You are, given a physicalist view of human beings. Insisting that you are not is just question-begging. — goremand

Then physicalism is wrong, since I'm not a zombie. I cannot be wrong about not being a zombie. Do you think you're a zombie?

I cannot be wrong about not being a zombie. — RogueAI

"I cannot be wrong", that sounds extremely dogmatic.

Do you think you're a zombie? — RogueAI

Sure, why not? At least it is worth considering.

I cannot be wrong about not being a zombie.
— RogueAI

"I cannot be wrong", that sounds extremely dogmatic.

Do you think you're a zombie?
— RogueAI

Sure, why not? At least it is worth considering. — goremand

If materialism requires one to be open-minded to the idea one is a p-zombie (or materialism somehow makes the idea that one is a zombie palatable), that is a giant red flag. Physicalism/materialism is in massive trouble if it can't find a way to get out of p-zombie open-mindedness.

"I cannot be wrong", that sounds extremely dogmatic. — goremand

Indeed, and yet a necessary condition for denying the existence of my mind is the existence of my mind.

Physicalism/materialism is in massive trouble if it can't find a way to get out of p-zombie open-mindedness. — RogueAI

Being open-minded is a red flag? Why is that? Usually I find dogmatism to be a red flag.

Indeed, and yet a necessary condition for denying the existence of my mind is the existence of my mind. — RogueAI

Not really, you can talk to chatGTP and it will deny having a mind.

the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, — SEP

Thales saying, that "everything is water" is wrong. He didn't say that. What he said was, that the origin of the world is water. To say everything is water doesn't make sense, and misinterpreting Thales.

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. — SEP

The word "Physicalism" itself is a concept, which is not physical, but an idea. Therefore saying "everything is physical" is a self-contradiction. If everything was physical, then the proposition itself must be physical. No proposition is physical. It follows the claim is a non-sense.

What's the starting point for an idealist? — Relativist

The fact that knowledge of the world comprises the synthesis of ideas and sensations.

The point is to understand that the origin of everything so far known is physical, and shouldn't imply more than that.
— Philosophim

Feel free to point out an issue with my proposal. — Philosophim

That it is exceedingly vague. As pointed out by me above, and by the SEP article, at issue the question of what constitutes the physical. This is 'Hempel's dilemma': if physicalism is defined by reference to contemporary physics, then it is false — after all, who thinks that contemporary physics is complete? — but if physicalism is defined via reference to a future or ideal physics, then it is trivial — after all, who can predict what a future physics contains? It might include what we now consider to be mental. After all scientific ideas of the physical have changed enormously over history, and are changing even more now. The century before last nobody had the vaguest clue of electromagnetic fields, nowadays the atom is only seen as a point within them. Who knows what 'the physical' might turn out to mean in future?

In effect, and this is the way you use it, 'physical' amounts to a general deference to science as an arbiter of reality. To you, this is obvious, as you frequently say, never mind that a great deal of philosophy comprises questioning what is generally thought to be obvious.

What's the starting point for an idealist? Don't you have to adopt a position that is contrary to our innate noetic structure?

There are different flavors of idealism, but in general they have the same starting point as physicalism. The external world and other minds exist. This would include modern forms of idealism, e.g. Kastrup, or Hegelian absolute idealism. They simply claim that the external world is made of mental substance. Or , in the case of absolute idealism, they claim that the physical and mental are both subsumed in the larger category of the Absolute, but that we can work across these boundaries because both emerge from the same rational structure. Platonic idealism would be another example where there is no denial of the external world. These would all be types of "objective idealism," if you will. I don't find Kastrup's proposed ontology very convincing, but his attacks on physicalism in the "Idea of the World" are pretty good, even if they aren't novel.

There are indeed versions of idealism that do radically diverge from our intuitions about the external world. Berkeley would be the canonical example here; "to be is to be perceived." This would be a "subjective idealism."

Arguably, objective idealism does less to mess with our intuitions than some popular versions of physicalism. Because many physicalists embrace a sort of Kantian dualism and indirect realism, such that we don't ever "experience the world," but experience only "representations of the world." But this leaves us with the whole problem of debating which facets of the world only exist in our map of it, versus which exist in the territory of the world itself. Is the world intelligible, rational, and law-like, or is this something our minds project onto the world? Is a sort of logic/Logos at work in the world, or is any such rationality the product of the mind, and if the latter, how does the mind create something (rationality) that doesn't exist in the world it emerges from?

Donald Hoffman's "The Case Against Reality," goes into this pretty well. Our senses evolved to deliver information about fitness payoffs, not truth. This is why we have such a hard time conceptualizing very large (relativity) and very small (quantum mechanics) things. Our intuitions and senses are only designed to work with medium sized objects and don't equip us to know the world "as it is." Perhaps, he suggests, even our entire view of three dimensional space is an illusion.

I would argue these varieties of physicalism have a bigger problem than idealism. If we can't be sure that what is in our "maps" is also in the "territory," then it seems that our physicalism might reveal itself to actually be subjective idealism. All knowledge turns out to be about how the mind represents the world, not the world itself. It is impossible to know anything about the noumena, the world in itself. But then why posit the noumena in the first place? It seems to be a position based solely on intuition and dogma. But our intuition continually turns out to be bad, the world isn't flat, etc. Plus, the noumena's existing or not makes no real difference for us.

Yet if we get rid of the noumena then we don't have a way to explain why all minds should work the same way, and if they don't work the same way and we can't know the intervening noumena, then we are basically all locked in our own seperate worlds. Or maybe we lose grounds for other minds existing entirely?

Idealism avoids this whole can of worms, and to be fair, some flavors of physicalism do as well.

On the idea of reductionism, I think there is a case for what I call mental content being mapped perfectly to the supporting brain biology. For me there isn't a better alternative. We can certainly map to physical time and location and that's simple enough and convincing to me.

However, I wouldn't end there. Once brains have a sufficiently powerful ability to manipulate non-physicals we have a situation were mental content can drive the physical world. It's a special case of physically supported non-physicals driving physical matter.

So I would focus on driverism not reductionism.
And it has physical results in our physical environment that are obvious.

Inference to a best explanation is nothing if not a metaphysical process, right?
— Mww
It's an epistemological process. — Relativist

I’ll grant the “best explanation” is a condition of the epistemological process, in that some knowledge is either affirmed or denied by it. But the query asks about the inference to, not the explanation for.

Or maybe we lose grounds for other minds existing entirely? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If Physicalism is all about saying "Everything is physical", then it is just a non-sense. If they say
that some objects in the world are physical, then maybe it could be acceptable.

hat it is exceedingly vague. As pointed out by me above, and by the SEP article, at issue the question of what constitutes the physical. — Wayfarer

For me, the physical is something that requires matter or energy to exist. I don't think its honestly all that detailed, its just an answer like: "What makes up molecules? "Atoms". The answer doesn't answer every question we have. It doesn't tell us how atoms can combine or be built into a world of humans. Its just noting the building blocks that everything fundamentally has at its core.

It also does not deny language that has arisen like 'mental', 'subjective' or 'feelings'. Its just important that while using different terminology that we don't forget that its all based in physical reality at the end of the day.

This is 'Hempel's dilemma': if physicalism is defined by reference to contemporary physics, then it is false — after all, who thinks that contemporary physics is complete? — Wayfarer

Hempel's dilemma is an issue of epistemology. Replace 'physicalism' with 'anythingism' and Hempel's dilemma still applies. All Hempel is noting is that what we know today may not be known tomorrow. As an epistemological problem, its trivial. Of course this is the case. That doesn't mean we dismiss what we know today for today. If we did, then we would be stuck in Hempel's dilemma every tomorrow as well. As such its a point that helps us understand epistemology, but does nothing about the issue of physicalism, idealism, or any other ism.

In effect, and this is the way you use it, 'physical' amounts to a general deference to science as an arbiter of reality — Wayfarer

Yes. I refer to what is known today. We always keep the possibility that what we know tomorrow may invalidate the knowledge of the day. But the only rational choice is to take what we know today and do our best with it. It doesn't mean we can't speculate! As I've noted many times, speculation is fun and can lead to some interesting ideas. The problem comes in when someone is so enamored with speculation, that they believe it must be true, and invalidates what we know today. This can never be the case.

To you, this is obvious, as you frequently say, never mind that a great deal of philosophy comprises questioning what is generally thought to be obvious. — Wayfarer

A great deal of philosophy is conjecture, fanciful ideas, and speculation. Many people love to think their viewpoint is obvious, but it must be proven, not assumed. All of these ideas are fun for sure, but its our job as philosophers to weed out philosophy that strays too far from logic and reality and begins to assert itself without proof. Philosophy is a giant brainstorm amongst multiple people, and most ideas will be wrong. Its why we study logic, logical fallacies, and means of thinking that have been proven as rational and air tight. Its so we can sail the storm to find the rare island of truth.

Please, keep brainstorming. Keep poking and prodding at what is known today. That is the only way we make progress and find things that have been missed. But a poke and a prod that does not reference what is known today, cannot demonstrate a valid and clear flaw in today's knowledge. A want, a wish, and our imagination may be desired as true, but that alone does not make it true.

It's worth pointing out that Kim himself says his arguments seem to shut the door on a non-reductive physicalism grounded in substance metaphysics. He allows that a process metaphysics could allow for a non-reductive physicalism.

Bickhard makes a compelling argument that we we should be looking at substance metaphysics anyhow. The story of science, so he says, is the story of the idea of sui generis substances being discarded and process explanations adopted in their stead. Heat turned out to be process, not the substance caloric. Fire turned out to be the process of combustion, not the substance phlogiston. Life turned out to be definable as a far from equilibrium thermodynamic process, not in terms of vital substance. "Fundemental" particles revealed themselves to have beginnings and ends, vacuum a seething sea of virtual particles. Thus, apparent substance seems to be revealed to simply be longer term stabilities in process.

The litany was compelling to me at least. Terrance Deacon cites some similar arguments in "Incomplete Nature." But I'm not sure exactly how this relates to physicalism, since I'm not sure if the term would mean in a process view, where causal closure and superveniance no longer seem relevant.

I don't understand what you're saying. "Inference to the best explanation" is a form of abductive reasoning. It entails consideration of explanatory hypotheses (the explanations) and identifying the one that seems best in terms of things like explanatory power and scope, and ad hoc-ness.

These zombie arguments are kind of pointless. They show nothing, outside of the fact that we can imagine stuff. Sure, that's why we write fiction and stories.

It's just an excuse to rehabilitate behaviorism to show it is wrong again, and to paint consciousness as magic, whereas everything else in the world is just normal "expected stuff".

It is not a-priori evident that non-conscious things with complex behaviors should be evident or obvious at all.

It is not a-priori evident that non-conscious things with complex behaviors should be evident or obvious at all. — Manuel

But it's conceivable. The fact that they show up in sci-fi demonstrates that. This means a reductionist can't shift the burden to a non-reductionist. The reductionist has the burden of proof.

Ok. Thanks.

I mean, if we are talking about conceivability, it's also conceivable that the mind of supreme being exist, absent anything else, that is, no matter, no physics - no "material substrate".

Reductionism is of limited use.

Could you give a little more detail on why a reductionist would have the burden of proof?

And if they do is it proovable?

I mean, if we are talking about conceivability, it's also conceivable that the mind of supreme being exist, absent anything else, that is, no matter, no physics - no "material substrate". — Manuel

Sure. The conceivability of p-zombies demonstrates that a functionalist like Dennett (assuming he qualifies as a functionalist) is only providing possible scenarios. He isn't providing an argument for functionalism. In order to do that, he'd have to actually show how phenomenal consciousness works.

. If we can't be sure that what is in our "maps" is also in the "territory," then it seems that our physicalism might reveal itself to actually be subjective idealism. All knowledge turns out to be about how the mind represents the world, not the world itself. It is impossible to know anything about the noumena, the world in itself. But then why posit the noumena in the first place? It seems to be a position based solely on intuition and dogma. But our intuition continually turns out to be bad, the world isn't flat, etc. Plus, the noumena's existing or not makes no real difference for us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Very interesting post!

I disagree that "all knowledge turns out to be about how the mind represents the world, not the world itself". Our internal representations are just the starting point. Fundamental physics (e.g. quantum field theory; general relativity) are well beyond our intuitive frameworks and the success of this science is a basis for confidence that these models are a good approximation. Any ontology is speculative, but doesn't it make the most sense to extrapolate from such science rather than to abandon it?

Physicalism is coherent: if we are produced from a world that is natural and physical, then our survival would require successful interactions with the actual world- thus implying our representations are functionally accurate- so it's a perfectly reasonable starting point to explore the world and to explain it. It's all about explaining the world to ourselves, so the starting and ending points are on the same basis. What I'm seeing in idealism seems somewhat defeatist:

Yet if we get rid of the noumena then we don't have a way to explain why all minds should work the same way, and if they don't work the same way and we can't know the intervening noumena, then we are basically all locked in our own seperate worlds. Or maybe we lose grounds for other minds existing entirely?

An ontology is a model of the noumena, is it not? So we aren't at all getting rid of it. Physicalism explains why all human minds work the same: they have the same physical construction, the product of the same evolutionary history- shaped by successful interaction with the world as it is.

Could you give a little more detail on why a reductionist would have the burden of proof? — Mark Nyquist

If I'm a functionalist, I would tell you that there is no hard problem. Phenomenal consciousness is fully explained (or explainable) by science in its present state. So I'm telling you that it's wrong to try to separate phenomenal consciousness out as a separate item to be explained.

The conceivability of the p-zombie shows that we can't assume that functionality covers phenomenality, because we can conceive of the former without the latter. To make the functionalist case, I'll have to demonstrate exactly how phenomenal consciousness is generated. Science hasn't done that yet.

Which he denies exist. Saw an extended interview with him the other day. His views on consciousness are frankly embarrassing to me. It's as Galen Strawson says you need to be trained to believe in this eliminitavist lunacy.

I don't know much about process philosophy; I am surprised that causal closure is not relevant to it.

I have to say, too, that the whole notion of "non-reductive physicalism" (nrp) is somewhat confusing to me. So it's difficult for me to parse it in process terms or in any terms.

NRP seems to stand in opposition to, as an alternative to, reductive physicalism.

Which he denies exist. Saw an extended interview with him the other day. His views on consciousness are frankly embarrassing to me. It's as Galen Strawson says you need to be trained to believe in this eliminitavist lunacy. — Manuel

I thought maybe he'd eventually come out of it and join the rest of us.

I have no issue with that at all. Great explaination.

:up:

At his age, it's not very plausible, he likely thinks every other person is serious deluded. Oh well.

The weirdly prophetic perspective that has resulted from being willing to seriously consider physicalism.
— wonderer1

What is it? What is that perspective like? — frank

It is hard for me to communicate, because a key aspect of my perspective results from being somewhat autistic and somewhat savantish. But to take a stab at it...

37 years ago I was a young electrical engineer who had studied information processing in artificial neural networks and I was desperately in love. So I got intensely focused on issues I have with communicating and considering how my brain might be weird in some ways. (I didn't know anything about autism or Asperger's at this point, and it would be a couple decades before I was diagnosed with Asperger's.)

Long story short, I came up with an extremely speculative hypothesis about how my brain might be wired differently from those of a lot of people, and this hypothesis seemed extraordinarily powerful in explaining a wide variety of idiosyncratic things about me, in addition to explaining aspects of human thinking more generally. Since that time I have had a lot of insight into psychology and neuroscience in the sense of recognizing a lot of psychology and neuroscience as bollocks that would be replaced by a view more consistent with my understanding given time. And psychology and neuroscience has gradually evolved to be more in line with what I recognized as being key aspects of human thinking.

In fact here's a scientific finding that is a great fit with the sort of thing I would have expected to find based on my speculations of 37 years ago. I recognized the two systems view of Kahneman years before Thinking, Fast and Slow came out.

So an aspect of what it has been like is being ahead of my time, but on the basis of an intuitive 'picture' I wouldn't know how to communicate very well to someone without a background in electrical engineering. Fortunately a substantial number of people have caught up, and are surpassing my understanding by leaps and bounds these days.

Another aspect of being willing to seriously consider physicalism is understanding that we are all social primates here, although that was a more gradual process for me.

Thank you for sharing that.