I am rethinking this normative theory; because I don’t think it works anymore. — Bob Ross

Right off the bat, maybe I shouldn’t comment, being more a subjective moralist than a normative ethicist, but one thing that stands out in my mind, as a possible clue to rethinking what you’ve done here already, is this…..

What if I also treat myself as a means to an end? — Philosophim

You can’t: it violates FET. — Bob Ross

…..in which is violated the fundamental moral condition, re: the worthiness of being happy. The argument is that he who is a moral agent in the strictest sense of the idea is thereby worthy of his being happy, which is the same as his happiness being given by his accordance with his own moral law. So it is that, not the being of happy, but the worthiness, the deservedness, the righteous acquisition, of it, as end, is always and only given by the self-determined moral law, re: the autonomous “command of reason”, as its means.

It follows that anything violated by acting in accordance with the worthiness of being happy, is an illegitimate moral condition, so if you claim I should not treat myself as a means to an end because it violates the FET, there’s something wrong with the FET.

The something wrong might be as little as….. an end cannot be a desired goal, as you say, but is instead a necessary accomplishment. It is that which determines the morality, the moral constitution, of such agent naturally imbued with it.

Now, ethically speaking, or, speaking from the perspective of a community predicated on moral agency, which just is a kingdom of ends in its strictest sense, putting the pieces of this particular puzzle together, you get to the conclusion that, if all members of the community are worthy of the happiness they each have, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle. And if they are all happy within the community, which is the same as all happy with each other, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle common to each member. Another name for a principle common to all which abide by it, is a universal law. And that subjective command which adheres to such law, is a categorical imperative, the formula for which in a community would be, then, treat each member as an end in himself, just as I treat myself.

These are the irreducible conditions, the means, for a necessary result, a moral end. Humans, on he one hand, being human, are hardly likely to all adhere to a common principle, such that it is impossible that all members of a community are not worthy of whatever happiness they each may have. Some, on the other, consider themselves happy in their disregard of such common principle, but should the less consider themselves worthy of it in the same sense as the other members, because they are not in accord with the community to which they belong, the ulterior witness herein being the administrative code of conduct, which relays to the offender the fact of his immorality and the related condition that his happiness, in whatever form it may have taken, is underserved.

Disclaimer: without “happiness” as the fundamental human aesthetic condition, re: what everybody wishes he had, and without “worthiness of being happy” as the fundamental human moral condition, re: what everybody ought to have, and a method for relating one to the other, none of the above is of any use and can be disregarded without fault.

Anyway….some thoughts, for whatever good they may be.

Right off the bat, maybe I shouldn’t comment, being more a subjective moralist than a normative ethicist,

Your thoughts are always welcome, Mww :heart:

…..in which is violated the fundamental moral condition, re: the worthiness of being happy. The argument is that he who is a moral agent in the strictest sense of the idea is thereby worthy of his being happy, which is the same as his happiness being given by his accordance with his own moral law.

My only worry here is that it isn’t the necessarily the case that a person’s absolute end is their own happiness—viz., happiness may be a means towards something else for someone, or not a means nor an end at all.

I would say that I agree with this section if we replace happiness with, more abstractly, one’s absolute end.

so if you claim I should not treat myself as a means to an end because it violates the FET, there’s something wrong with the FET.

This is fair: if I cannot use myself as a means towards an end, then I am not actually able to set out my own absolute ends. The idea was supposed to be that no one can be used as a sole means toward any end, so that would technically include oneself.

The something wrong might be as little as….. an end cannot be a desired goal, as you say, but is instead a necessary accomplishment

I didn’t understand the distinction here between “desired goal” and “necessary accomplishment”: could you please elaborate?

Now, ethically speaking, or, speaking from the perspective of a community predicated on moral agency, which just is a kingdom of ends in its strictest sense, putting the pieces of this particular puzzle together, you get to the conclusion that, if all members of the community are worthy of the happiness they each have, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle. And if they are all happy within the community, which is the same as all happy with each other, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle common to each member. Another name for a principle common to all which abide by it, is a universal law. And that subjective command which adheres to such law, is a categorical imperative, the formula for which in a community would be, then, treat each member as an end in himself, just as I treat myself.

Notwithstanding my quibble with happiness being necessarily the core of moral agency, I think this makes sense; but my issue is, although it is very practical, that it isn’t a commitment one has simply by being committed to being rational; instead, people have to genuinely (subjectively) obligate themselves to get along with other people: they must accept being a part of a kingdom of ends.

I am trying to avoid these kinds of moral anti-realist motivated normative theories, because moral realists are going to have an easy time dismissing them (and I think most people will not find it convincing): why should I care about being a member of a kingdom of ends?

Instead, I think, it would be much more convincing (especially to the layman) if it followed from the avoidance of a logical contradiction—e.g., because if you don’t, then you are being irrational...that’s a much harder bullet to bite then simply lacking the preference to care about other people. I am having a hard time coming up with one though.

Disclaimer: without “happiness” as the fundamental human aesthetic condition, re: what everybody wishes he had, and without “worthiness of being happy” as the fundamental human moral condition, re: what everybody ought to have, and a method for relating one to the other, none of the above is of any use and can be disregarded without fault.

What do you mean by “worthiness of being happy”? What would make one worthy of that in this view you have outlined?

P1: One should abide by the intended function(s) of their organism. — Bob Ross

"Intended" by who? Which or all "function(s)"? (Hidden premises again invalidate your demonstration.)

I just meant the function in terms of a perfectly healthy organism relative to its species, not that there is an author to those functions. We say "a human is 'intended' or 'biologically wired to' see if they are not defective.

Homeostasis?

What is the question?

'biologically wired to' see if they are not defective — Bob Ross

Are yoi referring to homeostasis?

Sort of. I wouldn't say that the argument is that we should do whatever keeps us at balance to survive, but, rather, align ourselves with our nature as a species: does that imply homeostasis? I thought homeostasis was just an individual's ability to maintain balance in the physical system of which is themselves (i.e., their organism).

….an end cannot be a desired goal, as you say, but is instead a necessary accomplishment.
-Mww

I didn’t understand the distinction here between “desired goal” and “necessary accomplishment”: could you please elaborate? — Bob Ross

After all the metaphysical reductionism, desire is a mere want, the satisfaction of which is anything sufficient for it, hence, contingent. A desired goal may be specific in itself, but makes no allowance for its satisfaction, which may still, then, remain contingent. An accomplishment indicates a satisfaction in itself, a particular goal, but a necessary accomplishment manifests as a satisfaction of a specific goal achievable only under a certain condition, hence not contingent.

This relates to the topic at hand iff the adherence to a subjective principle from which an act according to a categorical imperative the principles prescribes follows, is the one and only permissible means leading to a necessary accomplishment, re: worthiness of being happy.
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Notwithstanding my quibble with happiness being necessarily the core of moral agency, I think this makes sense; but my issue is, although it is very practical, that it isn’t a commitment one has simply by being committed to being rational — Bob Ross

Happiness isn’t the core of moral agency; the worthiness for being happy, is. A guy understandably feels happy for having done the moral thing which justifies it, but he can just as well feel morally worthy of being happy by doing that from which he receives no pleasure at all.

The worthiness of being happy is the core of moral agency; the rationality with which you’ve taken issue I think, comes into play in the injunction of the subjective principle, by means of pure practical reason, from which the worthiness manifests. In this way, a guy may be worthy of being happy, even if the prescription from his own principles cause him to act in such a way he feels no happiness at all.

Happy and happiness are just words, those alledged “fuzzy concepts”, that represent a specific kind of feeling. One could use righteousness, positive well-being, or the like. The word as used here is meant to indicate a fundamental human aesthetic condition. Call that whatever you like, I suppose.
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….why should I care about being a member of a kingdom of ends? — Bob Ross

If there were such a thing, and it was a universal condition, there would be no need to, e.g., turn the other cheek, or, engage in the ol’ eye-for-an-eye routine. And that would make everybody happy, or if not so much happy, then at least to release them from having to worry about being a target of them.
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Instead, I think, it would be much more convincing (especially to the layman) if it followed from the avoidance of a logical contradiction — Bob Ross

In a system where the agent is a causality, contradiction is impossible. The ground of pure practical reason is the construction of its own objects, re: all things moral. Once given, or technically by being given, there is no contradiction possible. If there were such possibility, the agent could not have been his own causal nexus, in which case the entire morally prescriptive methodology is destroyed.

Takes an awful lot of presuppositions for this all to work, but none of them are particularly far-fetched.

align ourselves with our nature as a species: — Bob Ross

Describe "our nature as a species" and explain how you determine that to be so (unless you mean something like 'Aristotle's teleology', then never mind).

I just mean historical, pyschological, and physiological analysis of human's seems to point to a 'boiler plate' human, although we don't have complete knowledge of it yet, such that there is a way which a human--absent of outside infringements, impediments, and influence as well as biological defects--would develop into as time goes on and on...until death. It seems, indeed, like we are 'wired' a particular way, but we can be influenced (externally) or damaged to the point where we do not live up to our human (biological) potential. Does that help?

After all the metaphysical reductionism, desire is a mere want, the satisfaction of which is anything sufficient for it, hence, contingent. A desired goal may be specific in itself, but makes no allowance for its satisfaction, which may still, then, remain contingent. An accomplishment indicates a satisfaction in itself, a particular goal, but a necessary accomplishment manifests as a satisfaction of a specific goal achievable only under a certain condition, hence not contingent.

I think I understand now, the ‘desire’ is just the want for something; whereas the ‘accomplishment’ is the happiness it may bring us upon achieving it—correct?

This relates to the topic at hand iff the adherence to a subjective principle from which an act according to a categorical imperative the principles prescribes follows, is the one and only permissible means leading to a necessary accomplishment, re: worthiness of being happy.

I see now. So ‘worthiness’ is being used in the sense, here, of ‘accomplishment’, right? From this, it follows that we only ever accomplish, and consequently acquire happiness, when we have performed something worthy or perhaps have a character that is worthy (virtuous). Correct?

In this way, a guy may be worthy of being happy, even if the prescription from his own principles cause him to act in such a way he feels no happiness at all.

So, are you saying that in order to accomplish a goal, which brings about happiness, the means may itself not bring any happiness—is that right? Because I can agree with that.

Happy and happiness are just words, those alledged “fuzzy concepts”, that represent a specific kind of feeling. One could use righteousness, positive well-being, or the like. The word as used here is meant to indicate a fundamental human aesthetic condition. Call that whatever you like, I suppose

Fair enough. I think my issue is that worthiness of happiness (i.e., what constitutes an “accomplishment”) seems to be, in your view here, fundamentally “regarding other people as ends in themselves”--but this is predicated on the assumption that everyone would subjectively agree to this, and I don’t think most would. Also, what if they gain accomplishments by defining worthiness in a different way than “being considerate of others”? That seems feasible, at least prima facie, to do, doesn’t it?

In other words, what makes someone actually worthy of being happy other than completing their own subjectively defined goals such that they accomplish them; which could certainly include “regarding people as worthless”.

In a system where the agent is a causality, contradiction is impossible

True.

If there were such a thing, and it was a universal condition, there would be no need to, e.g., turn the other cheek, or, engage in the ol’ eye-for-an-eye routine. And that would make everybody happy, or if not so much happy, then at least to release them from having to worry about being a target of them.

For it to be a universal condition, everyone would either have to agree to it; and I don’t see what convincing argument one can give to get everyone on board with a single (subjective) principle.

Takes an awful lot of presuppositions for this all to work, but none of them are particularly far-fetched.

I like where your heads at, and am intrigued to here more: it, indeed, is not bad at all (:

…..the ‘desire’ is just the want for something; whereas the ‘accomplishment’ is the happiness it may bring us upon achieving it—correct? — Bob Ross

Close enough. If anything, the primary consideration is worthiness, not happiness. It is possible, and often the case, happiness occurs but worthiness for it does not. To accomplish a gain, say, in paying less than market value for a thing, has denied its worth, insofar as the gain on the one hand has cost the seller his profit on the other.

consequently acquire happiness, when we have performed something worthy or perhaps have a character that is worthy (virtuous). Correct? — Bob Ross

Yes, in a moral sense. One is always worthy of his happiness iff he acts in accordance with his virtuous character. Still, it is incumbent upon him, to determine only that act which justifies both his virtuous character, and the happiness he obtains from it.

this is predicated on the assumption that everyone would subjectively agree to this, and I don’t think most would. — Bob Ross

Yeah, that is the common argument. Still, the real point is only to profess that moral condition which is both irreducible and irrefutable. If this and this and this occur, one is morally secure, without equivocation. Seeing as how all this and this and this is an approach to perfection, and no human being ever was an example of perfection, the system it itself an “as if” kinda exposition. Or, “if only”.

Easy to see why folks favor a more practical moral philosophy, one which accommodates less-than-optimum human inclinations. The possibility remains nonetheless, insofar as there is historical precedent for, e.g. categorical imperatives, in the form of galvanizing communities into an objective like-mindedness, re: Pearl Harbor, the Magna Carta, even the Inquisition. Getting a community all together is very far from getting the entire species all together, but maybe it’s merely a matter of the degree of necessity. Alien invasion, global catastrophe….whatever.

Anyway….fun to think about.

:up: