A: Yes, but only up to the point where the rate is so high that the interaction between different electrons can no longer be neglected. — Wayfarer

OK, should have thought of that. I was kind of thinking photons, which don't interact with their neighbors nearly as significantly as something like a charged particle. So I pictured a laser weapon aimed at the slits...

It's the nature of that existence which is the philosophical conundrum. It's not as if it's precise position and momentum is unknown, but that it's indeterminable. It will be found whenever it is observed, but the sense in which it exists when not being observed is what is at issue.

The moon was measured. It's still there despite it not being measured at the moment (like it's possible to ever not measure the moon from anywhere as close as Earth). The proton is like that, but with not quite as many 9's to express the probability of it still 'existing'.
The conundrum of which you speak seems to be that the proton in fact hasn't an objective location/momentum at all between measurements. The moon, being classical, isn't like that. But quantum theory doesn't say that the particle doesn't 'exist'. A few interpretations say it does in fact have these properties at all times, but they're just interpretations. The others might still say it 'exists', in the manner of say energy, charge, baryon & lepton number conservation. It can't just not-exist. It just lacks objective properties that put it in a specific state.

Note that if I say something different from the physics-forum guys, they trump me. There are some really solid experts over there, and I don't often respond to questions for fear of putting my foot in my mouth.

Another note: I've not been reading this thread, so not sure how the non-classical nature of QM has to do with 'best argument for (or against) physicalism'.

The Schrödinger equation's solution is called a wave function. If one simplifies the equation considerably it has the form dQ/dt=kQ, which has solutions involving e^it=cost+isint, giving it repetitive or wave-like characteristics. — jgill

Thanks for the clarification, which was mostly about the terminology. Yes, it definitely has wave-like characteristics.

You don't want to answer them, OK. But that weakens your case. — RogueAI

One would hope, only in the minds of those as subject to fallacious thinking as you are. But what ya gonna do? :chin:

E pur si muove.

The moon was measured. It's still there despite it not being measured at the moment (like it's possible to ever not measure the moon from anywhere as close as Earth). The proton is like that, but with not quite as many 9's to express the probability of it still 'existing'. — noAxioms

I often bring up the famous rhetorical question that Albert Einstein asked his friend on an afternoon walk (I think it was Abraham Pais): 'Does the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?'

I think the answer is obviously 'yes' but the question I would like to ask is, why did he feel compelled to ask it in the first place? Why did it bother him?

Note that if I say something different from the physics-forum guys, they trump me. There are some really solid experts over there, and I don't often respond to questions for fear of putting my foot in my mouth. — noAxioms

They give philosophical questions very short shrift. To all intents, they're banned. So these questions fall between the planks - Philosophy Forum says 'hey, this is a physics question, it's not a matter for philosophy', and on Physics Forum, philosophical questions are not encouraged. I should know - I brought up a question about Platonic realism in mathematics, and it was deleted, with a polite note from a mod saying that nobody there had the expertise to answer it.

The others might still say it 'exists', in the manner of say energy, charge, baryon & lepton number conservation. It can't just not-exist. It just lacks objective properties that put it in a specific state. — noAxioms

Where I think it's philosophically interesting is because it introduces just this question of degree or kinds of existence. You know - it kind of exists. Because in most other contexts, 'existence' is a univocal term - something either exists, or it doesn't.

I often bring up the famous rhetorical question that Albert Einstein asked his friend on an afternoon walk (I think it was Abraham Pais): 'Does the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?'

I think the answer is obviously 'yes' but the question I would like to ask is, why did he feel compelled to ask it in the first place? Why did it bother him? — Wayfarer

The quip was said in the early days of quantum theory when what is now known as the Copenhagen interpretation was 1) pretty much all they had, and 2) was strictly an epistemological interpretation, concerning what was known about a system and not what was. Ontologically, only the Wigner interpretation (leading to solipsism) suggests that human observation has anything to do with what is.

So Einstein perhaps was vocalizing some of the apparent implications of quantum experiments, that one cannot know the state of a system (moon in this case) between measurements. And indeed this is true. The moon is not in a specific state relative to anybody on Earth since it is over one second away and any measurement of it is quite old. That statement is wrong if one presumes counterfactuals.

They give philosophical questions very short shrift. — Wayfarer

That they do. Wrong forum to ask that sort of stuff. But most of the forums that do allow it don't have the sort of expertise found there. I mean, I'm a mod on one of them, and apparently 'top dog' on things like relativity and maybe QM, which is pathetic since I would utterly fail a college level exam on either subject. I learned enough to glean informed implications of both theories on philosophical topics, but not enough to actually do the higher mathematics.

I dabbled in mathematical Platonic realism (especially as it applies to Tegmark's MUH) and found it lacking in explanatory capability. The kind of ontology that makes sense to me simply does not apply to most mathematical structures functionally different than our own. I'm of course not 'most other contexts'.

So many of the actual philosophy forums suffer from a lack of posting standards, resulting in a negligible signal to noise ratio.

The best book I read on it was Manjit Kumar's 'Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality.' It provides a lot of detail on the original discoverers of quantum physics and especially on the Bohr-Einstein debates. Einstein was a diehard realist, he believed there is an objective reality and its the job of scientists to discern it. That was the reason he could never accept the probabalistic nature of quantum theory, God playing dice and spooky action at a distance. But as John Bell gloomily put it 'The discomfort that I feel is associated with the fact that the observed perfect quantum correlations seem to demand something like the "genetic" hypothesis. For me, it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry with them programs, which have been correlated in advance, telling them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, although history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. I feel that Einstein's intellectual superiority over Bohr, in this instance, was enormous; a vast gulf between the man who saw clearly what was needed, and the obscurantist. So for me, it is a pity that Einstein's idea doesn't work. The reasonable thing just doesn't work.'

The moon is not in a specific state relative to anybody on Earth since it is over one second away and any measurement of it is quite old. That statement is wrong if one presumes counterfactuals. — noAxioms

I've never understood that expression about 'counter-factuals'. What does it mean, exactly?

Unfortunately for many of you, I am 85% sure the stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct. Unfortunate, because it is very boring and marks a return to the realism of classical particles with the caveat that they move about randomly. But it literally answers every single interpretational issue in quantum mechanics in very commonsensical parsimonious ways.

I guess there's part of the issue with bringing with bringing quantum mechanics into it ... interpretations are so controversial because everyones got very different opinions. Then again, its hard to ignore because if the quantum mysticists are correct then it does have possibly very big metaphysical implications. Big implications no matter who is correct I guess.

It's the nature of that existence which is the philosophical conundrum — Wayfarer

Precisely! The enigmas of quantum physics are Ontological, not Physical. Waveforms & wavefunctions are subjective metaphors, not objective things. They offer material analogies (water waves) to symbolically represent unseen causes of observed effects (wave-like behavior in aether-like empty space).

Some posts in this thread focus on scientific Physicalism beliefs about quantum queerness, and miss the philosophical Metaphysicalism notions about the fundamental nature of Being. Obviously, an objectively observable material form is necessary for Real existence. But beliefs & ideas having no physical form, can only be "observed" by imagination, and possess only Ideal existence.

The worldview of Physicalism (matter + energy) seems to deny the existence & meaning of immaterial Ideas (mind) that don't seem to be either of those types of real things. Perhaps a perspective of BothAnd Meta-physicalism could combine Real & Ideal into a single monistic über-Ontology, where the prefix doesn't mean "Supernatural", but "Beyond" or "Holistic" or "Comprehensive" : more-than the sum. For example, a quantum particle is both Real (physical) and Virtual (mental or mathematical). :smile:


Physicalism, Dualism, and Idealism :
The debate between physicalists, dualists, and idealists is often presented as an ontological one—a debate over what exists. Very roughly, physicalists hold that everything is physical, dualists hold that some things are physical, and some are mental, while idealists hold that everything is mental.
https://academic.oup.com/book/26763/chapter-abstract/195671674?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Waveforms & wavefunctions are subjective metaphors, not objective things. — Gnomon

Seems to me that these concepts transcend the division between subject and object - which you actually posit here:

a quantum particle is both Real (physical) and Virtual (mental or mathematical) — Gnomon

That book looks absolutely splendid, by the way. I will search around for it. Noted this quotation from the Notre Dame review of same:

(Susan) Schneider argues that physicalism stands astride a contradiction. On the one hand, the physicalist maintains everything in reality is either a fundamental physical entity or depends upon a fundamental physical entity in its (supervenience) base. On the other hand, the physicalist is committed to the idea that, at least in part, what individuates physical entities are certain mathematical facts. But mathematical facts are best construed as facts about abstracta, and hence the physicalist cannot accommodate them in her ontology. Schneider calls this the "problem of the base".

Bullseye!

...can anyone set out clearly what emergence is? — Banno

On my view emergence makes the most sense when used to refer to a naturally occurring(evolutionary) process that began long before language use emerged.

Consider a specific example of knowledge...

It is only from the recognition of causality, that a capable language-less creature will learn and thus come to know that touching fire causes pain. A creature incapable of attributing meaning to the behaviour and the fire will avoid the danger nonetheless, because fire damages biological material regardless of whether or not the biological entity in question is capable of acquiring the aforementioned knowledge in the aforementioned way. So, to be clear, avoiding the danger does not always require knowing that touching fire causes pain. Very simple biological organisms do it just fine despite not having what it takes to correctly attribute causal relations between different things.

Emergence is how the recognition of causality results in knowing that fire hurts when touched. Knowing that fire hurts when touched emerges from correctly attributing(recognizing) the aforementioned causal relations.

Knowledge of biological machinery and physics results in knowing how fire hurts when touched.

Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed.

Knowing that fire hurts when touched - as set out directly above - is existentially dependent upon more than just the fire and the biological creatures' behavior regarding that fire. The knowledge is not contained within, nor possessed by merely the elemental constituents, nor is such knowledge possible without all of them. Without the fire, the behaviour cannot happen. Without the behaviour, the attribution of meaning cannot happen. Without the attribution of meaning, the knowledge cannot be formed/acquired. Without the capable creature, the meaningful attribution of causality cannot happen. Without the meaningful attribution of causality, the formation/acquisition of that bit of knowledge cannot happen.

Other notably emergent things include truth(all senses of the term) and meaning(all senses of the term).

Of course, although I'm not certain, I would strongly suspect that not much of this, if any, aligns with current academic notions of "emergence".

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Earlier you asked what the difference was between emergence and 'backwards reduction', or something to that affect/effect. Why does that question matter to you? Keep in mind what I just roughly outlined above.

Waveforms & wavefunctions are subjective metaphors, not objective things. — Gnomon
Seems to me that these concepts transcend the division between subject and object - which you actually posit here:
a quantum particle is both Real (physical) and Virtual (mental or mathematical) — Gnomon — Wayfarer

The concepts & language in Explanation, Idealism, and Design may be way over my head. So, I only read the Abstract. But you may be able to make sense of it.

When I said a sub-atomic particle is both Real and Virtual, I wasn't making a counter-factual or profound statement. It was just an expression of my personal BothAnd philosophy, wherein both material objects and mental concepts are included in my Holistic worldview. I suppose you could say that it "transcends" our conventional divisions between mental & material Reality, as in Brain/Mind categories.

For example, I accept the scientific/mathematical definition of sub-atomic particles as a practical tool for understanding physics. Yet the waveform itself is not a particle, but a metaphorical representation of a particle's mathematical properties. Ironically, if taken literally, Physicalism might omit philosophical metaphors from its definition of Reality. Which is OK by me. I simply put such non-things into the category of "Ideality". Is that a legitimate word? :smile:

PS___ I don't think UFO's are alien spacecraft in Reality, but I accept that the notion of alien visitations is a popular belief in Ideality.

Both/And Principle :
My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized by putting them into the context of a whole system. . . .
This principle is also similar to the concept of Superposition in sub-atomic physics. In this ambiguous state a particle has no fixed identity until “observed” by an outside system. For example, in a Quantum Computer, a Qubit has a value of all possible fractions between 1 & 0. Therefore, you could say that it is both 1 and 0.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

I think an oft missed distinction here is between the idea that "every thing around us is physical" and the broader claim that "all facts can be explained in terms of facts about physical entities." Abstract objects are more of a problem for the second claim.

The idea that "all the things around us are physical," doesn't seem particularly at odds with some forms of "idealism," particularly Platonism or Absolute Idealism.

The argument that knowledge of mathematical facts is "caused by a physical brain," fails to be a conclusive argument in favor of the stronger claim that "all facts reduce to facts about the physical." The facts underlying X's knowledge that 7 is prime seem like they should be different than those underlying "7 is prime." It seems quite possible that it could be true that we need our brain to recognize mathematical facts and for it to be true that mathematical truths cannot be reduced to some set of facts about physical entities.

If it is claimed that mathematical facts are actually facts about "relations between physical entities," then it still seems like abstract relations exist, and these relations just happen to be equivalent to our original mathematical facts, in which case, it still seems like mathematical facts cannot be reduced properly.

...can anyone set out clearly what emergence is? — Banno
On my view emergence makes the most sense when used to refer to a naturally occurring (evolutionary) process that began long before language use emerged. — creativesoul

Emergence is a Holistic concept, that doesn't make sense from a Reductive perspective, such as Physicalism. Hence, it is sometimes dismissed as anti-science, although Emergence is essential to the 21st century sciences of Systems and Complexity. :smile:

Emergence :
Emergence is a continuous process that appears to be sudden only because the mind reaches a tipping-point of understanding between an old meaning and a new meaning, causing a conceptual phase-change from one logical category to another.

Holism, reductionism and emergence :
Emergence is the opposite of reduction. Holism is the opposite of separability.
The difference is subtle, but emergence and reduction are concerned with concepts, properties, types of phenomena, being deducible from other (lower level) ones, while holism is concerned with the behaviour of parts being independent from relational aspects, or their pertaining to a whole.
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/21419/holism-reductionism-and-emergence
Note --- Holistic properties are top-down phenomena that emerge from collective interrelations within an integrated unified System. :smile:

A Test of Emergence :
This chapter illustrates how the concept of emergence has become a great attention grabber due to the striking behaviors demonstrated in artificial life experiments. Emergence has been called upon conveniently whenever the unexpected intrudes into the visual field of the experimenter, consequently requiring or justifying an economy of explanation. This abuse of the term will eventually devalue its significance and put the concept of emergence itself under a bad light.
https://academic.oup.com/mit-press-scholarship-online/book/13765/chapter-abstract/167404766?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Note --- Unexpected results may result from erroneous expectations. Physical Emergence happens regardless of your presumptions.

I think an oft missed distinction here is between the idea that "every thing around us is physical" and the broader claim that "all facts can be explained in terms of facts about physical entities." Abstract objects are more of a problem for the second claim. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Everything we know via the five senses is physical. But we know some abstract concepts via the sixth sense of Rational Inference. We typically call sensory knowledge "Facts", and theoretical conclusions "Beliefs". Facts can be proven, but Beliefs can only be argued. :smile:

Note --- Of necessity, philosophers have developed Rules of Argument, which are themselves moot.

There are no good arguments for physicalism. Unless we want to say that reality is one and that everything has both a mental and a physical aspect to that. The primacy of physicality is possible but still inferior to the primacy of mentality.

Emergence is a continuous process that appears to be sudden only because the mind reaches a tipping-point of understanding between an old meaning and a new meaning, — Gnomon

As if all emergence results from a tipping point between an old meaning and a new one.

There is no good argument for Budweiser. Unless we want to say that reality is one and that everything has both a Michelob and a Budweiser aspect to that. The primacy of Budweiser is possible but still inferior to the primacy of Michelob.

Did that make sense to you?

Can anyone show something that is not based on physical matter?

I could give time perception, past and future that don't exist in physical matter but that resolves itself as mental content (brain based and physical) that only exists in the physical present.

Eh. Only if you're a presentist.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/

Okay.
Presentism,
Growing block,
And eternalism.

Are those the choices?
Presentism works.

I don't think our best physics even addresses the other two. Is it in the math or something?

Heh. Those are some of the choices.

Presentism does work.

So do the others.

How do we decide?

We have direct access to the present.

It would be the easiest to defend.

How do you prove past or future matter exist.

And their origin is in your brain not a physical observation.

We have direct access to the present. In the present I pick up a history book which tells me something about the past. Was JFK physically assassinated, or was he only assassinated in my brain? JFK's assassination took place in my brain just now, but I believe it took place in past material reality.

Today I can look at a history book. What is its relation to the past?

I'd say your/our/my perception of historical fact is valid. The nature of physical matter is its physical presence. We rely too much on a mental picture of time that isn't a physical reality

We can imagine time lines in our brains but we can't physically get out of the present. Two things are at play, the mental and the physical.

Two things are at play, the mental and the physical. — Mark Nyquist

I agree here. So we're at least equally confused.

I disagree that physical matter is its physical presence. But I also agree with:

We can imaging time lines in our brains but we can't physically get out of the present — Mark Nyquist

I hope nothing I've said suggests that we can, physically or otherwise, get out of the present.

Okay, that's basically what I think.
Could I say a property of physical matter is its physical presence? I'm just getting lost in the words.

We both are. No worries. You can say it -- but I disagree on the basis that yesterday the mountains are as physical as today. So if they are physical today I feel that they must have been yesterday.

But, also, I'll note we're getting into some of the topics outside the topic :D -- I'm not sure where to go, though I'm still interested in arguments for physicalism. Time, causation, meta-metaphysics, metaphysics of physicalism?

The one thing I want to avoid in making another thread is the mind-body problem because that's what this thread is :D

I should correct your grammar.
Yesterday the mountains were as physical as they are today.
Isn't that the correct grammar?
Interesting that you used are instead of were.

Yes, that's the correct grammar.

Arguments for physicalism you mentioned....

What works for me is setting things into a universal form like this:

Physical brain; (mental content)
Physical brain; (time perception)
Physical brain; (thought)
Physical brain; (knowledge)
Physical brain; (mathematics)

On and on.
It recurs often enough that we should expect it to be a universal form of our mental worlds.

It's also useful to understand information physically exists in this form

So information is physical brain; (mental content)

That's my view of how physicalism deals with information being physically based.

Presentism works. — Mark Nyquist

If you deny relativity.