As noted, in light of this complete meltdown, I don't care.
The majority of my posts are seeking correction, and accepting correction. So the patent falseness of your ad hominem is just not a good way to comport yourself. — AmadeusD

You sounded blatantly irrational just demanding me to accept I am wrong. You had no arguments for your points, and also appeared to be not knowing exactly what has been discussed as well. God was only mentioned to add clarification to Thing-in-Itself.

Kant's Theology is a huge area itself, and it is another topic of its own. It would only possible to discuss a concept or two out of Kant's theology in CPR thread as a passing point in conjunction with some other main CPR topics, which was the case here.

But you claimed that Kant's view on God is unknowable ...etc went on with God blah blah, and accused me of being wrong. I thought that is not a proper way to oppose someone philosophically.

I felt that your point of telling me wrong was based solely on your blind trust of the other people (authority, or someone you respect etc) or source of the info (the internet), rather than the arguments or the truth itself, and for some reason having strong emotional urge to put my points down for no particular reason. Not fair was it?

….reputable source…. — fdrake

Palmquist. Guyer. (?)

I don't know. Anyone with papers published in Kant, or the SEP article. Or Kant.

I felt that your point of telling me wrong was based solely on your blind trust of the other people (authority, or someone you respect etc) or source of the info (the internet), rather than the arguments or the truth itself, and for some reason having strong emotional urge to put my points down for no particular reason. Not fair was it? — Corvus

I understand this. And i understand it to be an emotive defense of a patently incorrect assertion, based on an irrational response to a perceived slight, which did not transpire at all how you interpreted it.

Which is why I am not amenable to taking it too seriously.

I understand this. And i understand it to be an emotive defense of a patently incorrect assertion, based on an irrational response to a perceived slight.

Which is why I am not amendable to taking it too seriously. — AmadeusD

In a thread, I would never say someone is wrong blatantly (without having gone through much mutual arguments exchanges), because the arguments and logic will speak for themselves. I would only say something similar or same level of tones, it if the other party said first. If it were the case then the philosophical discussion would be derailing into an ordinary discussion from that point.

It was nothing serious event for me. Just explaining the situation and the logic that operates. :)

I'm not entirely sure I understand the part about the conversation devolving from philosophical to ordinary, but hey... I don't understand a lot of things.

I sincerely appreciate you pulling back from the rather personal nature of hte last few comments. We've had some good interactions here and I wouldn't want a silly blow up like this to ruin that.

:cool: :ok:

You cannot prove the existence of the objects in space outside of you by simply saying you are conscious of your own existence. — Corvus

In B276, Kant starts his proof with "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time."

He doesn't start his proof with "I am conscious of my existence".
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Not contradictory, but not making sense either. — Corvus

Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Refutation of Idealism B276 make sense to an Indirect Realist but perhaps not to a Direct Realist.
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Do you have the CPR reference for backing that points up? No Wiki or SEP, but CPR. — Corvus

For posts on the Forum, the SEP as source information is more than adequate.

Welcome to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), which as of Summer 2023, has nearly 1800 entries online. From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up-to-date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public. Consequently, our dynamic reference work maintains academic standards while evolving and adapting in response to new research. — https://plato.stanford.edu/about.html

In B276, Kant starts his proof with "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time."

He doesn't start his proof with "I am conscious of my existence". — RussellA

"as determined in time" sounds like it needs awareness of time, which can only be achieved by the outer sense perception such as perceiving the movement of the sun around the earth. How does one know one's own existence "determined in time" without yet being sure of the external world?

Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Refutation of Idealism B276 make sense to an Indirect Realist but perhaps not to a Direct Realist. — RussellA

Should the indirect realist not check the argument of the Refutation for the Idealism for any logical obscurity before accepting it?

For posts on the Forum, the SEP as source information is more than adequate. — RussellA

It would be likely to be a biased opinion. It is better to look at the original work first, and then various other commentaries rather than just relying on one 3rd party commentary source.

How does one know one's own existence "determined in time" without yet being sure of the external world? — Corvus

I assume you know your own existence within time, yet you don't seem to believe in an external world.

As you wrote:

I don't see it anywhere. Even with binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world. There is just the empirical world with the daily objects I see, and interact with. That is the only world I see around me. Nothing else. — Corvus

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Should the indirect realist not check the argument of the Refutation for the Idealism for any logical obscurity before accepting it? — Corvus

I'm sure they do. I know I have.
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It would be likely to be a biased opinion. It is better to look at the original work first, and then various other commentaries rather than just relying on one 3rd party commentary source. — Corvus

As Kant's philosophy is extremely complex and notoriously difficult to understand, I think the sensible approach is first to read various commentaries and then look at the original material.

I assume you know your own existence within time, yet you don't seem to believe in an external world. — RussellA

Please don't misunderstand again. I do believe in only one world i.e. the physical world. I was asking about the external world in the Refutation for the Idealist you quoted.

I'm sure they do. I know I have. — RussellA

It didn't appear to be quite the case.

As Kant's philosophy is extremely complex and notoriously difficult to understand, I think the sensible approach is first to read various commentaries and then look at the original material. — RussellA

CPR is not a bible. You don't accept the whole lot in CPR as if it is some religious text like some other folks do. One thing for sure is, it is a great classic with lots of great ideas in it, but also there are some contentious, inconsistent parts and contradictions too.

You must try to clarify the contentious or obscure parts before accepting them. As I said, just relying on only one commentary source, and believing in all it says is not helpful and even might be futile. But also the most important part is your own interpretations on it backed by the logical argument, the original work and the various academic commentaries.

Interpretation based solely on one's own mind sounds more obscure than Kant, and the points based on mainly the popular media sounds too obvious. Mix them all up, and come up with the best points you think correct seems the best way to go for it.

I do believe in only one world i.e. the physical world. I was asking about the external world in the Refutation for the Idealist you quoted. — Corvus

In B276 Kant refers to objects existing outside any human observer: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

You say that you see only one world, it is empirical, it is physical, it is external, it is not internal and it is not Mind-Dependent.

Are you:

An Indirect Realist who believes that the objects they see are only a representation of different objects that exist outside the observer in a non-mental world?

A Direct Realist who believes that the objects they see are the same objects that exist outside the observer in a non-mental world?

A Berkelian Idealist who believes that the objects they see are the same objects that exist outside the observer in a mind?

A Solipsist who believes that the objects they see only exist inside their own mind?

n B276 Kant refers to objects existing outside any human observer: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

You say that you see only one world, it is empirical, it is physical, it is external, it is not internal and it is not Mind-Dependent. — RussellA

There seems to be some logical flaws in the refutation, but it is good to know that Kant believes in the existence of the external world outside him.

Now the question goes back to Thing-in-itself. Is the Thing-in-itself something in the mind or does it exist outside of the mind? If outside, then would it be in the external world, or some other world totally separate from the external world?

If inside of the mind, then in which part of mind does it exist? Or is it just an abstract concept or idea in the mind?

Are you:

An Indirect Realist who believes that the objects they see are only a representation of different objects that exist outside the observer in a non-mental world?

A Direct Realist who believes that the objects they see are the same objects that exist outside the observer in a non-mental world? — RussellA

I don't know what ism I am following. None actually. As you pointed out very well this time, I believe in one empirical (physical) world outside of me. I am not sure if it is a mind dependent or mind independent world. My perception says that without my mind, the world doesn't exist, but my inference says, without my mind, the world will keep existing. :(

Now the question goes back to Thing-in-itself. Is the Thing-in-itself something in the mind or does it exist outside of the mind? If outside, then would it be in the external world, or some other world totally separate from the external world? — Corvus

It depends what you mean by "external world". There is the external world that I perceive as Appearance, and there is the external world outside me that I cannot perceive that is causing these Appearances.

Kant wrote in B276:

"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

Kant wrote in Prolegomena section 32:

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

To my understanding of Kant, Appearances are affected by unknowable Things in Themselves that exist outside me.

However, as we can also think in general terms about Things in Themselves using Transcendental Reasoning on Appearances, thoughts about Things in Themselves exist in the mind.

It depends what you mean by "external world". There is the external world that I perceive as Appearance, and there is the external world outside me that I cannot perceive that is causing these Appearances. — RussellA

How many external worlds do you have, and which one is the real world? Why do you need more than one world?

To my understanding of Kant, Appearances are affected by unknowable Things in Themselves that exist outside me. — RussellA

What is the unknowable Things in themselves that exist outside you exactly mean? What are they?

However, as we can also think in general terms about Things in Themselves using Transcendental Reasoning on Appearances, thoughts about Things in Themselves exist in the mind. — RussellA

So Things-in-themselves exist outside you, but it also exists in your mind? Are they the same Things-in-themselves? Or are they different entities? Are they visible or audible to you? Can you touch them? If they are not perceptible, then how do you know they actually even exist?

It depends what you mean by "external world". There is the external world that I perceive as Appearance, and there is the external world outside me that I cannot perceive that is causing these Appearances. — RussellA

You would agree that human visual perception is restricted to certain frequencies, and auditory perception restricted to certain wavelengths, would you not? Does this mean that frequencies and wavelengths that fall outside these limits are ‘mysterious’? Isn't it fairly simple that our perceptual abilities, and also our intellectual abilities, are limited in some ways, so that what the world is outside of those bounds can't be known by us? I can't quite see why this is such a difficult thing to come to terms with.

How many external worlds do you have, and which one is the real world? Why do you need more than one world? — Corvus

There are many uses for the word "world". There is the world of dance, the world of science, the world of literature, the world inside our minds, the world outside our minds, etc.

One word having several uses is in the nature of language.

What is real? Is the thought of a mountain any less real than the mountain itself?
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What is the unknowable Things in themselves that exist outside you exactly mean? What are they? — Corvus

Kant wrote in Prolegomena section 32:

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

We perceive appearances, phenomena, in our senses. We may see the colour red, feel a sharp pain, taste something sweet, smell something acrid or hear a grating noise.

We have the fundamental belief that something caused these phenomena. But we don't perceive what caused these phenomena, we only perceive the phenomena.

The cause of the phenomena is irrelevant in our experience of the phenomena, in that whether the sharp pain was caused by a bee sting, a sewing needle or a thistle plays no part in the nature of our experience of a sharp pain.

The cause of the sharp pain can be called a Thing in Itself, and even if unknowable, has no bearing on the nature of the actual experience of a sharp pain. Even if we knew what the cause was, this would not change the phenomena that we had perceived.
===============================================================================

So Things-in-themselves exist outside you, but it also exists in your mind? Are they the same Things-in-themselves? Or are they different entities? Are they visible or audible to you? Can you touch them? If they are not perceptible, then how do you know they actually even exist? — Corvus

My belief is that Things in Themselves have an ontological existence outside us even if a particular Thing in Itself is unknowable.

Kant uses Transcendental Reasoning on what we do know, appearances, to conclude that Things in Themselves must exist outside us.

Therefore, "Things in Themselves" have an ontological existence outside us, and they exist as thoughts inside us.

There are many things outside us that are not directly perceptible through the senses yet we reason exist. For example, gravity.

Isn't it fairly simple that our perceptual abilities, and also our intellectual abilities, are limited in some ways, so that what the world is outside of those bounds can't be known by us? — Wayfarer

Exactly. This is the point that Kant is making in the CPR, and as an Indirect Realist, something I totally agree with.

However, I don't think that the Direct Realist would agree with you.

So the indirect realist believes that what we can't see is what is real?

So the indirect realist believes that what we can't see is what is real? — Wayfarer

Not necessarily. Just because I cannot see a unicorn doesn't mean that I think unicorns are real.

From Wikipedia Direct and Indirect Realism

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.
Direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.

I see the colour red, yet the colour red doesn't exist outside my perception of it. I do have, however, the fundamental belief that there is something in the world that caused me to perceive the colour red.

My seeing the colour red is a real experience, and I believe that there is also a real something in the world that caused my seeing the colour red.

For example, you may feel a sharp pain in your hand caused by a bee sting. I don't think anyone would argue that the pain and the bee sting are the same thing and thereby interchangeable. Both are real, yet different things. One is the effect and the other is the cause.

:up:

There are many uses for the word "world". There is the world of dance, the world of science, the world of literature, the world inside our minds, the world outside our minds, etc.

One word having several uses is in the nature of language.

What is real? Is the thought of a mountain any less real than the mountain itself? — RussellA

I am not going to say you are wrong, because you can interpret Kant as you think right for you. But some arguments are more valid or invalid, more plausible or less plausible from the objective perspective.

In Kant, the world is one of the antinomy of pure reason, if you read CPR. Kant says, the world is a totality of all the objects and events in the universe, hence it cannot be conceived.

But he is not denying the outside empirical world where you see all the daily objects and interact with them. One point to bear in mind with CPR is that it is a Treatise for building a transcendental system for Metaphysics. What Kant is mainly interested in is how to build a metaphysical foundation for the transcendental objects such as God, Souls and Freedom. CPR is not a theory of perception or epistemology, but it is a treatise for metaphysical foundation of transcendental objects.

For that, he was trying to demonstrate how it all happens in transcendental way, not empirical way.
He was not interested in Direct Realist or Indirect Realist or Idealist.

Here is a clue. Why did Kant have two concepts on space and time? In CPR, he mostly talks about space and time as internal A priori condition for experience. But he also talks about space as a physical existence in empirical world. Can you think of the explanation for that?

The other points later~

We perceive appearances, phenomena, in our senses. We may see the colour red, feel a sharp pain, taste something sweet, smell something acrid or hear a grating noise.

We have the fundamental belief that something caused these phenomena. But we don't perceive what caused these phenomena, we only perceive the phenomena. — RussellA

This is a completely different interpretation from what I think, and I am afraid to say that it doesn't make sense. In Kant, our daily perception is via appearance and phenomena from the empirical world. And we know the contents in phenomena very well. The whole science is based on the appearance from the empirical world. Denying that would be denying the whole scientific knowledge, then you are degrading yourself to the Pyrrhonian scepticism, and must stop all your judgement on the world.

But obviously there are objects which we can think of, but don't have the matching physical objects in the empirical world such as God, Souls and Freedom. They must exist somewhere, otherwise we are just dreaming or fantasising about them. Kant didn't want that. They are the important metaphysical objects. Where do they belong? They belong to Thing-in-themselves = Noumena.

If you think about daily physical objects in transcendental idealistic way, then of course, you wouldn't know about them. Because you are not using your sensibility then. You would be just thinking about them. You are thinking about books that you have never read, trees that you have never seen ...etc, then of course you don't know what books and trees you are talking about. This makes sense. You can only know what you have experienced. But you can still think about them in concept without knowing.

With all your arguments and points so far which sound totally off the main ideas of CPR, I am wondering if you have been actually reading CPR, or just been reading the run-of-the-mill Wiki and SEP articles trying to jigsaw puzzle the Kant with some unfounded perceptual theories.

But he is not denying the outside empirical world where you see all the daily objects and interact with them. — Corvus

There are several things in your posts that I don't agree with, but as I am off on holiday, I won't be able to tackle them.

However, I think you are misusing the term "Empirical World".

The IEP article Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics differentiates between an "empirical world" in the mind and a "mind-independent world" outside the mind

Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible. Reason itself is structured with forms of experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of empirical experience. These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behaviour and logical properties. These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

IE, the "Empirical World" is the world as perceived via the senses. That we may perceive tables and chairs in this "Empirical World" does not of necessity mean that tables and chairs exist in a "Mind-Independent World".

The IEP article Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics differentiates between an "empirical world" in the mind and a "mind-independent world" outside the mind — RussellA

What do you mean by "mind-independent world"? Did Kant say anything about it?
What significance does "mind-independent world" have with CPR?

IEP seems another site with the run-of-the-mill infos. It is handy at times for getting quick info about simple terms, but not sure if they are accurate enough and offering you the depth in knowledge.
I don't quite agree with the Online info mostly (because for one, any Tom Dick and Harry on the street can go into the online add and edit the contents - why should anyone trust the accuracy of the info???), and also don't see the point of word searching in CPR, and giving out the obscure interpretations making the original text in question more confusing either.

The point of reading CPR is to interpret the original text in logical way, but also in clear and meaningful way, so it is easy to understand for everyone. If any CPR commentary appears sounding more obscure than CPR itself, then it should be committed to flames. :D

With your comment on my misusage of "empirical world", please prove why my usage was a misusage. From my point of view, "empirical world" was not even a main concept Kant delves into deep in CPR. He mentions a few times here and there to denote the external world we live in and interact with.

And please explain what is your "mind-independent world" is, and where is it coming from.

There are several things in your posts that I don't agree with, but as I am off on holiday, I won't be able to tackle them. — RussellA

You are free to disagree as long as you back up with your arguments and evidence for your disagreement. At the end of the day, no one is wrong or right in philosophical discussions, but the points they are making could be.

Enjoy your holiday. Take time. No rush.

To posit the existence of an object of thought is to affirm that which is thought about is conditioned by the categories of quality (whatever it is, it is real) and modality (whatever it is, it has phenomenal representation, thus can be an existence).

To adjoin to an object of thought that there can be no possible matching object in the empirical world, is to deny to that object the condition of the categories (whatever it is, it does not have phenomenal representation thus cannot be determinable as an existence, hence cannot be determinable as real).

In order to alleviate the absurdity of methodological contradiction, it must be the case, then, that the object of thought as such, is not a real physical object, hence the categories are not necessary conditions, and, consequently the object of thought belongs to understanding alone, insofar as the understanding is given as the faculty of thought, and therefore the existence of that object is not necessary and the contradiction disappears.

By thesis-specific definition, thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions, which reduces the faculty of understanding to the faculty by which conceptions arise. In turn, conceptions are representations of that which understanding thinks, as are phenomena representations of that which the faculty of sensibility intuits.

Because thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions, it follows necessarily there must be a plurality of conceptions in order for there to be a synthesis of them. On the other hand, for that object understanding thinks, it does not follow necessarily that object contains a plurality of conceptions, and if it does not, no synthesis of conceptions and thereby no cognition with respect to that object, is possible. By the containing of a plurality of conceptions is meant the schema of the lesser conceptions under the general, by which synthesis itself is even possible.

Under the condition that no faculty has contained in its method that which serves no purpose for its systemic employment, it must be that no singular, uncognizable conception belongs to understanding alone, but rather, belongs to a higher order faculty, and is called an idea, and is properly a transcendental conception of pure reason. The categories are of course, exempt from this criteria, insofar as, while they are themselves singular conceptions albeit not of objects understanding thinks, they have schema, the lesser conceptions, subsumed under them, they serve a systemic purpose within the faculty to which they belong, hence are not mere ideas.

To plumb the subtleties of transcendental philosophy is to grant to reason its proclivity for stepping out on its own, re: the whole raison d’etre of CPR, juxtapositioned to lesser faculties that always operate in conjunction with each other, or with Nature, regarding existences and knowledge.

“…. Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason, “they are only ideas,” we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise—a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason….”

Now, it’s time for important stuff. Like…..football.