So then never-mind all of the stuff(arguments from contingency) you've been saying heretofore?
That settles it now doesn't it?
I pointed out long ago that you were failing to properly quantify your arguments. If you believe all the stuff you've been writing about the existential contingency regarding meaningful statements, and this new revelation directly above, then I suggest you reconcile these claims by virtue of properly quantifying and categorizing the kinds of things that can be and/or are meaningful, and the kinds of meaning that apply to these things. — creativesoul
You seem to be writing random nonsense.
I'm saying you've argued that meaning is dependent upon... and truth is dependent upon... and interpretation is dependent upon...
You should've been arguing that some meaning, and some truth, and some... — creativesoul
The sentence means what it means, without being interpreted? I give up. — Metaphysician Undercover
The sentence only makes sense to a person interpreting it. Without a person interpreting it, it makes no sense, and therefore cannot be true. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can't tell the difference between a known fact, and something believed to be a known fact, because they both appear to be known facts. So we call them both known facts. Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact, or just believed to be a known fact, then it cannot be incorrect to call the thing which is believed to be known fact, by this name, "known fact", unless you want to ban the use of "known fact". Therefore your definition of "known fact" is untenable, rendering it always incorrect to use "known fact", because we would never know whether it is a known fact or not. However, if it is acceptable to refer to the thing which appears to be a known fact, as "known fact", then your definition is wrong. So your concept of "known fact" is actually useless. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, but I don't really see how disjunctivism helps here. How does a theory on perception address Gettier's original two formulations of justified true belief that can't reasonably be considered knowledge? — Michael
So how would you describe the famous fake barn facades case? You are standing in front of a real barn, and therefore you are directly aware of the barn, and so it seems that your are maximally warranted to believe that there's a barn in front of you; but you don't know that there's a barn in front of you (since it is the only real barn in that place, and you found it by mere chance). It seems to me that the disjunctivist will also have to admit as well that it's a case of a true justified believe that isn't knowledge. — Fafner
And the reason that I think this case is particularly problematic for the disjunctivist because in this case your evidence consists in precisely the fact itself that you believe to be true, so we are not assuming here anything like the 'highest common factor' view of evidence, or anything of this kind.
The arguments I produced earlier demonstrate that it is necessary for someone to know P, in order for P to be true. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, when suitably conjoined with a contextualist account of knowlege, disjunctivism would not render a unique verdict in this case, as it indeed shouldn't. The mistake that must be avoided is the idea that there is a unique objective probability of the perceptual experience being an experience of a real barn independent of the characterization of the epistemic power being exercized. How might this probability rather to be evaluated? What contextual range of counterfactual circumstances is it that might relevantly be taken into consideration for purpose of determining whether or not your belief that there is a barn count as knowledge? I'll let you think about it a little before I propose my own suggestion. — Pierre-Normand
And I agree that disjunctivist could possibly respond by giving some sort of contextualist account - but this was my point, it doesn't look that the disjunctivist has any inherent advantage over other accounts simply by virtue of being a disjunctivist. — Fafner
Sure, you can assume here anything you want about interpretation, but it doesn't matter because you have (b) as well that grounds its objective status. — Fafner
You just assume that knowledge (in my sense) is impossible without an argument. You wrote: "Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact" - I don't accept this and I don't see any argument to support this claim. — Fafner
Sorry, I can't figure out where you demonstrated this. Would you mind linking the post or posts? — Srap Tasmaner
All we have to refer to, as "the way which the world is", is how the world appears to us. This is our interpretation of the supposed objective reality. And how the world appears to us, may or may not be a true representation of the way which the world is. Both sides, (a) and (b) are subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now you've gone back to claiming that "known fact" is necessarily the way that the world is. Clearly this is not the case, because what is referred to as known fact is often proven wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
A very fair summary! I mean to test you on what seems to me a problem.Here's a summary. There is a sentence, belief, or some such thing which is said to be true. Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective. On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject", a property of knowledge. There cannot be truth outside of knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm looking at "interpretation." I claim that the meaning of a text is got through a kind of focusing at a correct level of magnification. What I have in mind is analogous to looking at a newspaper photograph. If not focused, the image is just a blur. Too much magnification and all you get is dots, maybe to which no determinate meaning can be attached.Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective.
On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject",
By the way, the inadequate, preconceived notion of knowledge, which led them astray, was the idea that knowledge had to exclude falsity — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore if someone knows that P, this does not mean P is true. — Metaphysician Undercover
Meta wrote:
Here's a summary. There is a sentence, belief, or some such thing which is said to be true. Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective. On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject", a property of knowledge. There cannot be truth outside of knowledge.
You don't see it, but what you said here actually proves my point. If the world appears to you in a certain way, then it is an objective fact that the world is either the way that it appears to you, or that it isn't. So having a mere appearance of reality already makes your appearance objectively true or false. So for example if you have an appearance of seeing a cat on the sofa, then it is either objectively true that there's a cat on the sofa, or objectively false. — Fafner
My definition merely states the conditional that if someone knows that P, then P is a fact. If P is not the case, then by definition the subject cannot known that P (and it doesn't matter if he himself is aware of this). I'm not claiming that we actually know the facts, it is only a definition of what it means to know something. — Fafner
Do you mean to say that under the same scheme of interpretation, some statement P could be false and someone know that P? — Srap Tasmaner
Is it possible for someone to know that I am at work today, interpreting "I am at work today" the same way I interpret it -- "I" referring to me, and so on -- an interpretation under which it is false? — Srap Tasmaner
Clearly, it cannot be the case that all of these claims are true. — creativesoul
Doing that would require re-categorizing meaning into different kinds. — creativesoul
have already presented you a case, based upon my framework, which you haven't actually considered in light of the framework itself. Rather than doing that, you continue to apply a different framework to the words I'm using. — creativesoul
The above conflates calling something "true" and truth. That is, it conflates belief(statements thereof) and truth. Granting all the rest, it would follow that calling something "true" is subjective. — creativesoul
I wrote:
You have claimed that correspondence is dependent upon meaning.
You have claimed that if something exists it is meaningful.
You have claimed that meaning depends upon interpretation.
You have claimed that meaning depends upon judgment.
Clearly, it cannot be the case that all of these claims are true.
You replied:
I don't see why not. Point to a place where you see inconsistency and I'll explain how you've misinterpreted what I said.
addressed the problem with this phrase "knows that P" in my last post to Srap. Your use involves a category error. — Metaphysician Undercover
When we call something true, "true" has meaning, it refers to something. What it refers to is something subjective (of the subject).
...this is what we call "truth", our agreement as to what constitutes being true.
You say that this is "correspondence", and many agree with you, but not everyone. For those who agree with you, truth is correspondence, and they will use "true" accordingly.
Can one's definitions be wrong? If so, how so? — creativesoul
No, it is not an objective fact that either the world is this way, or it is not this way. The concept of "the world" and the existence of the world, as understood by human beings, is supported by the concept of matter. Aristotle demonstrated that matter is necessarily exempt from the law of excluded middle, which you are employing to produce your so-called "objective fact". This refutes your argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
This interpretation, then, is a kind of selection from among possible, and contingent, meanings. — tim wood
The claim that a text is understood means exactly that the author has been understood (although, to be sure, not always as the author expected!), and nothing else. — tim wood
Now this second "interpretation" is a problem, maybe the problem. It simply is not the same as the first "interpretation." There's a better word: perception. But I think it's a mistake to play word games, here. You have to decide whether you "interpret" reality, or if you perceive it. That is, if reality is a text, you can - one supposes must - interpret it. But the consequence of its being a text is that in itself it has nothing on which to ground it as (a) reality - there is no "it," it's all interpretation! — tim wood
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