So from there to the sovereign individuals and from there quite naturally to the automatic right of the sovereign male to usurp the female body for his own gestation and subsequent pleasure and procreation. the sovereign foetus - ideosynchronicity!

And hence to the idio-cracy of fertility law in 'merca.

It is certainly true that the Greeks valued civic participation and criticized non-participation. Thucydides quotes Pericles' Funeral Oration as saying: "[we] regard... him who takes no part in these [public] duties not as unambitious but as useless" (τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν).[9] However, neither he nor any other ancient author uses the word "idiot" to describe non-participants, or in a derogatory sense; its most common use was simply a private citizen or amateur as opposed to a government official, professional, or expert.[10] The derogatory sense came centuries later, and was unrelated to the political meaning.[11][4][2]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idiot

The Greeks had a word for those who consistently engaged in fallacy, and it wasn’t “philosopher”.

Curious, that you chose such a cooperative resource as Wikipedia.

The citations in Wikipedia come down to one source, that noted resource for etymology, the Australian Journal of Political Science, which is paywalled.

But even if not quite true, it ought be. After all, by your own account, you have not made any statements here. Only thumped your keyboard.

the word "idiot" to describe non-participants, or in a derogatory sense; its most common use was simply a private citizen or amateur as opposed to a government official

Seems similar to the use of 'vulgar' in 18/19C philosophy.

Yes, private persons, the unskilled, laymen and those unconcerned with the state are all idiots. There’s that concern for “our commonality” revealing itself for what it really is.

You are enjoying the change of subject, I see.

Yes, not at all dissimilar.

not my fault. You elicited the response. The force and content animated me.

Is that your fear here? That you will lose your autonomy?

I'm sorry, Nos, I genuinely have been unable to follow what it is you see as problematic, nor have I been able to make sense of your account.

I agree that an ‘act’ (especially speech) involves not only me, and that that condition is not appreciated enough by philosophy. But he is not focused on what we physically do, nor translating anything into “physical terms”, as if what happens in the body matters in our considering something a threat or a promise. Again, we are not talking about actions, but participating in activities, accomplishing their execution. That there are actions, even speech, in a practice, does not mean that describing how the actions happen explicates our practices. The “acts of saying something” is not a breakdown of how saying works, it is how words are deemed to have achieved something, like a statement or an apology—and in this sense, “doing” something.

He is describing how these activities, “acts”, work (or fail)—at all. I do not, for example, intend acts, I conduct them (though some do require deliberateness). I may do my best to make a good (or sufficient) act (say, apology) but whether I do is judged by whether my offering meets the criteria (requirements for identity, completion, failure, etc.) inherent in the living practice of seeking forgiveness. These threshold conditions, measures, mechanics, etc., are the external, the codification of the judgment of others (even to myself); they are the “consequences thereafter” that Austin refers to as separate from the physical (e.g., the illocution, the saying). So the occurrence of the other “understanding” what we say is also a matter of judgment, whether they exhibit what is considered important in being understood in that case, which you actually partly draw out in saying “how one takes the words, uses them, and applies them in his conduct….” This is a demonstration and expression that we understand because these are what understanding consists of.

The Greeks had a word for those who consistently engaged in fallacy, and it wasn’t “philosopher”. — NOS4A2

You are referring, presumably, to the Sophists. Aristotle did criticize their use of logical fallacy but also their misapplication of theory and account to the subject being investigated. Thus observations like the following:

We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions. Accordingly we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put forward in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator. — Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1094b

In the case of your thesis, the subject is unavailable to the reader, a Chesire Cat, grinning derisively from a branch above.

Is there not a traditional distinction between doing things with words and philosophy - a la Wittgenstein - engine idle and being tuned? Hence a book about how to do things with words actually does nothing, except to lay out how best to do whatever one wants to do. That turns out to be rather dangerous, like giving a sharp knife to a toddler.

If I were religious I would reference the Lord dealing with the uppity builders of the tower of Babel.

surely tuning the engine is doing something…?

Even if it’s only making noise.

Well it's doing something, which is saying nothing with words just as tuning an engine is going nowhere in a vehicle, or sharpening a knife is not cutting anything with it. The words, the engine, the knife are idle; while the philosopher, the mechanic and the knife sharpener are busy.

‎

Here, doing nothing with words.

not my fault. You elicited the response. The force and content animated me. — NOS4A2

Oh dear, words did that to you!

I would not have written this unless you had posted; that's all that we need in order to say you elicited this reply. — Banno

For a hyperindividualist like Nosferatu, this is unintelligible.
From his pespective, he didn't do anything, nor did the words he typed do anything; you chose to reply; or well, you replied (somehow, whether by choice or not).
(He does yet have to make his language fully consistent with his hyperindividualism, though.)

It’s becoming more and more clear that people are searching for acts in the text and not in the actor. — NOS4A2

There are two extremes: One is the Skinnerian the-human-as-a-blackbox, stimulus-reaction kind of thinking ("He made me do it, I'm innocent"). The other is "stimulus is irrelevant; it's all up to what a person chooses to do with it" ("Nobody can make you do anything").
Most people typically reside somewhere inbetween.

Philosophy of language in a nutshell: the philosopher drifts from a clear and plain view of the human being into the muddled pursuit of sifting through his expressions.

So how is believing that there is no society working out for you?

So how is believing that there is no society working out for you?

Quite well. Now I concern myself with the rights of flesh-and-blood human beings rather than for the rights of the abstract concepts in my head.

So how is believing that there is no society working out for you? — baker

Framing it that way reminds me of Margaret Thatcher's saying, "society does not exist, only people and their families do." How does one separate such a bold claim of bourgeois supremacy over the functions of the state from the pre-linguistic space where the Sovereign Individual runs its cattle unfettered by the demands others? After all, they use many of the same words.

The word "right" is interesting because it expresses a direct or straight quality as an adjective: "Right on time", for instance. When the term is used as "rights of individuals", the use is all about the boundary between the prerogatives of a common interest and what an individual can preserve against such interests.

The thesis of the OP borrows from that latter use to deny the existence of what gave context for it.

I performed one visible act, did one measurable thing, but you saw two visible acts, or me doing two visible things. So did I really perform two acts, or are you describing the same act in two different ways? — NOS4A2

Suppose you are standing with someone from the Middle East and you notice a man looking towards the two of you. The man flashes the sign, " :up: ". You, being an American, assume that the man is expressing approval; you smile back. The person from the Middle East assumes the man is insulting them; they glare back.

Now the man "performed one visible act, did one measurable thing," but the two people interpreted his act in different ways. If it is safe to assume that one of the two interpretations is correct, and the incorrect interpretation is not stupid, then the visible gesture taken in itself does not explain what the man was doing or communicating. The man was using his hand to communicate, and he was assuming that the two of you had a preconceived notion of what that particular gesture meant. That's how signs work, including words. To make use of a sign is to use a sensible reality to communicate with others. The sign only has meaning because of an implicit agreement between the communicators, and the same sensible reality can have a different meaning in different contexts.

A stock example in the linguistic sphere would be the Spanish speaker who knows a smattering of English and needs a prescription filled while traveling in an English-speaking country. She finds the words on the label, "Take once daily," dutifully consumes 11 pills on the first day, and dies of overdose. A lawsuit may follow, and the intent and meaning behind those markings, "o-n-c-e," will become the object of scrutiny. The single sensible reality has many possible meanings.

Thanks for the explication.

I would add that the meaning is found in the people of your examples, and that any possible meanings of signs is in direct proportion to their language, insofar as they understand it. This would account for the differing interpretations of the same sign.

But I still hold that the intentions and assumptions of the speaker the do not leave the speakers body and travel in the signs to be conveyed to some listener. The listener is faced with the sign only, and it is up to him to provide it some with meaning. The act of understanding a sign, considering it, giving it meaning, and so on, are very important acts in this exchange and I think they have been largely ignored (as far as I know), at least as it pertains to Speech Act Theory.

The listener is faced with the sign only, and it is up to him to provide it some with meaning. The act of understanding a sign, considering it, giving it meaning, and so on, are very important acts in this exchange and I think they have been largely ignored (as far as I know), at least as it pertains to Speech Act Theory. — NOS4A2

Well, it seems to me that the speaker is trying to communicate something to the listener, and the listener is trying to understand something from the speaker, so that both are contributing towards communication. Would you agree with that?

I would agree, but wouldn't this intimate that there are two separate acts taking place, that don't necessarily require each other for pertinence? For example, If i am yelling across a crowd at someone to elicit some action (come to me, go get X, leave this place etc.. ) but they cannot hear me, only one side of the exchange actually obtains, yet my speech act seems to cover off all its requirements to be an act of Speech.

In the converse, I often times "hear" my wife say something specific, that she hasn't said. My brain has filled in based on some previously noted house-bound noises, that my wife was talking, and in fact calculated what she's likely to be saying. OFten, it transpires she was about it - but in fact hasn't - made a speech act - yet my side of the exchange obtains regardless.

I've not gotten in to this discussion much, so hopefully this isn't entirely pedestrian or uncouth.

I would agree, but wouldn't this intimate that there are two separate acts taking place, that don't necessarily require each other for pertinence? For example, If i am yelling across a crowd at someone to elicit some action (come to me, go get X, leave this place etc.. ) but they cannot hear me, only one side of the exchange actually obtains, yet my speech act seems to cover off all its requirements to be an act of Speech. — AmadeusD

Your speech act doesn't cover all of its requirements under speech act theory. There are two possibilities I see here:

You yell across the crowd at someone. They're unaware of you, and since they don't hear you, they remain unaware. The perlocutionary force as intended by the illocution fizzles out. No effect at all. The speech act remains incomplete.

You yell acroos the crowd at someone. They're aware of you, but can't hear you. Maybe they yell back, "what?" (and you can't hear them either, but you're able to guess based on visual cues). In that case the perlocutionary force doesn't bring you the expected effect, which makes the illocution unsuccessful.

In both cases, what's complete is the utterance.

Note that I have no idea if actual adherents of Speech Act theory would agree to my interpretation here. But an act in an actual situation can be re-defined, like when you accidentally insult someone and apologise. By the time you apologise you acknowledge that your speech act was an insult (or you're going through the motions); you didn't intend to make an insult. Conversly, you might intend an insult but your interlocutor doesn't notice. Double down on the insult, or try to hide you intended one?

Typical speech acts are ideals and might be useful in analysing real-life situation.

So:

In the converse, I often times "hear" my wife say something specific, that she hasn't said. My brain has filled in based on some previously noted house-bound noises, that my wife was talking, and in fact calculated what she's likely to be saying. OFten, it transpires she was about it - but in fact hasn't - made a speech act - yet my side of the exchange obtains regardless. — AmadeusD

So, yes, here you have a speech act you can describe in detail according to the theory, but once you find out that your wife hasn't spoken, all that description does is tell you which specific speech act didn't take place.

If you're going to use Speech Act Theory to analyse empirical situations, you'll need a theory how ideal-type speech acts relate to real speech acts. (Above statements imply some sort of theory, but I haven't quite worked it out - I just supply a potential analysis.)

A speech act has actually three components; a speaker, a hearer, and a set of rules that both of them expect the other to know. Those rules have no existence independent of the speaker/hearer, and needn't be the same for the speaker and hearer. They just have to be compatible to a high-enough degree to let situations in which speech acts occurs unravel to the satisfaction of either participant.

A non-linguistic example would be buying and selling. If you sell something, that implies that someone else bought something. It's a feature of the buying-selling transaction. Selling can't complete without buying also completing, and buying can't commence unless selling also commences. Speech acts aren't always like this, but they often are:

"Telling someone about something," isn't complete unless the hearer receives the information, for example. (The relevant technical term, I believe, is Felicity Conditions: the conditions a speech act needs to meet to be completed.)

I would agree, but wouldn't this intimate that there are two separate acts taking place, that don't necessarily require each other for pertinence? — AmadeusD

I don't think I would use the word "pertinence." If a speaker knows that someone is not listening, then he will not speak; and if a listener knows that someone is not speaking,* then he will not listen. So at the very least the purpose of either act fails without the other.

* For example, if someone begins lecturing, or mumbling, or shifts into a mode of monologue that is not directed at their interlocutor in any relevant way. Or if someone is pondering out loud and another person begins to interact with their speech, they may say, "Oh, never mind that, I was just thinking out loud. I wasn't talking to you." So apparently here there is a difference between using vocal words and addressing someone, where the words may or may not be addressed to another.

Framing it that way reminds me of Margaret Thatcher's saying, "society does not exist, only people and their families do." How does one separate such a bold claim of bourgeois supremacy over the functions of the state from the pre-linguistic space where the Sovereign Individual runs its cattle unfettered by the demands others? After all, they use many of the same words.

The word "right" is interesting because it expresses a direct or straight quality as an adjective: "Right on time", for instance. When the term is used as "rights of individuals", the use is all about the boundary between the prerogatives of a common interest and what an individual can preserve against such interests.

The thesis of the OP borrows from that latter use to deny the existence of what gave context for it. — Paine

Indeed, from other posts by the OP, I kept in mind that he thinks that society does not exist, in the Thatcherian sense.

This is relevant, because one's political and sociological outlook will also shape one's theory of communication. For a (neo)liberal hyperindividualist, when two people appear to direct utterances at eachother, something else is going on than what a more traditionalist person might think goes on in such a situation. Examples of this abound in the way the OP talks about or explains the charges against Trump in the Trump thread.

But I still hold that the intentions and assumptions of the speaker the do not leave the speakers body and travel in the signs to be conveyed to some listener. The listener is faced with the sign only, and it is up to him to provide it some with meaning. The act of understanding a sign, considering it, giving it meaning, and so on, are very important acts in this exchange and I think they have been largely ignored (as far as I know), at least as it pertains to Speech Act Theory. — NOS4A2

No, they have not been ignored; if anything, they have been taken for granted, on account of taking for granted that people do not exist in a vacuum and that communication is not a solipsistic enterprise.

Various theories of communication assume that communicators have a shared cultural and linguistic foundation, and that they have a concept of this shared foundation.

You, on the other hand, appear to be interested in an (hyper)individualistic theory of communication in which no such assumption as above is made.

Language is shared, and cannot be privatised. The thread is all about claiming the right to join the community of communicators while repudiating any responsibility or commitment to said community to put any value on honest and truthful communication. A special word has been coined for the proper community response to this immoral and illegitimate move — "de-platforming". In olden days we used to call it "sending to Coventry" presumably because Coventry was unspeakably awful. No one can, or should even try, to have a serious discourse with one who does not commit to making sense and speaking the truth as far as they are able. — unenlightened

But things have changed. We are now living in the modern age of hyperindividualism and practical solipsism.