If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic
If you don't believe in free will, then you can't intentionally fulfill your obligation, it's just happenstance — QuixoticAgnostic
but if you truly believe its not your choice, then you can't claim praise or blame — QuixoticAgnostic
Well, if there is free will, then you're wrong. Obligations is another matter. But the choice is still the result of free will. It can't not be the result of free will if you have free will. Every time you reaffirm your belief that there is no free will is an act of free will. You are still taking agency, whatever you do. You can't not.D. If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic
D. If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic
Firstly, A-D are all presupposing certain axiological claims that I would completely reject. For example, A and B are false. What matters is relative to values; and values are subjective and relative (e.g., if one values truth, then it absolutely matters if one believes that they have free will even when they don’t). — Bob Ross
Expand on this, if you would, because the implications of lacking free will make it clear to me that we can't hold any real (free) value in something like truth.
Starting with B, surely valuing truth implies avoiding error, and perhaps some sort of pride or otherwise virtue in comporting with reality. But, such a value implies we have the power to "avoid" error, i.e., we have a certain freedom to do otherwise
we can not value our belief in the truth of this proposition, because we could not avoid erring.
So there is nothing to lose for believing in free will, and, by C, everything to gain (which is where the parallel to Pascal's Wager comes in, even though they don't function on exactly the same principles).
is that if one has no free will (whatsoever), then there is no accountability — Bob Ross
How? If they accept sourcehood freedom? Is that not different from choice, or do you speak of leeway freedom, in which case I ask again, how does one choose if they can't do otherwise?...one cannot do otherwise but they can choose
I don't deny that one can value (or at least define values such that it is possible) under hard incompatibilism. However, notice I claimed we couldn't hold any value "freely", not just that we couldn't have values.one cannot do otherwise and they cannot choose; however, this does not negate the fact that they have values
And this is just an unsubstantiated claim. I ask again: how is it possible to "try to avoid" without being able to "choose" or "do otherwise"? Are these all diffferent things? If so, you have to explain how they're different, you can't just assert that "no, this doesn't mean that" and be done with it.One can try to avoid error without having the ability to do otherwise nor to choose: this is just a non-sequitur.
There's no probability in this argument, there's no numerical "cost-benefit analysis". It simply claims that if you value truth, and additionally, you value "ownership", i.e. "free control", over your beliefs, then the only way these two values are satiated occurs if you believe in free will. I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value.Pascal’s wager is a bad argument, because it renders the probability of the consequence occurring omissible when, in fact, it is the most critical factor for analysis.
firstly, that in every act of willing there is, first of all, a multiplicity of feelings, namely, the feeling of the condition away from which, a feeling of the condition towards which, the feeling of this "away" and "towards" themselves, then again, an accompanying muscular feeling which comes into play through some kind of habit, without our putting our "arms and legs" into motion, as soon as we "will.". . . — Vaskane
How? If they accept sourcehood freedom? Is that not different from choice, or do you speak of leeway freedom, in which case I ask again, how does one choose if they can't do otherwise?
There's no probability in this argument, there's no numerical "cost-benefit analysis".. I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value
It simply claims that if you value truth, and additionally, you value "ownership", i.e. "free control", over your beliefs, then the only way these two values are satiated occurs if you believe in free will
I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value.
So let me ask you this to further the discussion: why do you value truth?
Will you argue that reasons for valuations don't matter, because so long as one just so happens to value truth, the argument is defeated?
You are judging a determinist from the libertarian point of view.
So calling someone irrational for doing what they were predetermined to does not make sense.
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