Almost certainly; I've not read much Witty, but my understanding is that his 'objects' covers all objects that other theories, respectively, exclude - i.e abstract, physical, mental ... all objects.

Post 5

In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.

We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.

Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”

Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.

Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.

“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color.

Post 6

Wittgenstein’s reasoning was that if I assert that “Plato was a philosopher,” I know what I mean. But who is Plato and what is a philosopher? If we try to answer the questions, the questions may be open to more questions. Therefore, the process of analysis might go on and on without resolution. Wittgenstein believed that the process of analysis must come to an end (Nb p. 46), but what is that end? The end for Wittgenstein, as stated in the Tractatus and the Notebooks, are elementary propositions made up of names, “…which will correspond to... simple objects (Nb p. 61).” The point is that even though Wittgenstein was unable to give examples of names and objects (names being simple signs, and simple objects being the basic substance of the world), he believed that logic dictated that this is how it must be. Wittgenstein believed that the idea of a simple is already contained in the idea of a complex and the idea of an analysis (Nb. p. 60). For us to say things about the world, our statements must come in direct contact with the world. This is accomplished via names. “A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” And, although Wittgenstein was unable to carry out the analysis completely, he was sure that this is how it must be. Of course, we remember that Wittgenstein inherited many of these ideas from Frege and Russell, which provided the impetus for his logic.

In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.

We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.

Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”

Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.

Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.

“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color. — Sam26

This is a good write up, and I think you're on to something. I think that Witt's concept of object is heavily influenced by Russell, and Russell was heavily influenced by Mach.

Russell's position during the early 1900s was neutral monism which stems from the work of Ernst Mach. The neutral monism of Mach postulated reality as being composed of elements; these elements were: colors, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, etc.

“As to the sum of my physical findings, these I can analyse into what are at present unanalysable elements: colors, sounds, pressures, temperatures, smells, spaces, times, and so on. These elements depend both of external and internal circumstances; when the latter are involved, and only then, we may call these elements sensations…” (KE, 7).

These elements built up into ‘complexes’ or ‘bodies’ and those complexes which are “relatively more fixed and permanent...engrave [themselves] in memory, and express [themselves] in language” (AS).

I think that this is what Wittgenstein is going for.

"Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.0251).

Objects, give complexes their form, and their material properties. It would be senseless to say they themselves have the property, it is only in the instantiation within the complex that these properties are manifested. This is why Wittgenstein says: “The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties.

A fact, that “my car is black” is first presented in the proposition which pictures it, but that my car is black is dependent upon a certain arrangement of elements which give it the form of being both a car, and black.

Thanks for the compliment. As for Russell being influenced by Mach, I agree. The physicist and philosopher Ernst Mack did influence Russell's work, especially his early work.

Wittgenstein's objects are not physical objects, they are analytical.

In the Notebooks he says:

Let us assume that every spatial object consists of infinitely many points, then it is clear that I cannot mention all these by name when I speak of that object. Here then would be a case in which I cannot arrive at the complete analysis in the old sense at all; and perhaps just this is the usual case.

He asks:

Is it, A PRIORI, clear that in analyzing we must arrive at simple components - is this, e.g., involved in the concept of analysis-, or is analysis ad infinitum possible?-Or is there in the end even a third possibility?

And in response:

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.

But:

And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing.

(NB 17.6.15)

Whether things in the world are infinitely divisible is left open. His investigation is logical. To the question raised above as to whether we must arrive at simple components or ad infinitum analysis, his answer is a third possibility.

The simple thing for us is: the simplest thing that we are acquainted with.--The simplest thing which our analysis can attain-it need appear only as a protopicture, as a variable in our propositions-that is the simple thing that we mean and look for.

(11.5.15)

Wittgenstein's concern is propositional analysis, not physical analysis.

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

(17.6.15)

We do not have to dissect a frog to make sense of the proposition: "The frog jumps". In this proposition the frog is a simple object. If, however, the proposition was about the nervous system of a frog, the name 'frog' would not serve as a simple name.

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.

(18.6.15)

When he says that no further division is possible, this is because we have arrived at the simple propositional names, not at some imagined indivisible entities. Wittgenstein's simples are not Democrates' atoms. Further division is superfluous because it would not make better sense of the proposition.

Wittgenstein's simples are not Democrates' atoms. Further division is superfluous because it would not make better sense of the proposition. — Fooloso4

While I believe that a lot of what you said is true, I don't believe that its exhaustive of Witt's view in the Tractatus. In a sense, an object is both logical and physical.

You're right, Wittgenstein's endeavor is a logical one, not a scientific one, but Witt holds:

1. Logic tells us there must be logically simple objects
2. To these objects corresponds a definite atomic fact.
3. To each atomic fact corresponds a definite state of affairs

"Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (Tract, 4.2211)

"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality" (2.06).

I think Witts thoughts are more like this:

Consider the fact: "The ball is red". This fact can itself be analyzed into atomic facts, these facts would be about 1. the ball and 2. the color red. An atomic fact is a definite arrangement of objects.

"The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact" (2.0272).
"In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way" (2.031).

What does this mean? Well, what is a ball?

Just a quick google says: " a solid or hollow spherical or egg-shaped object"

okay, well what is "solid", "hollow" "spherical"?

Trying to define these words simply results in synonyms. This is because in some sense, these concepts are simple. We learn them not by definition, but ostensively. "Red" is the same, not something that can be taken to pieces by a definition so to speak. You either know what it is or you don't. These are objects. So, "The ball" is an arrangement of objects both logically and spatiotemporally. Logically its sphericalness that has either firmness or hollowedness. To this corresponds a definite complex in space - a ball - which depending on whether it is solid or hollow exists a certain resistance to pressures in a sphere form which obviously corresponds to a definite arrangement of atoms.

I think this way you get both the logical aspect of Witt's thought with the indefinable aspect of logically simple objects as well as their tie to reality.

Truthfully, though, I am still wrestling with this so I could be wrong.

"The ball" is an arrangement of objects both logically and spatiotemporally. — 013zen

If the ball is an arrangement of objects then it is composite. Objects cannot be composite. (2.021)

If the ball is an arrangement of objects then it is composite. — Fooloso4

It is composite. The ball is not a wittgensteinian object. It is made up of Wittgensteinian objects.

That's what I said.

"solid", "hollow" "spherical" — 013zen

are objects.

Sorry, you lost me. The passage you quoted:

"Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (Tract, 4.2211) — 013zen

Might seem to support that there are, independent of us, simple objects that combine to make the physical world. I have sometimes read it that way, but I think that is wrong. One problem is that if such objects are non-material, then how do non-material objects combine to make material objects?

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

Logical space is the space of what is possible. The facts in logical space are not the facts in physical space. The facts in physical space is a subset of the facts in logical space.

If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.

(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.)

(2.0121)

The passage you quoted:...might seem to support that there are, independent of us, simple objects that combine to make the physical world. I have sometimes read it that way, but I think that is wrong. One problem is that if such objects are non-material, then how do non-material objects combine to make material objects? — Fooloso4

I'm sorry, I don't entirely follow. To my understanding, the Tractatus essentially sets up an isomorphism between thought, language, and possible/actual reality.


Thoughts>Concepts>Simple concepts
Propositions>Expressions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts>objects

"We make for ourselves pictures of facts. The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and on-existence of atomic facts" (2.1-2.1).

"The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space" (2.202 ).

"The logical picture of the facts is the thought" (3).

"The picture is a model of reality" (2.12).

"Every part of a proposition which characterizes its sense I call an expression (a symbol). (The proposition itself is an expression.) Expressions are everything essential for the sense of the
proposition that propositions can have in common with one another. An expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31).

To an object corresponds a name, to which corresponds a simple concept which is indefinable or analyzable. These build up to form complex concepts, "classical objects" which are characterized by a "form and content" and are what different propositions have in common. For example, when I used the example "The ball is red" earlier, "ball" is simply the general form and content of particular objects which can have wildly different properties. It's only in the coupling of concepts in thoughts and propositions that objects are vested with properties "The ball IS red", and these map to possible states of affairs.

I could be wrong about this however. But, I don't see the issue that you're referring to.

I don't see the issue that you're referring to. — 013zen

What is at issue is the relationship between Wittgenstein's indivisible propositional 'objects' and the objects we find in the world. The question of whether there are indivisible objects that make up the world. In the Notebooks he says:

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.

(NB 17.6.15)

You said:

In a sense, an object is both logical and physical. — 013zen

But Tractarian objects are not physical:

... only by the configuration of objects that they [physical objects] are produced.

(2.0231)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

(2.027)

An expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31). — 013zen

A couple a points on the content of a proposition:

A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.

(3.13)

All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false.

(6.111)

We cannot infer the content of the world from the form of a proposition.

Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.

(3.221)

We cannot say what the objects of the world are. From the Notebooks:

Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one.

(21.6.15)

To my understanding, the Tractatus essentially sets up an isomorphism between thought, language, and possible/actual reality. — 013zen

It is isomorphic. That is, language and the world have the same underlying logical form. It is this form that makes it possible to say anything true or false about the world. But this says nothing about the content.

Post 7

Wittgenstein wasn’t blind to the fact that he was unable to give examples of objects. He says for example, “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 68).” For whatever reason Wittgenstein suppresses his doubts and proceeds with his analysis.

I’ll try to define objects as I see them, i.e., based on, I believe, a reasonable interpretation. Let me say first that you don’t need to have a perfect understanding of names or objects to have a clear understanding of the general ideas of the Tractatus, this seems obvious. You can be wrong about this or that interpretation (within reason) and still have a clear picture of most of his ideas.

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language.

Second, being subsistent in the case of objects, means their reality is not contingent on any observation or linguistic description. This implies that their existence is objective, which is the case with atomic and complex facts.

Third, objects are unchanging or unalterable.

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality).

Fifth, the implications of all this are closely related to the limits of language. Objects represent all that can be meaningfully said about reality. Why? Because combinations of objects represent every possible state of affairs. They are the building blocks of reality.

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language. — Sam26

I have recently come to the opposite conclusion as can be seen in my post above and subsequent exchange with @013zen.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects. The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'.

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

(Notebooks 17.6.15)

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with these statements.

The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects — Fooloso4

I might argue over the wording of this, i.e., the analysis of language brings us to names, the smallest component of an elementary proposition. Names correspond to objects, which make up atomic facts. A proposition is a picture, according to Witt, its "...end-points [names]... actually touch the object (T. 2.1521), like a measure laid against reality (T. 2.1512). Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality.

The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'. — Fooloso4

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality.

But Tractarian objects are not physical:

... only by the configuration of objects that they [physical objects] are produced.
(2.0231)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.
(2.027) — Fooloso4

You quote 2.0231, but let's look at the entire quote:

"The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions first formed by the configuration of the objects" (2.0231).

Wittgenstein says that "material properties" are determined by "the configuration of objects". This neither implies that:

1. objects are not physical
nor that
2. the configuration of objects makes something physical.

Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. But, notice that Witt is talking about 1. propositions and 2. objects; each of these corresponds to a different aspect of the isomorphism. One, at the level of language and two at the level of reality.

Thoughts>Concepts>Simple concepts
Propositions>Expressions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts>objects — 013zen

Witt is saying that a material property, such as a particular ball being red is expressed at the level of the proposition "The ball is red". To this proposition corresponds a definite arrangement of objects in the physical world which determines that the ball is red. If the arrangement of objects were different, the ball could very well be a different color, more or less firm, or perhaps not a ball at all.

We cannot say what the objects of the world are. From the Notebooks:

Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one.
(21.6.15) — Fooloso4

Correct. This is why I said originally that your post was correct, but I didn't believe it was exhaustive of Witt's view. Witt arrives at the necessity of objects through a logical analysis. He is a philosopher not a scientist. Recall Witt says:

"...there must be objects and atomic facts" (4.2211).

This is because:

"Objects form the substance of the world" (2.021).

and

"If the world had no substance...It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false) (2.0211-2.0212) .


---Edit---

I accidentally submitted the post before I was finished. I'll leave it at that for further discussion, but the end may not be so clear due to me having originally intended to say more lol

If I understand you correctly, I agree.

The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'.
— Fooloso4

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality. — Sam26

I agree with Sam..."Plato" is not a simple object. Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. Things such as his mortality, his being a man, his being a philosopher, his being bipedal, etc. A simple object can only be named, not analyzed further. Wittgenstein might say it has no "parts" to which we can take it to pieces, so to speak. Yet, Plato can be taken to many pieces, as illustrated.

Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality. — Sam26

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality.

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26

How do you interpret the passage I quoted?

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

On the same day he says:

Now, however, it seems to be a legitimate question: Are-e.g.- spatial objects composed of simple parts; in analysing them, does one arrive at parts that cannot be further analysed, or is this not the case?

and:

It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the WORLD must consist of elements. And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be definite. Or in other words, what vacillates is our determinations, not the world. It looks as if to deny things were as much as to say that the world can, as it were, be indefinite in some such sense as that in which our knowledge is uncertain and indefinite.

and:

All I want is only for my meaning to be completely analysed!

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26

I misspoke. I agree that proposition consist of names not objects, but Plato is both the object meant and the name of that object. When we talk about Plato isn't the meaning of who we are talking about clear? What further analysis is necessary? Does the meaning become clearer when we talk about Plato's eyes and hair or some other components of him?

Notice in your quote:

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

Those are objects "in the original sense" i.e. these are complex entities which we normally refer to as objects. These are not objects in the Tractarian sense. This notebook entry was written while Witt was thinking through his ideas which would become the Tractatus. That he even goes through the trouble of pointing out that he is using the word objects here "in the original sense" shows he's already thinking about a stipulative usage of the word that's different than the every day sense.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. — Fooloso4

Norman Malcolm asked Wittgenstein for an example of a simple object, and he records Witt's response in his memoir.

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70).

Wittgenstein arrived at the conclusion that there must be simple objects through logical analysis. What those objects turn out to be is a question for science.

"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word philosophy must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.)" (4.111).

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality. — Fooloso4

Every proposition (true or false) presents a picture of a possible state of affairs. If the picture matches the facts (state of affairs) of reality, then it's true, if not it's false. Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem.

"When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense (Nb. p. 63)."

I'd have to do a careful reading of the preceding pages but keep in mind that the Tractatus is the final arbiter of how to interpret propositions and facts. The Notebooks are not the complete story, the Tractatus is. That's not to say that it's not important, it's just that he's working through these ideas in the Notebooks. Besides I'm not sure I see your point.

I'm trying to give an accurate presentation for people to read. I don't want to get sidetracked with every little disagreement with you. I only say this so I can focus on my goal. If you want to present a different interpretation that's fine, but don't be surprised if I don't respond. I'm not always going to be correct with every nuanced word, but I think I can give an accurate overall interpretation.

Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. — 013zen

When he says that is that it is only by the configuration of objects that material are produced, he does not distinguish between the production of material properties in general and the precise material properties of particulars. It is only by the configuration of object that material properties are formed. Objects do not have material properties.

Those are objects "in the original sense" — 013zen

Right, and the proposition requires no further division for it to make sense.

Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. — 013zen

Take the proposition: Plato is a man. In our analysis of this proposition do we arrive at the tautological proposition: this man is a man? Is man a part of the man? Does an analysis go from the more general to the more specific or the more specific to the more general? Which is more simple? Is man a part of Plato or is Plato a part of man?

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70). — 013zen

That supports what I have been saying. His concern is with propositions and meaning. Whether this thing, Plato, is a simple or complex thing is not his concern. We know who Plato is and further analysis is not necessary.

For him objects are merely formal. Whether or not there are such things in the world was not his concern.

My goal is to explain, as simply as I can, the main thrust of his work, and to point out that Wittgenstein’s later thinking, on the logic of language, is a continuation of his early thinking with some important changes. What changes is his method of attacking the problems of language, and what Wittgenstein means by the logic of language changes. — Sam26

This is interesting. I actually share this view, although I will admit that I am far more knowledgeable about the Tractatus. But, from what I have read in the LE and PI I also feel that the two works are essentially saying the same thing - or rather, presenting the same problem from a different perspective. So, naturally, nothing really changes, except perhaps how we are talking about the problem.

Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem. — Sam26

The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world.

Besides I'm not sure I see your point. — Sam26

The point is that the analysis of a proposition is to determine its sense. If this means to arrive at the relationship between the names of simple objects then we never complete an analyse of propositions.

I'll answer some of this as I continue.

Take the proposition: Plato is a man. In our analysis of this proposition do we arrive at the tautological proposition: this man is a man? Is man a part of the man? Does an analysis go from the more general to the more specific or the more specific to the more general? Which is more simple? Is man a part of Plato or is Plato a part of man? — Fooloso4

Two things:

1. I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition.

Witt says of analysis that:

"Every statement about complexes can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes" (2.0201).

2. In the sentence "Plato is a man", Plato is a definite description, not an object.

But, I actually think you pointed out something that corrected my previous way of thinking, so thank you.

The relationship goes more like:

Thoughts>Concepts
Propositions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts (objects)

I believe that

"Socrates is a man" analyzes into:

∀x[Fx]


But, let me read a bit more and I'll comment more later. Thanks for the direction!

I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition. — 013zen

This begs the question of what stands as a completely analysed proposition. What functions as a name?

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.
(18.6.15) — Fooloso4

What determines a simple thing is that which yields definite sense. I think that holding on to the picture of elementary objects as the building block of the world (@Sam26 )misleads us. Wittgenstein's investigation is in "logical space" (1.13) not physical space.

Thanks for the direction! — 013zen

Now we can be lost together!

Post 8

I will continue with a few more remarks. All of this is still under the second main proposition of the Tractatus.

“What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. For example, “The Earth has one moon,” Is a state of affairs. The proposition represents a picture of a fact. A fact is something real, not imagined. The two parts of complex facts are atomic facts and the objects that make up atomic facts. These things (things in the normal sense) are real for Wittgenstein. “Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real.

Philosophers going back to Augustine have believed that names, in the normal use of the word, refer to objects (objects in this sense are things like chairs, pencils, cars, etc.). Wittgenstein develops this idea into his theory of names and objects. Of course, his idea of names and objects is much different from what philosophers traditionally meant, at least up to Frege, Russell, and maybe a few others.

“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true (T. 2.0111). In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false) (T. 2.0212).” Pictures, of course, are sketched by propositions, and names are the smallest component of propositions. The names within a proposition refer to objects in the world. All propositions for Wittgenstein are logical pictures. A picture presents a form, i.e., the arrangement of the elements of the picture, and the “…elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (T. 2.131).”

So, the form of a proposition, which is the arrangement of the elements of a picture (made up of names), must match the form of a fact, which is made up of the arrangement of the objects. “There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all (T. 2.161). What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form (T. 2.17). A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc (T. 2.171).”

All propositions have a sense, and that sense is represented by its pictorial form. Whether that sense is representative of reality depends on whether its logical form matches the logical form of reality. The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. This must be for us to understand the sense of false propositions or pictures that do not match reality.

“A picture represents its subject [the subject being the possibility of the existence of a fact] from a position outside it (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly (T. 2.173). A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form [a picture presents or shows its form] (T. 2.174).”

Now we can be lost together! — Fooloso4

This is why we do philosophy, after all. :)

This begs the question of what stands as a completely analysed proposition. What functions as a name? — Fooloso4

So, we know that facts/propositions are analyzed into atomic facts/elementary propositions. Regarding their structure Witt says:

"It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination" (4.221).
"The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (2.032).

So, we learn that elementary propositions have a structure which is names in immediate combinations.
But, how do we know when we have reached the end of our analysis and gotten to the objects?

Well, Witt says:

"Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.

The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of
the object.

The object is simple" (2.014 - 2.02 )

I believe what he is saying is simply this: In order to determine if a sign is signifying a simple object or a complex object, you simply have to ask "Can this name appear in an atomic fact?" You know that you have the proper form for an object if its possible for it to occur in one. This is what is meant by it being simple.

What do I mean by this? Well, Witt. says

"The names are the simple symbols, I indicate them by single letters (x, y, z). The elementary proposition I write as function of the names, in the form:

'fx', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc.

Or

I indicate it by the letters p, q, r" (4.24).

So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here.

Your original question:

Plato is a man — Fooloso4

should analyze into:

fx or more clearly F(x)

with F being "man" and x being "Plato".

This has the structure of objects in "immediate combination". In fact, we can now clearly see what Witt says that:

"The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (2.032).

Because:

"[He] conceives [of] the proposition like Frege and Russell as a function of the expressions contained in it" (3.318 ).

He believes that proper analysis results in you culling the excess and superfluous aspects of a proposition, resulting in two things:

1. Only those things which are logically necessary for the meaning of the proposition (These are the objects)
2. The form that the proposition is instantiating.

"A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental are the features which are due to a particular way of producing the propositional sign. Essential are those which alone enable the proposition to express its sense" (3.34).

So, what do we learn by analyzing "Plato is a man" into "F(x)"? Well, what does "F(x)" mean?

Witt says:

"For 'fa' says the same as (∃x) . fx . x = a" (5.47).

"(∃x) . fx . x = a"

Says: There exists at least one x that satisfies the function f(x), and "a" is that "x".

Or whatever is meant by the concept "man" at least one thing falls under it, and "Plato" is that thing.

Witt says as much in 5.471-5.4711.

"The general form of proposition is the essence of proposition. To give the essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world."

So, the relation contained in the original expression is just that of a Function and input. So these are the names that correspond to our objects, perhaps. Witt does say:

"One could therefore say the real name is that which all symbols, which signify an object, have in common. It would then follow, step by step, that no sort of composition was essential for a
name" (3.3411).